Barr v. Jefferson County Barber Commision, The et al
Filing
132
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Corey L. Maze on 11/23/2020. (SRD)
FILED
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2020 Nov-23 PM 05:00
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ANDRE’ TOFFEL, Bankruptcy
Trustee for the Estate of Geta
Barr,
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
JEFFERSON COUNTY BARBER )
COMMISSION, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
Case No.: 2:16-cv-01340-CLM
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Geta Barr sued two sets of defendants—the JCBC Defendants (the Jefferson
County Barber Commission, Florence Johnson, and Trina Paulding) and the Center
Point Defendants (the City of Center Point, Thomas Henderson, John Wood, and
John Watkins)—for shuttering her beauty salon and barbershop businesses in 2014.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed this court’s dismissal of Barr’s procedural due process
claims (doc. 87-1). To comply with the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate, this court has
had to sort out various issues on remand. The only remaining claims left unresolved
before trial are claims against the three remaining Center Point Defendants—the
City of Center Point, Henderson, and Watkins.
For the reasons stated within, Center Point’s motion for summary judgment
on the procedural due process claims against it will be DENIED; Henderson and
Case 2:16-cv-01340-CLM Document 132 Filed 11/23/20 Page 2 of 23
Watkins’s motion for summary judgment on the procedural due process claims
against them will be GRANTED; Henderson’s motion for summary judgment on
the intentional interference with business relationship and trespass claims against
him will be GRANTED; and Watkins’s motion for summary judgment on the
intentional interference with business relationship and trespass claims against him
will be DENIED. Barr’s motions to strike (docs. 65 & 66) will be DENIED as
MOOT.
The court will set for trial all claims not disposed of by this opinion or a
previous order. The court includes a list of these claims in its conclusion.
BACKGROUND
I.
Statement of the Facts
Geta Barr is a businessowner who operated a barbershop at 1687 Center Point
Parkway and a beauty salon and tax preparation business at 1849 Center Point
Parkway. In August 2014, the JCBC issued Barr multiple citations for inadequately
supervising student barbers at her barbershop. The JCBC then summoned Barr to
the Barber Commission office where the JCBC commissioners began to ask her
questions. Barr asked that the JCBC postpone the meeting until she could obtain
counsel, and the commissioners told Barr that the JCBC would reschedule the
meeting.
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But soon after Barr’s meeting with the JCBC, Trina Paulding, a JCBC
inspector, met with Center Point mayor Thomas Henderson about Barr’s citations.
Henderson told Paulding that Center Point “would cooperate with the Barber
Commission.” Doc. 63-2 at 17. Then Paulding along with Center Point building
inspectors John Woods, John Watkins, and Wayne Plunkett went to Barr’s
businesses where they chain locked the doors and left cease and desist notices.
Barr then obtained counsel, who convinced the JCBC to re-open Barr’s
businesses after she paid a $250 fine. The Center Point City Council then held a
hearing about Barr’s business licenses on October 9. Barr and her attorney both
attended the hearing. At the hearing, Barr’s attorney explained that he thought Barr
had resolved her issues with the JCBC regarding student barbers but that Center
Point had issues with Barr’s use of six non-permitted signs. The Councilmembers
then discussed that Center Point could require Barr to produce records of revenue.
At the close of the hearing, Barr’s attorney requested that the City Council list
actions that Barr needed to take and said that Barr would present evidence of
compliance at the next City Council meeting. The City Council then voted to allow
Barr “until Friday, October 17, 2014, at 5:00 PM to comply with all city ordinances.”
Doc. 61-6 at 6.
On October 17, members of the Center Point Inspections Department,
including John Watkins, put cease and desist notices on the doors of both of Barr’s
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businesses. But, at that point, the City Council had passed no new resolution finding
Barr noncompliant with city ordinances.
Six days later, the City Council met again and granted Barr until 1:00 PM on
October 31 to present all required information. The Council explicitly noted that if
Barr was “not in compliance at that time, the resolution to revoke the business
licenses will go into effect.” Doc. 61-7 at 3. Barr could not produce a requested 2010
tax return by October 31st, so she met with Henderson and asked him if she could
have an extension to produce the tax return. Henderson told her that he could do
nothing because “the order [was] already out.” Doc. 61-3 at 36. Members of the
Center Point Inspections Department then came to chain lock Barr’s businesses. And
Barr now no longer has a journeyman barber’s license from the JCBC.
