Woodard v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 6/1/15. (MRR )

FILED
2015 Jun-01 AM 11:41
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MONICA M. WOODARD,
o/b/o M.K.M.B.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case Number 2:14-cv-643-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff M.K.M.B., a minor child born in 1998, filed an application for supplemental
security income (“SSI”) by and through her step-mother, Monica Woodard, on March 16,
2011. Upon review of the record, the submissions of the parties, and the relevant law, the
court is of the opinion that the Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on March 16, 2011. (R. 60.)1 Her application was
denied by the Social Security Administration [“SSA”], (R. 61), and plaintiff subsequently
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge [“ALJ”], which was held on March
5, 2013, (R. 29). After the hearing, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 23.) In
light of this finding, the ALJ denied plaintiff’s request for SSI on April 12, 2013. (R. 24.)

Reference to a document number, (“Doc.___”), refers to the number assigned to each
document as it is filed in the court’s record. References to page numbers in the
Commissioner’s record are set forth as (“R.___”).
1

On May 3, 2013, plaintiff petitioned the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s
decision, (R. 5), and on February 20, 2014, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request
for review, thereby rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security, (R. 1). Following denial of review by the Appeals Council, plaintiff filed an
appeal in this court on April 9, 2014. (Doc. 1.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act, this court “is limited to an
inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Wilson v. Barnhart,
284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir.
1988). The court gives deference to factual findings and reviews questions of law de novo.
Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). The court “may not decide the
facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner];
rather the court must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))
(internal quotations and other citation omitted). “The Commissioner’s factual findings are
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1221 (citing Martin,
894 F.2d at 1529; Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987)). “Substantial evidence
is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as

2

adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178
(11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Conclusions of law made by the Commissioner are reviewed de novo. Cornelius, 936
F.2d at 1145. “[N]o . . . presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] conclusions
of law.” Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982).
III. DISCUSSION
A. THE THREE-STEP EVALUATION
The definition of child's SSI disability provides that a claimant under the age of
eighteen shall be considered disabled if the claimant has a medically determinable physical
or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which
can be expected to result in death, or which has lasted, or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). The Regulations
define the statutory standard of "marked and severe functional limitations" in terms of
"listing-level severity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.902, 416.906, 416.924(a), 416.926a(a); see also 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (the listings). The Commissioner has developed a specific
sequential evaluation process for determining whether a child claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.924.

3

1. Substantial Gainful Employment
First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in
“substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b).2 If the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled,
regardless of the claimant’s medical condition or her age, education, and work experience.
20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b).
The ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
March 16, 2011, the application date. (R. 14.)

2

The Regulations define “substantial gainful activity”:
(a) Substantial work activity. Substantial work activity is work activity
that involves doing significant physical or mental activities. Your work
may be substantial even if it is done on a part-time basis or if you do
less, get paid less, or have less responsibility than when you worked
before.
(b) Gainful work activity. Gainful work activity is work activity that
you do for pay or profit. Work activity is gainful if it is the kind of work
usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.
(c) Some other activities. Generally, we do not consider activities like
taking care of yourself, household tasks, hobbies, therapy, school
attendance, club activities, or social programs to be substantial gainful
activity.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1572.
4

2. Severe Impairments
At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically
determinable impairment that is “severe” or a combination of impairments that is “severe.”
20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). For an individual who has not attained the age of 18, a medically
determinable impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it is a slight
abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that causes no more than minimal
functional limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). If the claimant does not have a severe
medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, he is not disabled.
The ALJ determined that plaintiff had severe impairments of “post traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) [and] depressive disorder not otherwise specified.” (R. 14.)
3. The Listings
If a child claimant is not working and has a severe impairment, the ALJ must
determine if the child’s impairments meet or medically equal an impairment in the listings.
20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)-(d). If the child’s impairments do not meet or medically equal a listed
impairment, the ALJ must then determine if the child's impairments are functionally
equivalent in severity to a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.924(d), 416.926a(a). For the
child's impairments to functionally equal a listed impairment, the child's impairments must
result in "marked" limitations in two domains of functioning or an "extreme" limitation in
one domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). The ALJ considers the child's functioning in terms of
six domains: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3)

