Davis v. Jefferson County Jail

Filing 67

MEMORANDUM OPINION - The court reviews de novo the parts of the report and recommendation to which a party objects. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After reviewing the pleadings and the evidence, the court OVERRULES Mr. Davis objections, ADOPTS the r eport, and ACCEPTS the recommendation. The court WILL DISMISS AS MOOT Mr. Davis requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court WILL GRANT Defendants motion for summary judgment and WILL ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants and against Mr. Davis on all counts for monetary relief. Signed by Judge Annemarie Carney Axon on 3/18/2019. (KEK)

FILED
2019 Mar-18 AM 09:07
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL LEE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
KENNETH FELLS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:17-cv-00451-ACA-HNJ

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Michael Lee Davis, a pro se prisoner, filed suit against a number of
defendants, alleging that, while he was incarcerated in the Jefferson County Jail,
they violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him with kosher meals.
Mr. Davis asserts that Captain David Agree, Sergeant Kenneth Fells, fiscal
management supervisor Darryl Tavel, kitchen steward Daphne Parker, and Robert
Yarbough (the CEO of Yarbrough Company, which provides inmate food service
to the jail), violated his constitutional rights to freely exercise his religion, due
process, and equal protection and violated the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
Defendants filed a special report, which the magistrate judge construed as a
motion for summary judgment.

(Docs. 49, 51).

The magistrate judge

recommended granting the motion for summary judgment and entering judgment

in favor of Defendants and against Mr. Davis on all counts. (Doc. 57). Mr. Davis
objected to parts of the report. (Doc. 59). He did not object to the recommended
resolution of his Equal Protection claim or his claims against Mr. Tavel and
Mr. Yarbrough.

(See id.).

But he did object to the rest of the report and

recommendation on the basis that he needed more time to do discovery, as well as
to the magistrate judge’s description of some of the facts. (See id.).
The court reviews de novo the parts of the report and recommendation to
which a party objects. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After reviewing the pleadings
and the evidence, the court OVERRULES Mr. Davis’ objections, ADOPTS the
report, and ACCEPTS the recommendation. The court WILL DISMISS AS
MOOT Mr. Davis’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court WILL
GRANT Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and WILL ENTER
SUMMARY JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants and against Mr. Davis on all
counts for monetary relief.
I.

BACKGROUND
In January 2018, Mr. Davis moved to file a second amended complaint.

(Doc. 36). The second amended complaint listed five witnesses “who wish[ ] to
testify amicus curiae”: deputies Stanford, “Duke,” Watts, Stapleton, and Finely.
(Doc. 36-1 at 5). In February 2018, the magistrate judge granted the motion to
amend, making the second amended complaint the operative pleading. (Doc. 37).

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In July 2018, Defendants filed a special report contending that they were
entitled to summary judgment on all of Mr. Davis’ claims. (Doc. 49). On August
31, 2018, the magistrate judge entered an order construing Defendants’ special
report as a motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. 51).

The order advised

Mr. Davis that he had twenty-one days to respond to the motion for summary
judgment with evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact. (Id.). Mr. Davis moved for a sixty day extension of time so that he
could obtain testimony from witnesses. (Doc. 54). The magistrate judge granted
the motion for an extension of time and gave Mr. Davis until December 3, 2018, to
file his response to the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 55).
On January 3, 2019—a month after the deadline to respond to the motion for
summary judgment—Mr. Davis filed a “motion for subpoena and notification.”1
(Doc. 58). In it, Mr. Davis stated that had not heard anything about his case since
September 2018 and that he needed a subpoena form so that he could obtain
affidavits from witnesses.2 (Id.). Although Mr. Davis signed that pleading on
January 3, 2019, the court did not receive it until January 11, 2019. (See id.). In
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Because Mr. Davis is a pro se prisoner, the court uses the “prison mailbox rule” to
determine the dates on which he filed any pleadings. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988);
Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 783 (11th Cir. 1993).
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Although the docket sheet reflects that the court had an order returned as undeliverable
in November 2018 (see doc. 56), it is not the order granting Mr. Davis an extension of time to
conduct discovery. Instead, it is the order construing Defendant’s special report as a motion for
summary judgment. (Id.). Mr. Davis undisputedly received that order after the court re-sent it;
he filed his motion for an extension of time in response to that order. (See Docs. 52, 54).
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the meantime, on January 4, 2019, the magistrate judge entered the report
recommending that the court grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
(Doc. 57).

Mr. Davis then filed his objections to parts of the report and

recommendation. (Doc. 59).
II.

DISCUSSION
Mr. Davis contends that the court did not give him an opportunity to obtain

the discovery he needed to oppose the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 59 at
1–2, 4). But Mr. Davis has known about the five deputies he wanted to depose
since he filed his proposed second amended complaint in January 2018. (See Doc.
36-1 at 5). In other words, by the time he requested subpoena forms in January
2019, he had known for almost a year that he needed to subpoena those witnesses.
Mr. Davis’ argument that he did not receive the court’s order granting him an
extension of time does not change the analysis.
In any event, Mr. Davis does not dispute any of the facts supporting the
magistrate judge’s conclusion that Defendants employed the least restrictive means
of furthering compelling penological interests without substantially burdening
Mr. Davis’ exercise of religion. Although he complains that jail staff failed to
fully implement the accommodations, he has not alleged—even in his unsworn
objections—that any of the named defendants personally denied him
accommodations or that they were aware of any failure to implement the promised

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accommodations. See, e.g., Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir.
2003) (“[S]upervisory liability under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 occurs either when the
supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when
there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the
alleged constitutional deprivation.”).
Finally, Mr. Davis filed a notice indicating that he has been transferred out
of the Jefferson County Jail and to a different facility. (See Doc. 66). His requests
for injunctive and declaratory relief are therefore moot. See Spears v. Thigpen,
846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining an inmate’s § 1983 claim for
injunctive or declaratory relief are moot once the inmate has been transferred to
another facility).
For these reasons, the court ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s report and
ACCEPTS his recommendation.

The court WILL DISMISS AS MOOT

Mr. Davis’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief.

The court WILL

GRANT Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and WILL ENTER
SUMMARY JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants and against Mr. Davis on all
claims seeking monetary relief.
The court will enter a separate order consistent with this memorandum
opinion.

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DONE and ORDERED this March 18, 2019.

_________________________________
ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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