Muhammad v. Rice et al
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM OPINION - Here, the evidence submitted by the plaintiff falls short of overcoming the presumption of the decedents continued Alabama domicile and showing by a preponderance that at the time of his death the decedent had established a physi cal presence in Georgia with an intent to remain there indefinitely. Accordingly, this action is due to be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A separate final order will be entered. Signed by Magistrate Judge Staci G Cornelius on 10/18/2018. (KEK)
FILED
2018 Oct-18 PM 04:05
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARTHA S. MUHAMMAD,
Plaintiff,
v.
WENDY RICE, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No.: 2:16-cv-01206-SGC
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the undersigned are the parties’ briefs on the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. (Docs. 35, 36). For the reasons discussed below, this district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, this
action is due to be dismissed without prejudice.
I. Procedural History
Martha S. Muhammad commenced this action individually and as the
administrator of the Estate of Ayatollah Khomeini Muhammad. (Doc. 1). In those
capacities, she asserts claims for wrongful death, negligent supervision, and loss of
consortium against the defendants, C.R., a minor, and Wendy and Brian Rice,
individually and as next friend of C.R. (Id.). Federal subject matter jurisdiction is
premised on diversity of citizenship. (Id. at ¶ 2). To that end, the complaint
alleges Martha S. Muhammad (the “plaintiff”) is a citizen of Georgia (id. at ¶ 4),
Ayatollah Khomeini Muhammad (the “decedent”) was a citizen of Georgia (id. at ¶
1
5), the defendants are citizens of Alabama (id. at ¶¶ 6-8), and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000 (id. at ¶ 2). In their answer, the defendants deny the
existence of diversity jurisdiction on the ground the decedent was not of diverse
citizenship from the defendants. (Doc. 6 at ¶ 2, ¶ 5, p. 4). Consistent with the
obligation of a district court to ensure its subject matter jurisdiction at all times, by
an order dated September 11, 2018, the undersigned directed the Clerk to terminate
the parties’ pending motions for summary judgment addressing the merits of the
plaintiff’s claims and directed the parties to brief the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. (Doc. 34). The defendants submitted their brief on September 24,
2018 (Doc. 35),1 and the plaintiff submitted her brief on September 25, 2018 (Doc.
36).
II. Facts2
The decedent is the plaintiff’s son. (Doc. 36-1 at 5-7). He was shot and
killed in Blount County, Alabama on July 23, 2014. (Id.). Details for a criminal
harassment case to which he pleaded guilty in the District Court of Jefferson
County, Alabama in December 2004 identify 2600 Sweeney Hollow Road or 428
Plaza Drive, both in Birmingham, Alabama, as his address at that time and reflect
1
The defendants’ brief was docketed as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 35).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERM the motion.
2
The undersigned considers the evidence presented by the parties in the form of affidavits and
other documents. Unsworn statements contained in briefs are not evidence of citizenship for
purposes of establishing diversity. Travaglio v. Am. Exp. Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir.
2013)
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he held an Alabama driver’s license. (Doc. 35-5 at 2). Case details for a traffic
violation to which he pleaded guilty in the Sumiton, Alabama Municipal Court in
August 2012 identify 9600 Bradford Trafford Road in Warrior, Alabama as his
address at that time and record he held an Alabama driver’s license. (Doc. 35-4 at
2). A marriage certificate issued to the decedent and Wendy Rice by the Probate
Court of Jefferson County, Alabama in April 2013 identifies Birmingham,
Alabama as the decedent’s residence. (Doc. 35-3 at 2). Wendy Rice attests that
through December 2013, she and the decedent resided at a rental property in
Oneonta, Blount County, Alabama. (Doc 35-1 at 3). A traffic citation issued to
the decedent in Alabama by the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office on June 26,
2014, identifies 2345 7th Place N.W., Apt. K in Birmingham, AL as his address3
and records he held an Alabama driver’s license. (Doc. 35-2 at 2). Wendy Rice
attests that for 7-10 days immediately preceding his death, the decedent resided
with Brandon Shofner in Pinson, Alabama and it was her understanding the
decedent intended to remain there. (Doc. 35-1 at 3). She also attests that prior to
his death, the decedent had regularly worked for All My Sons Moving Company in
Homewood, Alabama; Eastern Tree Service in Pinson, Alabama; and Bass Pro
Shops in Irondale, Alabama. (Id. at 2).