II.
Procedural History
Barr originally filed this suit in 2016. Counts 1, 4, 7, 9, and 12 alleged
violations of Barr’s right to procedural due process. Counts 2, 5, 8, 10, and 13 alleged
violations of Barr’s substantive due process rights. In Count 3, Barr brought a failure
to adequately hire, train, discipline, and supervise claim against Johnson. In Count
6, Barr brought an intentional interference with business relationship claim against
Johnson and Paulding. In Count 11, Barr brought a failure to adequately train,
discipline, and supervise claim against Henderson. In Count 14, Barr brought an
interference with business relationship claim against Henderson, Wood, and
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Watkins. In Count 15, Barr brought a trespass claim against Henderson, Wood, and
Watkins. And in Count 16 Barr brought an agency claim against Center Point.
Soon after filing suit, Barr voluntarily dismissed Wood as a defendant. Doc.
18. The court then granted the JCBC and Paulding’s motion to dismiss the
procedural and substantive due process claims brought against them (Counts 1–2,
4–5). Doc. 35. The court also granted Johnson’s motion to dismiss the negligent
hiring claim brought against her (Count 3). See id. Following discovery, Center
Point, Henderson, Watkins, Johnson, and Paulding moved for summary judgment
on Barr’s remaining claims. Docs. 61, 62. The court granted Center Point,
Henderson, and Watkins summary judgment on the procedural and substantive due
process claims against them (Counts 7–10, 12–13) and dismissed with prejudice the
state-law agency claim (Count 16). Docs. 76, 77. The court then declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims (Counts 6, 11, 14–15)
and remanded those claims to state court. Docs. 76, 77.
Barr appealed the dismissal of her procedural due process claims. The
Eleventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Barr had stated a viable procedural due
process claim for at least the first closure of her businesses. See Doc. 87-1. But the
circuit court declined to address the merits of Barr’s procedural due process claims
over the second and third closure of her businesses. See id. Nor did the court reach
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Henderson and Watkins’s argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity on
the procedural due process claims brought against them. See id.
Upon remand, the court reinstated all procedural due process claims against
all defendants and allowed Barr and the JCBC Defendants to cross move for
summary judgment. Doc. 100. Following the filing of the cross motions for summary
judgment, it emerged that Barr had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. So the court
substituted the bankruptcy trustee, Andre’ Toffel, as the plaintiff. 1 Doc. 126. The
court then ruled on the cross motions for summary judgment, granting Paulding and
Johnson’s motion for summary judgment on the interference with business
relationship claims related to Barr’s barbershop customers but denying the motions
in all other respects. Doc. 127.
Following the ruling on the summary judgment motions related to the JCBC
Defendants, the court directed the Center Point Defendants and the trustee to file
supplemental briefing on the Center Point-related issues. Doc. 128. The parties have
completed the supplemental briefing, so the Center Point-related issues are now ripe
for this court’s review. 2
1
Even though the bankruptcy trustee is now litigating this case, the court calls Barr the plaintiff
throughout this memorandum opinion for ease of reference.
2
The trustee’s supplemental brief confirmed that he is no longer pursuing a negligent training
claim against Henderson. See Doc. 130 at 4–5. So the court issued an order dismissing Count 11.
Doc. 131.
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STANDARD
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this court views the facts and
draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 285 F.3d 962, 966 (11th Cir. 2002).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
A genuine dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
ANALYSIS
The court still has to rule on these claims:
• Count 7: the procedural due process claims against Center Point
related to the second and third closures of Barr’s businesses;
• Counts 9, 12: the procedural due process claims against Henderson
and Watkins;
• Counts 14, 15: the intentional interference with business relationship
and trespass claims against Henderson; and,
• Counts 14, 15: the intentional interference with business relationship
and trespass claims against Watkins.
Below the court addresses each claim in turn.
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I.
