Thompson v. QCHC Inc et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND ORDER the court GRANTS QCHCs motion for summary judgment and ENTERS JUDGMENT in favor QCHC on Ms. Thompsons Title VII hostile work environment claim and Title VII retaliation claim. The court DISMISSES these claims WITH PREJUDICE. The only remaining claim is Ms. Thompsons state law invasion of privacy claim against Mr. Henderson. In her complaint, Ms. Thompson did not allege that the court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, and she has not pro perly alleged her citizenship or that of Mr. Henderson. (See Doc. 1). Nor does the second amended complaint allege or establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (See Doc. 1). In the absence of an independent basis for jurisdiction over Ms. Thompsons invasion of privacy claim, the court will dismiss the claim without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Within 7 days of entry of this order, Ms. Thompson shall show cause why the court has original jurisdiction over her state law claim.. Signed by Judge Annemarie Carney Axon on 1/8/2019. (TLM, )

FILED
2019 Jan-08 PM 03:35
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DEBRA THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
QCHC, INC. and CLIFF
HENDERSON,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:17-cv-01456-ACA

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Debra Thompson alleges that Defendant Cliff Henderson sexually
harassed her and that Defendant QCHC, Inc. (“QCHC”) terminated her
employment for complaining about Mr. Henderson’s conduct. Ms. Thompson
asserts claims against QCHC for hostile work environment and retaliation under
Title VII. She asserts a claim against Mr. Henderson for invasion of privacy under
state law.
Before the court are Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 34;
Doc. 40). For the reasons explained below, the court GRANTS QCHC’s motion
for summary judgment (doc. 34), and in the absence of an independent basis for
jurisdiction over Ms. Thompson’s state law invasion of privacy claim against Mr.

Henderson, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
claim.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party bears the initial burden
of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” FindWhat
Inv’r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). A “material fact” is one that “might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
II.

BACKGROUND

QCHC is a Birmingham-based company that contracts with local
governmental entities to provide healthcare services to city and county correctional
facilities. (Doc. 34-1 at ¶ 2). QCHC hired Ms. Thompson in March 2015 as a
part-time nurse and assigned her to work at the City of Trussville’s Municipal Jail.
(Doc. 34-1 at ¶ 5; Doc. 34-2 at 8). She remained on that assignment until the
spring of 2016, when QCHC transferred her to another of the facilities it served.
(Doc. 34-2 at 14).

2

When Ms. Thompson was hired, her supervisor was Ashlei Porter, Chief
Nursing Officer for QCHC at that time. (Doc. 34-1 at ¶ 6). According to Ms.
Thompson, Stacie Thompson (“Stacie”) became her supervisor in the spring of
2016. (Doc 34-2 at 11). Stacie was a site administrator for the St. Clair County
Jail, another facility where QCHC provides healthcare services. (Doc. 34-2 at 11;
Doc. 34-4 at ¶ 1). Stacie was never formally assigned responsibility over the
Trussville Jail, but she did cover shifts there. (Doc. 34-4 at ¶ 2). Victoria
Singleton, QCHC’s Regional Director of Nursing for Alabama, also supervised
Ms. Thompson’s work at the Trussville Jail beginning in the spring of 2016. (Doc.
34-1 at ¶ 6).
Ms. Thompson alleges that Cliff Henderson sexually harassed her while she
worked at the Trussville Jail. (Doc. 34-2 at 25). Mr. Henderson was a police
officer who worked at the Jail, but he was not employed by QCHC. (Doc. 34-2 at
22). Ms. Thompson first met Mr. Henderson when he came into the office during
her training and would “laugh and talk and flirt and cut up and get in the way.”
(Doc. 34-2 at 22).
In July 2015, Ms. Thompson and Mr. Henderson began texting frequently.
(See generally Doc. 34-5). As time passed, the exchanges became increasingly
flirtatious. (See Doc. 34-5 at 3-5, 137, 140-142). On one occasion, Ms. Thompson
texted Mr. Henderson pictures of her feet after a pedicure, and Mr. Henderson
3

replied that she had “sexy toes.” (Doc. 34-2 at 26-27). In another exchange, Mr.
Henderson explained that he was so tired the night before that he never took his
clothes off. (Doc. 34-5 at 51). Mr. Henderson continued, “I don’t wear anything
when I go to bed, but I still had my cop suit on lol.” (Doc. 34-5 at 51). Ms.
Thompson replied, “lol . . . you are hilarious . . . I love it!” (Doc. 34-2 at 30; Doc.
34-5 at 51). In response to a number of Mr. Henderson’s text messages, Ms.
Thompson told Mr. Henderson that she either missed seeing him or was looking
forward to seeing him at work. (Doc. 34-5 at 29, 44).
In addition to the texts, Mr. Henderson and Ms. Thompson verbally
communicated.

