Johnson v. Blount County et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Johnson does not state a claim for age discrimination using Jeff as a comparator, nor does he state a constructive discharge claim or a § 1983 claim. Accordingly, Defendants motion is GRANTED and those claims are DISMISSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge John H England, III on 3/27/2017. (KEK)
2017 Mar-27 PM 04:25
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
BLOUNT COUNTY, et al.,
Case No.: 2:16-cv-01215-JHE
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
On July 25, 2016, Plaintiff Percy Johnson (“Johnson” or “Plaintiff”) initiated this action,
alleging a count for employment discrimination by Defendants on the basis of his age in violation
of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), a count for constructive discharge from his employment, and a count for violation of
his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. (Doc. 1). Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss
portions of Johnson’s first count and the entirety of his second and third counts. (Doc. 6). Johnson
filed a response in opposition on September 6, 2016. (Doc. 8). Defendants did not file a reply.
For the reasons stated more fully below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “[T]he pleading standard
Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge
conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 9).
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.
Ct. 1955 (2007)). Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action” are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid
of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
Additionally, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The complaint must establish “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965
(“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”).
Ultimately, this inquiry is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
The court accepts all factual allegations as true on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
See, e.g., Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000). However, legal
conclusions unsupported by factual allegations are not entitled to that assumption of truth. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
Factual and Procedural Background2
Johnson, now 57, was hired by the Blount County Commission (the “BCC”) on March 31,
2010, and last employed by Blount County as a Motor Grader Operator/Heavy Equipment
Operator III, grade 8. (Doc. 1 at 4-5). Johnson made $13.48 per hour and was the only employee
at his location with this role. (Id. at 5). At some point, the BCC hired a 32-year-old named Jeff,
for a “Truck Driver” position. (Id.). Jeff was not qualified for the Operator III position but
nevertheless was placed in it and received the same pay as Johnson. (Id.). In December 2015, the
BCC hired another younger employer, 32-year-old Colby McAnally, for a “Truck Driver”
position; McAnally was also placed in the Operator III position and received higher pay than
Johnson. (Id. at 5-6). Neither McAnally nor Jeff were hired, paid, or placed through a vote by all
the commissioners of the BCC, as required by its policy. (Id.).
One of the county commissioners, Carthal Self, told Johnson he was being discriminated
against because of his age, as McAnally made more money than Johnson despite having less
experience. (Id. at 6). Johnson raised this issue with the county commissioners and requested a
raise, but, although two commissioners supported Johnson’s efforts, Defendants Chris Green (the
county commission chair) and Dean Calvert (a county commissioner) told him he could not have
a raise. Calvert justified this by stating a raise for Johnson would require an across-the-board raise.
(Id. at 7). Calvert offered to reclassify Johnson as a mechanic, which would indirectly give
Johnson a raise; Johnson would not be required to do the actual work of a mechanic, but would
“When considering a motion to dismiss, all facts set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint ‘are
to be accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached
thereto.’” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting GSW,
Inc. v. Long Cnty., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993)). In other words, these “facts” are taken
directly from the complaint.
simply get a different title and higher pay. (Id. at 7-8). Johnson refused, stating it was against
policy and unethical. (Id. at 8). Calvert then denied to Self he had offered Johnson the mechanic
title; Self relayed that denial to Johnson. (Id.). Johnson’s complaints about this to the human
resources department were met with the statement the “rule book was dead.” (Id.). Johnson
suffered “stress, embarrassment, humiliation, shame, high blood pressure, and low self-esteem”
and resigned, whereupon he was replaced by a younger employee. (Id.).
Defendants have moved for partial dismissal of Johnson’s claims. Specifically, they seek
to dismiss any claims using “Jeff” as a comparator, Johnson’s claims of constructive discharge,
and Johnson’s § 1983 claim.
