Estate of Phillip James Binn v. Adamsville, Alabama, City of et al

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM OPINION - Because Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to assert its § 1983 state-created danger claim, the court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate it. The claim is thus due to be dismissed. Plaintiffs allegations do however suffi ciently allege injury in fact, causation, and redressability with respect to its remaining claims, and the court is satisfied it has jurisdiction to adjudicate them. The court will thus permit the defendants to refile their motions to dismiss the remaining claims. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/24/2018. (KEK)

FILED
2018 Aug-24 AM 10:36
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ESTATE OF PHILLIP JAMES BINN,
Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF ADAMSVILLE, et al.,

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Case No.: 2:17-cv-01993-RDP

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s Response to the Court’s Show Cause Order.
(Doc. # 49). On July 16, 2018, the court directed Plaintiff to show cause in writing as to why it
has standing to assert the claims alleged in its amended complaint. (Doc. # 48). For the reasons
explained below, the court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
for a state-created danger (Count II in the amended complaint, Doc. # 19). Accordingly, that
claim is due to be dismissed. However, the court is satisfied that Plaintiff has standing to assert
the remaining claims in this action (Counts I, III, and IV in the amended complaint, Doc. # 19).
The court expresses no view on the merits of those claims and hereby notifies Defendants that
they may refile their motions to dismiss the remaining claims.
I.

Background
On February 19, 2017, the City of Adamsville received a 911 call from Jaamal Thomas

stating that Phillip James Binn had allegedly shot himself. (Doc. # 19 at ¶ 20). Later, Binn, a
former United States Army Ranger who had served tours of duty in various war zones, was

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found deceased inside his home in Adamsville, Alabama. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16). Thomas allegedly
was present at the time of Binn’s death. (Id. at ¶ 21). When first responders arrived, Binn was
found to have sustained a gunshot wound to the back of his head. (Id. at ¶ 17). The bullet
allegedly exited through the front of Binn’s head and through the roof of Binn’s residence. (Id. at
¶ 18). The bullet that killed Binn has not been found. (Id. at ¶ 19).
Binn’s body was found positioned with his head underneath a chair and table in his
residence. (Id. at ¶ 24). The weapon allegedly used in Binn’s death was found several feet above
and away from Binn’s body on the countertop of an island in Binn’s residence. (Id. at ¶ 25). The
weapon was in a de-cocked condition, a condition that requires deliberate manipulation of the
weapon. (Id. at ¶ 26). A few hours after Binn’s death, Defendants concluded it was a suicide.
(Id. at ¶ 31).
Binn’s body was transported to the Jefferson County, Alabama Coroner’s Office, which
later examined his body. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28). The Jefferson County Coroner allegedly noted that no
gunshot residue was found on Binn’s hands or clothing. (Id. at ¶ 29). Based upon information
obtained from Defendants, the Jefferson County Coroner’s Office ruled Binn’s death a suicide.
(Id. at ¶ 33).
On November 29, 2017, the estate of Phillip James Binn (“Plaintiff”), by and through its
personal representative, Vivian Odom, filed this action in federal court. (Doc. # 1). Plaintiff filed
an amended complaint on February 9, 2018 against Defendants Warren Cotton, Rick Whitfield,
William Dougherty, R.W. Carter, and the City of Adamsville, Alabama. (Doc. # 19). In the
amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the position of Binn’s body, the location of the gun,
and the condition of the gun are all inconsistent with the conclusions reached by Defendants. (Id.
at ¶ 26). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants failed to conduct an investigation into Binn’s

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death, and certainly not an investigation consistent with the prevailing standards and practices
used by similarly situated law enforcement agencies. (Id. at ¶ 30). The amended complaint
contains several claims for relief. Plaintiff asserted various claims against Defendants under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, including (1) denying Plaintiff’s right of access to the courts by failing to perform
a proper investigation, preserve evidence, and share the details of the investigation with Plaintiff;
(2) taking actions that resulted in a state-created danger to Plaintiff and other residents; and (3) as
to Defendants Adamsville, Carter, and Cotton, failing to implement appropriate policies, training
methods, and practices. (Id. at 6-16). Plaintiff also asserted a claim for civil conspiracy and
claims for wrongful death and negligence against Binn’s unknown killer. (Id. at 16-18).
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. (Doc. # 33; Doc. # 34; Doc. # 40).
On July 16, 2018, the court dismissed the wrongful death and negligence claims against fictitious
party “Killer John Doe.” (Doc. # 48). At that time, the court also administratively terminated
Defendants’ pending motions to dismiss and ordered Plaintiff to show cause why it has standing
to assert the remaining claims in its amended complaint.
II.

Standard of Review
For purposes of assessing standing, the court assumes the allegations contained in the

amended complaint are true. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“At the
pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may
suffice [to establish standing], for on a motion to dismiss we presum[e] that general allegations
embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

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III.

Analysis
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and

“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Having said that, not all disputes that might be termed
“cases” or “controversies” in the colloquial sense count as Article III cases and controversies.
The doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes that qualify as Article III cases and
controversies—that is, “those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial
process.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Standing is “perhaps the most
important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines,” and federal courts are under an independent
obligation to ensure standing is present, even if the parties have not raised it. United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995) (alteration in original). Because the court concludes that Plaintiff
lacks Article III standing to assert its § 1983 state-created danger claim, the claim is due to be
dismissed. However, the court is satisfied that Plaintiff has standing to assert its remaining
claims.
A. Plaintiff’s § 1983 State-Created Danger Claim
“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact.” Id. An injury in fact is
“an invasion of a legally protected interest” which is both “concrete and particularized” and
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (internal quotation marks removed).
Second, the conduct complained of must have caused the plaintiff’s injury—that is, the injury
must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, not the conduct of some third party not
before the court. Id. Third, “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks removed).