During some conversations, Mr. Henderson referred to Ms.

Thompson as “Miss 44” or “My 44 girl.” (Doc. 34-2 at 25). Ms. Thompson
believes the reference to “44” was in relation to her breast or bra size, although she
denies giving Mr. Henderson her breast or bra size, and she denies that “44” is the
correct size. (Doc. 34-2 at 25). Mr. Henderson occasionally referred to Ms.
Thompson as “Hottie Nurse,” but Ms. Thompson testified that Mr. Henderson was
joking on some occasions. (Doc. 34-2 at 26). Ms. Thompson never told Mr.
Henderson that she was offended by the reference to “Hottie Nurse” and never told
him to stop referring to her as “44.” (Doc. 34-2 at 26).
Mr. Henderson also gave Ms. Thompson a few shoulder/back massages.
(Doc. 34-2 at 33). Ms. Thompson texted Mr. Henderson on one occasion and said
4

that the massage “felt good.” (Doc. 34-2 at 28). In another text message, Mr.
Henderson suggested that he could give a better massage if Ms. Thompson took off
her shirt. (Doc. 34-5 at 131). During one of the massages, Mr. Henderson “pushed
back” Ms. Thompson’s scrubs and “put[] his hands onto [her] skin.” (Doc. 34-2 at
28). Ms. Thompson “got up and felt very uncomfortable.” (Doc. 34-2 at 28). Ms.
Thompson never complained to Mr. Henderson about the massages, and she never
asked him to stop. (Doc. 34-2 at 33).
Ms. Thompson testified that Mr. Henderson’s conduct caused stress, but the
stress did not prevent her from providing patient care to inmates at the Trussville
Jail. (Doc. 34-2 at 46-47). In fact, Ms. Thompson sought to work more hours at
the Trussville Jail. (Doc. 34-2 at 47). She asked QCHC to approach the City of
Trussville and ask if the contract could be amended to allow for a full-time nurse
position at the jail. (Doc. 34-2 at 13-14, 17). After the City of Trussville rejected
the idea, Ms. Thompson transferred to another QCHC location where she could
work more hours. (Doc. 34-2 at 14).
After her transfer, Ms. Thompson returned to the Trussville Jail “a couple of
times” to check on inmates there. (Doc. 34-2 at 38). One day in June 2016, Stacie
asked Ms. Thompson whether she wanted to go check on the inmates at the
Trussville Jail. (Doc. 34-2 at 38). Ms. Thompson told Stacie that she did not want
to go back to the Trussville Jail because Mr. Henderson made her “feel
5

uncomfortable” and “says sexual things.” (Doc. 34-2 at 38). Ms. Thompson
showed Stacie some of the text messages from Mr. Henderson, and Stacie
responded, “Oh, gosh.” (Doc. 34-2 at 38). This was the first time that Ms.
Thompson reported Mr. Henderson’s conduct to QCHC management, and after
Ms. Thompson told Stacie about Mr. Henderson’s conduct, QCHC did not require
her to go back to the Trussville Jail. (Doc. 34-2 at 38). 1
On June 28, 2016, a new inmate asked Ms. Thompson for blood pressure
medication. (Doc. 34-2 at 39; Doc. 34-4 at ¶ 4). Ms. Thompson gave the inmate
one dose of prescription blood pressure medication without confirming that the
inmate had a prescription for the medication and without getting approval from a
QCHC doctor as required per QCHC policy. (Doc. 34-3 at 2; Doc. 34-4 at ¶¶ 4-6).
Ms. Thompson gave the prescription medication to the inmate without checking
the inmate’s blood pressure and without documenting the event in the inmate’s
medical file. (Doc. 34-4 at ¶ 5). Later that day, Ms. Thompson called Stacie and
told her what she did. (Doc. 34-2 at 39). According to Ms. Thompson, Stacie told
her, “It’s okay this time, but don’t do it anymore, just always call the doctor.”
(Doc. 34-2 at 40).

