Coleman et al v. Morris-Shea Bridge Company Inc et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 1/3/2019. (PSM)

FILED
2019 Jan-03 PM 01:10
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LARRY COLEMAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MORRIS-SHEA BRIDGE
COMPANY, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

2:18-cv-00248-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
Plaintiffs Larry Coleman (“Larry”), Chester Coleman (“Chester”), and
Freddie Seltzer (“Freddie”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against
Defendants Morris-Shea Bridge Company, Inc. (“Morris-Shea”), Richard J.
Shea, Jr. (“Dick Shea”), and Richard J. Shea, III (“Richard Shea”)
(collectively “Defendants”), alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”), Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”). Before the Court is Morris-Shea and Dick Shea’s
motion to dismiss. (Doc. 20.) The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe
for review. For the reasons stated below, the motion is due to be denied.

Page 1 of 19

I.

BACKGROUND 1
Defendant Morris-Shea is a heavy construction contractor with a focus

on deep foundation work related to bridges, highways, buildings, and similar
foundation engineering. The company is managed and partially owned by
Defendants Dick and Richard Shea who are Caucasian. Both Dick and
Richard Shea are involved either directly or indirectly with all decisions
regarding Morris-Shea employees. Plaintiffs Larry Coleman, Chester
Coleman, and Freddie Seltzer are three brothers who are African-American.
The brothers are age sixty, fifty-six, and fifty-two, respectively. Each brother
was employed by Morris-Shea for at least twenty-five years. Larry worked in
various positions at Morris-Shea, and his last position was that of
superintendent. Chester and Freddie were construction crew members who
worked on various projects for Morris-Shea throughout the years.
On April 10, 2017, the three brothers were all working on a construction
project at the home of Richard Shea in Mountain Brook, Alabama. Around
lunch time, Freddie and Chester left the worksite to get a sandwich at a local
restaurant. Larry did not leave the worksite during lunch because he had

1

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, this Court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint
as true and construe[s] the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Johnson v.
Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). The following facts, are
therefore, taken from the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, and the
Court makes no ruling on their veracity.

Page 2 of 19

brought his lunch. Although it took Freddie and Chester less than thirty
minutes to return, Dick Shea complained to Larry that his brothers were
taking too long of a lunch break. When they returned to the worksite, Dick
Shea told Larry to send Freddie and Chester home. The next morning, when
Larry arrived at the worksite, another superintendent for Morris-Shea told
him that Dick Shea wanted him to leave the worksite and go home.
About two weeks later, Lee Dubberly, a different superintendent for
Morris-Shea, called Larry and told him that he, Chester, and Freddie had all
been terminated by Morris-Shea. Although no one at Morris-Shea would tell
the brothers why they had been fired, when Larry asked human resources to
complete a form necessary for him to receive food stamps, a human
resource manager wrote “lack of work” as the reason for his termination.
Since their termination, Morris-Shea has not recalled the Plaintiffs to work
and has determined that they are not eligible for rehire. According to
Plaintiffs, Morris-Shea has never terminated a white employee for taking
more than thirty minutes at lunch. The construction workers hired to replace
Plaintiffs are all white and are substantially younger than Plaintiffs.
In May 2017, a month after they were terminated, Plaintiffs filed
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
alleging that Morris-Shea discriminated against them. Specifically, the EEOC
Page 3 of 19

charges claim that the brothers were harassed by fellow white employees
and compensated less than similarly situated white employees due to their
race. The EEOC charges also include allegations that the brothers were
terminated due to age and race discrimination.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In general, a pleading must include “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
However, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), a complaint “must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1347–
48 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Stated another way, the factual
allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1301 (11th Cir.
2010). A complaint that “succeeds in identifying facts that are suggestive
enough to render [the necessary elements of a claim] plausible” will survive

