Anderson v. United States of America

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER For the reasons explained within, Twin City's motion for conditional intervention is GRANTED. This conditional intervention does not include the right to participate in motions for summary judgment or trial on the merits. Signed by Judge William M Acker, Jr on 12/15/15. (SAC )

FILED
2015 Dec-15 PM 03:59
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIAM DEAN ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}

CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:14-cv-1182-WMA

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On November 19, 2015, Twin City Fire Insurance Company (“Twin
City”)

moved

for

conditional

intervention

to

protect

its

subrogation interest as the worker’s compensation insurance carrier
for the employer of plaintiff William Dean Anderson. (Doc. 26). On
November 20, 2015, defendant United States of America filed its
opposition to the motion. (Doc. 27).

The court entered an order

allowing plaintiff to respond to the motion by December 4, 2015.
(Doc. 28).

Plaintiff having not filed any response, the motion is

now under submission.
For the reasons given below, the motion will be granted.
I. Timeliness
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 a party may move to
intervene “[o]n timely motion.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24(a)-(b).
“‘Timeliness’ is not precisely measurable, and courts should view
it flexibly toward both the courts and the litigants in the
interests of justice . . . [specifically] considering . . . (1) the
1

length of

time

during

which

the

proposed

intervenor

knew

or

reasonably should have known of its interest in the case before
moving to intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice to the existing
parties as a result of the proposed intervenor's failure to move
for intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably should have known
of its interest; (3) the extent of prejudice to the proposed
intervenor if its motion is denied; and (4) the existence of
unusual

circumstances

militating

either

for

or

against

a

determination that its motion was timely.” Brown ex rel. O'Neil v.
Bush, 194 F. App'x 879, 882 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Chiles v.
Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989)).
While Twin City did not file its motion until after the
November 6, 2015 close of discovery (Doc. 19; Doc. 26) and more
than a year after the suit was filed (Doc. 1), such timing is not
unreasonable given that it seeks to intervene for the limited
purpose of protecting its subrogation interest. See Southern v.
Plumb Tools, A Div. of O'Ames Corp., 696 F.2d 1321, 1322-3 (11th
Cir. 1983).

Although

the

United

States

opposes

Twin

City’s

intervention on timeliness and jurisdictional grounds, it fails to
demonstrate any basis for prejudice to the parties. (Doc. 27). The
fact that plaintiff does not object to the intervention is an
important fact.

Being filed before entry of judgment or any

distribution, granting the motion to intervene will not prejudice
any party nor interfere with the orderly processes of the court,

2

whereas “denial of the motion to intervene will harm [movant] by
frustrating its efforts to satisfy its subrogation interest.”
McDonald v. E. J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970);
see Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).

Finally, the United States fails to show any unusual

circumstances militating against a determination that the motion is
timely. See Id. at 1072 (finding a motion to intervene made a few
hours after the entry of judgment to be timely and recognizing “the
special nature of a motion to intervene for the limited purpose of
protecting [a] subrogation interest”).

Therefore, in light of all

of these factors Twin City’s motion is timely.
II. Jurisdiction
Under Rule 24(a), a party is entitled to intervene as of right
where it either:
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal
statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its
interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that
interest.
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24(a)(1)-(2).

A party may seek permissive

intervention where it either:
(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal
statute; or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the
main action a common question of law or fact.
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24(b)(1)(A)-(B).

A court has jurisdiction to

support intervention under Rule 24(a) as a matter of right because

3

it is ancillary to the underlying dispute, however, permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b) requires an independent ground of
jurisdiction. Sweeney v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., 917 F.2d 1560,
1565 (11th Cir. 1990); see Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto
Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1113 (5th Cir. 1970) (“no independent
ground of jurisdiction need be shown to support intervention as a
matter of right”).
Twin City does not specify whether it seeks intervention as of
right under Rule 24(a) or permissive intervention under Rule
24(b).1 Instead, it simply says that its motion is for conditional
intervention limited to protecting its right of subrogation under
Alabama law. (Doc. 26).

Because there is no basis for permissive

intervention under Rule 24(b),2 this court will evaluate Twin
City’s motion under Rule 24(a).

Twin City’s subrogation interest

sufficiently relates to the subject of the underlying action, and

1

Twin City states its conditional intervention is “pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(2)(B).” (Doc. 26 at 1).
Rule 26 contains no such subsection and deals with general
provisions governing discovery, not intervention.
2

Twin City fails to state an independent jurisdictional
basis for permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b). Twin
City does not present a federal question but rather its
subrogation interest arises under Alabama law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Additionally, Twin City fails to support diversity jurisdiction
given that the amount in controversy is $10,583.43 and the
citizenship of Twin City is not stated on the face of the
complaint. (Doc. 26 at 1, 3). 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Furthermore,
supplemental jurisdiction is unavailable for intervention where
“exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirement of section
1332.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
4

disposing of this action may impair or impede Twin City’s
ability to protect said interest. See Campbell v. Kovalev, 2013 WL
3833066, at *1-2 (N.D. Ala. July 23, 2013) (“Alabama Code, §
25–5–11 provides

the

right

to

assert

a

subrogation

lien

for

workers' compensation benefits paid to an employee . . . [and]
courts have found that the creation of a subrogation lien is a
sufficient interest to satisfy the first requirement of Rule
14(a)”).

Further, no party currently in this suit adequately

represents the interests of Twin City.

Therefore, this court will

allow Twin City to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a). See
McDonald,

430

F.2d

at

1071

(finding

a

motion

to

intervene

cognizable as intervention of right under Rule 24(a) where a movant
sought to protect its subrogation interest as a compensation
carrier under a Mississippi statute).
Therefore, for the reasons explained above, Twin City’s motion
for

conditional

intervention

is

GRANTED.

This

conditional

intervention does not include the right to participate in motions
for summary judgment or trial on the merits

DONE this 15th day of December, 2015.

_____________________________
WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5