Fairfield, Alabama, City of v. United States of America

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Chief Judge Karon O Bowdre on 5/31/18. (SAC )

FILED
2018 May-31 PM 12:12
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
FAIRFIELD, AL, CITY OF
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:17-CV-1064-KOB

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the court is the City of Fairfield’s second amended complaint. (Doc. 19). This
court has the United States’s “Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint” (doc. 20); the City’s
motion to amend its second amended complaint (doc. 23); the United States’s “Motion to Strike”
the City’s response to its motion to dismiss (doc. 26); and the City’s “Motion to Exclude Exhibit
B” (doc. 27).
The City filed its first complaint, styled as a petition to quash summons, on June 23,
2017. The United States moved to dismiss the first complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, contending that the City had failed to plead any valid waiver of the United States’s
sovereign immunity. This court granted the United States’s motion and dismissed the City’s first
complaint without prejudice, granting the City leave to file the second amended complaint now
before the court.
The United States now moves to dismiss the City’s second amended complaint, arguing
that the City again fails to establish a waiver of the United States’s sovereign immunity relevant
to the City’s allegations. (Doc. 22). The United States also argues that the City fails to plead

exhaustion of administrative remedies under 26 U.S.C. § 7433, which provides a limited waiver
of the United States’s sovereign immunity.
The City responded to the United States’s latest motion to dismiss, and, in a separate
filing, asks the court to allow it to amend its second amended complaint. (Docs. 22, 23). The
City’s proposed amendment is before the court. The City also moves to strike “Exhibit B” (doc.
23-2), which is a tax document the City avers it accidentally filed alongside its motion to amend
its complaint. (Doc. 27).
The United States, for its part, moves to strike the City’s response to the motion to
dismiss, which looks like an independent attempt to amend the City’s second amended complaint
outside the City’s formal request. (Doc. 26).
The court will DENY the United States’s motion (doc. 26) to strike the City’s response
(doc. 22). However, amending a complaint through a response to a motion to dismiss is
inappropriate and confusing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a short and plain statement
that the pleader is entitled to relief). Accordingly, the court considers the City’s filing (doc. 22)
only as a response to the United States’s motion to dismiss and nothing more.
The court will DENY the City’s motion to amend its second amended complaint. (Doc.
23). The City’s proposed addition to its complaint does not add anything of substance to the
second amended complaint nor does it cure the second amended complaint’s defects. The court
will GRANT the City’s motion to strike “Exhibit B” because it was inadvertently filed. (Doc.
27; Doc. 23-2).
Finally, the court will GRANT the United States’s motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint. The court will DISMISS the City’s complaint without leave to amend. After
addressing the United States’s first motion to dismiss, this court gave the City an opportunity to

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correct the first complaint’s myriad deficiencies. The City squandered that opportunity. The
second amended complaint is woeful; it contains even more deficiencies than the first complaint
and adds patently frivolous legal allegations to the mix. The court will accordingly DIRECT the
Clerk of Court to close this case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As with the City’s first complaint, the court takes the allegations in the City’s second
amended complaint (doc. 19) as true for purposes of examining its subject-matter jurisdiction.
See Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). In addition to arguing that
the court lacks jurisdiction, the United States asserts that the City’s second amended complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Generally, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “‘a short and plain statement of
the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A
plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement, but Rule 8 generally does not require
“detailed factual allegations.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
The Supreme Court explained that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting and explaining its decision in
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To be plausible on its face, the claim must contain enough facts that
“allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If the court determines that well-pleaded facts,
accepted as true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the claim must be dismissed. Id.
FACTS
A. Background
As with its first complaint, the City’s second amended complaint contains few coherent
facts and provides insufficient background. The court makes its best attempt at piecing together
the City’s allegations and claims.
The City admits that it owes the IRS significant sums of unpaid taxes. The City cannot
immediately pay all of what it owes, so it has looked to alternative methods of payment. To that
end, City officials had a conference call with an IRS officer on November 16, 2016.
The City appears or attempts to incorporate three affidavits by reference into its second
amended complaint. City officials Ed May, Dianne Cain, and Frank Woodson each aver that on
November 15, 2016, 1 they participated in a conference call with the IRS officer about the City’s
unpaid taxes. (Doc. 19-1; Doc. 19-2; Doc. 19-3). During this conference call, the IRS officer
indicated that the IRS would not take action to collect the City’s unpaid taxes. Furthermore, the
officer said that the IRS would work with the City on a payment plan or other relief. The City’s
complaint lacks allegations about whether it took any steps immediately after the November
conference call to submit to the IRS an offer-in-compromise or installment plan agreement in
writing.
In March 2017, the IRS notified the City that it intended to levy on funds in the City’s
bank accounts. (Doc. 19 ¶ 11). The City states that, at that time, the IRS had not yet notified the