Page 4 of 19

a motion to dismiss. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.
2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court first “identif[ies]
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This Court then
“assume[s] the[] veracity” of the complaint’s “well-pleaded factual
allegations” and “determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Id. Review of the complaint is “a context-specific task
that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. If the pleading “contain[s] enough information regarding the
material elements of a cause of action to support recovery under some
‘viable legal theory,’” it satisfies the notice pleading standard. Am. Fed’n of
Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678,
683–84 (11th Cir. 2001)).
“In general, if it considers materials outside of the complaint, a district
court must convert the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion.”
SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc. of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th
Cir. 2010). However, a “district court may consider an extrinsic document if
it is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim, and (2) its authenticity is not
Page 5 of 19

challenged.” See id. (citing Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir.
2005)). In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to their EEOC charges
and notice of right to sue letters. The EEOC charges are also referred to
throughout the motion to dismiss. As the Court finds the EEOC charges
central to the plaintiffs’ claims and their authenticity is not in dispute, the
Court will take them into consideration in this Opinion. 2
III.

DISCUSSION
Defendant Dick Shea seeks to dismiss the § 1981 claims brought

against him in Counts Five, Six, Seven, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen of the
Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. Morris-Shea also seeks
dismissal of certain allegations contained within Counts Two and Eight of the
Amended Complaint, arguing that Plaintiff Larry Coleman failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies with respect to these allegations. Defendants
also ask the Court to require the Plaintiffs to re-plead their claims, contending
that the Amended Complaint is “needlessly long, unnecessarily repetitive,
and frustrates Defendants’ ability to respond to material allegations against
them.” (See Doc. 20 at 12.) The Court will address each argument in turn.

2

Typically, an EEOC charge will not merely be referenced by the plaintiff or defendant
but will be attached as either an exhibit to the complaint or motion to dismiss. Here, the
EEOC charges are not attached as exhibits to either the Amended Complaint or the
Motion to Dismiss. However, the charges are in the record as attachments to Plaintiffs’
original complaint. (See Docs. 1-1, 1-2, & 1-3.)

Page 6 of 19

A.

42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claims Against Dick Shea

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State . . . to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. “To state a claim of
race discrimination under § 1981, [a plaintiff] must allege facts establishing:
(1) that [he] is a member of a racial minority; (2) that the defendant intended
to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) that the discrimination concerned
one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute.” See Moore v. Grady
Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 834 F.3d 1168, 1171–72 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Unlike claims of racial discrimination brought under Title VII, individual
employees may be held personally liable for violating § 1981. See Faraca v.
Clements, 506 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir. 1975). 3 However, a supervisor may
be held individually liable under § 1981 only if he personally participated in

3

The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
rendered prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc).

Page 7 of 19

the alleged discrimination. See Burnstein v. Emtel, Inc., 137 Fed. App’x 205,
208 (11th Cir. 2005). 4
Plaintiffs bring § 1981 claims against all three Defendants, alleging that
they were compensated less than white employees and subjected to a
racially hostile work environment. Defendant Dick Shea does not dispute that
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they are members of a racial minority
and that the alleged discrimination concerns activities described in the
statute. However, he argues that Plaintiffs’ allegation that “[a]cting as the
manager of Morris-Shea, [Dick Shea] is involved either directly or indirectly,
with all decisions regarding Morris-Shea’s employment contract[s] with”
Plaintiffs is insufficient to state a claim that he personally engaged in
intentional discrimination. (See Doc. 20 at 6.) Instead, he contends that to
state a § 1981 claim against him Plaintiffs would need to allege that he
personally decided to pay Plaintiffs less than white employees or that he
personally subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment.
The Court disagrees with Dick Shea’s contention that Plaintiffs have
not alleged sufficient facts to state claims for individual § 1981 liability against
him. Plaintiffs’ allegations that Dick Shea was involved with all decisions

4

“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as
persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

