Hudson v. Affinity Hospital LLC

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER- The motion to enforce the settlement agreement (Doc 24 ) is GRANTED, and the court does not require any execution or signature by Hudson; Upon payment of the settlement, counsel SHALL file a joint stipulation of dismissal. Signed by Magistrate Judge John H England, III on 7/13/18. (MRR, )

FILED
2018 Jul-13 PM 12:43
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DAVIDA A. HUDSON,

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Plaintiff,
v.
AFFINITY HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
GRANDVIEW MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant.

Case Number: 2:16-cv-01748-JHE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
This is an employment action wherein Plaintiff Davida A. Hudson (“Hudson”) asserts Title
VII claims for sex discrimination and retaliation against her former employer Defendant Affinity
Hospital, LLC d/b/a Grandview Medical Center (“Affinity”).

(Doc. 1).

The parties have

completed discovery and no dispositive motions have been filed.
I. Procedural History
On May 21, 2018, Counsel for Defendant Affinity Hospital, LLC, Attorney Anne Knox
Averitt (“Attorney Averitt”), filed a Joint Status Report. (Doc. 21). The Joint Status Report stated
that the parties had reached a settlement agreement “last week” and that they were finalizing
paperwork. (Id.).

The Joint Status Report was electronically signed by Attorney Averitt and

Counsel for Plaintiff Davida A. Hudson, Attorney Roderick Cooks (“Attorney Cooks”), with
permission. (Id.). Upon reviewing the status report, the undersigned entered an order staying all

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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge
conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 11).
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pending deadlines in the case and ordering the parties to file another Joint Status Report by June
22, 2018, if they had not stipulated to dismissal of the action by that time. (Doc. 22).
On June 22, 2018, Attorney Averitt filed another Joint Status Report on behalf of the
defendant as well as on behalf of counsel for the plaintiff. (Doc. 23). This Joint Status Report
provided that, on May 11, 2018, counsel for the parties reached a settlement agreement on behalf
of their clients. (Id. at ¶ 1). Although, the terms and amount of the settlement agreement were
agreed upon and memorialized in writing via electronic mail correspondence between counsel for
both parties, Hudson refused to sign the settlement agreement. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3). Counsel for both
parties agreed that a valid and enforceable settlement agreement was reached and that it was due
to be enforced by the court. (Id. at ¶ 4).
Also on June 22, 2018, Defendant moved for the court to enforce the May 11, 2018
settlement agreement. (Doc. 24). Counsel for the plaintiff did not opposed the motion. (See id).
The undersigned set the motion for a hearing, which was held on July 10, 2018. (Doc. 25). Prior
to the hearing the court received a copy of the settlement agreement and the attorneys’ email
correspondence, which it entered into the record under seal. (See docs. 26 & 28). During the
hearing the court received a copy of the plaintiff’s Professional Service Agreement, signed by
Hudson, which it entered into the record under seal. (Doc. 30-1). After the hearing the court
received email correspondence between Hudson and her attorneys and conducted an in camera
review. (See doc. 29).
II. Analysis
Alabama law requires that an attorney possess “express, special authority” to settle a case
on behalf of a client. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has explained as follows:
An attorney cannot settle a client's action or claim . . . without authorization from
the client. . . . . The authority to settle is not incidental, but it is essential that an
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attorney have express, special authority from his client to do so.
Batton v. City of Jasper, 345 Fed. App’x 400, 401-02 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Benitez v. Beck,
872 So.2d 844, 847 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (holding that a judgment entered upon an agreement by
the attorney may be set aside on affirmative proof that the attorney had no right to consent to its
entry)) (emphasis added).
If it is determined that the attorney had this authority to settle the case, a settlement
agreement entered into by an attorney cannot be repudiated and will be summarily enforced. Mays
v. LeCraw & Co., Inc., 807 So. 2d 551, 544 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (holding that the lower court
erred when it did not enforce a binding settlement agreement memorialized through letters). In
other words, when there is a final settlement, such settlement is binding and may only be opened
for fraud, accident, or mistake. Id.; see e.g., Harris v. Preskitt, 911 So. 2d 8 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
Counsel for both parties assert that a valid and enforceable settlement agreement was
reached on May 11, 2018, and that it is now due to be enforced by the court. They informed the
court of this settlement agreement on May 21, 2018, in their joint status report, where they stated
that they were finalizing paperwork and working to execute the agreement. (Doc. 21). This is
confirmed by emails exchanged between Attorney Averitt and Attorney Cooks. (Doc. 28-2 at 23; see doc. 28-1, settlement agreement).
At the hearing it became clear that the issue here is whether Attorney Cooks had the
requisite “express, special authority” to settle the case on Hudson’s behalf for the amount and with
the terms in the settlement agreement.2
The evidence presented in this case shows that Attorney Cooks had the “express, special

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Attorney Averitt was asked to step out of the courtroom for much of the testimony
because it concerned issues covered by attorney-client privilege.
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authority” required under Alabama law to bind Hudson to the settlement agreement. When
Hudson entered into the Professional Services Agreement with her attorneys she agreed that her
“Attorneys shall have full power and authority to settle, compromise or take such action as
Attorneys might deem proper for the best interest of the client . . . .” (Doc. 30-1 at 2). Although
she now claims she did not authorize her attorneys to settle the case for on May 10, 2018, the
evidence contradicts her version of events. Both of her attorneys, who are officers of the court,
have represented that she gave Attorney Cooks authority to settle her case for a specific amount
during the May 10, 2018 telephone call. This is memorialized in one of Attorney Davis’s emails
with Hudson, and further supported by Attorney Cooks’ actions, who, the next day, entered into a
settlement agreement for the exact amount the attorneys say was discussed on the telephone call.
To the extent Hudson takes issues with of the terms of the agreement, in her contract with
her attorneys she specifically authorizes them to settle and compromise in her best interest. (Doc.
30-1 at 2). The only specific issue she raises in her emails is the amount of attorneys’ fees, which
she specifically agreed to in the Professional Services Agreement. (Id.). As to any concerns about
future employment, to clarify any issues, the settlement agreement only restricts Hudson’s future
employment with Affinity Hospital, LLC and its affiliates and does not prohibit her from seeking
employment at any of the many medical facilities in this area.
Having found that Attorney Cooks had the requisite “express, special authority” to enter in
to the settlement agreement on Hudson’s behalf, the parties have a valid and enforceable settlement
agreement that is to be enforced. See Mays v. LeCraw & Co., Inc., 807 So. 2d 551 (Ala. Civ. App.
2001).
III. Conclusion
The motion to enforce the settlement agreement (doc. 24) is GRANTED, and the court

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does not require any execution or signature by Hudson. Upon payment of the settlement, counsel
SHALL file a joint stipulation of dismissal.
DONE this 13th day of July, 2018.

_______________________________
JOHN H. ENGLAND, III
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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