Hodge v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge John H England, III on 9/29/2015. (KEK)

FILED
2015 Sep-29 AM 08:56
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CLEORA TUQUANA HODGE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

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Case Number: 2:14-cv-01268-JHE

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
Plaintiff Cleora Tuquana Hodge (“Hodge”) seeks review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
§ 205(g) of the Social Security Act, of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (“Commissioner”), denying her application for a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (Doc. 1).
Hodge timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies. This case is therefore ripe for
review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The undersigned has carefully considered the
record and, for the reasons stated below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Hodge was a fifty-year-old female at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)
decision. (Tr. 38, 40). Hodge has a high school education, as well as two years of college
coursework, and previously worked as a Head Start teacher. (Tr. 179).
Hodge filed her applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on November 29,

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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge
conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 10).

2010, and November 30, 2010. (Tr. 136-39). The Commissioner initially denied Hodge’s
application, and Hodge requested a hearing before an ALJ. (Tr. 98). After a hearing, the ALJ
denied Hodge’s claim on November 30, 2012. (Tr. 40). Hodge sought review by the Appeals
Council, but it declined her request on May 9, 2014. (Tr. 1-6). On that date, the ALJ’s decision
became the final decision of the Commissioner. On July 1, 2014, Hodge initiated this action.
(See doc. 1).
II. Standard of Review 2
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed. The
function of this Court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This Court
must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.
1983). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.”
Id.
This Court must uphold factual findings supported by substantial evidence. However, it
reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the
ALJ’s determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528,
531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ

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In general, the legal standards applied are the same whether a claimant seeks DIB or
SSI. However, separate, parallel statutes and regulations exist for DIB and SSI claims.
Therefore, citations in this opinion should be considered to refer to the appropriate parallel
provision as context dictates. The same applies to citations for statutes or regulations found in
quoted court decisions.
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fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining the proper legal analysis has
been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 114546 (11th Cir. 1991).
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of
disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations
promulgated thereunder. 3 The Regulations define “disabled” as “the inability to do any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To
establish entitlement to disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence of a “physical or
mental impairment” which “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

whether the claimant is currently employed;
whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed
by the [Commissioner];
whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and
whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national
economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to the formerly applicable C.F.R.
section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999);
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The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R.
Parts 400 to 499.
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accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “Once the claimant has
satisfied steps One and Two, she will automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed
impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the
burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job.”
Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The
Commissioner must further show such work exists in the national economy in significant
numbers. Id.
IV. Findings of the Administrative Law Judge
After consideration of the entire record and application of the sequential evaluation
process, the ALJ made the following findings:
At Step One, the ALJ found Hodge meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2014, and that Hodge did not engage in substantial gainful
activity from the alleged onset date of June 1, 2009. (Tr. 21). At Step Two, the ALJ found
Hodge has the following severe impairments: epilepsy and recurrent seizure disorder; brain
lesion; asthma with a nicotine dependency; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; hypertension;
left cervical radiculopathy; cognitive disorder; adjustment disorder; depression with insomnia;
and anxiety disorder. (Id.). At Step Three, the ALJ found Hodge does not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 23-26).
Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ determined Hodge’s residual functioning
capacity (“RFC”), which is the most a claimant can do despite her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ determined Hodge has the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20
C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with specified limitations. (Tr. 26). She can only lift, carry,

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push and pull 20 lbs. occasionally and 10 lbs. frequently; can sit, stand, and walk 6 hours
intermittently through an 8-hour workday; can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can
frequently climb stairs and ramps; can frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and engage in
activities requiring balance; must avoid concentrated expose to extreme heat and cold and
concentrated areas; must avoid all exposure to operational controls of moving machinery and
unprotected heights; no commercial driving; limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks;
limited to work in a low-stress environment defined as requiring only occasional decisionmaking and only occasional changes in work setting; and limited to only occasional, brief, and
superficial interaction with the public, co-workers, and supervisors. (Id.).
At Step Four, the ALJ determined, through the date last insured, Hodge is unable to
perform any past relevant work. (Tr. 38). At Step Five, the ALJ determined, based on Hodge’s
age, education, work experience, and RFC, jobs exist in significant numbers in the national
economy Hodge could perform. (Tr. 39). Therefore, the ALJ determined Hodge has not been
under a disability and denied Hodge’s claim. (Tr. 40).
V. Analysis
Although the court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported
by substantial evidence or because improper legal standards were applied, “[t]his does not relieve
the court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether
substantial evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672
F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)).
The court, however, “abstains from reweighing the evidence or substituting its own judgment for
that of the [Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination Hodge failed to demonstrate

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a disability, and the ALJ applied the proper standards to reach this conclusion.