Page 8 of 19

regarding Morris-Shea’s employment contracts could give rise to the
reasonable inference that Dick Shea was involved in the decisions to
compensate Plaintiffs differently than their white counterparts. As Plaintiffs
have stated that these decisions were racially motivated, these allegations
could support a claim of individual § 1981 liability under Counts Five, Six,
and Seven of the Amended Complaint. Moreover, the Plaintiffs’ allegations
that Dick Shea is the manager of Morris-Shea, who is involved with all
decisions regarding Morris-Shea employees, combined with the allegations
that the Defendants, collectively, engaged in acts that favored white
employees over Plaintiffs could support a claim against Dick Shea for § 1981
liability under Counts Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen of the Amended
Complaint.
Contrary to Dick Shea’s assertion, the Plaintiffs are not attempting to
impermissibly hold him vicariously liable for the alleged discriminatory acts
of others. Instead, they have alleged facts that raise a reasonable inference
that Dick Shea personally participated in decisions that led to the Plaintiffs
being compensated less than white employees and being subjected to a
racially hostile work environment. Certainly, to survive summary judgment
Plaintiffs will have to present evidence of Dick Shea’s personal involvement
in these decisions. However, at this motion to dismiss stage, the Court
Page 9 of 19

cannot say that there are insufficient factual allegations linking Dick Shea to
the alleged discriminatory conduct that would warrant dismissal of the § 1981
claims against him. Therefore, Dick Shea’s motion to dismiss the § 1981
claims against him is due to be denied.
B.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2. This includes discrimination with respect to compensation or any
other terms or conditions of employment. See id. A plaintiff may bring a Title
VII action in district court against an employer that discriminates against him
based on race but only after exhausting his administrative remedies. See
Forehand v. Fla. State Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562, 1567 (11th
Cir. 1996). Typically, exhaustion requires a plaintiff to file a charge with the
EEOC. See id. The EEOC charge limits the scope of the plaintiff’s
allegations. See Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Resources, 355 F.3d 1277,
1279 (11th Cir. 2004). However, “the scope of an EEOC complaint should
not be strictly interpreted.” Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455,
465 (5th Cir. 1970). Rather, a plaintiff’s district court complaint “is limited by
the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to
grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (quoting
Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 465). Thus, claims that “amplify, clarify, or more clearly
Page 10 of 19

focus” the allegations in the EEOC charge are permissible, but those that
make allegations of new acts of discrimination are disallowed. See id. at
1279 (citing Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1989)).
Morris-Shea points to three allegations by Larry Coleman in the
Amended Complaint that it argues are materially different than the claims in
his EEOC charge. Specifically, Morris-Shea points to allegations in Count
Two of the Amended Complaint that in 2008 Morris-Shea reduced the
salaries paid to all superintendents, including Larry, but that after business
improved Morris-Shea only reinstated the salaries of the Caucasian
superintendents. (See Doc. 18 at ¶¶ 45–46.) Morris-Shea also contends that
allegations in Count Eight of the Amended Complaint that Larry was
improperly classified as a salaried employee and that Larry was not
rewarded for work performed in the same manner as similarly situated white
employees are new allegations of discrimination that did not grow out of
Larry’s EEOC charge. (See id. at ¶¶ 166–69.)
While it is true that none of these specific allegations were made in the
EEOC charge, they are all related to the claims Larry made to the EEOC.
With respect to Count Two, Larry’s EEOC charge states that “[t]here was . . .
a disparity [in] how African Americans were paid compared to Caucasian
employees.” (See Doc. 1-1 at 5.) It further states that Larry was paid $1,400
Page 11 of 19

a week while a white counterpart made $2,500 a week. (See id.) Although
the EEOC Charge does not mention that this was not always the case and
that the white superintendents’ salaries were reinstated after an uptick in
business while Larry’s was not, the information provided was sufficient to put
Morris-Shea on notice of Larry’s Title VII compensation claim against it. An
EEOC investigation would likely look at the entire picture of Larry’s salary
history with Morris-Shea when investigating his claim that he was paid
differently than similarly situated white employees. Further, the allegations
regarding reinstatement of salary are not allegations of a different type of
discrimination than the compensation claims contained within the EEOC
charge. Therefore, Morris-Shea’s motion to dismiss this allegation from
Count Two for failure to comply with Title VII’s administrative exhaustion
requirement is due to be denied.
Similarly, Morris-Shea’s argument that the allegations in Count Eight
are due to be dismissed is without merit. Morris-Shea contends that although
Larry’s EEOC Charge included claims that he was salaried and paid less
than other salaried employees that there are no allegations in the EEOC
Charge related to whether he was discriminated against due to his exempt
status under the FLSA. According to Morris-Shea, an EEOC investigation
would only look to whether or not Larry was treated differently than other
Page 12 of 19

