Fail v. University of Alabama Ophthalmology Services Foundation, The
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Ott on 7/20/2018. (KAM)
FILED
2018 Jul-20 PM 03:14
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JANICE FAIL,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA
OPHTHAMOLOGY SERVICE
FOUNDATION,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No.: 2:16-cv-01393-JEO
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The court has before it the November 3, 2017 motion for summary judgment
filed by Defendant University of Alabama Ophthalmology Service Foundation
(“OSF”). (Doc. 9). Pursuant to the court’s initial order (Doc. 6), the motion was
under submission as of December 8, 2017. After consideration of the briefs and
evidence, the motion is due to be granted for the following reasons.
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
OSF is a multispecialty ophthalmology practice with clinics located in the
Callahan Eye Hospital and several satellite offices around Alabama. (Doc. 11-3
(“Grover Aff.”) ¶ 2). Plaintiff began her employment with OSF in 2005 as an
office manager, but resigned in 2007. (Doc. 11-1 (“Pl. Dep.”) at 14-19). In the
spring of 2013, she applied for employment with OSF, and in June 2013, OSF
hired Plaintiff as the Clinical Coordinator with an annual salary of $44,000 with
the possibility of a $2,000 performance bonus. (Pl. Dep. at 40-44; Doc. 11-2 at 1;
Grover Aff. ¶ 12). Personnel Manager Cassandra Page, an African American
female, and then-Operations Manager 1 Rett Grover, a white male, made the
decision to hire Plaintiff. (Grover Aff. ¶12; Doc. 11-3 (“Page Aff.”) ¶ 3).
As the Clinical Coordinator, Plaintiff supervised front office representatives,
surgery schedulers, and phone representatives for OSF’s seven clinics. (Pl. Dep. at
48).
Physicians reported any issues with clerical employees and other office-
related concerns, such as an unsatisfactory job by the cleaning crew, to Plaintiff.
(Id. at 63-64). She assisted with employee scheduling, kept track of attendance,
and filled in for clerical employees as needed. (Id. at 48-49). Plaintiff also
monitored call volume and patient flow.
(Id. at 49-51). She handled patient
complaints about non-medical issues, such as wait time, bills, or co-pays. (Id. at
53).
OSF steadily expanded its operations during Plaintiff’s employment with the
addition of multiple new clinics and a rise in patient volume. (Grover Aff. ¶¶ 5-8).
Sometime in 2013, OSF decided to integrate its clinics into the Callahan Eye
Hospital system to gain financial support for OSF’s continued expansion,
streamline management services, and better align physician practice and hospital
1
Grover became the Chief Operating Officer of the Callahan Eye Hospital in October 2015.
(Grover Aff. ¶ 3).
2
operations. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10). As part of this expansion and integration, Grover
decided to restructure OSF’s administrative support in the spring of 2014. (Id. ¶¶
13-14).
Grover eliminated the Clinical Coordinator position and created a new Lead
Office Representative (“LOR”) role. (Id. ¶ 14). With the elimination of this
position and the addition of five new LOR positions, the clinics would have an
LOR to schedule office employees, monitor attendance, and fill in where needed,
instead of one central Clinical Coordinator to do the work for all the clinics. (Id. ¶
14-15). Grover believed replacing one position with five LORs would provide
better administrative support for OSF’s operations. (Id. ¶ 15).
OSF selected five existing employees for the new LOR positions: Jennifer
Boudreau Lorino, a white female; Kim Odom, a white female; MacKenzie Rush, a
black male; Jacqueline Ward, a white female; and Tiffany Williams, a black
female. (Page Aff. ¶ 4). The new LORs absorbed the former Clinical Coordinator
responsibilities for their clinics, in addition to the responsibilities they were already
handling as front office representatives or surgery schedulers. (Page Aff. ¶ 5).
Each LOR received a raise for assuming the additional duties. (Id. ¶ 5). All were
paid less than Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 15; Doc. 11-4 at 7-25).
