Williams v. Housing Opportunities for Persons with Exceptionalities
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Annemarie Carney Axon on 7/31/2018. (TLM, )
FILED
2018 Jul-31 AM 10:26
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KHALIL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES FOR
PERSONS WITH
EXCEPTIONALITIES,
Defendant.
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Case No.: 2:17-cv-00468-ACA
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this employment discrimination action, Plaintiff Khalil Williams claims that
his former employer, Defendant Housing Opportunities for Persons with
Exceptionalities (“HOPE”), terminated his employment because he is AfricanAmerican. Mr. Williams asserts Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 race discrimination
claims against HOPE.
Before the court is HOPE’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 16). The
parties have fully briefed the motion. (Docs. 17, 19, 20). For the reasons explained
below, the court GRANTS the motion.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” FindWhat Inv’r
Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). A “material fact” is one that “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
To demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact that
precludes summary judgment, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must
cite “to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (“[A]
party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon
mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”).
The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Baas v. Fewless, 886 F.3d 1088, 1091 (11th Cir. 2018). The court “may not
weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations of its own.” FindWhat
Inv’r Grp., 658 F.3d at 1307. “If the record presents disputed issues of fact, the court
may not decide them; rather, it must deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Id. at
1307.
2
II.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Williams is African-American. (Doc. 18-1, p. 59). He worked for HOPE
on two separate occasions. HOPE Executive Director Debra Sokol originally hired
Mr. Williams in 2000. (Doc. 18-1, p. 5). Mr. Williams left HOPE in 2006 to pursue
other career opportunities. (Doc. 18-1, p. 4). Ms. Sokol hired Mr. Williams again in
2011, and Mr. Williams worked for HOPE until May 2016. (Doc. 18-1, pp. 5-6; Doc.
18-3, p. 6).
When he returned to HOPE in 2011, Mr. Williams worked as a Direct Care
Provider at a group home that HOPE operated for three autistic and mentally
challenged adults. (Doc. 18-1, p. 8). As a Direct Care Manager, Mr. Williams
assisted the residents with daily activities, including household chores, personal
grooming, meal preparation, and transportation to social activities and doctor’s
appointments.
(Doc. 18-1, pp. 8, 26).
Mr. Williams also was Medication
Administration Certified (MAC) which meant that he could administer medication to
the group home residents. (Doc. 18-1, p. 7).
Mr. Williams was regularly scheduled to work at the group home on Friday
evenings from 10:00 p.m. until 8:00 a.m. and on Saturday and Sunday evenings from
8:00 p.m. until 8:00 a.m. (Doc. 18-1, p. 7). When he was on duty, Mr. Williams was
the only HOPE staff person at the group home. (Doc. 18-1, p. 8).
Ms. Sokol was Mr. Williams’s supervisor during both periods of employment.
(Doc. 18-1, p. 5). Mr. Williams received positive performance reviews and was not
3
subject to disciplinary action or any kind of adverse performance review. (Doc. 18-1,
p. 8). Mr. Williams “had no major issues” with Ms. Sokol before HOPE terminated
his employment. (Doc. 18-1, p. 7).
Mr. Williams believes that his relationship with Ms. Sokol suffered after he
performed a side job for Ms. Sokol. (Doc. 18-1, pp. 21, 25). Sometime shortly before
his employment with HOPE ended, Ms. Sokol hired Mr. Williams to repaint the deck
on her home. (Doc. 18-1, p. 21). According to Mr. Williams, Ms. Sokol told him that
he could not use the restroom inside her house while he was working on the deck, but
he could go to the bathroom outside. (Doc. 18-1, p. 21). Mr. Williams ended up
driving to a nearby McDonald’s to use the restroom. (Doc. 18-1, p. 82).
After Mr. Williams completed the deck project, Ms. Sokol noticed that Mr.
Williams had not painted the cracks between the deck boards. (Doc. 18-1, pp. 22-23).
Mr. Williams offered to paint between the deck boards for an additional $100.00.
(Doc. 18-1, p. 22). Ms. Sokol declined the offer, and she paid Mr. Williams the full
amount to which they originally agreed for the job, even though she considered the
job incomplete. (Doc. 18-1, pp. 22-23; Doc. 18-2, p. 9).
On Wednesday, May 4, 2016, Ms. Sokol called Mr. Williams and asked him to
cover a shift for another employee on the evening of Thursday, May 5, 2016. (Doc.
