Larson v. Wills

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the court is defendants' objection (Doc. 27) to the report and recommendation (Doc. 11) entered by the magistrate judge recommending that some but not all of plaintiff's claims be dismissed pursuant to 2 8 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court has reviewed both the portions of the report and recommendation to which the parties did not object and the portions to which defendants objected and finds no error to be present. Accordingly, the magistrate judge 9;s report is due to be and is ADOPTED and the magistrate judge's recommendation is ACCEPTED. The following excessive force claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1): Plaintiff's claim that defendant Stacy used excessive force when he initially arrested and subdued him; Plaintiff's claim that defendant Stacy failed to intervene when defendant Wills tased plaintiff; and Plaintiff's claim that defendant Wills used excessive force when he handc uffed him too tightly. Plaintiff's request that criminal charges be brought against defendants is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Finally, all 3 remaining claims are REFERRED again to the magistrate judge for further proceedings. Signed by Judge William M Acker, Jr on 12/2/15. (SAC )

FILED
2015 Dec-02 PM 05:01
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LAWRENCE OLIVER LARSON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM STACY, et al.,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:14-cv-1085-WMA-JHE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is defendants’ objection (Doc. 27) to the
report and recommendation (Doc. 11) entered by the magistrate judge
recommending

that

some

but

not

all

of

plaintiff’s

claims

be

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court has reviewed
both the portions of the report and recommendation to which the
parties did

not

object

and

the

portions

to

which

defendants

objected and finds no error to be present.
Defendants first complain that the report and recommendation
exceeds the scope of § 1915A because the magistrate judge went
beyond merely determining the cognizability of plaintiff’s claims
and instead made factual findings and legal conclusions as to
defendants’ conduct. Defendants’ argument, however, reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of the scope of review under § 1915A.
The pertinent statutory language is: “On review, the court should
identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint, if the complaint . . . fails to state a claim

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upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The
standard of review applied under § 1915A is the same as is applied
to a motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Leal v. Ga. Dep’t
of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001). When reviewing
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must “accep[t] the
complaint’s allegations as true and constru[e] them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693
F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012).
In summarizing and discussing plaintiff’s allegations, the
magistrate judge in no way made any conclusive findings of fact
against defendants. Instead, he did only what was necessary to
discharge his duties under § 1915A: identify plaintiff’s cognizable
claims and recommend dismissal of the non-cognizable claims. In
making these determinations, the magistrate judge was required to
accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true; contrary to defendants’
assertions,

his

necessary

restatement

and

discussion

of

the

allegations do not constitute findings of fact. Because the legal
conclusions drawn by the magistrate judge were both necessary and
correct, and because no factual findings were actually made, the
court OVERRULES defendants’ objection.
Defendants raise two other grounds of objection, but they are
both without merit. Defendants Stacy and Wills argue that they
cannot be held liable for the alleged post-handcuffing beating of
plaintiff by other unnamed officers because plaintiff did not

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allege said defendants’ specific and active participation. The
magistrate judge correctly found, however, that defendants Stacy
and Wills may still be found liable for their failure to intervene
and protect plaintiff from the beating. See Hadley v. Gutierrez,
526 F.3d 1324, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2008). Defendants also argue that
plaintiff

does

not

allege

how

defendants

were

made

aware

of

plaintiff’s interracial relationship, so claims based on such
knowledge should be dismissed. Defendants once again misunderstand
the standard of review under § 1915A. Plaintiff need not prove his
case in his complaint; it is enough that he alleged the fact of
defendants’ knowledge, and he is not required to prove the basis of
their knowledge at this stage. Consequently, these objections are
also OVERRULED.
Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s report is due to be and is
hereby

ADOPTED

and

the

magistrate

judge’s

recommendation

is

ACCEPTED. The following excessive force claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1):
•

Plaintiff’s claim that defendant Stacy used excessive
force when he initially arrested and subdued him;

•

Plaintiff’s claim that defendant Stacy failed to
intervene when defendant Wills tased plaintiff; and

•

Plaintiff’s claim that defendant Wills used excessive
force when he handcuffed him too tightly.

Plaintiff’s request that criminal charges be brought against
defendants is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Finally, all

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remaining claims are REFERRED again to the magistrate judge for
further proceedings.
DONE this 2nd day of December, 2015.

_____________________________
WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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