Raymond v. GEICO Casualty Company

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Accordingly, the Court GRANTS GEICOs motion to dismiss (Doc. 16). The Court DENIES AS MOOT Mr. Raymonds motion to dismiss Count III (Doc. 20). The Court DISMISSES Mr. Raymonds claims WITH PREJUDICE. The Court will enter a separate final judgment. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 4/20/2018. (KEK)

FILED
2018 Apr-20 PM 04:24
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

STEVEN RAYMOND,
Plaintiff
v.
GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:16-cv-01292-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This insurance coverage dispute is before the Court on defendant GEICO
Casualty Company’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) and plaintiff Steven Raymond’s
motion to dismiss Count III (Doc. 20). GEICO argues that Mr. Raymond cannot
pursue his claims for breach of his uninsured motorist policy because Mr.
Raymond did not comply with the requirements of the policy. (Doc. 16, pp. 1–2).
Mr. Raymond asks the Court to dismiss his claim for bad faith without prejudice.
(Doc. 20, p. 1). For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant GEICO’s
motion and deny Mr. Raymond’s motion as moot.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain, “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). “Generally, to survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss and meet the
requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain ‘detailed
factual allegations,’ but rather ‘only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Maledy v. City of Enterprise, 2012 WL 1028176, at *1
(M.D. Ala. Mar. 26, 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555,
570 (2007)). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The Court must “accept[] the allegations in the complaint as true and
constru[e] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Miljkovic v. Shafritz &
Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hill v. White, 321
F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal marks omitted).

The Court may

consider as “part of the complaint for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes” exhibits that Mr.
Raymond attached to his complaint.