salaried employees and not look to his treatment compared to non-salaried
white employees. However, as pointed out by Plaintiffs, Larry’s EEOC
Charge included the statement that he “was classified as a salary worker and
paid $35 an hour for 8 hours a day, five days a week, despite having to work
longer hours and not treated as a superintendent.” (See id.) Although the
EEOC Charge never specifically mentions the FLSA, “[t]he specific words of
the charge of discrimination need not presage with literary exactitude the
judicial pleadings which may follow.” IMPACT v. Firestone, 893 F.2d 1189,
1196 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 465). Due to Larry’s
broad assertions regarding his classification as a salaried worker and the
failure to pay him overtime, the Court is convinced that it would have been
reasonable for the EEOC to investigate Larry’s treatment in comparison to
the non-salaried white employees.
The same is true for Larry’s allegations in Count Eight that
Superintendent Dubberly and his crew were rewarded for successfully
completing tasks assigned to them but Larry and his crew were never
rewarded for the work they performed. (See Doc. 18 at ¶ 166.) Larry’s EEOC
charge stated that “[t]here was an obvious difference in how I was treated as
the lone African-American superintendent compared to the other white
superintendents.” (See Doc. 1-1 at 5.) Based on this allegation, an EEOC
Page 13 of 19

investigation into how Morris-Shea treated Larry would likely look at all
aspects of how he was treated in comparison to the white superintendents
and not just the specific examples provided in the EEOC charge. Assuming
Larry’s allegation that Morris-Shea treated his crew differently is true, this
investigation would likely reveal that Morris-Shea only rewarded the white
superintendents’ crews for the successful completion of tasks. Therefore,
Morris-Shea’s motion to dismiss the allegations in Count Eight for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is due to be denied.5
C.

Shotgun Pleading

Defendants finally argue that the Court should strike the Amended
Complaint and require Plaintiffs to re-plead their claims. Rule 8(a)(2) requires
a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 10(b) further
provides:
A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered
paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a
paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote
clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or

5

Morris-Shea also states that the allegation that Morris-Shea “never rewarded Larry
Coleman for the work performed by him and his crew” is vague and does not put it on
notice of the precise unlawful conduct complained of. (See Doc. 20 at 9.) To the extent
that Morris-Shea argues that this allegation is deficiently pleaded, the Court agrees with
Plaintiffs that this allegation provides sufficient factual detail to survive the motion to
dismiss stage.

Page 14 of 19

occurrence–and each defense other than a denial—must be
stated in a separate count or defense.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
Complaints that violate these rules are often referred to as “shotgun
pleadings.” “The failure of the plaintiff to identify his claims with sufficient
clarity to enable the defendant to frame a responsible pleading constitutes
shotgun pleading.” See Sledge v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America,
Ltd., 275 F.3d 1014, 1018 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit has
identified four rough “categories” of shotgun pleadings that are prohibited:
The most common type—by a long shot—is a complaint
containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive
count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint. The next most common type
. . . is a complaint that does not commit the mortal sin of realleging all preceding counts but is guilty of the venial sin of being
replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not
obviously connected to any particular cause of action. The third
type of shotgun pleading is one that commits the sin of not
separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for
relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin of
asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts
or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought
against.

