Tamba v. Publix Super Markets Inc
Filing
42
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Karon O Bowdre on 9/20/2019. (JLC)
FILED
2019 Sep-20 AM 10:07
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PAPE TAMBA,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,
v.
PUBLIX SUPER MARKETS, INC.,
Defendant/Counter-Claimant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:18-CV-00392-KOB
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This employment discrimination and breach of contract case comes before
the court on Defendant Publix Supermarket, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment
as to Plaintiff Pape Tamba’s claims and Publix’s counterclaims. (Doc. 22).
Publix asserts that it terminated Mr. Tamba, who is African-American and
an immigrant, for dishonesty, not because of his race or national origin. And no
dispute exists that Publix reasonably considered Mr. Tamba to be dishonest.
Even so, Mr. Tamba contends that Publix committed race and/or national
origin discrimination because it did not terminate two allegedly similarly-situated
employees, one who was white and one who was not an immigrant. But no
evidence shows that Mr. Tamba and the white employee were similar in any
material respects and the non-immigrant employee does not exist on the record.
And Mr. Tamba offers no other circumstantial evidence of discrimination. So the
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court will grant Publix’s motion for summary judgment on Mr. Tamba’s claims.
Publix also moves for summary judgment on its counterclaims against Mr.
Tamba. According to Publix, Mr. Tamba breached a relocation benefits contract
by not returning any of the money that Publix gave him to cover his moving
expenses when he relocated from Florida to work at Publix’s facility in Alabama.
The company also claims that Mr. Tamba has been unjustly enriched by retaining
those relocation benefits and other erroneous payments Publix made to him.
Mr. Tamba does not meaningfully dispute the evidence that shows he
breached the contract by not returning his relocation benefits, so the court will
grant summary judgment in favor of Publix on its breach of contract counterclaim.
But genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment on Publix’s
unjust enrichment counterclaim.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court can resolve a case on summary judgment only when the moving
party establishes two essential elements: (1) no genuine disputes of material fact
exist; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
As to the first element of the moving party’s summary judgment burden,
“‘[g]enuine disputes [of material fact] are those in which the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant.’” Evans v. Books-A2
Million, 762 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Mize v.
Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996)). And when
considering whether any genuine disputes of material fact exist, the court must
view the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. White v.
Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 2015).
Pursuant to these rules, the court presents the facts supported by evidence on
the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Tamba.
II.
FACTS
A.
Payment Issues After Mr. Tamba’s Transfer to Alabama
For the majority of 2016, Mr. Tamba worked as a forklift operator at
Publix’s warehouse in Lakeland, Florida. At the end of 2016, Mr. Tamba
completed an application for a position titled “truck driver/truck driver trainee” at
Publix’s warehouse and distribution center in McCalla, Alabama. (Doc. 24-3 at
16–17, 86).
Publix accepted Mr. Tamba’s application and agreed to cover his expenses
to relocate to McCalla. Pursuant to a “Relocation Package Repayment
Agreement” that both parties signed, Publix paid Mr. Tamba, or moving
companies on his behalf, $15,246.57 in moving expenses. (Doc. 24-3 at 16, 85;
Doc. 24-6 at 2). The Repayment Agreement provided that if Mr. Tamba left
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Publix within 12 months of receiving the relocation benefits, he would have to
fully reimburse Publix for those payments.
Though Mr. Tamba applied for a position titled “truck driver/truck driver
trainee,” “truck driver” and “truck driver trainee” are different positions with
different rates of pay. Truck drivers drive over the road and can initially make
$21.85 per hour, while truck driver trainees move trailers and perform spotter
driver duties only on Publix’s property and can initially make $16.79 per hour.
Truck driver trainees train to eventually become truck drivers in the event of a
truck driver position vacancy.
The truck driver/truck driver trainee distinction caused confusion that
followed Mr. Tamba throughout his employment with Publix in Alabama. First,
Publix accepted Mr. Tamba’s “truck driver/truck driver trainee” job application
and, according to the company, hired him as a truck driver trainee. (See Doc. 24-8
at 2) (email from Publix manager informing an administrator that Mr. Tamba
would be transferring as a truck driver trainee). But Publix internally classified
him as a truck driver making $21.85 hour, rather than a truck driver trainee making
$16.79 per hour. (Doc. 24-1 at 22; Doc. 24-5 at 38; Doc. 24-7 at 3–4; Doc. 24-9 at
¶ 9). Publix contends that its administrator made this mistake because several
other transfers from Lakeland, Florida were truck drivers.