Miljkovic, 791 F.3d at 1297 n.4 (citing

Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c)). The Court also may consider the GEICO policy that
GEICO attached to its motion to dismiss because the policy is central to Mr.
Raymond’s claim, and the policy’s contents are not in dispute. See Lockwood v.
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Beasley, 211 Fed. Appx. 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2006); Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here the
plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint and those documents are
central to the plaintiff’s claim, then the Court may consider the documents part of
the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and the defendant’s
attaching such documents to the motion to dismiss will not require conversion of
the motion into a motion for summary judgment.”).
BACKGROUND
In his second amended complaint, Mr. Raymond alleges that on August 7,
2014, he was standing in the bed of his truck attempting to move a piece of
furniture when an unknown flatbed truck struck the bumper of his truck. (Doc. 15,
¶ 8). The collision caused Mr. Raymond to fall from the bed of his truck and suffer
serious injury. (Doc. 15, ¶¶ 8, 11). A bystander at the scene of the accident
contacted emergency responders who transported Mr. Raymond to the hospital.
(Doc. 15, ¶ 10). “[N]o police report was made detailing the accident.” (Doc. 15,
¶ 9).
From June 6, 2014, to September 23, 2014, GEICO insured Mr. Raymond
through automobile insurance policy number 4331-77-92-33. (Doc. 16-1, p. 3;
Doc. 15, ¶ 14; Doc. 15-1, p. 5). This policy included uninsured motorist coverage.
(Doc. 15, ¶ 14; Doc. 16-1, p. 3).
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On January 4, 2015, Mr. Raymond learned from a television program that he
might have a cause of action for damages against the driver of the unidentified
flatbed truck and contacted counsel. (Doc. 15, ¶ 12). On February 24, 2015, Mr.
Raymond, through counsel, notified GEICO of the accident. (Doc. 15, ¶¶ 13, 24).
GEICO denied Mr. Raymond’s claim. (Doc. 15, ¶¶ 15–24).
This lawsuit followed. Mr. Raymond asserts claims against GEICO under
his auto insurance policy for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage and breach
of contract. (Doc. 15, pp. 7–10). Mr. Raymond also asserts a bad faith tort claim
against GEICO. (Doc. 15, pp. 10–13). GEICO asks the Court to dismiss Mr.
Raymond’s claims with prejudice because Mr. Raymond did not report the August
2014 accident to police within twenty-four hours and did not report the accident to
GEICO within thirty days as required by Mr. Raymond’s insurance policy. (Doc.
16, pp. 1–2).
Under the title “LOSSES WE PAY,” Mr. Raymond’s GEICO insurance
policy provides, in relevant part:
Under the Uninsured Motorists Coverage [GEICO] will pay damages
for bodily injury caused by accident which the insured is legally
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto or
hit-and-run auto arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
that auto.
(Doc. 16-1, p. 14) (emphasis in policy). The policy defines “Hit-and-run auto” this
way:
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“Hit-and-run auto” is a motor vehicle causing bodily injury to an
insured through physical contact with him or with an auto he is
occupying at the time of the accident and whose operator or owner
cannot be identified, provided the insured or someone on his behalf:
(a) reports the accident within 24 hours to a police, peace or
judicial officer or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles;
(b) files with [GEICO] within 30 days a statement setting forth
the facts of the accident and claiming that he has a cause of
action for damages against an unidentified person; and
(c) makes available for inspection, at [GEICO’s] request, the
auto occupied by the insured at the time of the accident.
(Doc. 16-1, p. 14, ¶ 1) (emphasis in policy). The policy also contains a condition
that “[s]uit will not lie against [GEICO] unless the insured or his legal
representative have fully complied with all the policy terms.” (Doc. 16-1, p. 16,
¶ 3) (emphasis in policy).
ANALYSIS
Alabama law governs the interpretation of Mr. Raymond’s insurance policy
because the parties entered into the contract in Alabama. See Indus. Chem. &
Fiberglass Corp. v. N. River Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 825, 829 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1990);
Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 562 So. 2d 201, 203 (Ala. 1990); (Doc. 15,
¶ 3). The Alabama Civil Court of Appeals previously addressed a policy provision
like the one in Mr. Raymond’s policy in Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Cain, 421 So. 2d 1281 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). In Cain, the Alabama Court of
Civil Appeals wrote:
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The clear and unambiguous language defining “hit-and-run” provides
that compliance with the definitional requirements is a condition
precedent to coverage for “hit-and-run” accidents. In the absence of
statutory provisions to the contrary, insurance companies have the
same right as individuals to limit their liability or impose conditions
upon coverage so long as such conditions are not inconsistent with
public policy. Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance
Company v. Goodman, 279 Ala. 538, 188 So.2d 268 (1966).
Conditions precedent to an action on a policy requiring notice of an
accident have been continually held valid and enforceable by the
courts of this state. Almeida v. State Farm Mutual Insurance
Company, 53 Ala. App. 175, 298 So.2d 260 (1974). In Alabama
Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Cook, 388 So.2d 1001 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1980) we held that failure of an insured to comply with the
“Notice of Legal Action” provisions of a policy released the insurance
company from liability on the uninsured motorist provisions. In
Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Teague, 269
Ala. 53, 110 So.2d 290 (1959), our supreme court held that if the
policy of the insurance provides that notice of a loss must be in
writing, the requirement is binding upon the insured, and notice must
be in writing in the absence of waiver or estoppel.
Cain, 421 So. 2d at 1283. Similarly,
[i]n Almeida v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 53 Ala. App. 175,
298 So.2d 260 (1974), the facts were strikingly similar to the instant
case in that Mr. Almeida was injured in an accident with an uninsured
motorist and two and one-half years later recovered a default
judgment against the uninsured. Almeida had not sent a copy of the
suit against the uninsured motorist to his insurer nor did he otherwise
notify his insurance carrier of said suit until after the judgment was
rendered against the uninsured. Notice of such legal action was
required by a paragraph in his uninsured motorist coverage which was
identical in all respects to the above quoted policy proviso of this
plaintiff’s policy. In the Almeida case this court held that such policy
provision was valid, that compliance with such notice requirement
was essential, and that the trial court properly rendered a summary
judgment in favor of State Farm because of Mr. Almeida’s noncompliance with such policy requirement.
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Alabama Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Cook, 388 So.2d 1001, 1002 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1980).
Accordingly, Mr. Raymond can recover under his GEICO policy only if he
reported the accident to police within 24 hours and filed a statement with GEICO
within 30 days. (See Doc. 16-1, p. 14, ¶ 1). Mr. Raymond admits that he did not
inform GEICO of his potential claim until February 24, 2015, more than six
months after the incident. (Doc. 15, ¶¶ 13, 24; see also Doc. 18, pp. 3–4). Mr.
Raymond argues that, as a layperson, he should not be held to the terms of his
policy requiring him to report to GEICO within 30 days of the accident. Mr.
Raymond argues that he should be permitted to notify GEICO of the accident
within 30 days of discovering that he had a cause of action against GEICO. (Doc.
18, p. 3).
As the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals stated in Cain, the language in Mr.
Raymond’s policy is clear and unambiguous. See Cain, 421 So. 2d at 1283. Mr.
Raymond’s policy required him to report to GEICO within 30 days of the accident
and to inform GEICO of the facts of the accident and his cause of action for
damages against an unidentified person. (Doc. 16-1, p. 14, ¶ 1(b)). Because Mr.
Raymond did not do so, he does not meet the definition of “Hit-and-run auto” in
his policy, and he may not recover from GEICO. See Cain, 421 So. 2d at 1283.

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Mr. Raymond asks the Court to dismiss his claim for bad faith without
prejudice. (Doc. 20, p. 1). In response, GEICO argues that Mr. Raymond’s claim
should be dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 21, p. 1). Dismissal with prejudice is
appropriate because Mr. Raymond cannot prove a breach of his policy, a necessary
element of a bad faith claim under Alabama law. See Nat’l Ins. Ass’n v. Sockwell,
829 So. 2d 111, 127 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 417
So. 2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982)).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS GEICO’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 16).
The Court DENIES AS MOOT Mr. Raymond’s motion to dismiss Count III (Doc.
20). The Court DISMISSES Mr. Raymond’s claims WITH PREJUDICE. The
Court will enter a separate final judgment.
DONE and ORDERED this April 20, 2018.

_________________________________
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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