Boyd v. Medtronic PLC

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Eleventh Circuit does not require that a Title VII plaintiff must plead a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a Motion to Dismiss. As Medtronic's motion to dismiss (Doc.7) moves for dismissal solely on the Complaint's failure to articulate a prima facie case, it is due to be DENIED. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 4/26/2018. (TLM, )

FILED
2018 Apr-26 AM 11:46
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOSHUA H. BOYD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MEDTRONIC, PLC,
Defendant.

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2:17-cv-01588-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Joshua H. Boyd (“Boyd”) brings the instant action against his
former employer, Medtronic, PLC (“Medtronic”) 1, alleging claims for sex
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). Before this Court is Medtronic’s
Motion to Dismiss the sex-discrimination claim in count one of Boyd’s Complaint
(Doc. 7.) The Motion has been fully briefed by the parties and is ripe for review.
For the reasons described more fully herein, Medtronic’s Motion is due to be
denied.

1

Defendant Medtronic has indicated that it was incorrectly styled in the Complaint as
Medtronic, PLC, although the entity that employed plaintiff was Medtronic USA, Inc. (Doc. 7 at
1 n.1.)

I.

BACKGROUND2
Boyd began his employment with Medtronic, a medical technology

company, as an Area Sales Manager in January of 2013. When hired, Boyd’s
supervisor was Kevin Burke (“Burke”). Under Burke’s supervision, Boyd was not
subjected to any form of discipline and generally maintained an excellent sales
record.
On November 24, 2014 Medtronic’s Chief Executive Officer, Omar Ishrak
(“CEO Ishrak”), gave a presentation to a Medtronic’s women’s group called
“Aspire”. At this presentation, CEO Ishrak stated “our goal should be that we get
to fifty-percent [female representation in management] . . . those of you who are
managers or in positions where you can do that, please make it a priority.” CEO
Ishrak did not address the qualifications or merits of female managers at this
presentation.
In April of 2015, Kelly Nicholas (“Nicholas”), a new regional vice president
(“RVP”), became Boyd’s direct supervisor. Under Nicholas’s supervision, Boyd
achieved 252% of his requisite sales plan, earning him the title of “top-seller,”
prestige, and pecuniary awards. Despite his status as “top-seller,” in April of 2016
Nicholas placed Boyd on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”), Medtronic’s
2

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, this Court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint as true
and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679
F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2012).
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progressive discipline system, all the while knowing that doing so would strip Boyd
of his “top-seller” position. The title and associated accolades were then awarded
to a female coworker. Boyd contested his placement on the PIP and Medtronic
conducted an extensive, two-month long investigation.
Before the investigation concluded, but after fully discovering the facts, Boyd
notified Medtronic that it was his belief that his placement on the PIP was
motivated by Nicholas’s gender bias. Nicholas had previously voiced personal
gender bias when speaking to a male employee interested in applying for one of the
new RVP positions. During this conversation, Nicholas said to the male employee
“[y]ou know, [], the only problem you are going to have is you don’t have the right
gender…they [Medtronic] are looking for.” Once the two-month investigation
concluded, Boyd’s PIP was removed, he was re-designated “top-seller,” and he
was placed under a new supervisor, RVP Michelle Gaulding (“Gaulding”).
When Boyd was placed under Gaulding as of July 2016, Medtronic removed
Regional Capital Manager, Chuck Gross (“Gross”), from Gaulding’s supervision
and placed Gross under Nicholas’s supervision. Prior to Gross’s transfer, Gaulding
had twice tried to replace Gross with two separate female employees and Gross
made internal complaints of gender discrimination against Gaulding.