5

interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring
for yourself; and (6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1).
A child has a “marked” limitation in a domain when her impairment(s) “interferes
seriously” with the ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. A child’s
day-to-day functioning may be seriously limited when the impairment(s) limits only one
activity or when the interactive and cumulative effects of the impairment(s) limit several
activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2). A child has an “extreme” limitation in a domain when
her impairment(s) interferes “very seriously” with the ability to independently initiate,
sustain, or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3).
The ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled a listing or that functionally equaled a listing. (R.
14.)
B. MS. WOODARD’S CLAIMS
Plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ did not properly consider all medical evidence in
determining plaintiff’s severe impairments, (2) the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff did not meet
listing 112.08 is unsupported by substantial evidence, (3) the ALJ did not properly consider
the evidence in determining whether plaintiff’s condition functionally equaled a listing under
the domains of interacting and relating with others and attending and completing tasks, and
(4) the ALJ ignored the medical opinion of Dr. Jon Rogers without providing a sufficient

6

explanation. (Doc. 11.) Upon reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, the court finds that
the Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed.
1. Determination of Plaintiff’s Severe Impairments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not treating plaintiff’s bipolar disorder as a
severe impairment. (Doc. 11 at 12.) Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s failure to discuss
plaintiff’s bipolar disorder shows that the ALJ failed to thoroughly evaluate the evidence of
record. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff’s bipolar disorder to be a nonsevere
impairment, stating that Dr. Jon Williamson ruled out bipolar disorder in 2006, that he noted
that plaintiff had “Bipolar Disorder, by history” in 2011, and that a therapist reported that
plaintiff was “displaying classic bipolar behavior, but did not specifically diagnose bipolar
disorder.” (R. 14.)
Plaintiff contends that additional evidence shows that she was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder. (Doc. 11 at 12.) For example, on both July 25, 2006 and March 15, 2007, Cynthia
Fuller, a certified registered nurse practitioner (“CRNP”) operating Harmony, LLC in
collaboration with Dr. Jon Williamson, wrote “Bipolar I” in her medical notes, (R. 239, 287),
and Dr. Williamson acknowledged that plaintiff “was previously diagnosed with Bipolar
Disorder,” and stated that “[t]he patient has been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder and placed
on Lamictal, Wellbutrin and Catapress at various times in the past,” (R. 343).
While defendant is correct that the notes taken by Cynthia Fuller do not establish an
impairment, since a CRNP is not an acceptable medical source whose opinions may provide

7

evidence to establish the existence of an impairment, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a), Dr.
Williamson’s statements show that plaintiff received a valid diagnosis for bipolar disorder,
although that diagnosis does not appear to be in the record. As defendant argues, however,
a valid diagnosis does not establish limitations from the impairment. (Doc. 12 at 5); see
Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he mere existence of these
impairments does not reveal the extent to which they limit her ability to work or undermine
the ALJ's determination in that regard.”). Furthermore, “even if the ALJ erred in not
indicating whether [a condition] was a severe impairment, the error was harmless because
the ALJ concluded that [the claimant] had a severe impairment: and that finding is all that
step two requires.” Heatly v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 382 F. App'x 823, 824-25 (11th Cir. 2010).
"Nothing requires that the ALJ must identify, at step two, all of the impairments that should
be considered severe. Instead, at step three, the ALJ is required to demonstrate that it has
considered all of the claimant's impairments, whether severe or not, in combination." Id. at
825.
Defendant also contends:
Notably, that the ALJ found at the third step that [p]laintiff did not have an
“impairment or combination of impairments” that met or equaled a listed
impairment is sufficient to show the ALJ considered the combined effect of
[p]laintiff’s impairments[.] [(R. 14.) See Wilson v. Barnhart], 284 F.3d
1219, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 2002); [Hutchinson v. Astrue], 408 F. App’x 324,
327 (11th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff failed to show that her alleged bipolar disorder, whether severe or
not severe, caused limitations in addition to those from the mental
impairments the ALJ found to be severe. [See Sanchez v. Comm'r of Soc.
8

