Corley v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge T Michael Putnam on 3/23/18. (MRR, )

FILED
2018 Mar-23 AM 08:10
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SUSAN CORLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 2:16-cv-1912-TMP

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Susan Corley, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner1

of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application
for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Ms. Corley
timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of the
Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. '' 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The

1

The court takes judicial notice that Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting
Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk is DIRECTED to change the style of the case
accordingly.
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parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 626(c). (Doc. 18).
Ms. Corley was 52 years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge=s
(“ALJ’s”) decision,2 and she has a high school education. (Tr. at 21). Her past
work experiences include employment as a receptionist, administrative
assistant/secretary, bookkeeper, purchasing clerk, and payroll clerk. (Tr. at 20-21).
Ms. Corley claims that she became disabled on January 15, 2010, due to bipolar
disorder with rapid cycling, anxiety, depression, diverticulitis, sleep apnea,
fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”), gastroesophageal reflux disorder
(“GERD”),

hidradenitis

suppurativa, 3

folliculitis,

and

methicillin-resistant

staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”). (Tr. at 226).
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the
regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R.
2

This appeal related to Ms. Coley’s second hearing before the ALJ. His first decision
that she was not disabled was vacated and remanded by the Appeals Council, with instructions
that the ALJ: (1) further consider the effects of the degenerative joint disease, (2) further consider
statements by John Neville, Ph.D., recommending that the claimant needed a representative
payee, and (3) provide specific references to evidence relating to the RFC and weight given to
opinion evidence. (Tr. at 84-85).
3

Hidradenitis suppurativa is defined by the Mayo Clinic as “a rare, long-term skin
condition that features small, painful lumps under the skin,” that can worsen over time and
develop into open wounds. See https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/hidradenitissuppurativa/symptoms-causes/syc-20352306 (viewed March 22, 2018).
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'' 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.
2001). The first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing
substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If
she is, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If she is not, the
Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental
impairments combined. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These
impairments must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a
claimant will be found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends upon the medical
evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If
the claimant’s impairments are not severe, the analysis stops.

20 C.F.R.

'' 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis continues to step
three, which is a determination of whether the claimant’s impairments meet or
equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s
impairments fall within this category, she will be found disabled without further
consideration. Id. If they do not, a determination of the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) will be made and the analysis proceeds to the fourth
step. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Residual functional capacity is an
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assessment based on all relevant evidence of a claimant’s remaining ability to do
work despite her impairments. 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1545(a).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s
impairments prevent her from returning to past relevant work.
'' 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).

20 C.F.R.

If the claimant can still do her past

relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the
claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step.
Id. Step five requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the
claimant’s age, education, and past work experience, in order to determine if she
can do other work. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the
claimant can do other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden of
demonstrating that other jobs exist which the claimant can perform is on the
Commissioner; and, once that burden is met, the claimant must prove her inability
to perform those jobs in order to be found to be disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d
1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms. Corley
has not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act from
the date of onset through the date of his decision. (Tr. at 22). He determined that
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Ms. Corley has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset
of her disability. (Tr. at 13). According to the ALJ, the plaintiff’s bipolar disorder,
depressive disorder, and degenerative joint disease of the knees are considered
“severe” based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Tr. at 14). He
further determined that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of
the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 14).
The ALJ did not find Ms. Corley’s allegations regarding the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of her symptoms to be entirely credible. (Tr. at 17). He
determined that the plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform light
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) with the following limitations: she will
have occasional difficulty remembering multi-step and complex instructions but no
difficulty with simple work procedures; she will have problems carrying out
detailed and complex instructions but no difficulty carrying out simple instructions;
she will require breaks every two to four hours during a workday; her contact with
coworkers, supervisors, and the public should be casual, infrequent, non-intensive,
and not prolonged; she can accept supportive feedback; she will require assistance
with long-term planning but should have no difficulty with daily work routines.
(Tr. at 16).

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According to the ALJ, Ms. Corley is unable to perform any of her past
relevant work. (Tr. at 20). The ALJ concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff
was not disabled at any time from the alleged onset date through the date last
insured. (Tr. at 22).

II.

Standard of Review
This court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act

is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether
there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284
F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The court approaches the factual findings of the
Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions.
See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not
decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Id. “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative
decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative

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agency=s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen,
793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v.
Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this court finds that
the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, the court must
affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400.
No decision is automatic, however, for “despite this deferential standard [for
review of claims] it is imperative that the Court scrutinize the record in its entirety
to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815
F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987).

Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal

standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th
Cir. 1984).

III.

Discussion
Ms. Corley alleges that the ALJ=s decision should be reversed and remanded

because the ALJ: (1) failed to properly apply Social Security Ruling 96-7p4 in

4

SSR 96-7p, which was in effect at the time of the claimant’s adjudication by the
ALJ, has been superseded by SSR 16-3p, which took effect in March of 2016. The new
regulation removes the term “credibility” from the policy, and clarifies that “subjective symptom
evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character.” SSR16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 at
*1. Plaintiff does not argue that the newer regulation should apply retroactively, and the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recently determined that it does not. Hargress v. Soc. Sec.
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evaluating the credibility of the Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her limitations,
and (2) failed to assign proper weight to the opinions of the Plaintiff’s treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Fred Habeeb, Jr. (Doc. 14). The Commissioner has asserted that
the ALJ followed the controlling law in evaluating the credibility of the plaintiff’s
description of her limitations and symptoms, and that he properly weighed Dr.
Habeeb=s opinions in accordance with the governing standards. (Doc. 16).
A.

Assessment of Credibility

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an ALJ must “clearly
‘articulate explicit and adequate reasons’ for discrediting the claimant’s allegations
of completely disabling symptoms.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (2005)
(quoting Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1995). A credibility
determination is not permitted to be a “broad rejection” that would demonstrate to
the court that the ALJ did not consider the claimant’s medical condition as a whole.
Dyer, 395 at 1211 (quoting Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561). An ALJ has “wide latitude as
a finder of fact” to evaluate credibility, but that evaluation must rest on a “clear
articulation” of the relevant facts and the governing law. See Owens v. Heckler,
Admin., Comm=r, No. 17-11683, 2018 WL 1061567 (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2018) ( holding that the
rule “applies only prospectively and does not provide a basis for remand”). Accordingly, the
court evaluates the ALJ=s assessment in light of SSR 96-7p.
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748 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984). Pursuant to Social Security Ruling 96-7p,
the ALJ has a duty to consider the claimant’s explanations for her lack of medical
treatment or her noncompliance with medical advice, without prejudging her. It
has been established that an “ALJ’s discretionary power to determine the
credibility of testimony is limited by his obligation to place on the record explicit
and adequate reasons for rejecting that testimony.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221,
1223 (11th Cir. 1991). Because the ALJ in this case recited numerous specific
instances in which the plaintiff failed to comply with her medication regimen, even
though the medications apparently helped to limit her symptoms of depression, his
reasons for discounting Ms. Corley’s credibility were both explicit and adequate.
The ALJ addressed reasons for rejecting Ms. Corley’s testimony regarding
her physical and mental limitations, noting that, while the plaintiff listed numerous
physical impairments as the cause of her disability, she testified that the reason she
could not work was her depression and that she did not know if any of her physical
impairment affected her ability to work. 5 The ALJ further noted that multiple
doctors had recorded Ms. Corley=s failure to take the medications that were
5

In his findings, the ALJ stated that the plaintiff “testified at the hearing she was unable
to work due to her mental impairment” and that “she did not know if her physical impairments
prevented her from working….” (Tr. at 18). In her brief, under a heading entitled “Summary of
Testimony,” the plaintiff adopted “the ALJ’s recitation as true and correct.” (Doc. 14, at 2).
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prescribed for her mental disorders.6 (See Tr. at 336, 396, 409, 416-419, 443, 444,
469, 470).

In addition, he pointed out that, while she maintained that she could

not function in the workplace because of her mental disorders, she had worked at
approximately twenty jobs and had been terminated only once. Two jobs ended
because of a layoff, and the rest ended because she quit. (Tr. at 18-19, 516). Ms.
Corley testified at her second hearing that she “just can=t seem to keep” a job
because she has “problems with people.” (Tr. at 516).
The ALJ also recited the plaintiff=s admission that she had applied for and
received unemployment benefits after ending her employment because of a lay-off,
which indicated that she had represented that she was capable of working after the
alleged onset date. Id. Another specific reason the ALJ gave for his negative
assessment of her credibility was that she listed daily activities that were
inconsistent with her allegations of disability. He noted that Ms. Corley was able
to do household chores, help with caring for pets, care for her family, prepare
meals, drive, shop, use a computer, crochet, go fishing, garden, and attend church.
(Tr. at 19).
6