On the other hand, on a “Job Offer Acceptance and Commitment Form,” Mr.
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Tamba checked a box for “Truck Driver”—and not “Truck Driver Trainee”—
following the statement, “I accept a transfer to the following position in the
McCalla Distribution Center.” (Doc. 24-5 at 30). Mr. Tamba and the Dispatch
Superintendent at the Florida facility, Alan Dorman, signed the commitment form.
After transferring to McCalla on April 8, 2017, Mr. Tamba only performed
spotter driver duties at the facility and never drove a truck over the road; i.e., he
did not perform the duties of the “truck driver” position. But he received truck
driver pay during the entire month of April. (Doc. 24-3 at 97–99; Doc. 24-5 at 38).
In early May 2017, Publix discovered that Mr. Tamba had been receiving
truck driver pay since he transferred to McCalla, which Publix considered a
mistake because, according to the company, Mr. Tamba transferred as a truck
driver trainee, not a truck driver. In an email sent to Publix Human Resources, a
manager at the McCalla facility stated, “[Mr. Tamba] has been overpaid about
$500 for the month of April because Paul Chambers misclassified his position in
his transfer paperwork. He was listed as a Truck Driver but he is working in
Trailer Movement.” (Doc. 24-1 at 79). Publix decided that it would reduce Mr.
Tamba’s paychecks by $200 per week until it fully recouped the $500
overpayment.
But the mistakes continued. On Mr. Tamba’s next paycheck, issued on May
4, 2017, Publix withheld the entire $500 overpayment, rather than the $200 per
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week as agreed. When Publix attempted to correct this mistake on May 11, 2017,
it made yet another mistake—the company overpaid Mr. Tamba again. Publix
paid Mr. Tamba as if he had worked 143.65 hours during the week of April 22,
2017, when he had actually worked only 51.68 hours, and Publix paid him the
truck driver rate instead of the truck driver trainee rate. (Doc. 24-3 at 100–01;
Doc. 24-7 at ¶ 8). According to Publix, these errors caused a net overpayment to
Mr. Tamba of $2,009.54.
Finally, Publix gave Mr. Tamba paid leave from May 2 to May 4, 2017 in
return for his agreement to work the holidays of Memorial Day, July 4, and Labor
Day later that year. But Mr. Tamba never worked those holidays. So, according to
Publix, it paid Mr. Tamba $1,049.89 for working holidays that he did not work.
The court will return to these alleged overpayments later.
B.
The June 8, 2017 Incident and Mr. Tamba’s Termination
The court now examines the events surrounding Mr. Tamba’s termination.
Mr. Tamba does not dispute the following interpretation of surveillance footage
captured of him.
Surveillance footage taken at Publix’s McCalla facility shows that, on June
8, 2017 at 11:33 p.m., Mr. Tamba parked his tractor and trailer outside, did not set
the parking brake, exited the tractor, and entered the return center building. (See
Doc. 24-11). Approximately one minute later, the tractor and trailer drifted
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forward and the tractor hit a parked trailer. The collision dented the tractor and the
parked trailer.
Approximately one minute after the collision, Mr. Tamba returned and saw
that the tractor had hit the parked trailer. He backed the tractor up, appeared to
review the damage, and then backed the tractor up to the loading dock. He exited
the tractor, left its lights on, and again appeared to inspect the damage.
Approximately six minutes later, Mr. Tamba again appeared to review the
damage to the tractor. Then he exited the tractor, left its lights on, and walked
back to the damaged trailer. He then drove the tractor to another location.
Approximately 40 minutes later, at 12:23 a.m. on June 9, 2017, Mr. Tamba
drove his tractor back to the damaged trailer, realigned the damaged trailer, and
backed it into place. The relevant surveillance footage ends there.
Later in his shift, Mr. Tamba reported to the return center lead, Deonta
Harvard, and the safety manager, Russ Weiner, that the front of his tractor was
damaged. Mr. Harvard asked Mr. Tamba to write an incident report. On an
“Incident Analysis Form,” Mr. Tamba wrote, “I was doing the post trip inspection
and I found damage on the front and [right] side of the tractor. I may [have] hit
something or I was hit by someone. I immediately advise[d] the return center lead
person.” (Doc. 24-3 at 123).