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The text of the complaint indicates that the conference call occurred on November 16,
2016, but the affidavits state that the conference call occurred on November 15.
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City that the relief proposed 2 in the November 2016 conference call would not suffice. The IRS
began levying on the City’s bank accounts, and, in total, garnished an amount “in excess of
$42,311.23.” (Doc. 19 ¶¶ 13, 19). On May 1, 2017, the City submitted an offer-in-compromise
to the IRS. (Id. ¶ 15).
The Internal Revenue Code provides administrative review mechanisms that a litigant
must exhaust before bringing a claim in federal court. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-1(f). The City
alleges that on March 24, 2017, it appealed “the installment agreement rejection through the
[IRS’s] Collection Appeals Program (CAP) and requested a return of the wrongfully levied
proceeds through the CAP proceeding.” (Doc. 19 ¶ 14). The City does not indicate the outcome
of its appeal or whether it had any hearing as part of the appeal.
The City also attaches to its complaint several documents, including the IRS’s notice of
levy. The notice is dated March 7, 2017, and notifies the City that the IRS has sent a request to
Compass Bank to levy $42,311.23 from the City’s accounts. (Doc. 19-4). Another document is
a June 6, 2017, notification to the City of an IRS summons to Compass Bank. (Doc. 19-7). The
last document is the summons itself, which compels Compass Bank to provide to the IRS
information about the City’s bank accounts by July 7, 2017.
B. Allegations
The City appears to complain primarily that the IRS’s notice of levy and/or summons
lacked valid Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) “control numbers.” (See doc. 19 ¶¶
23-24, 33, 36). From there, the City concludes that the IRS’s levy of funds from the City’s
accounts was unauthorized. The City’s contention is akin to a “fruit of the poisonous tree”
argument: because the IRS improperly notified the City and improperly obtained its bank records
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The complaint does not identify what specific relief the City proposed in the November
conference call.
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using documents without OMB control numbers, the IRS’s subsequent levy of the City’s funds
using that information and relying on those notifications was, in the City’s view, improper. The
City’s second amended complaint contains four counts, plus an unnumbered “Legal Claim.”
In its first count, the City alleges that the IRS violated the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44
U.S.C. § 3512, which the City argues prohibits the IRS from issuing documents without an OMB
control number. The City calls the IRS’s violation of the Paperwork Reduction Act a “systemic”
and “pervasive” scheme that “has no bounds.” It adds that “this scheme must be stopped
immediately” because, in the City’s view, the IRS’s “abuse of power” “threatens to make a
mockery of our democratic systems.” (Doc. 19 ¶¶ 26, 28). And the City affirmatively states that
“[t]his is not an isolated incident.” (Id.). But the City’s complaint lacks factual allegations about
the other alleged incidents in which the IRS violated the Paperwork Reduction Act in the same
way.
In the second count, the City alleges that the IRS violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a, by collecting information with unauthorized documents (i.e., the documents without an
OMB control number) and then providing that information to Compass Bank. (Doc. 19 ¶ 32). In
the third count, the City states that the IRS violated the Fourth Amendment by using
unauthorized documents to seize the City’s money. In the fourth count, the City notes the
principles contained in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, 26 U.S.C. § 7803(a)(3), but does not make
any allegations. (See doc. 19 ¶¶ 40-41).
Lastly, the City includes what it titles a “Legal Claims” section. The City’s “Legal
Claims” section comes after its four enumerated counts. In this “Legal Claims” section, the City
observes that 26 U.S.C. § 7433 provides taxpayers a private right of action when an IRS officer
disregards any provision of the Internal Revenue Code or any regulation promulgated under the

