Bridges v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 12/1/2014. (PSM)

FILED
2014 Dec-01 AM 09:50
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHERRY BRIDGES,

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action Number
2:14-cv-690-AKK

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Sherry Bridges (“Bridges”) brings this action pursuant to Section
205(g) of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review
of the final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”). This court finds that the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) applied the correct legal standard and that her decision—which has
become the decision of the Commissioner—is supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, the court AFFIRMS the decision denying benefits.
I. Procedural History
Bridges filed her application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits and
Title XVI Supplemental Security Income on January 31, 2011, alleging an

Page 1 of 14

amended disability onset date of January 28, 2011 due to congestive heart failure,
sleep apnea, hypertension, and tendonitis. (R. 41, 112, 128, 150). After the SSA
denied her application, Bridges requested a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 61-62, 73).
The ALJ subsequently denied Bridges’s claim, (R. 19-25), which became the final
decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council refused to grant review,
(R. 1-4). Bridges then filed this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §
205(g), on April 4, 2014. Doc. 1.
II. Standard of Review
The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial
evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v.
Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988);
Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c) mandate that the Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if
supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990). The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the
evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must
review the final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is “reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.” See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler,
703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Page 2 of 14

Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a
preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 849 F.2d at 1529
(quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by
substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner’s factual findings
even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner’s findings.
See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review
of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review “does not yield
automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(I)(A). A physical or
mental impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Page 3 of 14

Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in
sequence:
(1)

whether the claimant is currently unemployed;

(2)

whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3)

whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary;

(4)

whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and

(5)

whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national
economy.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “An affirmative
answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps
three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other
than step three, leads to a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f)). “Once a finding is made that a claimant cannot return to
prior work the burden shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can
do.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Lastly, where, as here, a plaintiff alleges disability because of pain, she must
meet additional criteria. In this circuit, “a three part ‘pain standard’ [is applied]
when a claimant seeks to establish disability through his or her own testimony of
pain or other subjective symptoms.” Holt v. Barnhart, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th
Cir. 1991). Specifically,
Page 4 of 14

The pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical
condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the
severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the
objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it
can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.1
Id. However, medical evidence of pain itself, or of its intensity, is not required:
While both the regulations and the Hand standard require objective
medical evidence of a condition that could reasonably be expected to
cause the pain alleged, neither requires objective proof of the pain
itself. Thus under both the regulations and the first (objectively
identifiable condition) and third (reasonably expected to cause pain
alleged) parts of the Hand standard a claimant who can show that his
condition could reasonably be expected to give rise to the pain he
alleges has established a claim of disability and is not required to
produce additional, objective proof of the pain itself. See 20 CFR §§
404.1529 and 416.929; Hale [v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th
Cir. 1987)].
Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1991) (parenthetical
information omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[a] claimant’s subjective
testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the pain standard is itself
sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223. Therefore, if
a claimant testifies to disabling pain and satisfies the three part pain standard, the
ALJ must find a disability unless the ALJ properly discredits the claimant’s
testimony.
Furthermore, when the ALJ fails to credit a claimant’s pain testimony, the
ALJ must articulate reasons for that decision:

1

This standard is referred to as the Hand standard, named after Hand v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir.
1985).

Page 5 of 14

It is established in this circuit that if the [ALJ] fails to articulate reasons for
refusing to credit a claimant’s subjective pain testimony, then the [ALJ], as a
matter of law, has accepted that testimony as true. Implicit in this rule is the
requirement that such articulation of reasons by the [ALJ] be supported by
substantial evidence
Hale, 831 F.2d at 1012. Therefore, if the ALJ either fails to articulate reasons for
refusing to credit the plaintiff’s pain testimony, or if the ALJ’s reasons are not
supported by substantial evidence, the court must accept as true the pain testimony
of the plaintiff and render a finding of disability. Id.
IV. The ALJ’s Decision
In performing the five step analysis, the ALJ found that Bridges had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 28, 2011, and therefore met
Step One. (R. 21). Next, the ALJ found that Bridges satisfied Step Two because
she suffered from the severe impairments of “congestive heart failure, chronic
kidney disease, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, and hypertension.” Id. The ALJ
then proceeded to the next step and found that Bridges did not satisfy Step Three
since she “[did] not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments.” (R. 22).
Although the ALJ answered Step Three in the negative, consistent with the law,
see McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030, she proceeded to Step Four, where she
determined that Bridges has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to “perform
light work . . . except without concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat,

Page 6 of 14

humidity, fumes, odors, etc. She can occasionally kneel and crawl.” (R. 22). In
light of Bridges’s RFC, the ALJ determined that Bridges “is capable of performing
past relevant work as a jailer and caseworker.” (R. 25). Therefore, the ALJ found
that Bridges “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security act,
from January 28, 2011, through the date of [the ALJ’s] decision.” Id.
V. Analysis
Bridges raises two contentions of error: that the ALJ erred in discounting the
opinion of Dr. Shirley Jones, her treating physician, and in evaluating Bridges’s
RFC. Doc. 14 at 6-9. The court rejects both of these contentions and addresses
each in turn.
1. Opinion of Dr. Jones
Dr. Jones opined that Bridges experiences high levels of fatigue and
weakness, and can lift five pounds, sit for five hours, and stand/walk for one hour
in an eight hour day. (R. 239-243). Bridges maintains that Dr. Jones’s opinion
supports Bridges’s contention that she is disabled, and that the ALJ committed
reversible error when she rejected Dr. Jones’s opinion. Doc. 14 at 6-7. Generally,
“[i]t is well-established that ‘the testimony of a treating physician must be given
substantial or considerable weight unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary.’”
Crawford v. Comm’r of Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)). See also 20
Page 7 of 14