In an email sent to the return center manager, Godfrey Saunders, on June 9,
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2017 at 3:20 a.m., Mr. Harvard stated that he asked Mr. Tamba to complete a post
driver vehicle inspection report before leaving. (Doc. 24-12 at 2). The email
states, “[Mr. Tamba] went outside to inspect his [tractor] and noticed that the front
was damaged that wasn’t there at the beginning of the shift. [Mr. Tamba] noted
that he did not know his truck was damaged or when it actually happened.” (Id.).
According to the email, Mr. Harvard and the supervisor on duty, Tim Meek, found
several pieces of Mr. Tamba’s truck in front of the door where the collision
happened.
Then, at 4:03 a.m. on the same morning, Mr. Meek sent an email to Mr.
Saunders and several other managers that stated, “[Mr. Harvard] said that [Mr.
Tamba] was doing his post trip inspection when he noticed the damage. [Mr.
Tamba] said that he didn’t notice anything when he did his pre-trip inspection, so it
must have happened on his shift.” (Doc. 24-12 at 2). The email states that Mr.
Meek and Mr. Tamba walked around the yard and found pieces of the tractor’s
reflector near a loading dock door. The email also states, “[Mr. Tamba] said that
he backed a trailer into that door when the dock coordinator called him on the radio
to come inside for a second. . . . He didn’t notice anything when coming back
out.” (Id. at 3).
To investigate the incident, Mr. Saunders reviewed Mr. Tamba’s incident
report, the emails from Mr. Harvard and Mr. Meek, and the surveillance footage.
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Mr. Saunders believed that the surveillance footage showed that Mr. Tamba saw
that he caused the collision, so Mr. Saunders determined that Mr. Tamba was
dishonest when he wrote on the incident report that he “may [have] hit something
or I was hit by someone.” (Doc. 24-2 at 26). Thus, Mr. Saunders decided to
terminate Mr. Tamba for dishonesty. (Id. at 20).
When Mr. Tamba arrived for his next shift, Mr. Saunders and the dispatch
superintendent, Paul Chambers, met with Mr. Tamba and informed him that Publix
was terminating him for dishonesty. Mr. Tamba testified that he could “understand
why Publix would think that [he was] lying on [the incident] report or not being
honest.” (Doc. 24-3 at 42).
C.
Mr. Tamba’s Claim
In his complaint, Mr. Tamba brought claims for race and national origin
discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract. But he has abandoned his
retaliation and breach of contract claims by not providing any argument for those
claims in his response to Publix’s motion for summary judgment. See Resolution
Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[G]rounds alleged
in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed
abandoned.”); Cole v. Owners Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1329 (N.D. Ala.
2018) (“The court finds that the Coles abandoned any suppression- or deceit-based
fraud theory by failing to advance a relevant argument in response to Owners’s
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motion for summary judgment.”). So only Mr. Tamba’s claim that Publix
terminated him because of his race and/or national origin in violation of Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 remains.
D.
Publix’s Counterclaims
Publix asserts two counterclaims against Mr. Tamba: breach of contract and
unjust enrichment. Publix contends that Mr. Tamba breached the “Relocation
Package Repayment Agreement” by not repaying Publix for his relocation benefits
after leaving the company within 12 months of transferring. Publix also contends
that Mr. Tamba has unjustly enriched himself by retaining those relocation
benefits, the amounts that Publix asserts it overpaid him in April and May 2017,
and the money that Publix paid him for working holidays that he did not work.
III.
ANALYSIS
The court begins by analyzing whether any genuine issues of material fact
exist as to Mr. Tamba’s claim against Publix, and then turns to whether any
genuine issues of material fact exist as to Publix’s counterclaims against Mr.
Tamba and whether Publix is entitled to judgment on its counterclaims as a matter
of law.
A.
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Mr. Tamba’s Claim
Mr. Tamba does not offer any direct evidence of race or national origin
discrimination; instead, he relies on materials that he contends constitute
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circumstantial evidence of race and/or national origin discrimination.
When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, he may use the burdenshifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973) to establish a Title VII race or national origin discrimination claim.