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Wendy Rice attests this address was “our apartment residence.” (Doc. 35-1 at 3).
3
The plaintiff, by contrast, attests the decedent resided with her at 2773
Snapfinger Manor in Decatur, Georgia at the time of his death, had not resided at
the Alabama address listed on his driver’s license for at least a year at the time of
his death,4 had refused Wendy Rice’s attempts to convince him to return to
Alabama in June 2014, and had traveled to Blount County, Alabama at the time of
his death for a car show. (Doc. 36-1 at 2-3). In further support of her allegation
the decedent was a Georgia citizen at the time of his death, the plaintiff submits the
following evidence: (1) the decedent’s death certificate listing 2773 Snapfinger
Manor, Decatur, Georgia as his residence (id. at 5-7; Doc. 36-4 at 2-4);5 (2) letters
of administration issued by the Probate Court of DeKalb County, Georgia,
indicating the decedent’s domicile in DeKalb County, Georgia as the basis of the
probate court’s jurisdiction (Doc. 36-1 at 9);6 (3) a bill for medical treatment the
decedent received in Atlanta, Georgia on July 9, 2014,7 identifying his address as
2773 Snapfinger Manor, Decatur, Georgia (id. at 12); (4) photos of medication the
plaintiff attests was prescribed for the decedent in connection with the foregoing
4
Wendy Rice attests 2345 7th Place N.W., Apt. K, Birmingham, Alabama is the address that
appeared on the decedent’s driver’s license. (Doc. 35-1 at 3).
5
The plaintiff attests Wendy Rice provided the information for the decedent’s death certificate.
(Doc. 36-1 at 3).
6
A decedent’s residence at the time of death in the county where application for administration
of his estate is made is one basis for a Georgia probate court’s exercise of jurisdiction. O.C.G.A.
§ 15-9-31. For purposes of this Georgia statute, residence is equivalent to domicile. Wright v.
Goss, 494 S.E. 2d 23, 26 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
7
The plaintiff attests the decedent received medical treatment for a hand injury sustained while
working on his car. (Doc. 36-1 at 3).
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treatment and that she further attests the decedent filled in DeKalb County,
Georgia (id. at 3, 13-15);8 (5) the affidavit testimony of Alice Goodman that the
decedent resided at 2773 Snapfinger Manor in Decatur, Georgia with his mother
and was Goodman’s neighbor in July 2014 (Doc. 36-2 at 2); (6) Brandon Shofner’s
statement to the Blount County Sheriff’s Office that on the day of his death the
decedent told Shofner there was “nothing here for him,” “he was going back to Atl.
w/ his mother, ” and “he was going to go see [someone] about a job for money to
get home” (Doc. 36-5 at 2); and (7) a business card for the decedent’s personal
training services printed with the 2773 Snapfinger Manor, Decatur, Georgia
address and a phone number with a Georgia area code (Doc. 36-6 at 2).
III. Discussion
Subject matter jurisdiction premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires every
plaintiff to be of diverse citizenship from every defendant. Triggs v. John Crump
Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). Where an estate is a party, it is
the citizenship of the decedent at the time of his or her death that is relevant for
purposes of determining diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2); Moore v. N. Am.
Sports, Inc., 623 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2010).9 A natural person is a citizen
8
The photos are too dark and blurry for the undersigned to make out an address printed on the
medication. (See Doc. 36-1 at 13-15).
9
The citizenship of the estate’s legal representative is relevant to the extent the representative
asserts claims in his or her personal capacity. Leyva v. Daniels, 530 F. App’x 933, 934 (11th Cir.
2013) (citing Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1562 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994)).
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of the state where he is domiciled, and domicile requires residence in a state and an
intention to remain there indefinitely.
Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1269; see also
McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A person’s
domicile is the place of his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal
establishment, and to which he has the intention of returning whenever he is absent
therefrom . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).10
Determination of a person’s domicile requires consideration of a variety of
objective facts, including:
where civil and political rights are exercised, where taxes are paid,
where real and personal property are located, where driver’s and other
licenses are obtained, where mail is received, where telephone
numbers are maintained and listed, where bank accounts are
maintained, where places of business or employment are located, and
where memberships in local professional, civil, religious or social
organizations are established.