3
Around the same time as this new position was created, in late June 2014,
Plaintiff told Cassandra Page, the OSF Personnel Manager, that African-American
clerical employees were being unfairly assigned to clinics with heavier workloads.
(Pl. Dep. at 73-76).
Plaintiff told Page she did not agree with the work
assignments and that white clerical employees were being assigned the outlying
clinics with less workloads. (Id.) When she tried to change the work assignments,
Plaintiff said doctors would complain and the assignments would be returned to the
pattern of African Americans at the busiest clinics. (Id.). Page did not tell anyone
about Plaintiff’s comments. (Page. Aff. ¶ 12).
A few weeks later, in early July 2014, Page told Plaintiff her position had
been eliminated and her employment would be terminated effective July 9, 2014.
(Id. ¶ 7). Page was not involved in the decision to eliminate the position and
terminate Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff received severance benefits in accordance with
OSF’s position elimination policy. (Id. ¶ 14; Doc. 11-2 at 4-7).
Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge on December 18, 2014, alleging
discrimination on the basis of his race and retaliation. (Doc. 11-2 at 3). After an
investigation, the EEOC dismissed Plaintiff’s charge on April 26, 2016, and she
timely filed her complaint on July 26, 2016. (Page Aff. ¶ 13; Doc. 1-2 at 6-10).
4
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper
“if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary
judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis
for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving
party to go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by the depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324.
The substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are
irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All
reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor
of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.
1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the
5
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment
may be granted. See id. at 249.
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s complaint states three claims: (1) race discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 200e, et seq.
(“Title VII”) and 29 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) retaliation in violation of Title VII and §
1981; and (3) a violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (“EPA”). (Doc.
1-2 at 6-10). After careful review and for the reasons stated below, the court
concludes there are no material issues of fact and Defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
A. Race Discrimination in violation of Title VII and § 1981 2
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee because of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Absent
direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff may prove her case through
circumstantial evidence using the framework established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d
1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination. Id. After a prima facie case is established, the
2
Because Title VII and § 1981 have the same requirements of proof and use the same analytical
framework, Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998), the court
addresses the Title VII claims with the understanding that the analysis applies to the § 1981
claims as well.
6
employer has the burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision.
Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087. This burden involves no
credibility determination, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509,
(1993), and has been characterized as “exceedingly light.” Perryman v. Johnson
Prod. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1141 (11th Cir. 1983). As long as the employer
articulates “a clear and reasonably specific” non-discriminatory basis for its
actions, it has discharged its burden of production. Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981). After an employer articulates
one or more legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the employment action, the
plaintiff must show the proffered reason was a pretext for illegal discrimination.
Id. If the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, a
plaintiff cannot recast the reason but must “meet that reason head on and rebut it.”
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000). Although the
burden of production shifts back and forth, the ultimate burden of persuasion
remains with the plaintiff. E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265,
1272 (11th Cir. 2002).
Additionally, the court is mindful that in Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327,
1332–1333 (11th Cir. 2013), the Eleventh Circuit clarified that the McDonnell
Douglas framework is not the only way for a plaintiff to survive summary
judgment in a discrimination case. See Smith v. Lockheed–Martin Corp., 644 F.3d
7
1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). Rather, “[t]he plaintiff will always survive summary
judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue
concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Id. A triable issue of fact exists
if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a
“convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer
intentional discrimination by the decision maker. Id.; see generally Hamilton v.
Southland Christian School, Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012).
1. Prima facie case of discrimination
Because this case involves a discharge because of the elimination of a
position, Plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing:
(1) she was a member of a protected group; (2) she was adversely affected by an
employment decision; (3) she was qualified for her own position or to assume
another position at the time of the discharge; and (4) “sufficient evidence from
which a rational fact finder could conclude that [her] employer intended to
discriminate against [her] in making the discharge decision.” Standard, 161 F.3d
at 1331. It is undisputed Plaintiff satisfies the first three prongs of the prima facie
case.
