Davis v. Falls et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Judge William M Acker, Jr on 2/4/16. (SAC )

FILED
2016 Feb-04 AM 11:36
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
VINCENT EDWARD DAVIS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
BRANDON FALLS, et al.,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:16-cv-103-WMA

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the court is the motion of plaintiff Vincent Edward
Davis for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). The motion
will be granted by separate order. The granting of the motion,
however, imposes a duty upon the court to review Davis’s complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which requires the court to dismiss the
action if it “is frivolous,” “fails to state a claim on which
relief may
defendant

be
who

granted,”
is

immune

or

“seeks
from

monetary

such

relief

relief.”

28

against

a

U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B).
This action is due to be dismissed under § 1915 for two
reasons. First, plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine set
forth in Heck v. Humphrey, in which the Supreme Court stated:
[I]n
order
to
recover
damages
for
allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal
1

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §
2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a
conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated
is not cognizable under § 1983.
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). In his complaint, plaintiff alleges
that defendants violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in the course of his 2001 arrest, indictment, and conviction
on five counts of theft of property, as well as by denial of his
requested post-conviction remedies. There is no indication in
plaintiff’s

complaint,

however,

that

his

conviction

has

been

overturned or invalidated by one of the ways identified in Heck.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s action is barred by Heck and is due to be
dismissed.
Second,

plaintiff’s

action

is

barred

by

the

statute

of

limitations applicable to § 1983 claims. In Owens v. Okure, 488
U.S. 235, 250 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the statute of
limitations to be applied to a § 1983 action is the state general
or

residual

statute

of

limitations

governing

personal

injury

actions. The general or residual statute of limitations in Alabama
is two years. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l); Holt v. Valls, 395 F.
App’x 604, 606 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, plaintiff’s claims are based
on events occurring in 2001, when he was arrested and convicted of
theft of property. The statute of limitations has therefore long
since expired, requiring dismissal.
Accordingly, Davis’s action will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 by separate order, and his motion for appointment of an
2

attorney will be denied.
DONE this 3rd day of February, 2016.

_____________________________
WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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