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Working under Gaulding meant Boyd would be working in a new region,
which required him to set up a new capital sales pipeline and obtain new contacts.
As a result, he only achieved thirty-five percent of his sale’s quota, whereas in his
previous region, he had achieved one-hundred seventy-five percent of his sales
quota.
On August 8, 2016 Boyd filed the First Charge against Medtronic for gender
discrimination and retaliation. Shortly after Boyd filed his First Charge, Gaulding
began using derogatory statements and making false accusations about Boyd to his
coworkers by stating “[Boyd] left a mess in the Midwest Region. You know he left
behind a log of broken glass.” In a conference call to various team leaders,
Gaulding also stated “[Boyd] is not allowed in Memorial Hospital.” Memorial
hospital is one of Medtronic’s largest accounts, and if Boyd was banned from
entering

the

premises,

it

would

be

detrimental

to

his

and

his

coworkers’/subordinates’ careers.
On or about September 13, 2016, Medtronic notified Boyd of its receipt of
his First Charge. Boyd then engaged Medtronic in discussions about his First
Charge and his concerns relating to Gaulding’s actions. On September 22, 2016,
Boyd met with Gaulding and Mark Eller (“Eller”), a Human Resources
Representative, to discuss Gaulding’s behavior towards Boyd and their working
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relationship. During this meeting, Boyd voiced his opposition to Gaulding’s gender
discrimination and retaliation.
On or about September 30, 2016, CEO Ishrak gave another presentation to
Aspire, which Gaulding attended. In line with his April 2015 mandate, CEO Ishrak
once again emphasized the advancement of women over men without regard to
qualification or merit. At this presentation, CEO Ishrak stated that Medtroinc has
“. . . a goal to see forty percent (40% women in leadership positions within
Medtronic by 2020)” and they all needed to try to make this happen. CEO Ishrak
also stated that “. . . two (2) areas of particular focus, to move the needle, are
within the engineering and sales functions.”
In order to realize CEO Ishrak’s mandate by 2020, Medtronic would need to
either more than triple in size or immediately begin terminating males in sales
leadership and management roles. On October 5, 2016, five days after CEO
Ishrak’s second goal presentation, Medtronic placed Boyd on administrative leave
for allegedly undermining Gaulding. Boyd contested the discipline and attempted
to explain the situation. Unlike the thorough investigation Medtronic conducted
when Boyd contested his placement on the PIP, Medtronic’s investigation on this
matter lasted only five days, only two of which were full business days.

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During the investigation, a key witness submitted a statement to Lisa Jones
(“Jones”), a Human Resources Representative. This statement would have
exonerated Boyd from any wrong doing, but Jones told the witness “she did not
have time to read” the statement. On October 10, 2017 Boyd was terminated.
Based on these events, count one of Boyd’s Complaint asserts a claim of sex
discrimination, and more specifically, that his gender was a motivating factor in his
placement on administrative leave and termination. (Doc. 1 at 14.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In general, a pleading must include “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, in
order to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a
complaint “must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to drag the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Stated another
way, the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to “raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th
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Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). A complaint that “succeeds in identifying facts that
are suggestive enough to render [the necessary elements of a claim] plausible” will
survive a motion to dismiss. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.
2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court first “identif[ies]
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679. This Court then “assume[s] the[]
veracity” of the complaint’s “well-pleaded factual allegations” and “determine[s]
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. Review of the
complaint is “a context-specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Id. If the pleading “contain[s] enough
information regarding the material elements of a cause of action to support
recovery under some ‘viable legal theory,’” it satisfies the notice pleading
standard. Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178,
1186 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d
678, 683–84 (11th Cir. 2001)).
III.

