Willingham v. Industrial Chemicals Inc

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM OPINION regarding text order 41 . Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 11/29/2018. (KAM)

FILED
2018 Nov-29 PM 02:40
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JEFFREY D. WILLINGHAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS, INC.
and WILLIAM L. WELCH, JR.,
Defendants.

}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}

Case No.: 2:16-cv-00435-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Jeffrey Willingham has filed a motion seeking relief from the
Court‟s order dismissing his RICO claims against defendants Industrial Chemicals,
Inc. and William Welch. (Doc. 35). Mr. Willingham asks the Court to either
reinstate his RICO claims, allow him to file an amended complaint, or certify the
Court‟s decision to dismiss his RICO claims for appeal under Rule 54(b). (Doc.
35, p. 1). For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Mr. Willingham‟s
motion for relief.
BACKGROUND
The defendants fired Mr. Willingham from his job at Industrial Chemicals.
Mr. Willingham alleges that the defendants fired him because of his disability and
because of his race in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and 42

1

U.S.C. § 1981. (Doc. 18). The defendants have not asked the Court to dismiss Mr.
Willingham‟s ADA claim, and the Court previously has determined that Mr.
Willingham has adequately pleaded his claim for race discrimination. (See Doc.
34).
The focus of this order is Mr. Willingham‟s third theory of recovery – his
RICO theory. Mr. Willingham asserts that IC and Mr. Welch, Mr. Willingham‟s
“ultimate boss,” violated RICO because they knowingly employed at least two
illegal aliens, and when IC fired him, the company unlawfully chose to retain an
illegal alien in a job which Mr. Willingham “had previously performed and was
willing and able to perform again.” (Doc. 18, pp. 4-5). The Court dismissed Mr.
Willingham‟s RICO claims because the Court found that “that Mr. Willingham did
not plead facts that would allow the Court to infer that the defendants‟ alleged
RICO violations were a substantial factor in the causal chain” that resulted in his
termination. (Doc. 34, p. 6). Because Mr. Willingham alleges that he worked
alongside at least one illegal alien at IC, and because he alleges that other factors –
race and disability – contributed to his unlawful termination, the Court was unable
to conclude that there was a substantial causal connection between IC‟s alleged
employment of illegal aliens and Mr. Willingham‟s termination. (Doc. 34, pp. 68). Mr. Willingham argues that the Court clearly erred in construing his factual

2

allegations and that he is, therefore, entitled to relief from the order dismissing his
RICO claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources,
reconsideration of an order is an extraordinary remedy and is employed sparingly.”
Wallace v. Holder, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (N.D. Ala. 2012). Reconsideration
is appropriate when there is a “change in controlling law,” when new evidence
becomes available, or when a court must correct clear error or prevent manifest
injustice. Wallace, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
DISCUSSION
1. Reinstatement of RICO Claims
Mr. Willingham argues that the Court clearly erred when it concluded that
the factual allegations supporting his RICO claims fail to give rise to an inference
of proximate causation.

Mr. Willingham contends that his allegation that

“Defendants fir[ed] Plaintiff, an American, and retain[ed], and prefer[ed] to retain,
at least one illegal alien” fairly addresses the causation element of his RICO
claims. The Court will assume for purposes of this motion that Mr. Willingham is

3

correct but still will dismiss his RICO claims because Mr. Willingham has failed to
properly allege a RICO claim for a separate reason. (Doc. 35, p. 4).1
Mr. Willingham‟s RICO allegations fail to state a colorable RICO claim
because there cannot be a RICO conspiracy between only a company and its
employees. See Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2016). To
properly allege a RICO violation, a plaintiff must identify a RICO enterprise, and
the members of an enterprise must be distinct from one another. Ray, 836 F.3d at
1355-57.