Sec.], No. 12-11762, 2013 WL 490029, at *4 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2013)
(noting even if it was error to exclude Plaintiff's personality disorder at step
two, ALJ considered the condition at other steps; and claimant failed to
show limitations beyond those manifested by other severe mental
impairments). Plaintiff does not contend her personality disorder caused a
particular mental limitation the ALJ did not consider.
(Doc. 12 at 6.)
The court finds no reversible error regarding the ALJ’s determination of plaintiff’s
severe impairments and finds that the ALJ properly considered plaintiff’s bipolar disorder
in evaluating plaintiff’s severe and nonsevere impairments.
2. Listing 112.08
Plaintiff alleges that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that
plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal a listing. (Doc. 11 at 13.) Specifically, plaintiff
contends that the ALJ erred in not finding that plaintiff met listing 112.08. (Id.) The ALJ did
not explicitly evaluate listing 112.08 but found, rather, that plaintiff’s impairments did not
meet or medically equal any listed impairment. (R. 14.) “To ‘meet’ a Listing, a claimant must
have a diagnosis included in the Listings and must provide medical reports documenting that
the conditions meet the specific criteria of the Listings and the duration requirement.”
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002). Listing 112.08, in conjunction
with 112.02, provides as follows:
Personality Disorders: Manifested by pervasive, inflexible, and
maladaptive personality traits, which are typical of the child's long-term
functioning and not limited to discrete episodes of illness.

9

The required level of severity for these disorders is met when the
requirements in both A and B are satisfied.
A. Deeply ingrained, maladaptive patterns of behavior, associated with
one of the following:
1. Seclusiveness or autistic thinking; or
2. Pathologically inappropriate suspiciousness or hostility; or
3. Oddities of thought, perception, speech, and behavior; or
4. Persistent disturbances of mood or affect; or
5. Pathological dependence, passivity, or aggressiveness; or
6. Intense and unstable interpersonal relationships and impulsive
and exploitative behavior; or
7. Pathological perfectionism and inflexibility;
AND
B. For children (age 3 to attainment of age 18), resulting in at least two
of the following:
a. Marked impairment in age-appropriate cognitive/communicative
function, documented by medical findings (including
consideration of historical and other information from parents or
other individuals who have knowledge of the child, when such
information is needed and available) and including, if necessary,
the results of appropriate standardized psychological tests, or for
children under age 6, by appropriate tests of language and
communication; or
b. Marked impairment in age-appropriate social functioning,
documented by history and medical findings (including
consideration of information from parents or other individuals
who have knowledge of the child, when such information is
needed and available) and including, if necessary, the results of
appropriate standardized tests; or
c. Marked impairment in age-appropriate personal functioning,
documented by history and medical findings (including
consideration of information from parents or other individuals
who have knowledge of the child, when such information is
10

needed and available) and including, if necessary, appropriate
standardized tests; or
d. Marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence,
or pace.
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. Plaintiff contends the disciplinary actions taken as a result
of her behavior at school show that her impairments met listing 112.08. (Doc. 11 at 14.)
Plaintiff also argues that her hospitalization in 2011 for suicidal thoughts, along with reports
to doctors that plaintiff was suffering from mood swings, poor concentration, and poor
impulse control, provide evidence satisfying listing 112.08. (Id. at 16.) Defendant responds
by stating that,
[a]s an initial matter, [p]laintiff cites to no specific medical findings to
show she satisfied either the A or B criteria[.] (Doc. 11 at 13-16[.])
Instead, she notes her disciplinary record for misbehaving at school and
cites to her testimony and subjectively-reported symptoms during a 2011
hospitalization. Contrary to [p]laintiff’s suggestion, she cannot establish
she met the criteria based on anecdotal evidence and subjective reports
uncorroborated by specific medical findings or the results of appropriate
standardized testing. Significantly, [p]laintiff does not even identify which
of the A criteria and which of the two B criteria she allegedly met, much
less point to documented medical findings.
(Doc. 12 at 9.)
Plaintiff has not supported her assertion that she met listing 112.08 with medical
findings, and as defendant noted, state agency medical consultants Dr. William Meneese,
Dr. Dale Leonard, and Dr. Samuel Williams reviewed the evidence of record and found that
plaintiff’s severe impairments did not meet or equal a listing. (See R. 233-34, 294-95, 314-

11

15.) The court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s
impairments did not meet or equal a listing, including listing 112.08.