Center Point is not entitled to summary judgment on the procedural due
process claims against it.
Center Point first argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the
procedural due process claims brought against it for the second and third closures of
Barr’s businesses. To make out a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must
show: “(1) a deprivation of constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2)
state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Catron v. City of St.
Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011). In its motion for summary
judgment, Center Point argued that Barr’s procedural due process claim failed
because Barr did not capitalize on available post-deprivation state law remedies. See
Doc. 61 at 17–19. But as the Eleventh Circuit has held, Barr’s procedural due process
claims fall under the general rule that “[i]n situations where the State feasibly can
provide a predeprivation hearing before taking property, it generally must do so
regardless of the adequacy of a postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the
taking.” Barr v. Johnson, 777 F. App’x 298, 302 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Zinermon
v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990)). So Barr’s failure to seek out post-deprivation
remedies does not doom her procedural due process claims.
Instead, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed the court to consider the threefactor balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976),
when evaluating Barr’s procedural due process claims. The Mathews factors include
(1) the private interest that the official action will affect; (2) the risk of an erroneous
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deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See id. On
remand, Center Point argues that it satisfied the Mathews factors before the second
and third closures of Barr’s businesses because it provided Barr with a hearing before
these closures of her businesses. Doc. 129 at 2–3.
The court is unconvinced that the mere fact that Barr and her attorney
appeared at a business license hearing before the Center Point City Council
establishes that Center Point provided Barr with adequate procedural due process
before the second and third closures of her businesses. To be sure, at the October 9
hearing, the City Council informed Barr that her businesses would be closed unless
she complied with Center Point’s requirements by October 17. But the City Council
never held a hearing following the October 17 deadline to determine whether Barr
had addressed all issues raised at the business license hearing. Nor did the City
Council adopt a new resolution explicitly finding Barr noncompliant before Center
Point closed Barr’s businesses on October 17. And although before the October 31
closure of her businesses Barr admitted to Henderson that she could not produce a
requested 2010 tax return, no evidence suggests that Center Point offered Barr a
chance to explain her inability to produce the tax return before the third closure of
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her businesses. The court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Center
Point’s procedures were constitutionally inadequate. So the court will deny Center
Point’s motion for summary judgment on the procedural due process claims related
to the second and third closures of Barr’s businesses.
II.
Henderson and Watkins are entitled to qualified immunity.
Henderson and Watkins each seek qualified immunity on the procedural due
process claims brought against them. Qualified immunity protects government
officials from being sued in their individual capacities so long as “their conduct ‘does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Vineyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.
2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The Eleventh
Circuit applies a two-part test to determine whether a government official is entitled
to the defense of qualified immunity. “First, the official must prove that the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct occurred while he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority. Second, if the official meets that burden, the plaintiff must
prove that the official’s conduct violated clearly established law.” Harbert Int’l, Inc.
v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
A.
Scope of Discretionary Authority
An official acted within the scope of his discretionary authority if he was “(a)
performing a legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b)
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through means that were within his power to utilize.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.
Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). In her response in opposition to the
Center Point Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Barr argued that Henderson
acted outside the scope of his discretionary authority because he “had no authority,
discretionary or otherwise, to chain lock a business or deprive owners of property
contained within their business.” Doc. 63 at 27. But the scope of discretionary
authority “inquiry is not whether it was within the defendant’s authority to commit
the allegedly illegal act.” Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th
Cir. 1998). Instead, the court must “ask whether the act complained of, if done for a
proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably related to, the outer perimeter of an
official’s discretionary duties.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
The court finds that Henderson’s actions were reasonably related to his job as
mayor of Center Point. Henderson’s involvement with the first closure of Barr’s
businesses was agreeing to cooperate with the JCBC and directing Paulding to
coordinate with the Inspections Department. And Henderson’s involvement in the
second and third closures relate to the enforcement of the City Council’s October 9
and 23 resolutions. As the Center Point Defendants have argued, “[a]ny action which
Mayor Henderson takes in supervising City employees, working in conjunction with
the City Council, or dealing with businesses within the City are necessarily
discretionary functions taken in his role as mayor.” Doc. 61 at 22. So Mayor
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Henderson has met his burden under the first prong of the qualified immunity
analysis.