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Plaintiff lacks standing to assert its § 1983 state-created danger claim because Plaintiff
has not suffered an injury in fact. Count II of the amended complaint alleges that, had
Defendants properly investigate the circumstances of Binn’s death, “Defendant Killer John Doe
would not be free” and thus would not have “the opportunity to carry out additional harm[,]
including murders on the community at large.” (Doc. # 19 at ¶ 53). By failing to properly
investigate Binn’s death and permitting the perpetrator to remain at large, Defendants are
allegedly responsible for a state-created danger to Plaintiff and others in the community. (Id. at
¶ 54). But Defendants’ failure to apprehend Binn’s alleged killer has not put Plaintiff at an
increased risk of being murdered or otherwise harmed. Plaintiff is Binn’s estate, not a natural
person. Binn’s estate cannot be murdered or otherwise physically harmed and thus is in no
danger as a result of Defendants’ failure to apprehend Binn’s killer. Further, even if Binn’s estate
had standing based on Binn’s own personal injuries, Binn has not been harmed by Defendants’
failure to apprehend Binn’s killer after the alleged homicide. Even if other members of the
Adamsville community have been (or may be) injured by Defendants’ failure to apprehend
Binn’s killer, neither Binn nor his estate are “among the injured.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563. Thus,
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert its § 1983 state-created danger claim.
B. Plaintiff’s Remaining § 1983 and Civil Conspiracy Claims
Plaintiff also asserts two remaining § 1983 claims and a civil conspiracy claim. (Doc.
# 19 at 6, 11, 16). Under § 1983, Plaintiff claims (1) that Defendants’ failure to properly
investigate Binn’s death denied Plaintiff’s right of access to the courts (Doc. # 19 at ¶ 43-44) and
(2) that certain Defendants’ failure to implement appropriate policies, training methods, and
practices undermined Plaintiff’s right “to face Killer John Doe in court” (Doc. # 19 at ¶ 59).

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Though Plaintiff’s amended complaint leaves much to be desired on this point,1 the court
understands Plaintiff’s theory to be that, had Defendants’ properly investigated Binn’s death and
implemented appropriate policies, training methods, and practices, Plaintiff could have pursued a
civil damages action against Binn’s killer using the evidence uncovered by Defendants’
investigation. (Id. at ¶¶ 43-44).
Though the court expresses no view on the merits of these claims,2 it is satisfied that
Plaintiff has standing to assert them. Plaintiff’s injury is pecuniary—due to Defendants’ failure
to investigate Binn’s death, his estate is unable to collect the money damages it could have won
in an action against Binn’s killer. Because pecuniary injuries are undoubtedly cognizable under
Article III, Via Mat Int’l S. Am. Ltd. v. United States, 446 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding that economic harm constitutes an injury in fact), Plaintiff has suffered an injury in
fact.3 Moreover, Plaintiff’s pecuniary injury was allegedly caused by the defendants in this
case—in particular, their failure to investigate Binn’s death and to implement appropriate
policies and practices—not by the conduct of some third party not before the court. Because
Plaintiff’s pecuniary injury is fairly traceable “to the challenged action of the defendant[s],”
causation is satisfied. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Finally, redressability is satisfied because

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Indeed, in its current state, the amended complaint is a shotgun pleading. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s
Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are
often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’”).
2

Whether a plaintiff has standing to assert a claim and whether a plaintiff has plausibly stated that claim in a manner
sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss are separate inquiries. See Culverhouse v. Paulson & Co.
Inc., 813 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the district court should have dismissed the case for failure to
state a claim rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Moody v. Holman, 887 F.3d 1281, 1285
(11th Cir. 2018) (2018) (observing “that federal courts must not confuse weakness on the merits with absence of
Article III standing”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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One might object that Plaintiff has not shown a pecuniary injury because it has not shown it would succeed in a
civil damages action against Binn’s killer. But Plaintiff need not show that it would have succeeded on the claim to
establish a pecuniary injury. Simply filing a viable claim creates the possibility of settlement, and assuming that the
allegations in the complaint are true, it is beyond question that Plaintiff would have a viable wrongful death claim
against Binn’s killer.

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Plaintiff’s pecuniary injury would be “redressed by a favorable decision” of this court, in the
form of a money damages award. Id. at 561. Thus, Plaintiff has standing to assert its remaining
§ 1983 claims. And because Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim is simply derivative of its other
claims, the court is satisfied Plaintiff has standing to assert it as well.
IV.

Conclusion
Because Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to assert its § 1983 state-created danger claim,

the court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate it. The claim is thus due to be dismissed. Plaintiff’s
allegations do however sufficiently allege injury in fact, causation, and redressability with
respect to its remaining claims, and the court is satisfied it has jurisdiction to adjudicate them.
The court will thus permit the defendants to refile their motions to dismiss the remaining claims.
An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED this August 24, 2018.

_________________________________
R. DAVID PROCTOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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