3. Determination as to Whether Plaintiff’s Condition Functionally Equaled a
Listing Under the Domains
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that plaintiff’s impairments did not
functionally equal a listed impairment. (Doc. 11 at 17.) To functionally equal a listed
impairment, plaintiff's impairments must result in "marked" limitations in two domains of
functioning or an "extreme" limitation in one domain. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). The ALJ
found that plaintiff had a marked limitation in interacting and relating with others, less than
a marked limitation in her ability to care for herself, and no limitation in the remaining
domains. (R. 18-23.) Plaintiff alleges that she has an extreme limitation in the domain of
interacting and relating with others and a marked limitation in the domain of attending and
completing tasks. (Doc. 11 at 16-17.) An extreme limitation is one which “interferes very
seriously with your ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” 20
C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3). A marked limitation is one which “interferes seriously with your
ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2).
a.

Interacting and relating with others

First, plaintiff argues that she has an extreme limitation in the domain of interacting
and relating with others. (Doc. 11 at 17.) To support her argument, plaintiff points to her
disciplinary record at school, her suspensions from school for misbehavior, her testimony that

12

she has no friends and does not get along well with her siblings, and her father’s testimony
that plaintiff has difficulty communicating, that she does not get along with family members
other than himself, and that he must go to the school every week to discuss plaintiff’s
behavior problems with her teachers. (Doc. 11 at 18.) While plaintiff also points to three
reports by plaintiff’s teachers or school staff stating that plaintiff had an “extreme” limitation
in interacting and relating with others, the ALJ did not heavily rely on these opinions, as at
least four other educators opined that plaintiff had anywhere from a moderate limitation to
no limitation in interacting and relating with others. (R. 18, 205-11.) Because those opinions
“are so widely varied and contain no explanation as to why the claimant has the stated
limitations,” the ALJ properly gave them little weight. (R. 18.)
The ALJ acknowledged plaintiff’s behavior problems, noting that after plaintiff was
raped by a family member in 2005, plaintiff misbehaved, refused to stay alone, and abused
her siblings. (R. 16.) The ALJ also discussed plaintiff’s disciplinary record at school, which
includes monthly referrals and suspensions from 2010 to 2012. (R. 17.) School records show
that plaintiff had problems attending class, used profanity around other students and teachers,
and fought with other students. (Id.) Nevertheless, the ALJ found that plaintiff had a marked,
as opposed to an extreme, limitation in interacting and relating with others. The ALJ noted
the lack of mental health treatment from 2006 until 2011. While plaintiff’s father explained
that plaintiff was on a waiting list for mental health treatment after her counseling sessions