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Code. In the same section, the City observes that the Internal Revenue Code prohibits levies
when an installment agreement is pending before the Secretary. The City then alleges that its
“offer to provide relief”—presumably a written offer to create an installment agreement or its
offer in compromise submitted May 1, 2017—was pending before the Secretary when the IRS
levied and garnished the City’s funds.
DISCUSSION
The court will DISMISS the City’s Paperwork Reduction Act and Fourth Amendment
allegations FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. The court will DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE the
City’s Privacy Act claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Furthermore, these allegations rest on a frivolous premise that the IRS’s failure to include an
OMB control number on its collection documents prohibited it from levying the City’s funds or
subpoenaing Compass Bank.
The City’s second amended complaint contains one allegation over which the court has
jurisdiction and is not frivolous. The City asserts that the IRS violated the Internal Revenue
Code or its regulations by levying funds while the City’s proposed offer-in-compromise or
installment agreement was pending before the IRS. However, the court will DISMISS that
allegation WITHOUT PREJUDICE because the City failed to plead whether and how it
exhausted any administrative remedies available to it before filing a lawsuit in this court.
To start, the court discusses the City’s claim that the IRS levied funds during the
pendency of an installment agreement or offer in compromise. Next, the court discusses the
City’s allegations under the Paperwork Reduction Act, Fourth Amendment, and Privacy Act that
the IRS used “unauthorized” or “fake” documents to collect the City’s unpaid taxes. Lastly, the

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court briefly discusses Count 4, which contains the City’s statements about the Taxpayer Bill of
Rights.
A.

Levy During Pendency of Offer-In-Compromise or Installment Agreement
(“Legal Claims”)

The court first looks to the City’s claim that the IRS violated its own regulations by
levying funds while an offer in compromise was pending before the Secretary. As in its first
motion to dismiss, the United States argues that the City has failed to plead a waiver of sovereign
immunity. Sovereign immunity deprives the court of subject-matter jurisdiction absent the
federal government’s waiver of its immunity. JBP Acquisitions, LP v. U.S. ex rel. F.D.I.C., 224
F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2000).
To establish such a waiver of the United States’s sovereign immunity, the City points to
26 U.S.C. § 7433. Section 7433 waives the United States’s sovereign immunity and provides a
private right of action in certain circumstances. Specifically, the statute grants that waiver to any
taxpayer if an IRS officer negligently, recklessly, or intentionally disregards any provision of the
Internal Revenue Code or regulations promulgated under the Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7433.
The City alleges that the IRS improperly levied funds to recoup the City’s unpaid taxes
during the pendency of an offer-in-compromise or installment agreement. While the IRS may
collect unpaid taxes from any person by way of levy, 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a), the IRS also provides
methods through which taxpayers can mitigate their inability to pay a tax deficiency to the IRS
immediately and in full. For example, a taxpayer may submit an “offer in compromise” to the
Secretary, and “[n]o levy may be made . . . on the property . . . of any person with respect to
unpaid tax—during the period that an offer-in-compromise by such person . . . is pending with
the Secretary.” Id. § 6331(k)(1)(A); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7122. Similarly, the IRS may not levy

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funds while an offer for an installment agreement is pending. 26 U.S.C. § 6331(k)(2)(A); see
also 26 U.S.C. § 6159.
The court has jurisdiction to consider this claim because the City alleges a violation of 26
U.S.C. § 6331(k)(1)(A), (k)(2)(A). As noted above, § 7433 of the Internal Revenue Code
provides a waiver of the United States’s sovereign immunity for claimed violations of the Code.
Id. § 7433.
However, the City’s second amended complaint fails to allege facts from which a jury
could conclude that the City exhausted its administrative remedies before bringing its claim to
this court. Although the City finds its way past sovereign immunity on this claim, “[a] judgment
for damages shall not be awarded . . . unless the court determines that the plaintiff has exhausted
the administrative remedies available to such plaintiff within the Internal Revenue Service.” 26
U.S.C. § 7433(d)(1).
The City alleges that it brought a claim through the IRS’s Collection Appeals Program.
But, under the Internal Revenue Code and its regulations, a taxpayer must make administrative
claims regarding denied installment agreements and offers-in-compromise in a Collection Due
Process hearing—different from the Collection Appeals Program—before such claims are
subject to judicial review. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-1(f); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7122(e); 26
C.F.R. § 301.7433-1(e) (requiring administrative claims to be sent in writing and noting other
procedural requirements); Offiler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 492, 498 (2000) (finding that
review of taxpayer’s case through the Collection Appeals Program did not confer jurisdiction on
the tax court). The City fails to allege whether it brought these claims in a Collection Due
Process hearing.