Hodge

challenges the ALJ’s decision on two specific, narrow grounds. (Doc. 12). She contends (1) the
ALJ improperly discounted opinions from a treating physician and (2) absent development of the
record, the ALJ failed to favorably apply the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. (Id.). Neither of
these contentions has merit.
A. The ALJ Properly Discounted Dr. Jeremy Allen’s Conclusions
Hodge challenges the ALJ’s conclusion not to accord controlling weight to Dr. Jeremy
Allen’s Medical Source Statement (“MSS”) opining Hodge is limited to a reduced range of
sedentary work. (Tr. 458). Because this opinion addresses Hodge’s RFC, an issue reserved for
the Commissioner, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Allen’s conclusory statement and provided
an adequate basis for doing so.
Generally, a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to “substantial or considerable weight
unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Security, 363
F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir.
1997) (internal quotations omitted)). “Good cause” exists to reject a treating physician’s opinion
when the: “(1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence
supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent
with the doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir.
2004). “When electing to disregard the opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must clearly
articulate his reasons.” Id. The Court must also be aware of the fact that opinions such as
whether a claimant is disabled, the claimant’s RFC, and the application of vocational factors “are
not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner
because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the

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determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). The Court is
interested in the doctors’ evaluations of the claimant’s “condition and the medical consequences
thereof, not their opinions of the legal consequences of his condition.” Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440.
Such statements by a physician are relevant to the ALJ’s findings, but they are not determinative,
as it is the ALJ who bears the responsibility for assessing a claimant’s residual functional
capacity. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c).
Dr. Allen’s conclusion that Hodge is limited to a reduced range of sedentary work is an
opinion on an issue reserved to the Commission, specifically Hodge’s RFC, and thus, while
relevant, is not determinative or entitled to controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e),
416.927(d). Furthermore, Dr. Allen’s MSS is a “check-the-box” form, which provided no
narrative or insight into the reasons behind Dr. Allen’s conclusion. (Tr. 458). Therefore, it has
little probative value. See Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1094 (11th Cir. 1985). The ALJ
discounted Dr. Allen’s conclusion because it was inconsistent with the evidence of record. (Tr.
38). Dr. Allen indicated Hodge would experience fatigue and weakness from walking, standing,
bending, stooping, and moving extremities. He also indicated this fatigue and weakness would
negatively impair her performance of tasks and cause abandonment of tasks. (Tr. 38, 461). The
ALJ, however, found this inconsistent with the examination notes indicating Hodge had normal
neurological and musculoskeletal findings with respect to weakness or fatigue, (tr. 264, 274,
381, 405, 469, 527, 528), and Hodge’s report regarding her activities of daily living, which
included housework, such as laundry and dishwashing, as well as grocery shopping. (Tr. 38,
326). Given the consideration of the evidence of record, the ALJ provided a proper basis to
discount Dr. Allen’s conclusory statement.

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B. The ALJ Was Not Required to Apply the Medical-Vocational Guidelines
At Step Five, the Commissioner must determine that a significant number of jobs exist in
the national economy that the claimant can perform.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

416.920(a)(4)(v); see Winschel v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011).
Generally, there are two methods by which the Commissioner may carry this burden: (1) through
use of expert vocational testimony or (2) the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpt. P, App. 2 (“the Grids”). See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180. The Grids, however, are not
applicable where nonexertional limitations are severe enough to prevent a wide range of gainful
employment at the designated level. See Syrock v. Heckler¸ 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985).
Hodge challenges the ALJ’s determination that she is capable of other work available in
the national economy. Specifically, it appears she is arguing that, because the ALJ found her
limited to a reduced range of light work, he should have looked to Rule 201.14 to find that she
was disabled, at least after age 50. Rule 201.14, however, applies to individuals who are limited
to unskilled, sedentary work. Because the ALJ found Hodge capable of a reduced range of light
work, he was not required to look exclusively to the Grids to determine whether Hodge was
disabled.
Where, as here, the Grids are inapplicable, the ALJ will solicit testimony from a
vocational expert to determine whether a claimant’s RFC permits her to engage in work that
exists in the national economy.

See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180.

There is no authority

commanding the ALJ to refer to a Grid rule below the claimant’s RFC to determine disability as
it appears Hodge suggests.
Moreover, Hodge is not challenging the ALJ’s RFC determination, and she has not
shown that she is limited to an RFC for sedentary work. At most, Hodge argues the ALJ should

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have further developed the record by obtaining medical expert testimony to determine her RFC;
however, she offers no basis to trigger the need for a medical expert. Although an ALJ “has a
basic obligation to develop a full and fair record[,]” “the claimant bears the burden of proving
[s]he is disabled, and, consequently, [s]he is responsible for producing evidence to support h[er]
claim.” Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). Hodge has not carried that
burden. Furthermore, “there must be a showing of prejudice before it is found that the claimant’s
right to due process have been violated to such a degree that the case must be remanded to the
[Commissioner] for further development of the record.” Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1423
(11th Cir. 1997). Hodge does not make this showing either. In sum, Hodge failed to prove she
was disabled, and the ALJ had no obligation to produce additional evidence for her.
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful consideration of the administrative
record and memoranda of the parties, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Hodge’s claim for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI is AFFIRMED and this action
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DONE this 29th day of September 2015.

_______________________________
JOHN H. ENGLAND, III
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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