Slate v. Shell Oil Co., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1215 (S.D. Ala. 2006). No one fact is
given controlling weight, but rather, courts look to the totality of the
circumstances.
Id.
Determination of a person’s domicile also requires
consideration of subjective statements of intent. Id. However, such statements are
not dispositive, id., and in fact, the Eleventh Circuit has noted, “[c]ourts generally
The defendants do not dispute the plaintiff, who asserts a claim for loss of consortium in her
personal capacity, is a citizen of Georgia.
10
The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized “[c]itizenship, not residence, is the key fact that must be
alleged in the complaint to establish diversity for a natural person.” Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d
1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Keshock v. Metabowerke GMBH, 2015 WL 4458858, at *2
(S.D. Ala. July 21, 2015) (collecting Eleventh Circuit cases).
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give little weight to a party’s profession of domicile . . . because these declarations
are often self-serving.” Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d
1330, 1342 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Hendry v. Masonite Corp., 455 F.2d 955,
956 (5th Cir. 1972) (“In determining one’s ‘citizenship’ or ‘domicile’ statements of
intent are entitled to little weight when in conflict with facts.”).
Finally, courts consider certain presumptions to aid their determination of a
person’s domicile. Audi Performance & Racing, LLC v. Kasberger, 273 F. Supp.
2d 1220, 1226 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (noting usefulness of certain presumptions
regarding domicile). There is a presumption a person’s current residence is his or
her domicile. Id.; see also Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1342 (noting it could be presumed
party was domiciled at current residence until controverted by fact). However,
because domicile has a mental or subjective element, it “ ‘is not necessarily
synonymous with “residence,” and one can reside in one place but be domiciled in
another.’” McNeal v. Workmaster, 2009 WL 4508545, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 30,
2009) (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48
(1989)); see also Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1341-42 (“Domicile is not synonymous with
residence; one may temporarily reside in one location, yet retain domicile in a
previous residence.
Although physically present in the current residence, the
person does not intend to remain in that state indefinitely.”).
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There is also a century-old presumption that once a person establishes a
domicile in one state, that remains his domicile until he satisfies the physical and
mental requirements of domicile in another. See Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S.
350, 353 (1874) (“A domicile once acquired is presumed to continue until it is
shown to have been changed.”); Audi, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (noting
requirements to overcome presumption). “The reason for this presumption is to
solve the problem of locating an individual who has clearly abandoned his present
domicile but either has not arrived at a new one or has arrived without formulating
the intent to stay.” White v. All Am. Cable & Radio, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 69, 72
(D.P.R. 1986) (citing 13E Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3612 (3d ed.)); see also Jones
v. Law Firm of Hill and Ponton, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1355 (M.D. Fla. 2001)
(noting courts refer to presumption of continuing domicile because changes in
residence are so common in this country). The party invoking federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of proving facts supporting its existence by a preponderance of
the evidence, McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1257, and the presumption of continuing
domicile imposes “a heavier burden on a party who is trying to show a change of
domicile than is placed on one who is trying to show the retention of an existing or
former one,” Audi, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
Here, the evidence establishes the decedent was domiciled in Alabama in the
years preceding his death. In December 2004, the decedent held an Alabama
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driver’s license and maintained one or more addresses in Birmingham, Alabama.
(Doc. 35-5 at 2).
In August 2012, he held an Alabama driver’s license and
maintained an address in Warrior, Alabama. (Doc. 35-4 at 2). In April 2013, he
and Wendy Rice obtained a marriage license from the Jefferson County, Alabama
Probate Court, and in doing so, the decedent identified his residence as
Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. 35-3 at 2). Wendy Rice testified she and the
decedent resided in a rental property in Oneonta, Alabama through December 2013
and that the decedent had regularly worked for businesses located in Alabama.