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). The Eleventh Circuit instructs that “good
cause” exists when the “(1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the
evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) [the] treating
physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical
records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004).
Additionally, the “ALJ must clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight to
the opinion of a treating physician, and the failure to do so is reversible error.”
Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440.
In this case, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr.
Jones’s assessments “are inconsistent with the overall objective medical evidence
and his own treatment notes.” (R. 25). For example, the record includes an
echocardiogram from June 27, 2011 indicating that Bridges’s ejection fraction
exceeded 55 percent, which demonstrates normal heart functioning. (R. 217).
Additionally, a consultative examination on June 28, 2011 revealed that Bridges’s
cardiovascular, respiratory, and musculoskeletal health, her extremities, grip
strength, and overall dexterity were all normal. (R. 224). Indeed, even Dr. Jones’s
own treatment notes from August 2011 and February 2012 indicate that Bridges’s
hypertension, congestive heart failure, and chronic kidney disease were
“controlled” and “stable” with medications, and include no mention of fatigue,
weakness, shortness of breath, or chest pain. (R. 229, 249). In light of this record
Page 8 of 14

evidence, the court concludes that the ALJ did not err in finding that Dr. Jones’s
opinion is not consistent with objective medical evidence or Dr. Jones’s own
treatment notes. See Simone v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 465 F. App’x 905, 910
(11th Cir. 2012) (ALJ did not err in rejecting treating physician’s opinion where
echocardiogram demonstrated an improved ejection fraction of approximately 50
percent, and the treating physician’s own letters and treatment notes reported that
the claimant’s cardiovascular condition was “stable”).
2. The ALJ’s RFC determination
Bridges next challenges the RFC determination. Doc. 14 at 7-9. Specifically,
Bridges contends that the ALJ (a) failed to consider the effects of obesity on
Bridges’s ability to work, (b) erred in finding that Bridges can “occasionally kneel
and crawl,” and (c) failed to consider Bridges’s nonexertional capabilities. The
court addresses these contentions in turn.2
A. The effects of obesity on Bridges’s ability to work
To support her contention that the ALJ failed to address the effects of
Bridges’s obesity in making the RFC determination, Bridges seemingly offers two
arguments. First, Bridges points out that obesity can affect an individual’s ability

2

Because the court concludes that the ALJ did not err in her RFC determination, and because Bridges otherwise
offers no additional argument suggesting that the ALJ erred at Step Four, the court does not reach Bridges’s
unsubstantiated contention that “she would readily ‘grid’ under Medical Vocational Rule (MVR) 201.14 from
onset.” Doc. 14 at 9. Moreover, the court is confounded by Bridges’s assertions that her “work ethic and willingness
to work if physically and mentally capable is apparent” and “[a]n Alabama court has found that claimant’s prior
consistent work history supported his [sic] credibility,” id., in light of Bridges’s failure to elaborate on those
statements or explain their relevance.

Page 9 of 14

to “sustain routine movement and work activity” and exacerbate a cardiovascular
impairment, and claims that the ALJ failed to consider these effects in Bridges’s
case. Doc. 14 and 7-8. This contention overlooks that the ALJ in fact considered
Bridges’s “movement and work activity” when the ALJ stated: “Although
[Bridges] testified she tires easily, she cares for her autistic son daily. She shops,
cooks, and does laundry. She also reported cleaning, paying the bills, managing her
finances . . . [and] attending church . . . .” (R. 23). The ALJ also pointed out that
Bridges “reported she was able to walk around the grocery store for 45 minutes.”
Id. As is evident, the ALJ’s opinion specifically addressed Bridges’s movement
and work activity. Therefore, Bridges’s contention is without merit. To the extent
that Bridges is claiming that her obesity justifies a different RFC determination,
this contention fails also because Bridges does not point to any record evidence to
support the claim that her symptoms preclude her from performing work at a light
level of exertion. Ultimately, Bridges’s own testimony regarding her daily
activities, (R. 41-43), the consultative examination confirming that Bridges’s
strength, her range of motion in most of her body, and her cardiovascular,
muscoskeletal, and respiratory health are normal, (R. 220), as well as Bridges’s
treating physician’s treatment notes indicating that her conditions are stable and
controlled by medication, (R. 229), militate against a finding that her impairments