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The City also observes, correctly, that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a
jurisdictional issue under 26 U.S.C. § 7433. Galvez v. IRS, 448 Fed. Appx. 880, 885 (11th Cir.
2011). However, failure to exhaust administrative remedies requires dismissal nonetheless. Id.
at 887. (“Having avoided the Scylla of the exhaustion requirement[] in . . . [§ 7433] acting as [a]
jurisdictional bar[] to suit, the taxpayers nonetheless run into the Charybdis of failure to state a
claim.”). And the City has failed to plead whether and how it exhausted the administrative
remedies available to it under the Internal Revenue Code and the IRS’s regulations. For that
reason, the court will DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE the City’s allegation that the IRS
violated §§ 7433 and 6331 by levying funds while an offer-in-compromise or installment
agreement was pending before the Secretary.
As a final note on this issue, the City’s complaint is self-contradictory and contains
conflicting and confusing factual assertions regarding the dates on which the IRS took action
against the City. For example, the City alleges that the IRS levied funds from the City’s
accounts at Compass Bank in March 2017. However, the City also indicates that the IRS did not
subpoena Compass Bank for information about the City’s accounts until June 2017. Similarly, in
one place, the City alleges that it had a pending offer-in-compromise or installment agreement
before the IRS levied the City’s funds in March 2017, but in another place contends that it did
not submit an offer-in-compromise until May 2017. Even if the City had pleaded exhaustion of
remedies, the court would have difficulty concluding that the second amended complaint meets
Rule 8(a)(2)’s mandate of a short and plain complaint because of its contradictions.
B.

Paperwork Reduction Act, Privacy Act, and Fourth Amendment (Counts 1, 2, and
3).

Next, the court addresses the City’s assertion that the IRS acted unlawfully by using
documents without OMB control numbers to levy on the City’s funds. The City provides three
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ostensibly-legal bases for this claim: the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Privacy Act, and the
Fourth Amendment. The government argues that the City’s claims should be dismissed for
failure to plead any valid waiver of the United States’s sovereign immunity.
The City appears to point to 26 U.S.C. § 7433, but that statute only waives the United
States’s sovereign immunity for claims under the Internal Revenue Code and regulations
promulgated under it. But the Internal Revenue Code and its regulations do not include the
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3512, and the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the City
cannot use § 7433 to elude sovereign immunity for those allegations. The City identifies no
other waiver of the United States’s sovereign immunity for these claims. For those reasons, the
court will DISMISS the allegations in Counts 1 and 3 of the City’s second amended complaint
because they are barred by sovereign immunity and thus the court lacks jurisdiction to hear these
claims.
But the Privacy Act does contain a waiver of the United States’s sovereign immunity for
an agency’s violations of § 552a(b). 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D). Under § 552a(b), “[n]o agency
shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of
communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or
with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains . . . .” Id. § 552a(b).
In Count 2, the City contends that the IRS violated § 552a(b) by “collect[ing] information
obtained with unauthorized documents and provid[ing] those unauthorized documents to
Compass Bank to obtain the City’s funds.” (Doc. 19 ¶ 32). And in its response to the United
States’s motion to dismiss, the City argues that the Privacy Act prohibits the “nonconsensual
disclosure of agency records”; the City explains that the IRS violated the Privacy Act by
“concocting non-valid, unenforceable and fake instruments with the Plaintiff’s personal and

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private information and willfully sen[ding] that information to the Plaintiff’s bank officers.”
(Doc. 22 at 3-4). The City asserts that “the Internal Revenue Service has attempted to sabotage
the [the City] by [its] reckless and intentional acts.” (Id. at 11). Essentially, the City argues that
by using documents without OMB control numbers in violation of the Paperwork Reduction Act,
the City also violated the Privacy Act by using “unauthorized” or “fake” documents to obtain the
City’s banking information from Compass Bank.
In its motion to dismiss, the United States argues that the City cannot bring a claim under
the Privacy Act because 26 U.S.C. § 7433’s exclusivity provision preempts the Privacy Act for
claims related to the collection of taxes. But, § 7433’s exclusivity provision applies, in relevant
part, only to IRS officer actions that violate the Internal Revenue Code or its regulations. 26
U.S.C. § 7433. The exclusivity provision, therefore, does not apply to conduct that violates the
Privacy Act, which is not part of the Internal Revenue Code. See id.
But avoiding the exclusivity provision does not carry the day for the City. The City fails
to state a claim under the Privacy Act upon which relief can be granted. Although the United
States does not address whether the City’s Privacy Act claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the court finds that this claim warrants a sua sponte ruling to that effect.
See Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Foundation, 789 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2015) (observing that
district courts can sua sponte dismiss patently frivolous complaints without notice).
The City’s “OMB control number” claim qualifies as patently frivolous. The Paperwork
Reduction Act contains a statutory exemption for agency investigations of specific entities, such
as the IRS investigation into the City’s unpaid taxes. See 44 U.S.C. § 3518(c)(1)(B) (“[T]his
subchapter shall not apply to the collection of information . . . during the conduct of . . . an
administrative action or investigation involving an agency against specific individuals or

