Kitchens v. Jefferson County Board of Education

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 10/19/2017. (PSM)

FILED
2017 Oct-19 PM 04:26
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ANGELA KITCHENS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFFERSON COUNTY
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.

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2:16-cv-01232-LSC

Memorandum of Opinion
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Angela Kitchens (“Kitchens”) brings this action against her

employer, Jefferson County Board of Education (“the Board”), alleging that she
suffered discrimination on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). Before this Court
is the Board’s Motion for Summary Judgement. (Doc. 14.) For the reasons
explained herein, the Board’s motion is due to be GRANTED.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

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Kitchens is a physical education teacher at McAdory Middle School (the
“Middle School”) and has been employed by the Board since 2004. In addition to
teaching, Kitchens was the head softball coach at the Middle School and the
assistant volleyball coach at McAdory High School (the “High School”); she is
also a school bus driver. In May 2015, Jennifer Smith (“Smith”), the head varsity
softball coach at the High School, informed Brent Shaw (“Shaw”), who was the
principal of the High School at the time, that she was not going to continue
coaching softball in the following school year. In order to hire a new varsity softball
coach for the High School, Shaw “posted” the position on “SearchSoft,” which is
an intranet system used by the Alabama Department of Education. Shaw eventually
received three applications for the position from (1) Kitchens, (2) Joshua Coffelt
(“Coffelt”), and (3) K.R. Battles (“Battles”). At the time of the application,
Coffelt was a science teacher as well as the assistant varsity softball coach and the
assistant boys’ basketball coach at the High School. Battles was an English teacher
and the head varsity volleyball coach at the High School.
After conducting an initial round of interviews with other employees of the
Board, Shaw chose Coffelt to be the interim varsity head softball coach for the High
School during the summer. Prior to this recommendation, Shaw had informed his
superior that he had been hired to be a principal at a different high school. Shaw
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wanted the new principal for the upcoming year to make a final hiring decision for
the softball coach position.
Tod Humphries (“Humphries”), a former assistant principal at Pleasant
Grove High School, was chosen to be the new principal at the High School in July
2015. Humphries interviewed the same three candidates and received
recommendations from Shaw, Kane, Powell, and Storie about who they thought
should have the position. He ultimately decided to hire Coffelt as the varsity
softball coach and informed Kitchens of his decision on or about August 6, 2015.
Kitchens then filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on September 25, 2015, alleging she was not selected to be
the head softball coach on account of her sex. She was mailed her right to sue letter
from the EEOC on May 2, 2016, and then instituted this suit.
B. HIRING PRACTICES BY THE BOARD AND AT THE HIGH SCHOOL
The Board has no standard process for the hiring of coaches for the schools
in the district. Instead, the principal of each school is given discretion to post jobs,
conduct interviews, and make initial hiring recommendations. (Storie Depo. at 19.)
The Board typically only advertises head varsity football or basketball coaching
positions, as these positions have a teaching position attached to them. Id. For
other coaching positions, the general practice is for the school administrator to first
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look to current faculty of the school to fill the position, but teachers are often hired
from other schools to fill coaching vacancies. Id. at 19-20. At the High School in
2015, there were coaches who taught at other schools in the Jefferson County
school system. The Board’s only qualification to be a coach was for the applicant to
have a teaching certificate. (Doc. 16. ¶ 4.)
Once a principal makes hiring decisions for coaches, he submits a list of his
selections to the Board so they may receive a monetary supplement for coaching.
Upon the principal’s submission, the Board’s athletic department reviews the
candidates and assigns them a supplemental salary based on an internal pay
schedule. (Storie Depo. at 27.) The athletic department gives the list to the Board’s
human resources department, who forwards the list to the superintendent who in
turn recommends the coaches to the Board for approval. Once approved, the
coaches receive a supplemental salary for performing their coaching duties. In
Kitchens’ case, the Board did not independently investigate or interview any of the
candidates for the position. (Doc. 16 ¶ 14.) In regards to Board approval of
principals’ coaching assignments, the director of athletics, Ken Storie (“Storie”),
does not recall an instance where a principal’s recommendation for a coaching
supplement was denied by the Board. (Storie Depo. at 33.)
C. THE SHAW INTERVIEW
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The first interview of candidates for the head varsity softball coach position
was conducted by Shaw, David Powell (“Powell”), Kim Kane (“Kane”), and
Storie. At the time of the interview, Shaw was principal of the High School, Powell
was the High School Athletic Coordinator; Kane was the Board Athletic
Department Supervisor; and Storie was the Board Athletic Director, among other
roles. (Doc. 16 ¶ 5.) The interview began with the same six questions that were
asked to each applicant, followed by an opportunity for the interviewee to ask
questions or make additional statements. (Kane Aff. ¶ 4.) The four interviewers
took notes on the interviewees’ answers and additional questions the interviewers
wished to ask the interviewees.
One of the six questions asked to each applicant was “[w]alk us through a
typical practice, beginning at 3:00.” (Kane Aff. Ex. A.) As summarized by Kane’s
notes for the interview, Kitchens answered that the running, stretching, and
throwing part of the practice would be directed by an assistant, as Kitchens would
be driving her bus route. (Kane Aff. ¶ 4, Ex. A.; Kitchens Depo. at 85.) Kitchens’
bus route generally ran from 2:55 PM when she left the Middle School to 3:45 PM
when she returned to the Middle School and conducted a post-trip inspection of
the bus. (Kitchens Depo. at 56-58.) Both Storie and Shaw’s interview notes
indicate concern with Kitchens’ bus route. (Storie Depo., Ex. 3 “Follow up . . .
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*Plans to continue bus route.”; Shaw Aff. ¶ 13, Ex. A “Any questions: [Kitchens]
[b]rings up bus route. She [Kitchens] plans to still have bus route.”) Coffelt did not
drive a bus at the time of his interview or hiring. (Humphries Aff. ¶ 6.)
The interviewers also asked about the interviewee’s previous experience in
athletics, with a specific focus on softball. Kitchens listed her extensive experience
playing and coaching softball. She played softball while attending the University of
Alabama-Huntsville. (Kitchens Aff. ¶ 1.) Before applying for the coaching position
at the high school, she had previously been the head softball coach at Calera High
School, Shades Valley High School, Bragg Middle School, Bob Jones High School,
and co-coached varsity softball at Limestone High School. Id. Kitchens was the
head softball coach of the Middle School’s team since 2006. Id. at ¶ 2.
As the assistant coach for the High School varsity softball team for the past
two years, Coffelt also had requisite coaching experience in softball, although it
does not appear that he had ever played softball. (Smith Aff. ¶ 3.) The outgoing
head coach of the softball team, Smith, informed Powell and Shaw that she did not
receive any complaints about Coffelt when he was her assistant coach and that “he
was ready to be the head varsity softball coach.” (Smith Aff. ¶ 8.)
After conducting the three interviews, Shaw, Powell, Kane, and Storie all felt
that Coffelt should be hired as the varsity softball head coach. Storie recommended
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Coffelt because he thought that Coffelt was the best fit for the school’s students
and the program. Specifically, Storie liked that Coffelt was already familiar with the