13

ended in 2012, plaintiff does not explain the lack of mental health treatment prior to 2011.
(See R. 16, 44.)
Additionally, the ALJ relied on plaintiff’s mental health treatment with counselor
Shannon Crenshaw in 2011. (R. 16.) While the counselor reported signs of depression on
April 14, she noted that plaintiff “presented in an acceptable manner” on April 7 and that
plaintiff “felt good about her school test scores and had a new boyfriend.” (R. 16, 304-05.)
Further, in July 2011, plaintiff told State agency examining physician Jon Rogers that she
was dating someone and that she had friends with whom she talked, walked, and went
skating. (R. 16, 313.) The record also shows that by December 2011, Dr. Khan removed
plaintiff from all medication due to her mood and behavior improving and stabilizing without
medication. (R. 17, 347.)
Defendant contends that the following evidence also supports the ALJ’s decision:
In 2006 and 2007, [p]laintiff’s father reported [p]laintiff had no limitation in
her ability to communicate, had friends her own age, and generally got along
with her parents, teachers, and other adults. [(R 106, 109, 116, 119.)] In July
2006, examining psychologist Dr. Cynthia Neville opined that [p]laintiff had
age-appropriate communication and social skills despite mild to moderate
misbehaviors. [(R. 232.)] Later in July 2006, state agency psychologist Dr.
Meneese reviewed the available medical and testimonial evidence and
opined [p]laintiff had less than marked limitation in interacting and relating
with others. [(R. 235.)] At the end of July 2006, psychiatric nurse Fuller
noted [p]laintiff was cooperative with good eye contact on exam. [(R. 239,
279.)] In December 2006, Ms. Fuller again noted good eye contact. [(R.
280.)] In July 2007, state agency psychologist Dr. Leonard reviewed the
available medical and testimonial evidence and opined [p]laintiff had less
than marked limitation in interacting and relating with others. [(R. 296.)]
(Doc. 12 at 11.)
14

The court finds that the ALJ relied on substantial evidence to determine that plaintiff
had only a marked impairment in her ability to interact and relate with others.
b.

Attending and completing tasks

Plaintiff contends that “the evidence overwhelmingly shows that plaintiff has a
‘marked’ limitation in the Domain of attending and completing tasks, and therefore[,] is
entitled to a finding of disabled.” (Doc. 11 at 19.) For example, plaintiff points to her
father’s statement that plaintiff has difficulty paying attention and that she cannot stay on
task on her own. (Doc. 11 at 20; see R. 48-49.) The ALJ found that plaintiff had no
limitation in attending and completing tasks. (R. 20.)
Defendant contends that:
Substantial evidence in the record, much of which the ALJ noted, supports
this finding . . . . Plaintiff had no mental health treatment between 2006 and
2011 and stopped taking medication in late 2011, which undermines her
claim of marked limitations in attending and completing tasks. [(R. 16-17.)]
In 2006 and 2007, [p]laintiff’s father reported [p]laintiff independently
worked on arts and crafts projects; in 2007, he added that she completed her
[homework].3 [(R. 111, 121.)] In July 2006, Dr. Cynthia Neville noted
[p]laintiff could calculate simple addition and subtraction problems, count
backward from 10 without difficulty, and spell the word “dog” backwards.
[(R. 230.)] She opined [p]laintiff had age-appropriate pace and mild to
moderately impaired concentration and persistence. [(R. 232.)] Later in July
2006, Dr. Meneese opined [p]laintiff had less than marked limitation in

While defendant states that “in 2007, [plaintiff’s father] added that [plaintiff] completed
her chores most of the time,” (Doc. 12 at 13), plaintiff’s father stated in the 2007 Function
Report that plaintiff completed her homework but marked that plaintiff did not complete
her chores most of the time, (R. 121). Therefore, the court assumes defendant intended to
state that, in 2007, plaintiff’s father added that she completed her homework.
3