A. Count I – ADEA Claims Related to “Jeff”
Defendants first move to dismiss Johnson’s claims of age discrimination founded on the
comparison of himself and Jeff, the employee Johnson alleges was paid the same as him despite
being less qualified. (Doc. 6 at 1). Defendants state Johnson has failed to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination with respect to Jeff because Jeff did not receive a higher wage than Johnson.
(Id. at 1-2). Johnson acknowledges he and Jeff made the same wage but states Jeff was not
qualified for that wage. (Doc. 8 at 5). He additionally responds he has alleged other facts
supporting a claim of age discrimination: that McAnally received a higher wage and that Johnson
was replaced by a younger employee after being constructively discharged. (Id. at 5-6).
First, Defendants misstate Johnson’s burden at the motion to dismiss stage. Defendants
argue Johnson’s claims using Jeff as a comparator fail to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas. However, both the
Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have expressly refused to treat the evidentiary standard
of McDonnell Douglas as a pleading standard for an employment discrimination plaintiff’s
complaint. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515, 122 S.Ct. 992, 999 (2002) (“[A]n
employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination . . . to
survive [a] motion to dismiss.”); Davis v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974
(11th Cir. 2008) (Title VII complaint not required to make out McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case); Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2004) (“McDonnell
Douglas [is] an evidentiary rather than a pleading standard . . . pleading a McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case [is] not necessary to survive a motion to dismiss”) (emphasis in original).
Johnson’s allegations need not rise to the level of a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case at this
stage of the proceedings.
Although Johnson is not required to allege facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case,
the elements of a prima facie case are a useful guide to determining whether his complaint states
a claim plausible enough to survive scrutiny under Iqbal and Twombly. See Bowers v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. Sys. Of Georgia, 509 Fed. Appx. 906, 910 (11th Cir. 2013) (elements of prima
facie case of Title IX discrimination a guideline for determining whether a plaintiff has stated a
claim). In the specific context of age-based wage discrimination, those elements are (1) the
plaintiff is a member of the protected age group (i.e., between the ages of 40 and 70); (2) he
received low wages; (3) similarly situated persons outside the protected group received higher
wages; and (4) he was qualified to receive the higher wages. MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo,
922 F.2d 766, 774 (11th Cir. 1991).
Examining those elements, Johnson clearly does not state a claim with respect to Jeff
because he explicitly admits Jeff was not paid more than him—rather, Johnson was paid the same
amount as Jeff. (Doc. 1-1 at 2; doc. 8 at 5). Johnson relies on his superior qualifications to suggest
Jeff did not deserve to make the same wage and ought not have been placed in the same position,
but offers no authority to convert this theory into actionable age discrimination. Johnson does not
merely fail to allege facts sufficient to meet the third element of the prima facie case (potentially
a permissible omission at this stage), the facts he does allege negate that element entirely. With
no adverse employment action at its core, Johnson’s ADEA claim is due to be dismissed to the
extent it uses Jeff as a comparator.
Johnson also argues he states an age discrimination claim using McAnally as a comparator,
as well as by alleging he was replaced by a younger employee after his resignation. (Doc. 8 at 56). Defendants have explicitly declined to challenge the McAnally claims in their motion to
dismiss and make no mention of the claims relating to Johnson’s replacement. (Doc. 6 at 8). Thus,
those claims proceed.
B. Count II – Constructive Discharge
Defendants offer two arguments for the insufficiency of Johnson’s constructive discharge
claim: (1) Johnson fails to state a claim because failure to pay equal wages is not a sufficient basis
for constructive discharge and (2) even if Johnson does state a claim for constructive discharge,
he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to that claim. (Doc. 6 at 2-3). Johnson
counters that constructive discharge is an issue of fact rather than law and, in addition to unequal
pay, his constructive discharge resulted from the Defendants’ “intentional, deceitful, corrupt, and
illegal conduct” and effort to engage him in that conduct to avoid discriminatory pay. (Doc. 8 at
7-8). Johnson further states this caused him a variety of emotional and physical harms. (Id. at 8).