team. (Storie Depo at 105.) Storie additionally felt that Coffelt was a better choice
because Coffelt worked at the High School. Id. at 106. The High School runs on a
five-period day, and the fifth period is often designated for athletics. Varsity
coaches at the High School were able to begin practice during the fifth period, thus
allowing the team to complete practice earlier. Id. at 106. Storie felt that early
practices were advantageous because it allowed the players to return home, focus
on their studies, and rest. Id. In relation to Kitchens, who worked at a different
school with a different schedule and drove a bus, Storie believed Coffelt would be
able to begin practice hours earlier. Adding to the chances of scheduling problems,
Kitchens’ employment at the Middle School would not allow her to coordinate as
easily with the administrators at the High School and could potentially lead to
issues scheduling games with other coaches during playoffs. Id. at 108.
Storie felt that Kitchens appeared “haughty” during the interview; as
though she “felt like she was owed the position.” Id. at 109. Additionally, when
asked about her position as an assistant varsity volleyball coach, Kitchens stated
that she actually ran the program. Id. Storie felt that Kitchens had overstated her
role because the program was actually headed by another coach, Ms. Battles. Id.
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Shaw, Powell, and Kane also recommended Coffelt over Kitchens for the
same reasons as Storie. They felt that Kitchens’ answer that she would miss part of
practice due to her bus route put her at a disadvantage to Coffelt, who would be
able to conduct early practices and attend games. (Kane Aff. ¶ 6; Powell Aff. ¶ 6;
Shaw Aff. ¶¶ 19-20.) Coffelt was at the High School, whereas Kitchens was at the
Middle School. (Kane Aff. ¶ 6; Powell Aff. ¶ 6; Shaw Aff. ¶ 20.) Kane felt that
Kitchens came across in the interview as if she felt that she was “entitled to the job
and should not have been interviewed.” (Kane Aff. ¶ 7.) Shaw essentially echoes
Kane’s opinion of Kitchens: he felt that Kitchens did not appear to be a “team
player” and that Coffelt had a better interview than Kitchens. (Shaw Aff. ¶ 20.)
Shaw and Powell also added that Smith, the former coach, had recommended
Coffelt to be the new varsity head coach. Id.
Kitchens herself felt that the interview was poorly conducted. She stated that
the interviewers did not appear to be “sincere or concerned about the program.”
(Kitchens Depo. ¶¶ 82, 93.) Kitchens could not recall whether she was asked about
the bus route during the interview, but admitted that if she discussed the bus route,
it would be in relation to the scheduling of practices. (Kitchens Depo. ¶ 88.) She
also disputed the four interviewers’ characterization of her answer about her role
on the volleyball team. According to Kitchens, her answer that she “basically . . .
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run[s] the program” was in regards to a question of whether she had any
experience running a sports program. (Kitchens Depo. ¶ 85.)
Kitchens stated that following the interview she texted Shaw to ask him if he
would be appointing the new head varsity softball coach. She also wanted to know
why no one had asked her during the interview whether she would be willing to give
up the bus route. (Kitchens Depo. ¶¶ 97-98.) Shaw said that because he was leaving
the school the next principal would decide who would be the head coach. Id. at 97.
He also asked whether Kitchens would be willing to give up the bus route. Id. at 98.
She answered “If I were able to be head softball and head volleyball.” (Kitchens
Depo. ¶ 98.)
D. HUMPHRIES INTERVIEW
After becoming principal at the High School, Humphries was informed of
the vacant softball coach position and the interviews of the three candidates
conducted by Shaw, Storie, Kane, and Powell. He asked Kane to provide him with
questions to ask the candidates and then re-interviewed Kitchens, Coffelt, and
Battles by asking each of them identical questions to begin each interview.
(Humphries Aff. ¶¶ 2-3)
Prior to Humphries’ interview, Kitchens had contacted Craig Pouncey
(“Pouncey”), the Board’s superintendent, to ask him whether there was a Board
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policy against driving a bus and being a head coach at the same time. (Humphries
Depo. at 195-97; Kitchens Depo. at 102-03.) Pouncey told Kitchens that coaches
are not per se disqualified by virtue of driving a bus route, although he understood
the concern with Kitchens missing part of practice. (Kitchens Depo. at 103.)
Pouncey allegedly told Kitchens that “I . . . could see that you could try it to see if it
would work.” (Kitchens Depo. at 103.) Humphries stated that Pouncey had later
contacted him to relay the conversation Pouncey had with Kitchens and to tell
Humphries that “this is your decision, but [Kitchens’ bus route is] a problem.”
(Humphries Depo at 197.)
Because Humphries knew of Kitchens’ conversation with Pouncey, he
wanted to ask her during the interview about the bus route. (Humphries Depo. at
195, 197.) Humphries directly asked Kitchens whether she would give up the bus
route, and Kitchens stated she would not. (Humphries Depo. at 198-99.) On the
other hand, Kitchens gave contradictory statements about her interview with
Humphries; she stated she does not remember or “can’t recall” whether
Humphries asked her to give up the bus route, although she “recall[ed] talking to
him about how bus routes are a lot of money . . . we talked about the money issue of
[bus routes].” (Kitchens Depo. at 115.) Kitchens stated that she told Humphries
that she would have certain parts of the practice run by assistants, and generally
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how she would structure the practice and have a bus route at the same time.
(Kitchens Depo. at 113-14.)
Humphries told Kitchens that he was concerned her bus route would
interfere with her responsibilities as head coach, specifically with the scheduling of
practices and games. (Humphries Depo. at 198.) He likewise feared that he would
set a precedent for other head coaches of major sports at the High School to begin
driving buses if he hired Kitchens. (Humphries Depo. at 198-99; Kitchens Depo. at
113 (“He said he had concerns with the bus, that he needed to set a precedent, that
he wanted all his varsity coaches at practice.”); see also Humphries Depo. at 96-97
(specifying “basketball, football, softball, baseball, volleyball, and wrestling” as
“major sports”).) Kitchens stated that at the end of her interview, Humphries told
her that she was the “most qualified candidate” but that he had concerns with her
bus route. (Kitchens Depo. at 116.)
Humphries also felt that Kitchens had been overbearing in relation to her
role as assistant volleyball coach. He stated that during his tenure as interim
principal of the High School from 2013 to 2014, he became aware Kitchens had
inappropriately been holding herself out as the “quasi head volleyball coach,”
when she was actually the assistant. (Humphries Depo. at 229-30.) Humphries
stated that during the interview Kitchens appeared to ask him to give her the head
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volleyball and softball coach positions in exchange for her giving up her bus route.
(Humphries Depo. at 224.) He thought this was inappropriate to ask, since it would
entail the firing of the current volleyball coach, Battles.
E. DECISION TO HIRE COFFELT
After interviewing the three candidates, Humphries called Shaw, Powell,
Kane, and Storie. Each recommended to Humphries that Coffelt become head
varsity softball coach. (Humphries Aff. ¶ 11.)
Humphries felt Kitchens had inappropriately been holding herself out as the
“quasi head volleyball coach,” when she was actually the assistant. (Humphries
Depo. at 229.) He states that he was aware of her making such statements while he
was the interim principal at the High School from 2013 to 2014. (Humphries Depo.
at 230.) Humphries felt during the interview that Kitchens acted as if she could
schedule the practices whenever she wanted, and that this was inappropriate
because ultimately the principal and superintendent have the final say in scheduling
times for practice. (Humphries Depo. at 236.)
Humphries stated that he hired Coffelt over Kitchens because: (1) Kitchens
would have to miss practice over the bus routes; (2) Kitchens was not a teacher at
the High School; (3) in the interview she stated that she had wanted Battles to be