She is African American, was terminated from her employment and
qualified for her position. Defendant contends, however, that Plaintiff has failed to
satisfy the fourth prong of her prima facie case. (Doc. 10 at 11-12). The court
agrees.
8
There is no evidence in the record from which a rational fact finder could
conclude OSF discriminated against Plaintiff because of her race when it
eliminated the Clinical Coordinator position and terminated Plaintiff. Instead the
evidence shows race was not a factor in the decision at all. Plaintiff’s duties were
assigned to the LORs, two of whom are African American. (Page Aff. ¶ 4).
Plaintiff’s bald assertion that she was terminated because of her race is insufficient.
As such, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case and Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim of race discrimination.
2.
Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and Plaintiff’s
evidence of pretext
Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, Defendant has carried its
burden of articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s
termination. The undisputed facts establish OSF reorganized its administrative
structure, eliminated the Clinical Coordinator position, and distributed the
position’s responsibilities to the LORs.
Because Defendant satisfied its burden of production of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination, Plaintiff must come forward with
evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude the reasons
Defendant gave were pretextual. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Plaintiff may do so by
demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies
or contradictions in [Defendant’s] proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a
9
reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Springer v.
Convergys Customer Mgmt. Group, Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348-50 (11th Cir. 2007).
Importantly, conclusory allegations of discrimination, without more, are
insufficient to show pretext. Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376
(11th Cir. 1996). “A reason is not pretext for discrimination unless it is shown
both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.”
Brooks v. County Comm’n of Jefferson County, 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir.
2006).
To show pretext, a plaintiff may not merely quarrel with the wisdom of the
employer’s reason but must meet the reason head on and rebut it. See Alvarez v.
Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010); Chapman, 229
F.3d at 1034. The inquiry into pretext is based on “the employer’s beliefs, and not
the employee’s own perceptions of his performance.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d
1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1997). As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “to be blunt about
it,” the inquiry does not center “on reality as it exists outside of the decision
maker’s head.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266 (explaining the question is not whether
the employee actually had performance problems but “whether her employers were
dissatisfied with her for these or other non-discriminatory reasons, even if
mistakenly or unfairly so, or instead merely used those complaints . . . as cover
for” discrimination).
10
Plaintiff does not make any attempt to establish pretext in opposition to
summary judgment, and, the record shows no evidence of pretext at all. Simply
put, there is no evidence before the court that the reason stated by Defendant for
her termination was false or otherwise a pretext for race discrimination. As such,
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s disparate treatment
claim.
3. Mixed Motive
Although Plaintiff does not discuss her burden under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, she instead argues her claim survives under a mixed-motive
analysis. To survive summary judgment on a mixed motive claim, a plaintiff must
show “(1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff;
and (2) [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for the defendant’s
adverse employment action.” Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227,
1232–33 (11th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original). To prove race was a motivating
factor in her position elimination, Plaintiff must show that OSF’s decision would
have been different if she belonged to a different race. Lewis v. Metro. Atlanta
Rapid Transit Auth., 343 F. App’x 450, 455 (11th Cir. 2009).3
Although Plaintiff’s termination is an adverse employment decision, she has
no evidence whatsoever that her race was even considered, let alone was a
3
Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals are not considered binding
precedent; however, they may be cited as persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.
11
motivating factor, in the decision to eliminate her position. Grover clearly stated
he did not consider her race in the decision. (Grover Aff. ¶ 19). Plaintiff has not
presented any evidence to rebut this statement. Because Plaintiff did not establish
she would not have been terminated if she were not African American, her claim
under a mixed motive theory fails as a matter of law.