18-1, pp. 8-9; Doc. 18-2, pp. 19-21). Mr. Williams told Ms. Sokol that he could not
work the shift because he planned to attend his graduation from trade school that
evening. (Doc. 18-1, p. 9). Mr. Williams alleges that Ms. Sokol told him that if he
4
did not appear for the Thursday evening shift, then he should not come back to work.
(Doc. 18-1, p. 10). Specifically, he testified that Ms. Sokol said, “Either you come in
or don’t come back.” (Doc. 18-1, p. 10). Ms. Sokol testified that after Mr. Williams
told her he could not work because of graduation, she “told him congratulations and
moved on.” (Doc. 18-2, p. 21). In addition, Ms. Sokol testified that Mr. Williams
was not required to work on Thursday, May 5, 2016 because he was graduating.
(Doc. 18-2, p. 36).
According to Mr. Williams, Ms. Sokol called him on May 5, 2016 and told him
that when he was hired, Mr. Williams signed paperwork agreeing to work overtime if
he was available. (Doc. 18-1, p. 31). Mr. Williams asked to see the paper. (Doc. 181, p. 10). Ms. Sokol denied his request and told Mr. Williams that he was “no longer
welcome at this office.” (Doc. 18-1, p. 10). Then, Ms. Sokol told Mr. Williams “to
come on over and we’ll read the paper.” (Doc. 18-1, p. 10).
When Mr. Williams arrived at the office, Ms. Sokol suggested that they go in
the kitchenette to read the paper. (Doc. 18-1, p. 11). When Mr. Williams and Ms.
Sokol got to the kitchenette, Mr. Williams “dropped [his] head and let [Ms. Sokol]
start to read.” (Doc. 18-1, p. 11). Then, the following exchange occurred:
When she started to read the paper, she said if available, can you work
overtime? That’s when I said, Ms. Deborah, we need to stop right there?
Stop? I said yes, ma’am. I said the paper specifically says if available,
and I have a legitimate excuse why I’m not available. Okay. After that,
that’s when she cursed me. She said, I can’t stand your black ass. I
called her name, Ms. Deborah. Okay. After I said Ms. Deborah, that’s
when she hauled off and went berserk. . . .
5
(Doc. 18-1, pp. 11-12). Mr. Williams and Ms. Sokol then argued for two or three
minutes about whether Ms. Sokol would give Mr. Williams a copy of the paperwork.
(Doc. 18-1, p. 13). Ms. Sokol slammed a book on the ground. (Doc. 18-1, p. 13).
Ms. Sokol picked up the book and said, “I don’t give a damn about your damn kids.”
(Doc. 18-1, p. 14). Ms. Sokol told Mr. Williams to “get out of here. Get out of this
office.” (Doc. 18-1, p. 14). Then, Ms. Sokol ran in her office, slammed and locked
her door, and got under her desk. (Doc. 18-1, p. 14).
Mr. Williams had no communication with anyone at HOPE after he left Ms.
Sokol’s office on May 5, 2016. (Doc. 18-1, pp. 14-15). Mr. Williams did not report
for his scheduled shifts on Friday, May 6, 2016 or the following Saturday and
Sunday. (Doc. 18-1, p. 15). He contends that he did not report to work because he
believed that Ms. Sokol had fired him. (Doc. 18-1, p. 15).
About a week later, Mr. Williams picked up his last pay check from the payroll
service and returned his key to the group home. (Doc. 18-1, p. 15). HOPE hired an
African-American employee to replace Mr. Williams. (Doc. 18-2, pp. 22-23; Doc.
18-3, pp. 4-5).
III.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Williams alleges that HOPE discriminated against him because of his race
in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court analyzes Mr. Williams’s
Title VII and § 1981 race discrimination claims together under the same framework.
6
Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010) (“This Circuit
has routinely and systematically grouped Title VII and § 1981 claims for analytic
purposes.”); Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998)
(“Both of these statutes have the same requirements of proof and use the same
analytical framework, therefore we shall explicitly address the Title VII claim with
the understanding that the analysis applies to the § 1981 claim as well.”).
“A plaintiff may prove a claim of intentional discrimination through direct
evidence, circumstantial evidence, or through statistical proof.” Rioux v. City of
Atlanta, 520 F. 3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008). Where, as here, a plaintiff relies on
circumstantial evidence to establish discriminatory intent, a district court may use the
McDonnell Douglas analytical framework to evaluate the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
evidence. Flowers v. Troup Cty., Ga. School Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1335-36 (11th Cir.