The court also finds that Watkins acted within the scope of his discretionary
authority when he participated in chain locking Barr’s businesses and signing the
cease and desist letters placed on her business’s doors. As a Center Point City
Inspector, it was Watkins’s job to make sure that businesses comply with Center
Point ordinances and regulations. While Barr may disagree with the lawfulness of
Watkins’s conduct, he acted in pursuit of a job-related goal.
B.
Clearly Established Law
So the court next considers whether Henderson and Watkins violated clearly
established law. “A government official’s conduct violates clearly established law
when, at the time of the alleged conduct, the contours of the right are sufficiently
clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
violates that right.” Mikko v. City of Atlanta, 857 F.3d 1136, 1146 (11th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). A right may be clearly established in one
of three ways: “(1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the
constitutional right; (2) a broad statement or principle within the Constitution,
statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so
egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence
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of case law.” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir.
2009) (internal citations omitted).
Although the procedures afforded Barr before the second and third closures
of her businesses may have been constitutionally inadequate, the court finds that
Henderson and Watkins are entitled to qualified immunity on the procedural due
process claims related to these closures. Before these two closures, the Center Point
City Council invited Barr and her attorney to a business license hearing where they
discussed Barr’s need to comply with Center Point regulations. The City Council
then gave Barr an October 17 deadline to comply. Only after this October 17
deadline passed did Henderson and Watkins participate in the second closure of
Barr’s businesses. And only after Barr failed to produce the 2010 tax return by a new
October 31 deadline to produce all requested documents did Henderson and Watkins
participate in the third closure of Barr’s businesses. A reasonable official could view
the notice and hearing that Center Point provided Barr before these two closures and
not have understood that these procedures may be constitutionally inadequate. So
Henderson and Watkins are entitled to qualified immunity on the procedural due
process claims related to the second and third closures of Barr’s businesses. See
Mikko, 857 F.3d at 1146.
Whether Henderson and Watkins are entitled to qualified immunity for the
procedural due process claims related to the first closure of Barr’s businesses
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presents a closer call because there was no hearing before this closure of Barr’s
businesses. But Barr has not pointed to a directly on-point case in which officials
who acted like Henderson and Watkins were found to have violated a plaintiff’s
procedural due process rights. And “[t]hough Mathews v. Eldrige can require predeprivation process, that is not always the case.” Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of
Miami Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). So the court
is unconvinced that every reasonable official would have understood that not
providing Barr with a pre-deprivation hearing before the initial closure of her
businesses violated her procedural due process rights. The court thus finds that
Henderson and Watkins are also entitled to qualified immunity on the procedural
due process claims related to the initial closure of Barr’s businesses.
In short, the court has found no case with similar enough facts that would have
put Henderson and Watkins on notice that their actions violated Barr’s constitutional
rights. So Henderson and Watkins are entitled to qualified immunity on the
procedural due process claims against them.
III.
Henderson is entitled to state-agent immunity.
Henderson asserts that he enjoys state-agent immunity from the intentional
interference with business relationship and trespass claims brought against him. The
Alabama Supreme Court has established a burden-shifting process that governs the
assertion of state-agent immunity. Under this framework, the state agent bears the
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initial burden of showing that he was engaged in a function that creates state-agent
immunity. Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003). These
functions include:
• the formulating of plans, policies, or designs;
• exercising judgment in the administration of a department or
governmental agency, for example, allocating resources and
supervising personnel;
• discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute,
rule, or regulation in the manner prescribed by the statute, rule,
or regulation;
• exercising judgment in the enforcement of criminal laws; and
• exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by
statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or
releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students.
See Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000).
Once the state agent has met his initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to show that one of the two exceptions to state-agent immunity applies. See Ex parte
Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282–83 (Ala. 2008). These exceptions prevent a
government employee from invoking state-agent immunity:
• when the Constitution or laws of the United States, the
Constitution of Alabama, or the laws, rules, or regulations of
Alabama enacted or promulgated for regulating the activities of
the governmental agency require otherwise; or
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• when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken
interpretation of the law.
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.