DISCUSSION
Medtronic’s sole argument is that Boyd has failed to state a claim because he

cannot plead a prima facie case of discrimination under the standard stated in
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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

According to

Medtronic, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Boyd must plead the
following: 1) that he is a member of a protected class; 2) he was qualified for his
position; 3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and 4) he was
replaced by a person outside his protected class or was treated less favorably than a
similarly-situated individual outside his protected class (Doc. 7 at 4.) See Maynard
v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). Under Medtronic’s
proposed standard, Boyd did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination
because he did not plead that he was replaced by someone outside of his protected
class or that a female employee had engaged in the same or substantially similar
conduct without being terminated. (Doc. 7 at 5.) Because Boyd did not plead a
prima facie case of discrimination, Medtronic contends that Boyd’s sex
discrimination claim in count one of his complaint is due to be dismissed. (Id. at 5–
6.)
The Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. established that for
employment discrimination cases, “the prima facie cause under McDonnell
Douglas…is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” 534 U.S. 506,
510 (2002). The McDonnell Douglas framework for discrimination cases is
specifically concerned with “the order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class
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action challenging employment discrimination,” not the pleading standards of such
a case. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800). Swierkiewicz noted that in
no Supreme Court case following McDonnell Douglas has the Court “indicated that
the requirements for establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas also
apply to the pleading standards that plaintiffs must satisfy… to survive a motion to
dismiss.” Id. at 511.
Following Swierkiewicz, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that a Title
VII claimant does not have to plead a prima facie case to survive a motion to
dismiss. See Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1270–71 (11th Cir.
2004) (“Swierkiewicz made clear that pleading a McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case was not necessary to survive a motion to dismiss . . . .”) and Davis v. CocaCola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (“. . . [A] Title VII
complaint need not allege facts sufficient to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case.”).
While Jackson and Davis both predate Iqbal and Twombly, the Eleventh
Circuit has reitereated after Twombly/Iqbal that Swierkiewicz still correctly states
the pleading standard for Title VII complaints. In Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace
Foundation, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that a claimant “need not allege facts
sufficient to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.” 789 F.3d
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1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Instead, “a complaint need only provide enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest intentional…discrimination.” Id. (quoting Davis, 516
F.3d at 974) (internal quotation marks omitted). Surtain reasoned that “[t]his is
because McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework is an evidentiary standard,
not a pleading requirement.” Id. (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510). Several nonbinding Eleventh Circuit cases likewise urge against granting Medtronic’s Motion
to Dismiss. See Castillo v. Allegro Resort Mktg., 603 F. App’x 913, 917 (11th Cir.
2015) (holding that “[t]o withstand a motion to dismiss . . . a plaintiff asserting
discrimination under . . . Title VII need not allege specific facts establishing a prima
facie case….”); see also Glover v. Donahoe, 626 F. App’x 926, 930 (11th Cir. 2015)
(holding that “. . . a Title VII complaint need not allege facts sufficient to make out
a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case . . .” (quoting Davis, 516 F.3d at
974)); Jacobs v. Biando, 592 F. App’x 838, 840 (11th Cir. 2014); Marshall v. Mayor
and Alderman of City of Savannah, 366 F. App’x 91, 100 (11th Cir. 2010).
Despite this precedent, Medtronic’s motion to dismiss asserts that the
Eleventh Circuit, since Iqbal and Twombly, has held otherwise. (Doc. 7 at 3-5.)
Medtronic cites Crawford v. City of Tampa, 397 F. App’x 621, 623–24 (11th Cir.
2010) as “holding that defendant’s motion to dismiss was properly granted where
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the plaintiff failed to articulate a prima facie case of discrimination because she
failed to identify an appropriate comparator who received more favorable
treatment.” (Doc. 7 at 5.) However, the plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim in
Crawford was not dismissed for failure to plead a prima facie case. Rather, the
defendant was granted summary judgment on this claim only after the plaintiff had
sufficient time and notice to conduct discovery and then “failed to identify
appropriate comparators.” Crawford, 397 F. App’x at 623. Crawford thus reiterates
the general McDonnell Douglas standard that does not apply at the motion-todismiss stage.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit does not require that a Title VII plaintiff must plead a

prima facie case of discrimination to survive a Motion to Dismiss. As Medtronic’s
motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) moves for dismissal solely on the Complaint’s failure to
articulate a prima facie case, it is due to be DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED on April 26, 2018.

_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
190485

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