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fired as head volleyball coach and replaced by her; and (4) Shaw, Powell, Kane, and
Storie recommended Coffelt over Kitchens. (Humphries Aff. ¶ 12.)
Humphries also stated that he hired Coffelt because he had worked with
Coffelt before, knew Coffelt to be a “stand-up person,” and trusted him.
(Humphries Dep. at 241.) Humphries additionally placed great weight on the
recommendations of Shaw, who at one time was his assistant and who he knew to
be reliable; as well as Kane, Powell, and Storie, who were involved in the Board’s
athletics department and were experienced. (Humphries Depo. at 242.)
Following Humphries’ decision, Kitchens was in Humphries’ office on an
unrelated matter. Humphries stated that as Kitchens left the office, she popped her
head back in the office and asked “It was the bus right?”; Humphries understood
her question to be about his decision to hire Coffelt. Humphries stated he said that
the bus route was “a big part of it.” (Humphries Depo. at 200.) Kitchens related a
contradictory version of this discussion, where she asked Humphries “was it the
bus route?,” and he answered “yes, it was just the bus route. It was not your
performance at all.” (Kitchens Aff. ¶ 9. (emphasis added).) During her deposition
Kitchens said she spoke with Humphries in his office after finding out he hired
Coffelt, and that he told her she was the most qualified candidate. (Kitchens Depo.
at 118.)
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III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgement is appropriate when “the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Ave. CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 723 F.3d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 2013). A genuine dispute as to a material fact
exists “if the nonmoving party has produced evidence such that a reasonable
factfinder could return a verdict in its favor.” Greenberg v. BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waddell v.
Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001)). The trial
judge should not weigh the evidence but must simply determine whether there are
any genuine issues to be resolved at trial. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 249.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must give
deference to the non-moving party by “view[ing] the materials presented and all
factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2015)
(citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). However,
“unsubstantiated assertions alone are not enough to withstand a motion for
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summary judgment.” Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.
1987). Conclusory allegations and “mere scintilla of evidence in support of the
nonmoving party will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment.”
Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Young
v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004)). “[T]he moving party
has the burden of either negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s
case or showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the
nonmoving party’s case.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236,
1242 (11th Cir. 2013). Although the trial courts must use caution when granting
motions for summary judgment, “summary judgment procedure is properly
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of
the Federal Rules as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any

individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1).
Discrimination claims under Title VII are typically categorized as either singlemotive or mixed-motive claims. Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227,
1236 (11th Cir. 2016). Here, Kitchens has alleged only single motive discrimination.
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A plaintiff can prove her discrimination claims by either direct or
circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1236-37 (citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S.
90, 99-102 (2003)). Where, as in Kitchens’ case, a plaintiff attempts to prove
intentional discrimination using circumstantial evidence, the Court applies the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting framework to evaluate singlemotive or “pretext” discrimination claims. Id. at 1238 n.7; see also Vessels v. Atlanta
Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of
producing circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d
1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 1999). If the plaintiff meets her initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Trask v.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub
nom. Trask v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1133, 197 L. Ed. 2d 176 (2017). If the defendant is
successful, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the
employer’s proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination.” Id. (quoting Alvarez
v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010)).
A. KITCHENS’ PRIMA FACIE CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
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Although the McDonnell Douglas analysis typically starts with an examination
of whether the plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the
Board’s motion does not contest Kitchens ability to do so. Thus, the Court will
presume its existence for the purposes of the summary judgment motion and
proceed immediately to the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Bass
v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, Orange Cty., Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1104 (11th Cir. 2001)
overruled in part on other grounds by Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th
Cir.2008); see also Imaging Business Machines, LLC v. BancTec, Inc., 459 F.3d 1186,
1191 (11th Cir. 2006) (where a defendant’s Rule 56 motion has not challenged an
element of a claim, absent notice and an opportunity to be heard, a court may not
grant summary judgment against a plaintiff based on the insufficiency of evidence
to establish that element of his claim).
B. THE BOARD’S LEGITIMATE, NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON
PROMOTING COFFELT OVER KITCHENS