“[A] corporate defendant acting through its officers, agents, and

employees is simply a corporation. Labeling it as an enterprise as well would only
amount to referring to the corporate „person‟ by a different name.” Ray, 836 F.3d
at 1357. Because Mr. Willingham alleges only that IC conspired with one of its
employees, he has not alleged a valid RICO claim. See Burchfield v. Indus.
Chems., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-2816-RDP, 2012 WL 5872808 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 16,
2012); Danny Lynn Elec. & Plumbing, LLC v. Veolia ES Solid Waste, No.
2:09CV192-MHT, 2011 WL 2893629, at *2–3 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (citing cases to
1

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have
indicated that, when ruling on a motion to dismiss RICO claims, a district court must consider
whether the plaintiff has adequately pleaded causation. See Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d
1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 457 (1991)).
“If the pleadings indicate that other causes contributed to the plaintiff‟s injuries, then the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the alleged RICO violation was a substantial factor in that causal chain.”
(Doc. 34, p. 6 (citing Simpson v. Sanderson Farms, 744 F.3d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 2014)).
Because Mr. Willingham alleges that his disability and his race were factors contributing to his
unlawful termination, he must show that a RICO violation was a substantial factor in causing his
termination. The Court will not explain again why it believes Mr. Willingham‟s allegations are
insufficient because the Court will dismiss the RICO claims based on Mr. Willingham‟s failure
to allege a RICO enterprise.
4

support the proposition that “a corporation and its associated subsidiaries,
employees and agents do not form an enterprise that satisfies the distinctness
requirement under RICO.”).
2. The Futility of Granting Leave to Amend the Complaint
Mr. Willingham attached a proposed second amended complaint to his
motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 35-1). Because Mr. Willingham is outside of
the 21-day window for freely amending his pleading, he may amend if the Court
gives him leave to do so under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). That rule
provides that a district court should freely give a plaintiff leave to amend his
pleadings “when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). But a district court
may deny a motion to amend “when (1) there has been undue delay, bad faith,
dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed; (2) allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing
party; or (3) amendment would be futile.” Lucas v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 716 Fed.
Appx. 866, 870 (11th Cir. 2017); see generally Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d
1008, 1015 (11th Cir. 2005) (denying plaintiff‟s motion to amend because “[t]he
deficiencies of the second amended complaint remained in the proposed
complaint”).

5

Here, Mr. Willingham‟s proposed second amended complaint does not
address the deficiencies in his current complaint. (Doc. 35-1, p. 5). Therefore, it
would be futile to allow the amendment.
3. Certification for Appeal
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), a district court must conduct a
two-step analysis to determine whether to certify an order for an interlocutory
appeal. Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777
(11th Cir. 2007). First, a court must determine whether the decision that a party
seeks to appeal is in fact a final judgment. Lloyd Noland Found., Inc., 483 F,3d at
777. Second, a court must find “there are no just reasons to delay the appeal of
[the] individual final judgment[].” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446
U.S. 1, 8 (1980).
The Supreme Court has instructed district courts to be mindful of “the
historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals” and the “„judicial administrative
interests as well as the equities involved‟” when considering a request for an
interlocutory appeal. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 8 (quoting Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956)).
This case is in the early stages of discovery, and Mr. Willingham is able to
pursue his discrimination claims. (Doc. 35, p. 11). Should discovery produce
evidence that would allow Mr. Willingham to properly allege a RICO claim, Mr.
6

Willingham may ask for permission to pursue a RICO claim at that juncture. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). Mr. Willingham has not indicated that he will suffer
substantial prejudice if he must wait until his theories of discrimination are
adjudicated before he may appeal the dismissal of his RICO claims.
By contrast, certifying the dismissal of Mr. Willingham‟s RICO claims for
appeal now would force the defendants to continue to litigate issues that they
already have argued in their motion to dismiss, in a hearing before this Court, and
in their response to Mr. Willingham‟s present motion for relief. (Docs. 21, 31, 38).
Given the opportunities that Mr. Willingham has had to make his arguments, the
Court does not believe that it is a prudent use of the Court‟s or the parties‟
resources to certify the dismissal of the RICO claims for immediate appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Mr. Willingham‟s motion for
reconsideration and declines to reinstate Mr. Willingham‟s RICO claims. Mr.
Willingham may proceed against the defendants on his claims for discrimination in
violation of the ADA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
DONE and ORDERED this November 29, 2018.

_________________________________
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7