Page 10 of 14

inhibit her movement and work activity or exacerbate her cardiovascular health.
Therefore, the court rejects Bridges’s argument on this issue.
Second, Bridges asserts that “the ALJ failed to persuasively discount treating
physician [Dr. Jones’s] assessment of fatigue or the consultative physician’s
impression of exertional dyspnea as well as congestive heart failure . . . with
recurrent flares” as it relates to the combined effects of Bridges’s obesity and other
impairments. Doc. 14 at 8-9. Apparently, Bridges’s argument is asserting that her
“stamina and . . . ability to work on a sustained regular and continuing basis” are
limited due to her “sleep apnea in combination with cardiac, renal and vascular
conditions together with obesity,” that the opinions of Dr. Jones and the
consultative physician support this assertion, and that the ALJ, in “fail[ing] to
persuasively discount . . . Dr. Jones’s assessment . . . and the consultative
physician’s impression,” erred in assessing the effects of Bridges’s combined
impairments on her ability to work. 3 See doc. 14 at 8. While Dr. Jones indeed

3

In a related but unsubstantiated contention buried in the text of the “Conclusion” to Bridges’s Memorandum of
Law, Bridges asserts that the ALJ “erred in failing to alternatively develop the record to obtain an MSO by a
medical expert . . . who could review the entire record particularly with regard to the interrelatedness of the
impairments of record in combination with obesity.” Doc. 14 at 10. To the extent Bridges is arguing that the ALJ
should have acquired a “medical second opinion” (perhaps an additional consultative examination) regarding the
effects of Bridges’s combined impairments on her ability to work, the court disagrees because Bridges has not
pointed to any evidentiary gaps in the record suggesting that a second medical opinion was necessary to enable the
ALJ to make an informed decision. See Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995) (to establish that the
ALJ failed to properly develop the record, a claimant must demonstrate “evidentiary gaps which result in unfairness
or ‘clear prejudice.’”); Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1988) (the ALJ must order a consultative
examination when “such an evaluation is necessary for [her] to make an informed decision”).

Page 11 of 14

opined that Bridges experiences high levels of fatigue, (R. 242), a fact that Bridges
is seemingly suggesting supports her contention that her stamina and ability to
work are limited, the court concludes that the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Jones’s
opinion, as explained above. Furthermore, regarding the opinion of the consultative
physician, the ALJ afforded great weight to that opinion and ultimately agreed that
Bridges suffers from severe impairments of exertional dyspnea and congestive
heart failure. (R. 21, 24). Therefore, Bridges’s contention that “the ALJ failed to
persuasively discount . . . the consultative physician’s impression” is not consistent
with the record. In any case, to the extent that Bridges is asserting the consultative
physician’s opinion supports her contention, the consultative physician’s findings
do not support the assertion that Bridges’s stamina and ability to work are limited.
To the contrary, the consultative examination confirmed that Bridges’s overall
cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, and respiratory health were normal, which belies
Bridges’s contention that her stamina and ability to work are limited. (R. 222-224).
Ultimately, even accepting Bridges’s assertion that obesity together with her other
impairments can limit “stamina and the ability to work on a sustained regular and
continuing basis,” doc. 14 and 8, the record contains no medical source suggesting
that Bridges’s suffers from this particular symptom (aside from Dr. Jones’s
opinion, which the ALJ properly discounted). Therefore, because an acceptable
medical source is required to establish the existence of a limitation, see Crawford
Page 12 of 14

v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004), the court rejects
Bridges’s argument.
B. Capacity to “occasionally kneel and crawl”
Turning to Bridges’s second contention challenging the ALJ’s RFC
determination, Bridges asserts that the ALJ’s finding that Bridges can
“occasionally kneel and crawl” is not based on record evidence because the
consultative physician found that Bridges’s capacity to squat is “limited to 60
degrees due to ankle pain” and she experiences pain in her left ankle when bearing
weight on her heel and toe. (R. 224). However, these assessments by the
consultative physician, to which the ALJ afforded great weight, (R. 24), are not
inconsistent with a finding that Bridges can “occasionally kneel and crawl”
because occasionally kneeling and crawling is not necessarily synonymous with
excessively squatting or bearing weight on the heel and toe. Significantly, the
record includes a range of motion chart completed by the consultative physician
which indicates that Bridges experienced full range of motion of the spine and
hips, shoulders, wrists, elbows, and knees, and that her extremities and overall
dexterity are normal. (R. 220). This evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that
Bridges can occasionally kneel and crawl. Therefore, the court finds no reversible
error on this issue.

Page 13 of 14

C. Nonexertional symptoms
Finally, regarding Bridges third contention that “the ALJ avoided any
consideration that the [nonexertional] symptoms associated with her conditions in
combination might affect concentration and ability to tolerate work stresses,” doc.
14 and 9, beyond stating that her symptoms “might” affect her concentration and
stress levels, Bridges does not elaborate on this contention by pointing to any
record evidence or citing to any legal authority. Accordingly, Bridges has waived
this issue. See Outlaw v. Barnhart, 197 F. App’x 825, 828 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006)
(finding that the claimant waived his argument that the ALJ failed to account for
exertional impairments because he “did not elaborate on [the] claim or provide
citation to authority”).
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination
that Claimant is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ
applied proper legal standards in reaching this determination. Therefore, the
Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED. A separate order in accordance
with the memorandum of decision will be entered.
DONE the 1st day of December, 2014.

_________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Page 14 of 14