FOR

As there is no dispute about Kitchens’ prima facie case, the burden of
production shifts to the Board “to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions.” Brown v. Ala. Dept. of Trans., 597 F.3d 1160, 1174 (11th Cir. 2010).
“This burden is one of production, not persuasion . . . .” Kragor v. Takeda Pharm.
Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)).
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“The defendant need not

persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is
sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
discriminated against the plaintiff.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (citation omitted). “[T]o satisfy this intermediate burden, the
employer need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of
fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by
discriminatory animus.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th
Cir. 1997) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added)). The employer may
rely on subjective evaluations as long as the employer provides “a clear and
reasonably specific factual basis” for those evaluations. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229
F.3d 1012, 1034 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
The Board has proffered three different reasons for its promotion of Coffelt
over Kitchens: (1) Kitchens was a bus driver who drove a route every day, which
created scheduling conflicts, while Coffelt did not drive a bus; (2) Kitchens was a
teacher at the Middle School, while Coffelt was a teacher at the High School; (3)
Kitchens and Coffelt were interviewed twice and all interviewers recommended
Coffelt be named as the varsity softball coach. Kitchens does not dispute that the
reasons given by the Board satisfy its burden under the McDonnell Douglas test,

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(doc. 17 at 9-10); nonetheless the Court briefly examines the grounds to conclude
they satisfy the Board’s burden of production.
From the Shaw and Humphries interviews it is apparent that the
interviewers were concerned that the head varsity softball coach be present for the
entirety of the practice. (See Kane Aff. ¶ 6; Powell Aff. ¶ 6; Shaw Aff. ¶¶ 19-20;
Storie Depo at 105-06.; Humphries Depo. at 195-99.) Kitchens in both interviews
stated she would continue to drive her bus route while coaching, where Coffelt did
not drive a bus route. Kitchens was employed at the Middle School, which had a
different schedule for class periods and also a different principal, making it more
difficult for Humphries to work closely with and supervise Kitchens. Coffelt taught
at the High School, and thus it would be easier for Humphries to work directly with
him and schedule games and practices. Finally, all interviewers recommended
Coffelt be hired over Kitchens. The interviewers cited Kitchens’ bus route, her
employment at the Middle School, as well as their greater experience in working
with Coffelt, trust in Smith’s recommendation of Coffelt, and belief that Kitchens
had a poor attitude during the interviews. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1033-34
(interviewers’ subjective perception of applicant’s interview performance is a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason where grounds for perception are clear and

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reasonably specific). The Court finds that the Board has proffered three legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for hiring Coffelt over Kitchens.
C. KITCHENS’ FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE
PROFFERED REASONS ARE PRETEXTUAL
If

an

employer

carries

its

burden

of

THAT THE

producing

a

BOARD’S

legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, the presumption of discrimination
created by the McDonnell Douglas framework drops from the case and “the factual
inquiry ‘proceeds to a new level of specificity.’” Brooks v. Cty. Comm’r, 446 F.3d
1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265,
1273 (11th Cir. 2002)). “To avoid summary judgment, [the plaintiff] must
introduce significantly probative evidence showing that the asserted reason[s given
by the defendant are] merely a pretext for discrimination.” Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163
(quoting Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 1993)).
“However, a reason is not pretext for discrimination ‘unless it is shown both that
the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’” Springer v.
Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 147 (2000) (“[I]t is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.” (emphasis
omitted)). A plaintiff can demonstrate that the employer’s proffered reason is
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pretextual