Henderson’s involvement with the closures of Barr’s businesses relate to the
exercising of judgment in the administration and supervision of the Center Point
Inspections Department. So he has met his initial burden to show that he was
engaged in an immunized function. See id.
The burden thus shifts to Barr to show that one of the two Cranman exceptions
to state-agent immunity applies. Barr argues that she has met this burden by
presenting evidence that Henderson “acted willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, and
beyond his authority when he authorized the City Inspection Department to chain
and lock [her] business doors on three separate occasions without a court order and
in violation of the City’s own ordinances.” Doc. 63 at 30. But the acts that Barr
points to in support of her state law claims against Henderson are that he (1)
facilitated the Inspections Department’s cooperation with the JCBC’s initial closure
of Barr’s businesses and (2) signed the cease and desist notice that led to the third
closure of Barr’s businesses after she informed him that she could not produce the
requested 2010 tax return by the City Council’s October 31 deadline. This conduct
does not support a finding that Henderson acted willfully, maliciously, in bad faith,
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or beyond his authority. So the court grants Henderson state-agent immunity on the
intentional interference with business relationship and trespass claims against him.
IV.
The court will deny Watkins’s motion for summary judgment on the
state-law claims against him.
The court finally addresses the intentional interference with business
relationship and trespass claims against Watkins.
A.
State-agent Immunity
In their supplemental briefing on remand, the Center Point Defendants have
argued that Watkins, like Henderson, is entitled to state-agent immunity on the state
law claims against him. See Doc. 95 at 1 n.1, Doc. 129 at 5. But when the Center
Point Defendants originally moved for summary judgment, only Henderson asserted
the state-agent immunity defense. See Doc. 61. And the Center Point Defendants’
reply brief failed to respond to Barr’s argument that Watkins waived the right to
assert a state-agent immunity defense by failing to raise it in the summary judgment
motion. See Doc. 63 at 32 n.5, Doc. 68. State-agent immunity is an affirmative
defense. See Ex parte Sawyer, 984 So. 2d 1100, 1107 (Ala. 2007). So the court finds
that by failing to raise state-agent immunity in his motion for summary judgment
Watkins has waived the right to assert state-agent immunity at the summary
judgment stage.
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B.
Intentional Interference with Business Relationship
The court thus turns to the merits of the intentional interference with business
relationship claim against Watkins. Under Alabama law, the elements of a claim for
wrongful interference with business relationship are “(1) the existence of a
[protectable] business relationship; (2) of which the defendant knew; (3) to which
the defendant was a stranger; (4) with which the defendant intentionally interfered;
and (5) damage.” White Sands Grp., LLC v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5, 14 (Ala. 2009).
But even if a plaintiff establishes these elements, justification is an affirmative
defense to a tortious interference claim. See id. at 12.
Watkins argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on the intentional
interference claim because no evidence shows that he intended to interfere with
Barr’s business relationships and/or he was justified in his actions because he was
merely enforcing resolutions of the Center Point City Council. Watkins signed cease
and desist letters placed on the doors of Barr’s businesses and participated in the
chain locking of her barbershop and beauty salon. The natural consequence of these
actions is that Barr would be prevented from servicing customers at her businesses
(at least temporarily). So the court rejects Watkins’s argument that no reasonable
juror could find that he intentionally interfered with Barr’s business relationships
with her beauty salon and barbershop customers.
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And fact disputes surrounding the adequacy of the procedures that Center
Point afforded Barr before the closure of her businesses precludes summary
judgment based on the affirmative defense of justification. As explained above, there
was no hearing before the first closure of Barr’s businesses. And although the City
Council ordered Barr to comply with its ordinances, there was no resolution before
the second closure of Barr’s businesses that explicitly found her noncompliant. Nor
did the City Council allow Barr to explain why she could not produce the 2010 tax
return that led to the third closure of her businesses. A reasonable juror could view
this evidence and determine that the closures of Barr’s businesses, which Watkins
participated in, were not justified. 3
C.
Trespass
The court next turns to the trespass claim against Watkins. A defendant is
liable for trespass if he intentionally: (1) enters land in the possession of another; (2)
causes a thing or third person to enter another’s land; (3) remains on the land; or (4)
fails to remove a thing from the land that he has a duty to remove. See Rushing v.