1

In addition to Stacie, Ms. Thompson told two QCHC co-employees about Mr. Henderson’s
conduct. (Doc. 34-2 at 33-38). One of Ms. Thompson’s co-employees told her to report Mr.
Henderson’s conduct to his boss at the Trussville Jail, but Ms. Thompson did not do so. (Doc.
34-2 at 36-37).
6

Stacie reported Ms. Thompson’s actions to Ms. Singleton. (Doc. 34-4 at ¶
7). Ms. Singleton asked Stacie about Ms. Thompson’s overall work performance,
and Stacie told her that there were other problems. (Doc. 34-4 at ¶ 7). Ms.
Singleton asked Stacie to prepare a disciplinary write up for the blood pressure
medication incident and to submit a written report of other performance issues.
(Doc. 34-4 at ¶ 7). On July 6, 2016, Stacie issued a “Notice of Disciplinary
Action” to Ms. Thompson for administering medication to the inmate without
taking the inmate’s blood pressure and without a doctor’s order in violation of
QCHC policy. (Doc. 34-3 at 2). Stacie provided a written report to Ms. Singleton
on July 7, 2016. (Doc. 34-4 at ¶ 7).
After receiving Stacie’s report, Ms. Singleton approached Justin Barkley,
QCHC’s in-house counsel, with concerns about Ms. Thompson’s work
performance. (Doc. 34-1 at ¶ 10). Ms. Singleton and Mr. Barkley made the
decision to terminate Ms. Thompson based on these performance issues, and they
checked with QCHC’s President, Dr. Johnny Bates, to make sure he was okay with
the decision. (Doc. 34-1 at ¶ 10; Doc. 34-6 at ¶ 2). Dr. Bates gave his approval.
(Doc. 34-6 at ¶ 2). Neither Dr. Bates nor Mr. Thompson were aware of any issues
that Ms. Thompson had with Mr. Henderson at this time and did not learn of those
issues until Ms. Thompson filed her EEOC complaint. (Doc. 34-1 at ¶ 10; Doc.
34-6 at ¶ 3).
7

On July 8, 2016, Mr. Barkley and Ms. Singleton called Ms. Thompson to
notify her that she was being terminated. (Doc. 34-2 at 40). Stacie was not
involved in the decision to terminate Ms. Thompson, and Stacie did not provide
any opinion to Ms. Singleton or Mr. Barkley about Ms. Thompson’s continued
employment with QCHC. (Doc. 34-4 at ¶ 10). The record contains no evidence
that Stacie or either of Ms. Thompson’s co-employees told Ms. Singleton, Mr.
Barkley, or Dr. Bates about Ms. Thompson’s complaints regarding Mr. Henderson.
III.

DISCUSSION
QCHC moves for summary judgment on both of the claims that Ms.

Thompson asserts against it. QCHC argues that Ms. Thompson’s Title VII hostile
work environment and Title VII retaliation claims fail as a matter of law because
Ms. Thompson cannot establish a prima facie case for either claim. The court
agrees.
A.

Title VII Hostile Work Environment

To establish a sexually hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must
show:
(1) that he or she belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee
has been subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual
nature; (3) that the harassment must have been based on the sex of the
employee; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a
discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) a basis for
holding the employer liable.
8

Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999). QCHC argues
that Ms. Thompson has failed to establish the fourth and fifth elements of her
claim. (Doc. 35 at 16-28).
Concerning the fourth element, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that
sexual harassment does “not constitute employment discrimination under Title VII
unless the conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. at 1245
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original).
“Establishing that harassing conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter an
employee’s terms or conditions of employment includes a subjective and an
objective component.” Id. at 1246. “The employee must subjectively perceive the
harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of
employment, and this subjective perception must be objectively reasonable. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).

QCHC challenges only the objective

component. (Doc. 35 at 17).
To determine whether harassment is objectively hostile, the court considers:
“(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the
conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
(4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job
performance.” Smelter v. So. Home Care Servs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th
9

Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). These factors guide the
court’s analysis, but “the objective element is not subject to mathematical
precision.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1297 (11th Cir. 2009). The court must
view the evidence “cumulatively and in the totality of the circumstances.” Reeves
v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010). Doing so
here, the court finds that Ms. Thompson has not demonstrated that Mr.
Henderson’s harassment was objectively hostile.
Concerning the frequency of Mr. Henderson’s conduct, the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to Ms. Thompson, demonstrates that Mr. Henderson
called her a “Hottie Nurse” or some iteration of “my 44” 15 to 21 times over the
course of the 16 months she was employed with QCHC. (See Doc. 34-2 at 25-26).
In addition, Mr. Henderson gave Ms. Thompson a back or shoulder massage on
four occasions during that same time period. (Doc. 34-2 at 23). The other
comments that Mr. Henderson made to Ms. Thompson via text occurred
intermittently between July 2015 and May 2016. (See generally Doc. 34-5). The
frequency of this conduct falls short of what the Eleventh Circuit has found
sufficient to constitute pervasive harassment. See Smelter, 904 F.3d at 1285
(plaintiff heard harassing comments “every day” during her two month
employment with defendant); Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240,
1251-54 (11th Cir. 2014) (plaintiffs heard harassing comments “every morning,”
10