by

revealing

“weaknesses,

implausibilities,

inconsistencies,

incoherencies, or contradictions” in the defendant’s reasoning. Springer, 509 F.3d
at 1348. In determining whether a proffered reason is pretextual, courts are not in
the “business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair” but
instead are solely concerned with “whether unlawful discriminatory animus
motivates a challenged employment decision.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of
Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999).
Kitchens first argues that regardless of the Board’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds for hiring Coffelt, the Board’s hiring of Coffelt supports a
finding of pretext because Coffelt was less qualified than her. The promotion of “a
less qualified applicant over the plaintiff may be probative of whether the
employer’s proffered reason for not promoting plaintiff was pretextual.” Alexander
v. Fulton Cty., 207 F.3d 1303, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000). However, a plaintiff can show
pretext by disparity in qualifications only where “no reasonable person, in the
exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the
plaintiff for the job in question.” Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006)
(quoting Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also Brooks,
446 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1339 (11th Cir.
2000)) (“[A] plaintiff cannot prove pretext by simply arguing or even by showing
Page 21 of 31

that he was better qualified than the [employee] who received the position he
coveted.”).
Kitchens’ argument fails because at its essence it simply quarrels with the
wisdom of hiring Coffelt and the nondiscriminatory qualifications Humphries
focused on. Kitchens argues her greater breadth and depth of experience coaching
and playing softball made her dramatically more qualified for the position than
Coffelt. She points to her “decades more experience” coaching softball than
Coffelt. Kitchens finds support in Humphries statement that “she was the most
qualified candidate for the position but that he did not want to set a precedent
regarding being a head coach and driving a bus route at the same time.” (Kitchens
Aff. ¶ 8.)
The Court agrees that Kitchens has more experience coaching and playing
softball than Coffelt, but a review of the testimony of the five interviewers shows
that experience is only one of the many qualities that they sought in a coach. All
interviewers agreed it was important for the coach to be present during the entire
practice and Kitchens’ bus route would prevent her from doing so.
While Humphries allegedly told Kitchens that “she was the most qualified
candidate for the position,” he immediately told her that the bus route was a
determining factor. (Kitchens Depo. at 116.) Humphries’ use of the words “most
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qualified” need not confuse the legal question—whether “no reasonable person, in
the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over
the plaintiff for the job in question.” Ash, 546 U.S. at 457. Humphries’ statement
reveals that the bus route, and Kitchens’ resulting absence from part of practice,
was more important than the difference in the backgrounds of Coffelt and
Kitchens. While Kitchens had more experience, Coffelt was “better qualified”
when it came to availability. Using just the qualifications Humphries referred to in
his conversation with Kitchens, and not even those identified in the Board’s
pleadings, the Court finds Kitchens has not shown an extreme gap in qualifications
needed to prevail under the high standard described above.
As part of her qualifications argument, Kitchens asserts that the
interviewers’ belief that the bus route would prevent her from being present for the
whole practice is mistaken, because “coaches are free to schedule games and
practices as they like.” (Doc. 17 ¶ 6.) Kitchens offers no proof that coaches have a
final say in scheduling other than her own affidavit, while Humphries stated in his
deposition that ultimately principals have the final say in scheduling matters.
(Humphries Depo. at 232-33.) Construing this contradictory evidence in Kitchens’
favor, the result of the Court’s analysis does not change. Kitchens does not argue
she informed any of the interviewers she would schedule the practice after her bus
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route and only brings it up as a post hoc attack on the Board’s reasons for choosing
Coffelt. Humphries appeared to act under the assumption that Kitchens would
begin her practice while she was conducting her bus route and would instruct her
assistants to supervise practice. (See Kitchens Depo. at 85, 94.) Because an
employer’s mistaken belief still justifies a nondiscriminatory employment decision,
Humphries’ belief that Kitchens would miss part of her practice is enough to justify
his decision. Silvera v. Orange Cty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001).
Even if Humphries knew that Kitchens could start the practice after the bus route
concluded, and thus be there for the whole practice, he stated this was a nonoptimal schedule because students would get home too late and their academics
would suffer as a result. (Humphries Depo. at 205.)
Kitchens seeks to argue in the alternative to her qualifications argument that
each of the Board’s given reasons for hiring Coffelt as the head coach are false and
unworthy of credence. “In order to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must
produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that each of the
employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons is pretextual.” Kragor, 702 F.3d at
1307 (quoting Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1037). Kitchens must show that each of the
three preferred reasons for Coffelt’s hiring over her is pretextual in order to defeat
summary judgment.
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i.