(Doc. 35-1 at 3). The plaintiff has produced no evidence to contradict that the
decedent was domiciled in Alabama during this time. Therefore, the question is
whether the plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption of continuing domicile and show by a preponderance of the evidence
the decedent had acquired a new domicile at the time of his death. See Slate, 444
F. Supp. 2d at 1215-16 (noting a person can have only one domicile at a time).
As an initial matter, the letters of administration issued by the DeKalb
County Probate Court identifying the decedent’s domicile in DeKalb County,
Georgia as the basis for the probate court’s jurisdiction (Doc. 36-1 at 9) are not
conclusive proof of the decedent’s domicile for purposes of establishing federal
subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship. See 13E Fed.
Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3612 (“Although a wide variety of documents can be entered
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as evidence of a person’s domicile, they are always subject to judicial scrutiny and
evaluation. Even formal declarations made for purposes other than the pending
lawsuit . . . are not conclusive.”). A state probate court’s adjudication of domicile
is not conclusive even for purposes of probate proceedings. See Wilson v. Willard,
358 S.E. 2d 859, 861 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (noting adjudication of domicile by
probate court in one state does not preclude conflicting adjudication of domicile by
probate court in another state); 121 A.L.R. 1200 (collecting “long line of cases”
supporting this settled proposition). Given as much, evidence of the decedent’s
residence and domiciliary intent has greater weight on the determination of
domicile in this action than the summary conclusion of domicile contained on the
face of the letters of administration.
There is conflicting evidence as to where the decedent resided after
December 2013 and in the months immediately preceding his death. However,
even assuming the plaintiff has made a sufficient showing the decedent was
residing in Georgia at the time of his death and had merely traveled to Alabama for
a car show, she has failed to produce preponderating evidence the decedent had
formed the requisite intent to make Georgia his home for an indefinite duration.
The bill for a single medical encounter the decedent had in Atlanta, Georgia
after an accident (Doc. 36-1 at 12) and the related medication he filled in that state
(id. at 3, 13-15) confirm the decedent’s presence in Georgia in July 2014, but they
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do not speak to his intent to remain there. Similarly, while the decedent’s rejection
of Wendy Rice’s efforts to convince him to return to Alabama in June 2014 (id. at
3) and his statement to Brandon Shofner on the day of his death that there was
“nothing [in Alabama] for him” (Doc. 36-5 at 2) could be viewed as evidence of an
intent to abandon Alabama as his domicile, they are not persuasive evidence of an
intent to make Georgia his fixed home.11 See White, 642 F. Supp. at 72 (noting
assumption of continuing domicile exists to solve problem of locating individual
who has abandoned present domicile without yet acquiring new one).
Finally, although the decedent’s business card for his personal training
services (Doc. 36-6 at 2) shows the decedent had some notion of remaining in
Georgia long enough that he would need to earn a living there, it lacks indicia of
permanence that would make it more compelling evidence of domiciliary intent.
The address listed on the card is the plaintiff’s home address in Decatur, Georgia
where the plaintiff claims the decedent was residing with her (id.); in other words,
the decedent had not leased or purchased commercial space for his business.
Moreover, the plaintiff has not shown the decedent opened a Georgia bank account
11
Any evidentiary value of the decedent’s statements to Shofner that “he was going back to Atl.
w/ his mother,” and “was going to go see [someone] about a job for money to get home” is
undercut by the fact that upon leaving Shofner’s residence, the decedent did neither of these
things but, rather, went to the house where Wendy Rice was living in Blount County, Alabama.
(Doc. 36-5 at 2-3). See Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1342 (noting courts generally give little weight to
professions of domicile because such declarations are often self-serving); Hendry, 455 F.2d at
956 (noting statements of intent are entitled to little weight in determining domicile when in
conflict with facts).
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for his business, purchased equipment for his business, had a client who used his
personal training services, or otherwise took any action to establish his business
beyond printing a business card.
IV. Conclusion
A federal court must zealously ensure the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction. Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001). It is
obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever presented
with the possibility it does not exist, Univ. of S. Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168
F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999), and it must dismiss an action if it determines at any
time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). Here, the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff falls short of overcoming the presumption of
the decedent’s continued Alabama domicile and showing by a preponderance that
at the time of his death the decedent had established a physical presence in Georgia
with an intent to remain there indefinitely. Accordingly, this action is due to be
dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A separate final
order will be entered.
DONE this 18th day of October, 2018.
______________________________
STACI G. CORNELIUS
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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