Smith v. Pelham, City of et al

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 41 42 MOTIONS for Leave to File Excess Pages of documents already submitted, DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 13 MOTION to Dismiss. Accordingly, Plaintiff Jennifer Smith is ORDERED to file a new complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order. Additionally, the STAY the Court placed on the case from March 7 is hereby LIFTED. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 4/27/2018. (JLC)

FILED
2018 Apr-27 PM 03:32
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JENNIFER SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF PELHAM, LARRY
PALMER, and GARY WATERS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
) Case No.: 2:17-CV-1320-VEH
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jennifer Smith (“Smith”) filed her Complaint against Defendants City

of Pelham, Larry Palmer, and Gary Waters on August 8, 2017. (Doc. 1). The
Complaint pursues eleven different claims ranging from Title VII to the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Stored Communications Act, and
Alabama state law. (See id. at 1-2). Defendants filed a Motion To Dismiss, combined
with an early Motion for Summary Judgment, (the “Motion”) that is the subject of the
present Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Doc. 13). Smith responded to that Motion,
and also filed a Rule 56(d) Motion. (Docs. 22, 23). The Court denied the Rule 56(d)
Motion and gave Smith time to file an adequate response to the Motion. (Doc. 36).
The briefing is complete and the Court now takes the Motion under submission. For

the reasons stated herein, the Court ORDERS Smith to replead her Complaint and
DENIES the Motion without prejudice.
II.

ANALYSIS
The Court has concerns about evaluating the merits of the Defendants’ Motion

based on its uncertainty about the scope of Smith’s Complaint and the numerous
pleading deficiencies contained therein.
Smith’s Complaint represents a classic “shotgun pleading.” This sort of
pleading fails to comply with the requirements set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The typical shotgun pleading is one that “contains several counts, each
one incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a
situation where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain irrelevant factual
allegations and legal conclusions.” Strategic Income Fund, LLC v. Spear, Leeds &
Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002). The term also refers to
pleadings that are “replete with factual allegations and rambling legal conclusions.”
Osahar v. U.S. Postal Service, 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008). The Eleventh
Circuit has repeatedly condemned the use of shotgun pleadings for “imped[ing] the
administration of the district courts’ civil dockets,” PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay
Beach Constr., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 806 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010), and making it “‘virtually
impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s)
2

for relief.’” Popham v. Cobb Cnty., Ga. Gov’t, 392 F. App’x 677, 680 (11th Cir.
2010) (quoting Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364,
366 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Courts have a role to play in preventing shotgun pleadings from frustrating the
“just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 1. For example, defendants can (and should) move for a more definite
statement before moving to dismiss or filing an answer. See Weiland v. Palm Peach
County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2015)
(encouraging parties to move for a more definitive statement and explaining the
Eleventh Circuit’s position on shotgun pleadings). Generally, the appropriate
response to a shotgun complaint is to dismiss it and allow the plaintiff an opportunity
to amend to provide greater specificity. Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366; Magluta v.
Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (“In the past when faced with
[shotgun] complaints like this one, we have vacated judgments and remanded with
instructions that the district court require plaintiffs to replead their claims.”).
The Eleventh Circuit has even noted the four types of shotgun pleadings:
Though the groupings cannot be too finely drawn, we have
identified four rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings. The most
common type—by a long shot—is a complaint containing multiple
counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts,
causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last
3

count to be a combination of the entire complaint. The next most
common type, at least as far as our published opinions on the subject
reflect, is a complaint that does not commit the mortal sin of re-alleging
all preceding counts but is guilty of the venial sin of being replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any
particular cause of action. The third type of shotgun pleading is one that
commits the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of
action or claim for relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare
sin of asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or
omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against. The
unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail
to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds
upon which each claim rests.
Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1313 (internal footnotes omitted). Smith’s Complaint is replete
with these issues.
For example, Smith’s Complaint has numerous examples of the first type of
shotgun pleading– re-alleging previous paragraphs without discerning what facts
matter. (Doc. 1 at 10 ¶50, 13 ¶65, 22 ¶128, 23 ¶134, 24 ¶141, 26 ¶149, 27 ¶157). This
pleading error starts fairly small. The first time she only re-alleges 38 paragraphs. (Id.
at 10 ¶50). However, by the end of the Complaint the error crescendos to re-alleging
a total of 145 paragraphs. (Id. at 27 ¶157). This is unacceptable.
Additionally, Smith’s Complaint names three defendants– the City of Pelham,
Larry Palmer, and Gary Waters. (Id. at 2-3). However, her Complaint fails have one
count for each defendant. (Id. at 14, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27). This problem is
4

compounded when Smith fails to make clear which Defendant she is talking about.
(See e.g., id. at 13 ¶¶70-72, 15 ¶¶77-80). This is even a problem in the “statement of
claims” section. (See id. at 8-10) (emphasis and capitalization omitted). Smith will
refer to plural “Defendants” in one paragraph, then refer to the now singular
“Defendant” the next, and vice versa. (See e.g., id. at 28 at ¶¶164-65). At least once,
Smith referred to plural defendants, then a singular defendant, then plural once more.
(Id. at 28 ¶¶161-164). The three Defendants are not the same person. Smith needs to
distinguish which Defendant she is talking about.
The foregoing were just a few examples of the flaws in this Complaint. There
are more that should be fixed in the new amended complaint. Pleading a Complaint
with facts and clarity is especially important in a case like the present, where Smith
alleges eleven counts against three defendants. (See generally Doc. 1). Repleading
the Complaint will clarify the case and help the parties focus on what precisely Smith
is alleging. Doing so protects Smith’s interests as it will help ensure that none of her
numerous theories are lost in the web of a shotgun pleading.
III.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Smith is ORDERED to file a new complaint within fourteen (14)

days of the date of this Order. The amended complaint must comply with Rule 10(b),
so that each count for relief contains only one defendant and one cause of action.
5

Each count must include facts that plausibly support why the stated Defendant is
liable to Smith under that count. This Order does not preclude a general recitation of
facts, but mere incorporation by reference followed by a series of legal conclusions
is insufficient. What really matters are the facts specifically supporting each count.
Plaintiff should also be mindful of the requirements for stating a plausible
claim for relief under FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Counts for which Smith,
upon reflection, is unable to muster sufficient factual matter to plausibly state a claim
shall not be included in the amended complaint. While Rule 8 does not require hypertechnical and detailed pleading, “it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
The failure of Smith to replead her claims consistent with the contours of this
ruling may warrant further action by this Court, including a dismissal of some or all
of her claims with or without prejudice.
In light of this repleader order, the pending Motion is hereby DENIED
without prejudice. (Doc. 13) Additionally, the STAY the Court placed on the case
from March 7 is hereby LIFTED. (Doc. 36). Finally, the Court GRANTS the
motions for leave to file excess pages of documents already submitted. (Docs. 41, 42).

6

DONE and ORDERED this the 27th day of April, 2018.

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge

7