KITCHENS’ BUS ROUTE
SCHOOL

AND

EMPLOYMENT

AT THE

MIDDLE

a. KITCHENS’ COMPARATOR ARGUMENT
Kitchens first argument is that the Board’s ground for not hiring her over
Coffelt—her bus route—is pretextual, because the Board employed other coaches
who had bus routes, and in any case Pouncey had told her that there was no rule
against driving a bus and being a coach at the same time. (Doc. 17 at 12-13.) She
argues that at the time of the hiring decision the Board employed twenty-seven
coaches who also drove school buses, including five coaches who were head
coaches of “major sports” such as soccer, basketball, and volleyball. Id. at 12.
Kitchens offers as comparators Chad Horn (“Horn”) and James Poindexter
(“Pointdexter”), both of whom coached at the High School in 2015. That year
Horn taught at the Middle School, drove a bus, and was the cross-country coach
and assistant baseball coach at the High School. (Humphries Depo. at 57-60;
Kitchens Aff. ¶ 6.) In 2015, Poindexter taught at the Middle School and had been
the head varsity basketball coach at the High School for years. Pointdexter started
coaching the varsity basketball team when the Middle School and High School
were combined as one school, and continued to teach once the school was divided
into the Middle and High School. (Storie Depo. at 107.)

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Identifying a comparator’s disparate treatment can be used to prove pretext,
in addition to the more widely known role of proving a prima facie case. Rioux v.
City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008); Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1259
(Court examined as part of plaintiff’s pretext argument whether there was any
disparate treatment of a similarly situated employee of a different race.). When
evaluating an allegation of disparate treatment, the comparator must be “similarly
situated to the plaintiff in all relevant respects.” Stone & Webster Const., Inc. v. U.S.
Dept. of Labor, 684 F.3d 1127, 1136 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Rioux, 520 F.3d at
1280). The Eleventh Circuit utilizes a “nearly identical” standard to determine
whether the job-related characteristics and situation of two employees are
sufficiently similar. Stone, 684 F.3d at 1134-35 (citing Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at
1323 n.2); see also MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 774 n.16 (11th
Cir. 1991). The “nearly identical” standard does not require that the comparators
are the “plaintiff’s dopplegangers” but requires “much more than a showing of
surface-level resemblance.” Flowers v. Troup Cty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327,
1340 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016).

Page 26 of 31

Neither Horn nor Pointdexter are similarly situated, such that their
treatment can be characterized as “nearly identical.” 1 Humphries chose to hire
Coffelt as the head softball coach, but had nothing to do with the hiring of Horn
and Pointdexter, which occurred before Humphries arrived and involved a
different decision-maker. See Silvera, 244 F.3d 1261 n.5 (“[D]ifferences in
treatment by different supervisors or decision makers can seldom be the basis for a
viable claim of discrimination.”); Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir.
1989) (“Courts have held that disciplinary measures undertaken by different
supervisors may not be comparable for purposes of Title VII analysis.”). But see
Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1281-82 (different supervisors not dispositive).
At the time Pointdexter was hired to be the head coach of the varsity
basketball team, he was working at the combined Middle and High School. When
the Middle and High School split into separate schools, Pointdexter worked at the
Middle School but retained his coaching position with the basketball team.
Kitchens on the other hand was applying directly to become the head varsity
softball coach while she worked at the Middle School. The circumstances of

1

Kitchens has not advanced any developed argument that any of other twenty-five coaches who
drive buses qualify as comparators in this case, outside of mentioning those coaches employed by
the Board also drove buses. The Court declines to develop Kitchens’ argument for her. Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir.1995) (The Court is not required “to
distill [a] potential argument that could [have] be[en] made based upon the materials before it on
summary judgment.”).