2015). Under this burden-shifting framework, “a plaintiff first must make out a prima
facie case of discrimination that ‘in effect creates a presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against the employee.’” Flowers, 803 F.3d at 1336 (quoting
Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). If a plaintiff
presents a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory basis for the employment action at issue. If the defendant carries this
light burden, then the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s
stated reason for its conduct is pretext for intentional discrimination. Flowers, 803
F.3d at 1336.
7
Although it is one tool for examining evidence of discriminatory intent, “‘the
McDonnell Douglas framework is not, and never was intended to be, the sine qua non
for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion’ in Title VII cases.” Flowers,
803 F.3d at 1336 (quoting Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328
(11th Cir. 2011)). “The critical decision that must be made is whether the plaintiff has
‘create[d] a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.’” Flowers,
803 F.3d at 1336 (quoting Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d at 1328). A convincing
mosaic of circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to allow a jury to infer that
discriminatory intent motivated an employment decision. Lockheed-Martin Corp.,
644 F.3d at 1328. “Whatever form it takes, if the circumstantial evidence is sufficient
to raise ‘a reasonable inference that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff,
summary judgment is improper.’” Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d
1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d at 1328).
Here, the parties agree that the McDonnell Douglas framework is not
appropriate for resolution of Mr. Williams’s claims. (See Doc. 19, pp. 10-11; Doc.
20, pp. 3-4). Instead, Mr. Williams contends that summary judgment is improper for
two reasons: (1) a factual dispute exists about whether HOPE actually terminated his
employment, and (2) he has presented a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence
from which a reasonable jury could infer racial animus.
persuasive.
8
Neither argument is
First, Mr. Williams submits that summary judgment is improper solely because
there is a factual dispute about whether HOPE terminated his employment. (Doc. 19,
pp. 11-12). Mr. Williams claims that Ms. Sokol terminated his employment. (Doc.
18-1, pp. 10, 15). Ms. Sokol testified that Mr. Williams’s employment with HOPE
ended because he did not report to work for scheduled shifts. (Doc. 18-2, pp. 21, 37).
This factual dispute, standing alone, does not preclude summary judgment. For
purposes of summary judgment, the court accepts as true Mr. Williams’s testimony
that Ms. Sokol fired him. But the analysis does not end there. To survive summary
judgment, Mr. Williams must produce sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact
may infer that HOPE terminated him because of his race. See Ferguson v. Veterans
Admin., 723 F.2d 871, 872 (11th Cir. 1984) (“To prevail under Title VII plaintiff
would have to show discrimination by h[is] employer.”); see also Damon v. Fleming
Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We are not in the
business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, our
sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged
employment decision.”).
Mr. Williams attempts to establish discriminatory intent through a mosaic of
circumstantial evidence. (See Doc. 19, pp. 10-13). Mr. Williams argues that a
reasonable jury could conclude that intentional race discrimination motivated HOPE’s
decision to terminate his employment based on three categories of circumstantial
evidence: (1) Ms. Sokol’s statement, “I cannot stand your black ass,” (2) Mr.
9
Williams’s strong work history coupled with the absence of an articulated reason for
termination, Ms. Sokol’s testimony that Mr. Williams stopped showing up for work,
and Ms. Sokol’s admission that Mr. Williams was not obligated to work an extra shift,
and (3) Ms. Sokol’s refusal to allow Mr. Williams to use the restroom inside her home
while he painted her deck. Mr. Williams’s evidence falls short.
Ms. Sokol’s comment on Thursday, May 5, 2016, that she “can’t stand [Mr.
Williams’s] black ass” is relevant circumstantial evidence. Construing the facts in the
light most favorable to Mr. Williams, Ms. Sokol fired him either on Wednesday May
4, 2016 when she told him to report to work the following day or to not “come back”
or on Thursday May 5, 2016 when she told him to “get out” of the office. (Doc. 18-1,
pp. 10, 14-15). Thus, Ms. Sokol made the racially offensive comment one day after
she fired Mr. Williams or on the day she terminated his employment. Under either
scenario, the comment is “probative as to whether [race] animus motivated the
decision to terminate” Mr. Williams. See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1363 (manager’s
statement that he wanted to promote “aggressive, young men” immediately after one
employee’s termination and three months after another employee’s termination was “a
significant piece of circumstantial evidence” from which a jury could infer age
animus); Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323 n.11 (11th Cir.
1998) (“[L]anguage not amounting to direct evidence, but showing some racial
animus, may be significant” circumstantial evidence.).
10
Although suggestive of discriminatory animus, under the circumstances of this
case, Ms. Sokol’s comment does not support an inference of intentional race
discrimination with respect to Williams’s termination.