15

attending and completing tasks. [(R. 235.)] In June 2007, examining
psychologist Dr. John Neville opined [p]laintiff was attentive with adequate
concentration. [(R. 291.)] He noted [p]laintiff correctly answered all the
administered addition and subtraction problems, counted back from 20 to
1 without error, spelled “stop” backwards, recalled four digits forward and
three digits backward, remembered two out of three items after a 5-minute
delay, and remembered her past day’s activities [(R. 290.)] In July 2007, Dr.
Leonard opined [p]laintiff had less than marked limitation in attending and
completing tasks. [(R. 296.)]
In May 2011, Ms. Crawford indicated [p]laintiff was at grade level in
reading and math skills . . . [and] reported . . . no problems with [p]laintiff’s
ability to attend and complete tasks. [(R. 143, 145.)] In July 2011, [p]laintiff
was able to perform the serial sevens subtraction task and correctly
answered two out of three math problems. [(R. 312.)] Later in July 2011,
Dr. Williams reviewed the available medical and testimonial evidence and
opined [p]laintiff had no limitation in attending and completing tasks. [(R.
316.)] In August 2011, examining psychiatrist Dr. Williamson noted
[p]laintiff’s attention was good and estimated she had an average IQ. [(R.
344.)] In February 2013, Ms. Cowan indicated p]laintiff had no limitations
in attending and completing tasks[, and] two other counselors and
[p]laintiff’s assistant principal indicated no more than slight or minimal
limitation in this domain. [(R. 206-208, 210.)]
(Doc. 12 at 12-14.) Additionally, even though plaintiff’s father testified that plaintiff had
problems with attention and task completion, he also stated that he was unsure whether
plaintiff simply did not feel like completing tasks or whether she was actually unable to
complete them. (R. 49.) The evidence of record supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff
does not have a marked limitation in attending and completing tasks.
4. Medical Opinion of Dr. Jon Rogers
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ disregarded the opinion of Dr. Jon Rogers without
providing an explanation for doing so. (Doc. 11 at 21.) The ALJ discussed Dr. Rogers’s

16

report, in which Dr. Rogers opined that the quality of plaintiff’s daily activities was normal
and diagnosed plaintiff with “PTSD and depressive disorder.” (R. 16.)The ALJ also stated
that “Dr. Rogers did not issue a medical source statement[,] but his consultative evaluation
is consistent with the findings in this opinion[.]” (R. 17.) Dr. Rogers noted several subjective
complaints plaintiff made during the examination, and he noted that plaintiff was alert and
cooperative, that “[h]er mood appeared normal,” that her “[s]tream of talk and mental
activity” and speech were all normal, and that her judgment and insight were fair. (R. 31113.) During the exam, Dr. Rogers diagnosed plaintiff with “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder”
and “Depressive Disorder,” (R. 313), and under the heading “Implications For
Employment,” Dr. Rogers opined that:
[Plaintiff] is not able to function independently. The quality of her daily
activities is normal. The medical evidence of record provided by DDS was
reviewed and those findings were considered in the overall assessment of
the patient. She reported she has friends with whom she walks and talks and
goes skating. [Plaintiff] stated she is happy mostly; and is unhappy, “I be
aggravated when my brother be aggravating me.” She said she has problems
“not being able to see my mama and my mama’s sister.” She reported getting
into trouble in school for fighting and hollering at people.
(Id.) First, defendant contends, “The ALJ had no obligation to mention Dr. Rogers’[s]
notations of [p]laintiff’s subjective complaints, as those are not objective medical evidence
and should not receive significant weight. (Doc. 12 at 14-15 (citing 20 C.F.R. 416.928, 416.
929; Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F. 3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004)).) Defendant also argues
that, although the ALJ did not explicitly discuss Dr. Rogers’s statement that plaintiff was
“not able to function independently,” that statement is unqualified, given that Dr. Rogers
17

failed to identify any specific functional limitations. (Doc. 12 at 15.) Additionally, defendant
points out that Dr. Rogers’s statement under the heading “Implications for Employment” is
unclear, as it may simply be an acknowledgment that plaintiff was a minor (thirteen years
old at the time) who could not live or work on her own. (Id.)
The court notes that the ALJ did not reject Dr. Rogers’s opinion but instead stated
that “his consultative evaluation is consistent with the findings in this opinion.” (R. 17.) The
ALJ properly concluded that Dr. Rogers’s report, noting plaintiff’s cooperation and normal
activities of daily living, was generally consistent with the ALJ’s findings. Furthermore,
defendant is correct that Dr. Rogers’s statement that plaintiff cannot function independently
is not qualified and is unclear, given the context of the statement, which was written under
a heading entitled “Implications for Employment.” Therefore, the court finds that the ALJ
did not improperly reject Dr. Rogers’s opinion, and thus, there is no reversible error.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth above, the decision of the ALJ, as adopted by the
Commissioner, denying plaintiff’s claim for SSI is due to be affirmed. An Order affirming
the decision of the Commissioner will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum
Opinion.
DONE this 1st day of June, 2015.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18

19