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Pointdexter and Kitchens’ hiring processes differ so that they are not “nearly
identical.”
Horn is likewise not a valid comparator. It is unclear from the record when
Horn was hired to be the cross-country coach, but in any case Humphries was not
the decision-maker as he was in Kitchens’ case. Humphries likewise stated a
preference for head coaches of “major sports” not having school bus routes. (Shaw
Aff. ¶ 19; Humphries Depo. at 82, 198-99.) Cross country is not a major sport
according to Humphries, while softball is. Finally, Kitchens has not shown that
there were any other teachers even willing to fill Horn’s coaching role, where in her
case, she was competing with other applicants for the position. Horn is thus not a
valid comparator to Kitchens because he was hired at a different time, not a head
coach of a major sport, and has unclear hiring circumstances.
Kitchens also argues her employment at the Middle School is a pretextual
reason for not hiring her because Horn and Pointdexter also worked at the Middle
School, but had coaching jobs at the High School. Springer, 509 F.3d at 1348.
During his deposition Humphries said he was generally averse to hiring coaches
who did not teach at the High School: “[T]here’s only two reasons I would [select
a coach that worked at a different school than the High School]. It’s, one, there’s a
championship level coach that’s willing to do it, . . . or there’s just nobody else to
Page 28 of 31

do it that’s qualified to do it.” (Humphries Depo. at 19-20.) The Board argues that
Humphries did not hire Kitchens because she did not fall into one of the two
exceptions. (Doc. 16 at 26-27.) Kitchens alleges that Horn and Pointdexter, who
worked at the Middle School but coached at the High School during the time
Humphries chose to not hire Kitchens, also do not fall into these two exceptions.
Thus, according to her argument, Humphries’ refusal to hire Kitchens because of
her employment at the Middle School must be a pretext for his actual reason, sex
discrimination.
Kitchens’ argument fails because it mischaracterizes Humphries’ statement.
Humphries’ self-imposed standard was that he would not hire a coach working as a
teacher at another school unless one of the two conditions was satisfied. He said
nothing about continuing to employ coaches who worked as teachers at another
school that had been employed previous to his tenure at the High School. As stated
above, when Pointdexter was hired he did work at the combined Middle and High
School. Nor does Kitchens offer any evidence that Horn was (1) not a
championship level coach or (2) that there were other persons at the High School
willing to take the job. Kitchens has failed to show how the Board’s proffered
reasons, (1) the bus route and (2) Kitchens’ employment at the Middle School, are
pretextual and that discrimination is the actual reason.
Page 29 of 31

ii.

THE INTERVIEWERS’
COFFELT’S INTERVIEWS

PERCEPTION

OF

KITCHENS’

AND

Kitchens also argues the Board’s third reason for not hiring her over Coffelt,
that all interviewers felt that Coffelt was more qualified, is pretextual. She rests her
argument on her conversations with Humphries that occurred after she found out
that Coffelt was hired. Humphries allegedly told Kitchens she was the most
qualified of the applicants and the bus route prevented her from being hired.
According to Kitchens, Humphries’s statement to Kitchens that she was most
qualified contradicts the Board’s argument that Humphries based his decision to
hire Coffelt on Shaw, Powell, Kane, and Storie’s recommendation to hire Coffelt;
because the Board’s argument is contradictory, a jury could find that sex
discrimination is the real reason Coffelt and not Kitchens was hired.
There are three different versions of what Humphries told Kitchens in his
office following his decision to employ Coffelt as head softball coach. Each version
differs slightly. The most helpful version of Humphries statement to Kitchens was
that her bus route was the only reason he hired Coffelt instead of her. (Kitchens Aff.
¶ 9.) Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Kitchens, i.e., the most
favorable version of Humphries’ statement, a reasonable jury could find
Humphries’ statement contradicts his argued reliance on the recommendations of
the other interviewers to hire Coffelt. Thus, Kitchens has carried her burden to
Page 30 of 31

show pretext for the Board’s grounds that it did not hire her because of her poor
interview performance. 2 By prevailing on this claim of pretext, Kitchens does not
change the final result as she has failed to show that the Board’s first and second
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for choosing Coffelt are pretextual.
V.

CONCLUSION
Kitchens has failed to show that all legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

the Board’s hiring of Coffelt instead of her were pretextual. As a result, the Board’s
motion for summary judgement is due to be GRANTED, and Kitchens’ claims
dismissed. An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered separately.
DONE and ORDERED on October 19, 2017.

_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
190485

2

Kitchens does not appear to argue that the Board’s second ground for choosing Coffelt over
Kitchens, her employment at the Middle School, was contradicted by Humphries’ alleged
statement that he did not hire Kitchens solely because of the bus route. This argument does not
receive further attention, as it is not properly before the Court. Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d at
599. Even if Kitchens made such an argument, it would not change the final result as the Court
finds that Kitchens’ bus route is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to hire Coffelt over her.

Page 31 of 31