“every day,” “regularly,” or “all the time”); Miller v. Kentworth of Dothan, Inc.,
277 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff exposed to harassing conduct
“three to four times a day” over a one month period); Johnson v. Booker T.
Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 509 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that
“roughly fifteen separate instances of harassment over the course of four months”
was pervasive).
Even if Mr. Henderson’s conduct was frequent, this “does not compensate
for the absence of the other factors.” Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1248. And here, the
evidence does not demonstrate that Mr. Henderson’s conduct was severe enough to
establish a hostile work environment claim. Mr. Henderson never exposed himself
to Ms. Thompson, and he never discussed any graphic sexual encounters he had.
(Doc. 34-2 at 32). Mr. Henderson did not proposition Ms. Thompson for sex or
make any explicit sexual advances toward her. (Doc. 34-2 at 32). The conduct
about which Ms. Thompson complains includes Mr. Henderson’s references to Ms.
Thompson as “Hottie Nurse” and “44;” his comment about him sleeping in the
nude, Ms. Thompson’s “sexy toes,” his ability to “get [her] going,” and his desire
to spend the day with her; his suggestion that he considered asking Ms. Thompson
to perform his prostrate exam; his sending her a picture of a family dressed up in
costumes that made them appear nude; and his giving her four back/shoulder

11

massages and suggesting after one massage that she should take her shirt off for
the next massage. (See Doc. 42 at 9-10).
Mr. Henderson’s conduct at times may have been inappropriate and
offensive, but the conduct fails to meet the severity prong required to constitute
actionable sexual harassment. Compare Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants, LLC, 367
F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2004) (conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive
where the plaintiff’s supervisor “frequent[ly]” tried to get plaintiff to date him
using “many direct as well as indirect propositions for sex” including “following
her into the restroom,” “repeated attempts to touch her breasts, place his hands
down her pants, and pull off her pants,” and “enlisting the assistance of others to
hold her while he attempted to grope her”) and Miller, 277 F.3d at 1276-77
(harassment was severe and pervasive where co-workers called plaintiff racially
offensive names three to four times per day) with Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212
F.3d 571, 584-85 (11th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (the following conduct over a six or
seven month period was not sufficiently severe or pervasive: flirtatious comments
such as “[y]ou are looking very beautiful”; frequent calls to plaintiff’s house at
night asking personal questions; one incident when plaintiff entered harasser’s
office when he was expecting her and he was sitting in his chair with his dress shirt
off, but wearing an undershirt, and he “unbuckled his belt and pulled down his
12

zipper and start[ed] tucking his shirt in”; one incident where harasser placed his
hand on plaintiff’s inner thigh; and one incident where harasser lifted plaintiff’s
dress four inches and felt the hem) and Lockett v. Choice Hotels Intern., Inc., 315
F. App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2009) (harasser’s comments to plaintiff about sexual
positions, that “he would go down on [her] good,” that her boyfriend “ain’t F’ing
[her] right, and that she needed “to get with a real guy” were not severe or
pervasive).
With respect to whether Mr. Henderson’s conduct was physically
threatening or humiliating, Ms. Thompson does not allege and has not produced
evidence that Mr. Henderson humiliated her. Ms. Thompson testified that Mr.
Henderson never physically threatened her. (Doc. 34-2 at 24). And, although the
four massages involve physical contact, Ms. Thompson told Mr. Henderson that
one of the massages “felt good.” (Doc. 34-2 at 28). Thus, the record contains no
evidence that Mr. Henderson physically threatened Ms. Thompson or humiliated
her, despite making her “uncomfortable” at times. (See Doc. 34-2 at 36).
Finally, Ms. Thompson offers no evidence that Mr. Henderson’s harassment
affected the performance of her job. Although Ms. Thompson testified that she
suffered stress as a result of Mr. Henderson’s conduct, she still was able to provide
quality patient care. (Doc. 34-2 at 47). In addition, months after Mr. Henderson’s
conduct began, Ms. Thompson requested to work more hours at the Trussville Jail,
13

even though she knew that doing so meant she might interact with Mr. Henderson
more frequently.

(Doc. 34-2 at 47).