B. Retaliation in violation of Title VII and § 1981
As in the discrimination context, where proof of retaliatory intent is offered
by way of circumstantial evidence, as here, courts apply a burden-shifting scheme
analogous to the McDonnell Douglas framework outlined above. Holifield, 115
F.3d at 1566; Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1162-3 (11th Cir. 1994).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse
employment action. Id. Once the employer proffers a legitimate reason for the
adverse employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show the
legitimate reason was pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct. Id.
1. Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
To establish a Title VII retaliation claim based on circumstantial evidence,
Plaintiff must show: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she
suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal
connection between the two events. See Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970; see also
12
Dixon v. The Hallmark Cos., Inc., 627 F.3d 849, 854 (11th Cir. 2010); Goldsmith
v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails on the element of causation.
As the
Supreme Court observed in University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 361 (2013), “Title VII retaliation claims must be proved
according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation
test stated in § 2000e–2(m). This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would
not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the
employer.” Id. In other words, a plaintiff making a Title VII retaliation claim
“must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged
adverse action by the employer.” Id. at 2534.
Plaintiff cannot establish her protected activity was the but-for cause of her
termination because Grover, the person who decided to eliminate Plaintiff’s
position, did not know she complained about race discrimination or engaged in any
protected activity. Plaintiff’s only purported protected activity before her
termination was her comments to Page in late June of 2014 about African
American employees’ unfair work assignments. (Pl. Dep. at 96). The only person
to whom Plaintiff made these comments was Page. (Id. at 104). Page did not tell
anyone about her comments and Grover testified he had no knowledge of the
conversation. (Page Aff. ¶ 12; Grover Aff. ¶ 20).
13
It is undisputed Page was not involved in the decision to eliminate Plaintiff’s
position and Grover made that decision. (Grover Aff. ¶¶ 18-20; Page Aff. at ¶7).
Plaintiff’s speculative testimony that Page was involved in the decision simply
because she works in Human Resources and contributed to termination decisions in
the past is not supported by the record. (Pl. Dep. at 108-09). Because Plaintiff
cannot establish the decision maker was aware of her alleged protected activity,
she cannot show the comments were the but-for cause of the decision.
Plaintiff provides no argument as to how her complaint to Page was the
“but-for cause” of her termination. Instead, Plaintiff argues the close temporal
proximity between her comments and her termination alone is sufficient to survive
summary judgment as to her retaliation claim.
(Doc. 12 at 5-8).
Plaintiff’s
argument is unpersuasive. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly made clear that
temporal proximity alone is insufficient to survive summary judgment. This is
especially true where, as here, the decision maker was unaware of the protected
activity. Brungart v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 800 (11th Cir.
2006) (“temporal proximity alone is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as
to causal connection where there is unrebutted evidence that the decision maker
did not have knowledge that the employee engaged in protected conduct”).
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.
14
C. Equal Pay Act
The EPA requires Plaintiff to show “that the employer paid employees of
opposite genders different wages for equal work for jobs which require ‘equal skill,
effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions.’” Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1077-78 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 1995)). If Plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case, the defendant may avoid liability by proving the pay differences
are based on one of the EPA’s four exceptions: “‘(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) . . . any other factor other than sex.’” Id. at 1078 (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). If Defendant meets this burden, Plaintiff “must rebut the
explanation by showing with affirmative evidence that it is pretextual or offered as
a post-event justification for a gender-based differential.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Plaintiff cannot satisfy her burden under the EPA.
Plaintiff has not
presented any evidence that OSF paid a male employee more for performing equal
work on a job requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility. As Clinical
Coordinator, Plaintiff handled clerical employee schedules, monitored attendance,
filled in where needed, and addressed patient complaints. (Pl. Dep. at 45-53).
When her position was eliminated, five LORs, four females and one male,
15
absorbed her duties. (Page Aff. ¶ 4). All of the LORs were paid less than Plaintiff.
(Id. at 6; Doc. 11-4 at 7-25).