Hooper McDonald, Inc., 300 So. 2d 94, 96 (Ala. 1974). Watkins argues that he is
entitled to summary judgment on the trespass claim because he was present at Barr’s
3
When originally briefing the summary judgment motions, Barr moved to strike Henderson,
Watkins, Johnson, and Paulding’s assertion of the affirmative defense of justification. Docs. 65,
66. Because the court rejects the justification defense on the merits, it denies as moot Barr’s
motions to strike. If Watkins, Johnson, or Paulding reassert the justification defense at trial, Barr
will have leave to renew her motion.
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businesses to enforce Center Point City Council resolutions not to engage in a
“wrongful act to intentionally intrude upon . . . Barr’s possessory interest.” Doc. 61
at 34.
But a defendant needn’t intend to intrude upon another’s possessory interest
to be liable for trespass. See W.T. Ratliff Co. v. Henley, 405 So. 2d 141, 146 (Ala.
1981). Instead, the intent required is “the intent to do the act which leads to the
trespass.” See id. And as Barr argues, a reasonable juror could find that Watkins
acted wrongfully because (a) there was no court order to shutter Barr’s businesses,
and (b) Center Point may have provided Barr with inadequate process before
Watkins arrived to chain lock the doors to Barr’s barbershop and beauty salon.
D.
Individual vs. Official Capacity
Watkins finally argues that the court should grant him summary judgment on
the state-law claims because Barr sues Watkins in his individual capacity for conduct
related to his official job duties. According to Watkins, a plaintiff cannot bring
individual capacity claims against a government employee for acts taken because of
his job position. In support of this argument, Watkins points to Justice Murdock’s
concurring opinion in Morrow v. Caldwell, 153 So. 3d 764, 772–74 (Ala. 2014) in
which he stated that a municipal employee’s personal liability depends “on the
existence of a duty that was personal to the employee (not merely a duty of his or
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her employer) and that ran to the plaintiff (and not merely from the employee to his
or her employer).”
But Justice Murdock’s opinion in Morrow was not dealing with the question
of when it is appropriate to bring an individual capacity suit against a government
officer. Instead, the question in Morrow was whether the $100,000 statutory cap on
suits against municipalities applies to claims asserted against employees in their
individual capacity. See id. So the court finds the Morrow concurrence to have little
applicability to Watkins’s argument that he should not be liable in his individual
capacity. Besides, Barr has not merely alleged that Watkins is liable because of
actions his employer took to close her businesses. Instead, she has argued that
Watkins is liable for intentional interference with her business relationships and
trespass because he personally chain locked her businesses and signed cease and
desist letters placed on her businesses’ doors. Given that plaintiffs often sue
government officials in their individual capacities for actions that they would have
not taken but for their jobs, the court rejects Watkins’s argument that it was
inappropriate to sue him in his individual capacity. The court will deny Watkins’s
motion for summary judgment on the intentional interference with business
relationship and trespass claims.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, the court will: DENY Center Point’s motion for summary
judgment on the procedural due process claims against it; GRANT Henderson and
Watkins’s motions for summary judgment on the procedural due process claims
against them; GRANT Henderson’s motion for summary judgment on the
intentional interference with business relationship and trespass claims against him;
and DENY Watkins’s motion for summary judgment on the intentional interference
with business relationship and trespass claims against him. The court will also
DENY as MOOT Barr’s motions to strike (docs. 65 & 66).
The claims set for trial are as follows:
• Count 1: procedural due process claims against the JCBC;
• Count 4: procedural due process claims against Paulding;
• Count 6: intentional interference with business relationship
claims against Johnson and Paulding related to Barr’s beauty
salon customers;
• Count 7: procedural due process claims against Center Point;
• Count 14: intentional interference with business relationship
claims against Watkins; and,
• Count 15: trespass claims against Watkins.
By separate order, the court will carry out these findings.
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Case 2:16-cv-01340-CLM Document 132 Filed 11/23/20 Page 23 of 23
DONE this November 23, 2020.
_________________________________
COREY L. MAZE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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