Ms. Thompson did not file a written

complaint about Mr. Henderson; she did not talk to QCHC’s human resources
department about Mr. Henderson; and she complained to Stacie only after QCHC
transferred her to a different jail. (Doc. 34-2 at 37-38). None of this evidence
suggests that Mr. Henderson’s conduct unreasonably interfered with Ms.
Thompson’s ability to perform her job.
Viewing the evidence as a whole, the court concludes that Mr. Henderson’s
conduct did not alter the conditions of Ms. Thompson’s employment.
Accordingly, QCHC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Ms. Thompson’s
Title VII hostile work environment claim.
Because Ms. Thompson has not demonstrated that Mr. Henderson’s
harassment was severe and pervasive, Ms. Thompson’s hostile work environment
claim fails as a matter of law. Thus, the court does not address QCHC’s alternative
argument that Ms. Thompson has not shown a basis for holding QCHC liable.
(See Doc. 35 at 22-38).
B.

Title VII Retaliation

To establish a claim for Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially
adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected
14

activity and the adverse action. Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244
(11th Cir. 2010). QCHC argues that Ms. Thompson cannot establish a prima facie
case of retaliation because there is no evidence of a causal connection. (Doc. 35 at
27-28).
A plaintiff establishes a causal connection through facts showing “that the
protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.” Clover v.
Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 1999). “In order to show the
two things were not entirely unrelated, the plaintiff must generally show that the
decision maker was aware of the protected conduct at the time of the adverse
employment action.” Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799
(11th Cir. 2000); see Raney v. Vinson Guard Serv., Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1197 (11th
Cir. 1997) (“[I]n a case involving a corporate defendant the plaintiff must show
that the corporate agent who took the adverse action was aware of the plaintiff’s
protected expression.”). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that this “requirement
rests upon common sense” because “[a] decision maker cannot have been
motivated to retaliate by something unknown to him.” Brungart, 231 F.3d at 799.
Ms. Singleton and Mr. Barkley, with Dr. Bates’s approval, made the
decision to terminate Ms. Thompson’s employment. (Doc. 34-1 at ¶ 10; Doc. 36-6
at ¶ 2). Ms. Thompson did not complain to Ms. Singleton or Mr. Barkley about
Mr. Henderson. Ms. Thompson complained to Stacie and two other QCHC
15

employees. (Doc. 34-2 at 34-38). Although Stacie completed a disciplinary report
and provided information to Ms. Singleton about Ms. Thompson’s job
performance, Ms. Thompson has presented no evidence demonstrating that Stacie
told Ms. Singleton about Ms. Thompson’s complaints. (See Doc. 34-1 at ¶10; Doc.
34-4 at ¶¶ 7, 10; Doc. 44-1 at ¶ 3). Moreover, neither Mr. Barkley nor Dr. Bates
was aware, prior to Ms. Thompson’s termination, that she complained about a jail
officer’s conduct. (Doc. 34-1 at ¶ 10; Doc. 34-6 at ¶ 2).
Ms. Thompson argues that a causal connection exists because QCHC
terminated her employment “within approximately 14 days of telling her
supervisor she did not want to go back to work with Henderson at the Trussville
City Jail.” (Doc. 42 at 16). An employee’s termination within weeks of her
protected activity may be circumstantial evidence of a causal connection, but
“temporal proximity alone is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to
causal connection where there is unrebutted evidence that the decision maker did
not have knowledge that the employee engaged in protected conduct.” Brungart,
231 F.3d at 799.
Because Ms. Thompson has not submitted evidence showing that the
decision makers knew about her complaints, Ms. Thompson has not demonstrated
that a causal connection exists between the complaints and her termination, and she
cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See e.g., Clover, 176 F.3d at
16

1356 (reversing district court’s denial of summary judgment on retaliation claim
because despite being terminated one day after protected conduct, the plaintiff
“failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that [the decision maker] was
aware of her protected conduct”); McCollum v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602, 610-11 (11th
Cir.1986) (plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case of retaliation where evidence
showed that the decision maker did not know that the plaintiff engaged in protected
activity).
Accordingly, QCHC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Ms.
Thompson’s Title VII retaliation claim.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the court GRANTS QCHC’s motion for

summary judgment and ENTERS JUDGMENT in favor QCHC on Ms.
Thompson’s Title VII hostile work environment claim and Title VII retaliation
claim. The court DISMISSES these claims WITH PREJUDICE.
The only remaining claim is Ms. Thompson’s state law invasion of privacy
claim against Mr. Henderson. In her complaint, Ms. Thompson did not allege that
the court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, and she has not properly alleged
her citizenship or that of Mr. Henderson. (See Doc. 1). Nor does the second
amended complaint allege or establish that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. (See Doc. 1).
17

In the absence of an independent basis for jurisdiction over Ms. Thompson’s
invasion of privacy claim, the court will dismiss the claim without prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Within 7 days of entry of this order, Ms.
Thompson shall show cause why the court has original jurisdiction over her state
law claim.
DONE and ORDERED this January 8, 2019.

_________________________________
ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18