Without specifically naming him, Plaintiff seems to argue that Martin Smith,
the Director of Ambulatory Operations (“DAO”), is an appropriate comparator for
purposes of her EPA claim. 4
(Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 30-34; Doc. 12 at 9-10).
This
comparison fails. The Clinical Coordinator position and the role DAO are not jobs
requiring the same skill, effort, and responsibility. The DAO position requires a
bachelor’s degree in healthcare administration, business administration, or a
similar field and relevant management experience. (Doc. 11-2 at 14). As DAO,
Smith handled responsibilities for physician business practices, regulatory
compliance, and clinical expansion and planned clinic infrastructure with new
physicians, including implementation of information technology and medical
equipment. (Doc. 11-6 (“Smith Aff.”) ¶¶ 4-5). He did, however, manage nonphysician employees, with assistance from the LORs and a head Ophthalmic
Technician, including those who previously reported to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 11). Smith
spent approximately twenty percent of his time managing those non-physician
employees and eighty percent performing his other duties. (Id. ¶ 12).
4
The court rejects Plaintiff’s attempted comparison to an office manager job she held from 2005
to 2007. (Doc. 12 at 9). Plaintiff did not make this claim in her complaint. Plaintiff cannot
pursue a claim based on her prior job for the first time in her brief in opposition to summary
judgment. Gilmour v. Gates McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004).
Additionally, even if the court allowed the claim, it is clearly time barred under the EPA’s three
year statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
16
Although Plaintiff does not have to prove that the jobs are identical, she has
“the heavy burden of proving ‘substantial identity of job functions.’” Waters v.
Turner, Wood & Smith Ins. Agency, Inc., 874 F.2d 797, 799 (11th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff cannot meet her burden. Although both Plaintiff and Smith managed
clerical employees, Smith spent only twenty percent of his time doing so and his
primary duties pertained to operational decisions about physician business
practices, clinical expansions, and integration into the Callahan Eye Hospital
organization. Broad similarities between a small percentage of Smith’s job and
Plaintiff’s job as the Clerical Coordinator are inadequate. See Rollins v. Alabama
Cmty. Coll. Sys., 814 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (holding plaintiff
cannot establish prima facie case simply based on general similarities in position);
Byrd v. Auburn Univ. at Montgomery, 2007 WL 1140424, at *9 (M.D. Ala. Apr.
17, 2007) (no prima facie case for EPA claim based on overlapping management
tasks where primary duties of position were different).
Additionally, the DAO position required a bachelor’s degree in healthcare
administration, business administration, or a similar field where the Clinical
Coordinator position required no such education. (Doc. 11-6 at 12). Finally, the
DAO position entailed significant decision making about OSF’s expansion, clinical
infrastructure, and physician business practices. (Smith Aff. ¶¶ 4-10). These
17
responsibilities were far greater than those Plaintiff performed as the Clinical
Coordinator.5
In summary, Plaintiff failed to show that OSF “paid employees of opposite
genders different wages for equal work for jobs which require equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.”
Steger, 318 F.3d at 1077-78 (internal quotations and citation omitted). As such,
her claim under the EPA fails as a matter of law.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant University of Alabama Ophthalmology
Service Foundation is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all the claims
asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint.
As such, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 9) is due to be granted. A separate order will be entered.
DATED this 20th day of July, 2018.
_________________________________
JOHN E. OTT
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
5
Plaintiff points to two newspaper advertisements for positions she contends lists the
responsibilities she had as Clinical Coordinator. (Doc. 12 at 9-10). One posting is for the DAO
position and other is for a Manager of Clinic Operations. (Doc. 11-2 at 13-14). Her comparison
to the DAO position fails for the reasons stated. As far as the Manager of Clinic Operations
position, there is no evidence in the record regarding whether anyone was hired to fill this
position, what the actual duties of the position entailed, or the salary for this position. (See Pl.
Dep. at 114-15). Without any of this information, the advertisement does not aid Plaintiff’s EPA
claim.
18
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?