Indeed, there is medical evidence in the record that the medication is helpful. For
example, on December 19, 2012, she complained of depression and was prescribed Prozac.
(Tr. at 438). At her next visit to Alabama Counseling, LLC, on January 28, 2013, she reported “I
do feel better.” Similarly, in sessions in June and August of 2012, she reported feeling “a little
better.” (Tr. at 439-440). See also Transcript at 334, 392, 467.
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The ALJ articulated explicit and adequate reasons for deeming the plaintiff=s
allegations “not entirely credible.” The opinion reflects that the ALJ considered
Ms. Corley=s medical condition, both physical and mental, as a whole.
Accordingly, his decision is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord
with the governing law.
B. Treating Physician=s Assessment
The claimant asserts that the Commissioner failed to give proper weight to
the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Habeeb, who opined that Ms. Corley
was “not able to maintain employment, of any kind.” (Doc. 14, pp. 11-12; tr. at
460). The ALJ gave Dr. Habeeb’s opinion little weight, stating that the physician’s
statements were inconsistent with his treatment records and involved a
determination of her ability to work that is reserved to the Commissioner. (Tr. at
19).
Under prevailing law, a treating physician=s testimony is entitled to
“substantial or considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.”
Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 1997)
(internal quotations omitted).

The weight to be afforded a medical opinion

regarding the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments depends, among
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other things, upon the examining and treating relationship the medical source had
with the claimant, the evidence the medical source presents to support the opinion,
how consistent the opinion is with the record as a whole, and the specialty of the
medical source. See 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). “Good cause” exists
for an ALJ not to give a treating physician’s opinion substantial weight when the
“(1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence
supported a contrary finding; or (3) ... was conclusory or inconsistent with the
doctor=s own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); see also
Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that “good
cause” exists where the opinion was contradicted by other notations in the
physician’s own record).
In this case, the opinion expressed in Dr. Habeeb’s letter of August 2, 2013,
is inconsistent with Dr. Habeeb’s own records, which consistently noted that Ms.
Corley showed improvement when she was compliant with her medication. (Tr. at
436-44, 467-480). While Dr. Habeeb’s records do reflect that the plaintiff suffered
from persistent depression and anxiety, the overall medical records show that her
conditions improved when she was compliant with medication and that she did not

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require more intensive therapies or hospitalizations. For example, Dr. Habeeb
described Ms. Corley on June 25, 2012, as “alert, pleasant, coherent, stable mood
(but some negative, pessimistic thinking), non-psychotic.”

(Tr. at 440).

On

January 15 and 28, 2013, she reported to Dr. Habeeb that she felt better after
changing her medication to Prozac. (Tr. at 471).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ

“picks and chooses isolated notations” from Dr. Habeeb’s records, but the court
finds that the ALJ viewed the records in their entirety and viewed the plaintiff=s
longitudinal record, which, on the whole, do not describe a debilitating condition.
Furthermore, it is well established that opinions such as whether a claimant
is disabled, the claimant=s residual functional capacity, the application of
vocational factors, and whether the claimant is able to work “are not medical
opinions, .. . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner.”
The ALJ is not required to accept a treating physician’s opinion that a claimant is
not able to maintain any employment. Likewise, this court “may not decide facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the
Commissioner.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). The
court instead looks to the doctors’ evaluations of the claimant’s condition and the
medical consequences thereof, not their opinions of the legal consequences of his

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[or her] condition.” Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. Such statements by a physician are
relevant to the ALJ’s findings, but they are not determinative, because it is the ALJ
who bears the responsibility of assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity.
See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1546(c). The ALJ has done that here, and there is
substantial evidence in the record supporting his conclusions.
In this case, the ALJ carefully reviewed the treating psychiatrist’s records,
and heeded the medical opinions therein. It is only the opinion regarding Ms.
Corley=s capacity to do work that was given little weight.

The ALJ clearly

articulated “good cause” for the limited weight he gave to Dr. Habeeb=s disability
assessment.

Therefore, the ALJ did not err in failing to give the treating

physician’s opinion more weight.

The objective medical and other evidence

supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Corley’s conditions did not cause disabling
limitations and instead shows that she could perform a reduced range of light
work.7

7

Indeed, scattered throughout Dr. Habeeb’s treatment notes are expressions by the
plaintiff herself that she believed she would feel better if she were active and had something to
do that gives her a purpose. (Tr. at 469, 471, 475).
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IV.

Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms.

Corley=s arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner=s decision is supported by
substantial evidence and is in accord with the applicable law; accordingly, the
decision is AFFIRMED.
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2018.

_______________________________
T. MICHAEL PUTNAM
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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