“To successfully claim constructive discharge, a plaintiff must demonstrate that working
conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person in [his] position would have been
compelled to resign.” Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 553 (11th Cir.
1997) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Whether a particular set of conditions amounts to
constructive discharge is an issue generally left to the trier of fact. See Wardwell v. Sch. Bd. of
Palm Beach Cty., Fla., 786 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1986). Without more, though, allegations
of unequal pay alone are insufficient to establish constructive discharge. Bourque v. Powell Elec.
Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980).3
Johnson’s complaint does not identify which facts support which count, but merely alleges
the following conditions support his constructive discharge claim: “the Defendant’s unlawful
discrimination, unlawful payment of lower wages to Johnson, and the Defendant’s inability to
follow it’s [sic] own procedure[.]” (Doc. 1 ¶ 52). The first two of these are clearly just a
restatement of Johnson’s claim of wage discrimination: he was discriminated against, therefore he
received lower wages. Johnson contends in his response the Defendants inviting him to join in
their improper classification scheme and refusing to give him a raise without his involvement in
the scheme is non-wage-related and argues “[w]hether a reasonable person could tolerate this
conduct is a question for the jury and not a question as a matter of law.” (Doc. 8 at 8). However,
the operative question here is not whether the conditions were intolerable (which would indeed be
a question for the jury), but whether the policy violations are separate from the wage claim.
The complaint includes the following examples of policy violations by Defendants:
Johnson asked for a raise pursuant to the Commission’s policies on numerous occasions, which
required a vote by the four county commissioners, and apparently did not receive one. (Doc. 1 at
¶¶ 21-22). Jeff and McAnally were hired and paid in violation of policy, as neither received a vote
The decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981, are
binding in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
by the commissioners and neither was “placed in the minimum wage classification for [his] job.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 23-26, 30). Dean Calvert told Johnson he could give him the title (but not the
responsibilities) of mechanic and thus secure a raise for him that way, a statement Johnson was
later told Calvert denied making. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-40). Finally, Johnson was told by an HR employee
that the “rule book was dead.” (Id. at 41).
Examining each of these instances, the undersigned cannot see how Johnson alleges
conduct separate from his wage discrimination claim. The Commission’s failure to give Johnson
a raise pursuant to its policies and subsequent hiring of Jeff and McAnally at the same or higher
pay rates in violation of policy are identical to the wage claim. The only conduct plausibly separate
from the wage claim is Calvert’s offer of reclassification, which Johnson presumably means when
he contends he was expected to engage in criminal activity to receive higher pay. Even in
presenting the argument this is separate from the wage claim, though, Johnson ties it back into the
discriminatory discrepancy in pay: “[t]he Plaintiff was not receiving a living wage, and they hired
younger, not qualified individuals at the same rate or higher without following proper protocol,
but placing these employees in the same position/title/grade as the Plaintiff when they were not
qualified, thus defrauding the taxpayers of Blount County.” (Doc. 8 at 8) (emphasis added). The
failure to follow procedures is the source of the age-based unequal pay, which is itself the source
of the alleged fraud on the taxpayers. In other words, the conduct that is supposedly separate from
the unequal pay claim is simply the mechanism through which the inequality in pay happened.
Even though Johnson points to the “embarrassment, humiliation, and stress” he suffered, the
inquiry into whether he states a claim for constructive discharge sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss is not about his subjective reaction (or even a reasonable person’s reaction), but rather
about whether he alleges something beyond unequal pay. He does not, and his constructive
discharge claim is due to be dismissed.
Because Johnson’s complaint is insufficient to state a claim for constructive discharge, the
undersigned does not reach Defendants’ administrative exhaustion argument.