In Damon v. Fleming
Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in an age discrimination
case because the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient
circumstantial evidence of age animus. Id. at 1357, 1361-1366. In Damon, one of the
pieces of circumstantial evidence that the plaintiffs proffered was a supervisor’s
comment that “what the company needed was aggressive young men . . . to be
promoted.” Id. at 1359. Regarding the comment, the Eleventh Circuit explained:
Far from being a stray remark, the comment may evince probative
evidence of the state of mind of the decision-maker at the time of
Kanafani’s termination. The comment also arguably suggests that Soto
had an ageist preference for young managers. Given the substance,
context, and timing of Soto’s comment, if credited, we find it to be a
significant piece of circumstantial evidence.
Id. at 1362.
The Court of Appeals found that the comment was “probative as to
whether age animus motived the decision to terminate” another plaintiff because “the
remark (1) was allegedly made only three months after Damon was terminated, (2)
immediately followed the termination of someone similarly situated to Damon and in
the same protected class, and (3) came from the same decision-maker responsible for
Damon’s termination.” Id. at 1363.
11
In Damon, the ageist comment was not the only piece of circumstantial
evidence on which the plaintiffs relied. In addition to the comment, the plaintiffs
presented evidence that the decisionmaker had “discriminatory animus towards older
store managers under his direct supervision.” Id. at 1361. Specifically, within a oneyear period, the employer terminated or demoted four “older, highly experienced store
managers” and replaced each of the employees with younger individuals. Damon,
196 F.3d at 1361. The plaintiffs in Damon also “offered evidentiary support by which
a reasonable jury could conclude that the specific reasons for termination given by
[the employer] were a pretext.” Damon, 196 F.3d at 1363.
As explained in greater detail below, see infra pp. 14-18, unlike the Damon
plaintiffs, Mr. Williams has offered no additional relevant circumstantial evidence
from which a jury could infer discriminatory animus.
Without this additional
evidence, the court finds that Ms. Sokol’s comment may be evidence of Ms. Sokol’s
underlying discriminatory attitude and racial bias generally, but the comment alone
does not support an inference that HOPE terminated Mr. Williams because he is
African-American.
The circumstances of this case are analogous to the facts in Jones v. Bessemer
Carraway Medical Center, 151 F.3d 1321 (1998). In Jones, on petition for rehearing,
the Eleventh Circuit found that a Title VII plaintiff failed to establish an inference that
her employer terminated her because of her race. Id. at 1323. The plaintiff submitted,
and the district court excluded from trial, evidence that one week before the plaintiff’s
12
termination, her supervisor said, “You black girls make me sick” and “You black girls
get away with everything.” Id. at 1322-23, 1325. The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that even if the district court erred in excluding the statements, the statements were
insufficient to permit an inference that the plaintiff’s termination was “more likely
than not . . . based on an illegal discriminatory criterion.” Id. at 1323. The Court of
Appeals noted that there was no evidence that the supervisor’s decisions “had
historically demonstrated racial discrimination” or that another supervisor “had a
history of racial statements or of racial discrimination in her decisions.” Id. at 132324. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit explained that:
In this disciplinary discharge case, no direct evidence of discrimination
was submitted at trial. No statistical evidence was presented. No
evidence shows that, after Plaintiff was fired, she was replaced by a
nonminority employee. No pattern-or-practice of discrimination was
evidenced or attempted to be evidenced. And, most important, no
similarly situated, nonminority employee was identified who was treated
better than Plaintiff.
Id. at 1324.
The record is similarly deficient here. Mr. Williams has offered no
evidence demonstrating that HOPE replaced him with a nonminority. Mr. Williams
has submitted no evidence that HOPE engaged in a pattern and practice of
discrimination. Mr. Williams has not identified a similarly situated, nonminority
employee who received more favorable treatment. To be clear, Ms. Sokol’s comment
is offensive and inappropriate in the workplace or any other setting. But, “without
more there is nothing to suggest a causal connection between [Mr. Williams’s] race
and his termination.” Flowers, 803 F.3d at 1338.
13
To carry his burden of establishing a question of fact regarding discriminatory
intent, Mr. Williams argues that his reputable work history and inaccuracies,
inconsistencies, or contradictions in HOPE’s explanation for his termination
establishes that racial discrimination was the real reason for the adverse employment
action. Specifically, Mr. Williams submits that:
Plaintiff’s excellent work performance, the absence of any other
articulated reason for termination, the falsity of Sokol’s explanation that
Plaintiff simply stopped showing up for work, and her admission that he
was not obligated to work on the night of his graduation further support an
inference of intentional discrimination.