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th
Cir. 2015) (footnotes omitted). “The unifying characteristic of all types of
shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way
Page 15 of 19

or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them
and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is ninety-one pages long and includes
five hundred separate paragraphs. Although the Amended Complaint alleges
violations of only four different federal statutes, it contains twenty-two counts.
As Defendants note, “[w]hile each Count is specific to a particular Plaintiff,
most of the paragraphs are substantially identical to the paragraphs
contained in the other Counts of the same claim.” (See Doc. 20 at 12.) For
example, the Amended Complaint does not include a factual allegation
section, but instead, repeats basic facts, such as, “Morris-Shea is a heavy
construction contractor with a focus on deep foundation work related to
bridges, highways, buildings, and similar foundation engineering” in multiple
different counts. (See Doc. 18 at ¶¶ 15, 99, 125, 142, 218, 242, 259, 352,
376, 398.) At times, the Amended Complaint refers collectively to
“Defendants” rather than specify which Defendant committed which alleged
act.
Even though Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint bears some resemblance
to a shotgun pleading, it is not one. “[T]his is not a situation where a failure
to more precisely parcel out and identify the facts relevant to each claim
materially increased the burden of understanding the factual allegations
Page 16 of 19

underlying each count.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1324. Indeed, Plaintiffs
included the relevant facts in each Count of the Amended Complaint
regardless of whether those facts had already been stated earlier in the
complaint.
Moreover, the Amended Complaint put Defendants on notice of the
allegations against them. Plaintiffs clearly identified the causes of action
brought against Defendants and in each and every Count noted which
specific Defendant that particular Count was brought against. Despite
arguing that the Amended Complaint constitutes shotgun pleading,
Defendants have not pointed out any specific factual allegations that are
immaterial to Plaintiffs’ claims. While the Court’s own review of the Amended
Complaint does reveal that Plaintiffs unnecessarily repeat certain factual
allegations, it does not find that the Amended Complaint is replete with facts
that are immaterial to Plaintiffs’ claims. Nor does the Amended Complaint fail
to separate out Plaintiffs’ various causes of action. In fact, Defendants
complain of just the opposite—that Plaintiffs have unnecessarily separated
out their claims into twenty-two different counts.
To be sure, at times, the Amended Complaint does refer to the three
defendants collectively as “Defendants” and does not specify whether the
defendants are alleged to have acted collectively or individually. In certain
Page 17 of 19

instances this lack of specification would render a complaint a shotgun
pleading. See, e.g., Magluta v. Samples, 256 F. 3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.
2001); Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 164 (11th
Cir. 1997). However, the mere fact that defendants are accused collectively
does not always necessitate a restatement of the complaint. Instead, where
“[t]he complaint can be fairly read to aver that all defendants are responsible
for the alleged conduct,” the complaint is not deficient. See Kyle K. v.
Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000). This is one of those
circumstances. The Amended Complaint identifies Dick and Richard Shea
as part owners and managers of Morris-Shea. Based on this allegation, it
can be inferred that they, along with Morris-Shea, hired, employed, and paid
Defendants. Thus, even though discovery may reveal otherwise, it is
plausible that all three are responsible for the conduct alleged.
In sum, the Court agrees with Defendants’ observation that the
Amended Complaint is unnecessarily long and repetitive. However, its
stylistic shortcomings are not so severe as to necessitate amendment. If the
Amended Complaint were a shotgun pleading, it would be “difficult to
understand what the Defendants ‘were alleged to have done and why they
were liable for doing it.’” See Downing v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 2:15cv-00737-RDP, 2016 WL 125861, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 12, 2016) (quoting
Page 18 of 19

Wright v. Watson, No. 15-cv-34, 2015 WL 4873381, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 13,
2015)). Here, the Court concludes that the “counts are informative enough
to permit a court to readily determine if they state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1326. Accordingly, Defendants’
motion to strike the Amended Complaint and require Plaintiffs to re-plead is
due to be denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Morris-Shea and Dick Shea’s motion to

dismiss (doc. 20) is due to be denied. An order consistent with this opinion
will be entered contemporaneously herewith.
DONE and ORDERED on January 3, 2019.

_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
194800

Page 19 of 19