C. Count III - § 1983 Claim
Finally, Defendants argue Johnson’s § 1983 claim must be dismissed. They note Johnson’s
§ 1983 count does not identify what constitutional right they are alleged to have violated and
assume it is a continuation of Johnson’s age discrimination claim. (Doc. 6 at 6-8). Defendants
argue the ADEA precludes an age discrimination claim under § 1983, and, alternatively, it is a
“class of one” equal protection claim and barred because Johnson was a public employee. (Id.).
Johnson states the law in the Eleventh Circuit is unsettled as to whether § 1983 claims of age
discrimination are precluded by the ADEA. (Doc. 8 at 10-11). Johnson argues he also alleged
violations of procedural due process by Defendants in failing to follow their policies on raises and
in assigning Jeff and McAnally to classifications that did not match the work they performed. (Id.
1. ADEA and § 1983
To the extent Johnson’s § 1983 claim is premised on age discrimination (and therefore,
although Johnson does not directly identify it, the Equal Protection Clause), Defendants point to
the Eleventh Circuit’s statement “the majority of Circuit Courts to address the issue have ruled
that the ADEA precludes the filing of age discrimination claims under Section 1983.” Duva v.
Board of Regents, 654 Fed. Appx. 451, 454 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Tapia–Tapia v. Potter, 322
F.3d 742, 745 (1st Cir. 2003); Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 757 F.3d 99, 110 (3rd Cir. 2014);
Zombro v. Balt. City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364, 1369 (4th Cir. 1989); Lafleur v. Tex. Dep't of
Health, 126 F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 1997); Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051,
1057 (9th Cir. 2009); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated on other
grounds by Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Migneault, 528 U.S. 1110, 120 S.Ct. 928, 145
L.Ed.2d 806 (2000); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1991); but see Levin
v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the ADEA does not preclude
section 1983 equal protection claims)). In opposition, Johnson points to the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Levin—the lone circuit court case cited by the Eleventh Circuit as permitting age
discrimination claims under § 1983—and a district court case from the Northern District of Iowa,
see Mummelthie v. Mason City, Ia., 873 F.Supp. 1293 1316-17 (N.D. Iowa 1995), on which the
Levin court based its reasoning in part.
Johnson is correct that the Eleventh Circuit has not directly addressed whether an age
discrimination claim under § 1983 is foreclosed by the ADEA; the Duva court acknowledged the
agreement of other circuits, but explicitly declined to decide the issue. See 654 Fed. Appx. at 454
(“because resolution of the preclusion issue is not dispositive in this appeal, we need not decide
that issue today”). However, the Eleventh Circuit has addressed the closely-related matter of
whether the ADEA precludes a federal employee from pursuing a § 1983 age discrimination claim,
holding it does. See Ray v. Nimmo, 704 F.2d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Paterson v.
Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 524–25 (5th Cir. 1981)). Additionally, the vast majority of district
courts in the Eleventh Circuit have concluded the ADEA forecloses the possibility of age
discrimination suits under § 1983 for all government employees. See Committe v. Bd. of Trustees
of the Florida State Univ., No. 4:15CV228-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 4942044, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug.
26, 2016), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Bruce Committe v. Bd. of Trustees of the
Florida State Univ., No. 4:15CV228-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 4942015 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2016)
(collecting cases). While none of this is dispositive of the issue, it does weigh in favor of
Beyond the sheer volume of persuasive authority supporting preclusion, the undersigned is
convinced by the reasoning leading to that result. The inference of the congressional intent
required for a statutory scheme to implicitly preclude a § 1983 claim may be shown by whether
“the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive.” Middlesex Cty.
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2626, 69 L. Ed. 2d
435 (1981). In Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989), the leading
case supporting preclusion, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the statutory framework of the ADEA to
determine if it met this test. Observing the ADEA’s mechanisms fit its purpose of facilitating an
informal process of mediation by the EEOC, the absence of such a process if § 1983 claims were
available, and the lack of evidence of congressional intent to the contrary, the court found it did.
Id. at 1368.
