Maddox v. Alabama Department of Transportation et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 7/3/2018. (JLC)
FILED
2018 Jul-03 PM 04:02
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LINDA MADDOX,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.
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Case No.: 2:15-cv-00312-MHH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.
(Doc. 49).
Ms. Maddox alleges that Alabama Department of
Transportation (ALDOT) violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794, by failing to provide reasonable accommodations to her and
forcing her to retire. (Doc. 17, ¶¶ 27–37). 1 ALDOT asks the Court to grant
summary judgment in its favor on Ms. Maddox’s claim. (Doc. 49, p. 1). It argues
that Ms. Maddox cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination because
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In her complaint, Ms. Maddox also asserted claims for prospective injunctive relief against Mr.
Cooper under Title I and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213. (Doc. 17, p. 10). She does not, however, seek prospective injunctive relief from Mr.
Cooper. (See Doc. 52-1, pp. 42–45, tpp. 168–78 (asking for damages to compensate for Mr.
Cooper’s failure to transfer her to a clean air environment, not for prospective injunctive relief)).
Moreover, Ms. Maddox has retired from ALDOT, so it is not clear how prospective injunctive
relief could benefit her. Accordingly, the Court will grant the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment with respect to Ms. Maddox’s claims against Mr. Cooper.
ALDOT did not refuse to provide her a reasonable accommodation or force her to
retire. (Doc. 51, p. 22). On October 4, 2017, the Court heard oral arguments on
ALDOT’s motion for summary judgment.2
For the reasons discussed on the
record at that hearing, and for the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To demonstrate that there is a genuine
dispute as to a material fact that precludes summary judgment, a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment must cite “to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1)(A). When considering a summary judgment motion, the Court must
view the evidence in the record and draw reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789
F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 2015).
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“The court need consider only the cited
A court reporter was present for the proceeding and a transcript is available upon request.
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materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3).
ANALYSIS
The standards used to determine whether an employer has violated the
Rehabilitation Act are the same as the standards applied under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq. Holbrook v. City of
Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522, 1526 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(d)) (“The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791–796(1), provides, in pertinent
part, that ‘[t]he standards used to determine whether this section has been violated
in a complaint alleging [nonaffirmative action] employment discrimination under
this section shall be the standards applied under [T]itle I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.).’”). “Title I of the ADA
provides that no covered employer shall discriminate against ‘a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual’ in any of
the ‘terms, conditions, [or] privileges of employment.’” Holbrook, 112 F.3d at
1526 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
To establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff “must prove that (1) [s]he has a
disability; (2) [s]he is a qualified individual; and (3) [s]he was subjected to
unlawful discrimination because of h[er] disability.” Holbrook, 112 F.3d at 1526
(citing Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 447 (11th Cir. 1996)). “An
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employer unlawfully discriminates against a qualified individual with a disability
when the employer fails to provide ‘reasonable accommodations’ for the
disability—unless doing so would impose undue hardship on the employer. Lucas
v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A)) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a)).
Under the ADA, the term “reasonable accommodation” may include,
inter alia, “job restructuring, parttime or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). This list
notwithstanding, “[t]he use of the word ‘reasonable’ as an adjective
for the word ‘accommodate’ connotes that an employer is not required
to accommodate an employee in any manner in which that employee
desires.” Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931, 947 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
This is so because the word “reasonable” would be rendered
superfluous in the ADA if employers were required in every instance
to provide employees “the maximum accommodation or every
conceivable accommodation possible.” Lewis, 908 F. Supp. at 947;
see also Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dept. of Admin., 851 F. Supp.
353, 360 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (“an employee is entitled only to a
reasonable accommodation and not to [a] preferred accommodation”),
aff’d, 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995). Stated plainly, under the ADA a
qualified individual with a disability is “not entitled to the
accommodation of her choice, but only to a reasonable
accommodation.” Lewis, 908 F. Supp. at 948.
Moreover, the burden of identifying an accommodation that would
allow a qualified individual to perform the job rests with that
individual, as does the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to
demonstrating that such an accommodation is reasonable. Willis v.
Conopco, 108 F.3d 282, 283 (11th Cir. 1997).
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Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285–86 (11th
Cir. 1997).
ALDOT does not dispute that Ms. Maddox suffers from asthma that is
exacerbated by her allergies to dust and asphalt. (See Doc. 51, pp. 25, 27). For
purposes of resolving ALDOT’s motion for summary judgment, the Court
assumes, without deciding, that Ms. Maddox can prove she has a disability as
defined under the ADA. ALDOT provided a number of accommodations to Ms.
Maddox to address her disability. ALDOT allowed Ms. Maddox to leave work
anytime the asphalt fumes affected her breathing. (Doc. 52-1, p. 35, tpp. 138–39).
It provided an air purifier for Ms. Maddox’s office. (Doc. 52-1, p. 47, tpp. 186–
87). ALDOT even relocated its asphalt lab to the rear of the building in which Ms.
Maddox worked (Doc. 52-1, p. 64, tp. 256), and replaced the air ventilation system
in that building (Doc. 52-1, pp. 64–65, tpp. 256–58). ALDOT offered to transfer
Ms. Maddox to the District 5 office in Shelby County. (Doc. 52-1, p. 47, tp. 188).
Ms. Maddox declined this transfer and asked instead for a transfer to the main
office. (Doc. 52-1, pp. 47–48, 51, tpp. 188–89, 203). ALDOT offered to transfer
Ms. Maddox to the main office but, because the main office was undergoing mold
remediation, ALDOT conditioned its transfer offer on Ms. Maddox obtaining a
letter from her doctor stating that the main office would provide a safe
environment for Ms. Maddox to work. (Doc. 52-1, pp. 51, 54, tpp. 203, 216). Ms.
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Maddox acknowledges that her doctor was not willing to provide such a letter and
that the mold in the main office might have caused health problems for her. (Doc.
52-1, p. 59, tpp. 234–35). Ms. Maddox argues that ALDOT should have allowed
her to take sick leave until a clean-air environment could be created in which she
could work. (Doc. 52-1, p. 65, tp. 260).
The Court is sympathetic to Ms. Maddox’s frustration, but the Rehabilitation
Act does not require an employer to create an environment completely free of
fumes, dust, mold, or other allergens to accommodate an employee’s health
condition.
ALDOT was required to provide Ms. Maddox with reasonable
accommodations, not the maximum accommodation or the accommodation of her
choice.
ALDOT offered several accommodations to Ms. Maddox, including
allowing her to leave work any time the office conditions affected her breathing.
Under the circumstances presented, this accommodation was tantamount to Ms.
Maddox’s request for sick leave. Thus, ALDOT satisfied its legal obligation to
accommodate Ms. Maddox.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above and stated on the record at the
hearing, the Court finds that Ms. Maddox cannot establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. The Court GRANTS the defendants’
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motion for summary judgment (Doc. 49). The Court will enter a separate final
judgment.
DONE this 3rd day of July, 2018.
_________________________________
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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