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entities.”). So the City’s conclusion that the IRS’s documents were “fake” and “unauthorized”
because it did not comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act falls flat. Accordingly, the City’s
allegation that the IRS violated the Privacy Act by using “fake” and “unauthorized” documents
also lacks merit. The IRS did not need to put any OMB control number on documents it issued
when collecting information relevant to its investigation into the City’s tax liabilities.
But § 3518(c)(1)(B) does not stand alone in showing the frivolity of the City’s argument.
Even cursory research uncovers droves of cases rejecting the City’s “OMB control number”
theory. United States v. Neff, 954 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Congress did not enact the
PRA’s public protection provision to allow OMB to abrogate any duty imposed by Congress.”);
see, e.g., Antolick v. C.I.R., 422 Fed. Appx. 859, 862 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming Tax Court’s
imposition of sanctions after pro se litigant raised “frivolous” OMB control number argument);
Cargill v. C.I.R., 272 Fed. Appx. 756, 757, 759-60 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting OMB control
number argument and granting Commissioner’s motion for sanctions against the pro se litigant
“[i]n light of the settled case law rejecting the position advanced by” the appellant); Taliaferro v.
C.I.R., 272 Fed. Appx. 831, 833 (11th Cir. 2008) (“In addition, we have rejected the argument
that a tax return need not be filed because of the absence of an OMB control number because
Congress did not condition the statutory duty to file a tax return on a Treasury regulation.”); IRS
Rev. Rul. 2006-21, 2006-1 C.B. 745 (adding OMB control number argument to IRS-maintained
list of commonly-raised “frivolous positions” and observing that “[c]ourts have repeatedly
rejected PRA-based arguments on a number of alternative grounds”).
And in holding that the lack of an OMB control number on a document issued by the IRS
does not make an IRS’s collection activity unlawful, the Eleventh Circuit was not alone. See,
e.g., United States v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Congress enacted the

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[Paperwork Reduction Act] to keep agencies, including the IRS, from deluging the public with
needless paperwork. It did not do so to create a loophole in the tax code.”); James v. United
States, 970 F.2d 750, 753 n.6 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that the lack of an OMB number on IRS
notices and forms does not violate the Paperwork Reduction Act).
District courts, too, routinely reject the City’s theory. See, e.g., Woods v. Commissioner,
I.R.S., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 1998) (“[D]espite Plaintiff’s protests to the
contrary, the absence of an OMB control number on the IRS’s request for tax information is not
tantamount to an illegal action taken by the IRS.”); United States v. Stoecklin, 848 F. Supp. 1521,
1521 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (finding that the absence of an OMB control number on a document is not
a “serious violation” of the Paperwork Reduction Act). 3
In summary, the City’s argument is frivolous. Notably, at least in the Eleventh Circuit
cases after Neff, only pro se litigants have raised this frivolous position. But the destination—
dismissal—is the same for the counseled as it is for the pro se. The court will DISMISS the
City’s Privacy Act claim in Count 2 WITH PREJUDICE because of its frivolity.
C.

Taxpayer Bill of Rights (Count 4)

As a final matter, Count 4 of the Amended Complaint notes the language of the Taxpayer
Bill of Rights, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7803(a)(3), part of the Internal Revenue Code. However,
the City makes no allegations in Count 4 of the Amended Complaint; the City merely observes
that this statute exists but does not explain how or why it would be entitled to relief pursuant to
that statute. As to Count 4, the court has no allegation or cause of action to address. To the
extent the City sought to assert a claim, the court will DISMISS Court 4 for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
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The City cites Stoecklin in its response to the United States’s motion to dismiss, but
fails to acknowledge that the case undercuts its argument. (Doc. 22 at 7).
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CONCLUSION
The court will GRANT the United States’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The court
has considered the content of the City’s proposed third complaint, and the content purportedly
added to the complaint in the City’s brief in response to the United States’s motion to dismiss.
Neither document contains any indication that the City, given the chance at a third complaint,
will fix any of the second amended complaint’s identified and obvious issues.
The court will DISMISS the City’s complaint without leave to amend and DIRECT the
Clerk of Court to close this case.
DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of May, 2018.

____________________________________
KARON OWEN BOWDRE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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