The provisions of the ADEA, we thus conclude, evidence congressional intent
to foreclose actions for age discrimination under § 1983. To allow such actions
would only circumvent the obvious congressional mandate, as well as the
detailed procedures of the Act. It is implausible that Congress would have
intended to preserve the private cause of action under § 1983 for age
discrimination when that cause of action would severely undermine, if not
debilitate, the enforcement mechanism created by Congress under the ADEA.
Congress, we believe, did not intend to permit plaintiffs to bypass the
comprehensive statutory scheme clearly embodied in the language and
legislative history of the ADEA merely because they are employed by an
agency operating under color of state law.
Id. at 1369.
Similarly, the undersigned is skeptical of the rationale adopted by the Seventh Circuit,
which concluded § 1983 claims were not precluded by the ADEA notwithstanding its
comprehensive nature because Congress was required to (and did not) provide some additional
indication of its intent. Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d at 619. The Levin court was the first to address
the issue after the Supreme Court’s decision in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S.
246, 129 S.Ct. 788, 172 L.Ed.2d 582 (2009), which held § 1983 claims were not precluded by Title
IX. The Levin court concluded Fitzgerald required a higher standard of congressional intent—a
clear statement in either its legislative history or statutory language—to conclude a § 1983 claim
alleging a constitutional violation was preempted, as compared to a § 1983 claim alleging a
statutory violation. Levin, 692 F.3d at 619. However, as the Third Circuit later observed in
rejecting Levin’s reasoning, the statutory-constitutional distinction embraced by Fitzgerald does
not require anything beyond the comprehensiveness of a statute to infer congressional intent to
preclude § 1983 claims. Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing
Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 253). This makes sense, because the primary concern in allowing § 1983
claims alongside a comprehensive statutory framework is enabling a remedy “inconsistent with
Congress’s carefully tailored scheme.” Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 255. A § 1983 claim bypasses that
scheme entirely. Therefore, the undersigned concludes Johnson’s § 1983 claim is precluded by
the ADEA insofar as it is based on age discrimination.
As Johnson’s § 1983 age discrimination claim is due to be dismissed because it is
precluded, it is unnecessary for the undersigned to consider whether that claim is a “class of one”
claim barred by Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 170 L. Ed. 2d
2. Procedural Due Process
In passing, Johnson’s response brief alleges his § 1983 claim is predicated in part on
procedural due process. (Doc. 8 at 12). Even assuming Johnson’s procedural due process claim
were not simply a restatement of his age-based wage discrimination claim, he has not alleged facts
to support the elements of such a claim and his complaint cannot be plausibly read to have done
A § 1983 claim based on procedural due process must assert (1) a deprivation of a
constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally
inadequate process. Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). On the first
element, the United States Constitution secures Johnson no right to procedural due process for his
raise unless state law provided him with a legitimate expectation of that raise. See Lassiter v.
Alabama A&M Univ. Bd. Of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1148 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated
on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). It is broadly conceivable the “dead”
rule book Johnson references could have created a property interest in a raise, see Marshall v. City
of Cape Coral, Fla., 797 F.2d 1555, 1559 (11th Cir. 1986) (personnel rules sufficient to create
property interest), but Johnson’s complaint points neither to the rule book nor any other source to
provide facts establishing such a property interest. The most Johnson’s complaint can fairly be
read to argue, even with all reasonable inferences made in his favor, is there is a set of procedures
through which an employee may request a raise, (doc. 1 at ¶ 21), after which a vote by the
commissioners determines whether the raise is granted, (doc. 1 at ¶ 22). This is the bare possibility
of entitlement to a raise, not its plausibility. Beyond mere assertion, Johnson presents no
discernable procedural due process claim, and this assertion cannot save his § 1983 count.
Johnson does not state a claim for age discrimination using Jeff as a comparator, nor does
he state a constructive discharge claim or a § 1983 claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is
GRANTED and those claims are DISMISSED.
DONE this 27th day of March, 2017.
JOHN H. ENGLAND, III
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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