(Doc. 19, p. 10). Mr. Williams has not articulated how this evidence supports an
inference of intentional discrimination. See Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d at 1328
n. 25 (“An inference, is not a suspicion or a guess. It is a reasoned, logical decision to
conclude that a disputed fact exists on the basis of another fact.”) (internal quotation
marks, citation, and alteration omitted).
The record supports Mr. Williams’s contention that he was a good employee.
Ms. Sokol testified that Mr. Williams “always showed up for his shift unless he
requested off,” and she received no complaints about his job performance. (Doc. 182, p. 15). Ms. Sokol gave Mr. Williams positive performance evaluations. (Doc. 181, p. 8). Mr. Williams worked for Ms. Sokol for 11 years, and with the exception of
the disagreement that led to his termination, Ms. Sokol made no derogatory comments
about his race, and she subjected him to no disciplinary action or reprimand. (Doc.
14
18-1, pp. 7-8). No reasonable juror could infer from this evidence that HOPE fired
Mr. Williams because he is African-American.
Ms. Sokol testified that Mr. Williams’s employment ended because “[h]e didn’t
show up” for his regularly scheduled shift the weekend of May 6-8, 2016. (Doc. 18-2,
p. 21).
Mr. Williams posits that this testimony is false.
Whether Ms. Sokol’s
testimony is false is a credibility determination for the trier of fact not for the parties
or the court. Again, for purposes of summary judgment, the court has viewed the
evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Williams and has concluded that HOPE
terminated his employment. This factual dispute as to why he was terminated does
not give rise to an inference of race discrimination.
Neither does Ms. Sokol’s
testimony that Mr. Williams was not required to work on the night he had graduation.
Through this evidence, Mr. Williams appears to contest the truthfulness of HOPE’s
justification for the adverse employment action. But in this case, HOPE has not
articulated a basis for Mr. Williams’s termination because it is HOPE’s position that
Mr. Williams abandoned his job.
Therefore, there is no legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for Mr. Williams to rebut. Even if HOPE had proferred a raceneutral justification for Mr. Williams’s termination and even if Mr. Williams had
identified a contradiction in HOPE’s asserted reason for his termination, this evidence
would not assist Mr. Williams without other evidence suggesting “that discrimination
was the real reason” for the adverse action. Brooks v. Cty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cty.,
Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
15
509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)); see also Flowers, 803 F.3d at 1339 (“The burden placed
on Title VII plaintiffs to produce additional evidence suggesting discrimination after
contradicting their employer’s stated reasons is not great, but neither is it nothing.
Though we do not require the blindered recitation of a litany, we cannot ignore the
failure to present evidence of discrimination.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Mr. Williams does not explicitly argue that Ms. Sokol’s refusal to let him use
the bathroom inside her home is circumstantial evidence of racial animus. (See Doc.
19, pp. 10-13). But Mr. Williams includes the incident in his statement of facts and
states that the encounter is an example of another occasion when Ms. Sokol “engaged
in racially offensive conduct.” (Doc. 19, p. 9). Therefore, the court briefly addresses
this evidence and explains why the evidence is not probative of discriminatory intent.
Ms. Sokol did not tell Mr. Williams that he could not use the restroom inside
her house because he is African-American, and Mr. Williams has submitted no
evidence demonstrating that Ms. Sokol allowed Caucasian individuals doing work at
her house to use the restroom inside. Therefore, this evidence does not give rise to an
inference of intentional race discrimination.
In the absence of other evidence
suggesting that Ms. Sokol prohibited Mr. Williams from using her restroom because
he is African-American, a reasonable jury cannot infer discriminatory intent from this
facially neutral act that is removed in time and place from the employment decision.
16
In sum, Mr. Williams has not presented sufficient circumstantial evidence that
would allow a jury to infer that HOPE terminated his position because of his race.
Therefore, HOPE is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Williams’s Title
VII and § 1981 race discrimination claims.
Because Mr. Williams has not created a triable issue of fact concerning
HOPE’s discriminatory intent, Mr. Williams’s Title VII and § 1981 claims fail as a
matter of law. Thus, the court does not analyze HOPE’s alternative argument that
collateral estoppel bars Mr. Williams’s § 1981 claim. (See Doc. 17, pp. 16-19).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court finds that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and HOPE is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the
court GRANTS HOPE’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 16). The Court will
enter a separate order consistent with this memorandum opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this July 31, 2018.
_________________________________
ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17
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