Under this framework, a plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Fla. Dept. of Educ., 342 F.3d
1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). A
plaintiff succeeds at this step by showing that (1) he is a member of a protected
class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) he was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual
outside of his protected class. Id.
To show that his employer treated him less favorably than a similarlysituated individual outside of his protected class, the plaintiff must present
evidence that he and that individual—a so-called “comparator”—were “similarly
situated in all material respects.” Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d
1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019). Ordinarily, a comparator similarly situated in all
material respects “will have engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct) as
the plaintiff”; “will have been subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or
rule as the plaintiff”; “will ordinarily (although not invariably) have been under the
jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff”; and “will share the plaintiff’s
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employment or disciplinary history.” Id. at 1227–28 (citations omitted). And “a
plaintiff and her comparators must be sufficiently similar, in an objective sense,
that they ‘cannot reasonably be distinguished.’” Id. at 1228 (quoting Young v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355 (2015)).
Here, Mr. Tamba offers two purported comparators: white employee “XX,”
and African-American non-immigrant employee “YY.” For the following reasons,
neither individual is similarly situated to Mr. Tamba in any material respects and is
thus not a valid comparator to support a prima facie case of discrimination.
Starting with XX, the only evidence of this employee on the record—
Publix’s supplemental interrogatory responses and production of records—shows
that XX was somehow associated with a damaged “ICC bar” on a trailer. (See
Doc. 38). The evidence regarding XX ends there, so it fails to show how XX was
similarly situated to Mr. Tamba in any respects.
Even accepting Mr. Tamba’s version of XX, that employee is still not a valid
comparator. According to Mr. Tamba, “XX lifted a trailer too [and] damaged a
trailer. Another employee reported the damage[], not the responsible party. . . .
An ‘awful noise’ was [] made [and] the trailer had to be removed from service. . . .
The trailer had over $1,000.00 in damage. No incident report was filed and there is
no suggestion engaged [sic] video review.” (Doc. 34 at 25). So, according to Mr.
Tamba, both he and XX damaged Publix’s property, but only Mr. Tamba was
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fired, thus raising a question of discrimination.
But Mr. Tamba misses the point. Publix fired him for dishonesty, not for
damaging property, and no evidence shows that XX was dishonest. The record is
silent as to whether XX knew about the damage to the ICC bar, whether Mr.
Tamba’s supervisors knew about the damaged ICC bar or XX’s association with it,
or what XX told anyone about the damage. So no evidence supports an inference
that Mr. Tamba and XX engaged in similar misconduct for which only Mr. Tamba
was terminated. Thus, XX is not a valid comparator.
Turning to Mr. Tamba’s second purported comparator, YY, the record has
no evidence of this employee. Mr. Tamba mentions YY in only two sentences in
his brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment: “African-American
and non-immigrant YY failed to notice that he [sic] his trailer doors were not
secure and he bent and broke the hinges. Publix 470. There is no suggestion that
Wainer pulled the video to see if YY walked around the truck an[d] could be
charged with being ‘dishonest.’” (Doc. 34 at 27). But, after reviewing the entire
record, the court cannot locate a document Bates-stamped “Publix 470.” Mr.
Tamba did not correct that citation in his motion to amend his brief that identified
more than 60 errors in his brief. (See Doc. 39). So, on the record before the court,
YY simply does not exist and is thus not a comparator.
Mr. Tamba then suggests that, even if he has no valid comparator evidence,
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his claim still must survive summary judgment because “[i]f there are legitimate
disputes regarding whether the allegations [of dishonesty] are true summary
judgment is inappropriate.” (Doc. 34 at 28). But no evidence legitimately disputes
that Mr. Tamba was dishonest, or, at the very least, and as Mr. Tamba admitted,
that Publix reasonably determined that Mr. Tamba was dishonest. So no other
circumstantial evidence supports an inference that Publix terminated him because
of his race or national origin.
Mr. Tamba has not stated a prima facie case of discrimination under
McDonnell Douglas or offered any evidence that could support an inference that
Publix terminated him because of his race or national origin. So the court will
grant Publix’s motion for summary judgment on Mr. Tamba’s claim.
B.
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Publix’s Counterclaims
Publix next moves for summary judgment in its favor as to both its breach of
contract counterclaim and unjust enrichment counterclaim against Mr. Tamba. For
the following reasons, the court will grant summary judgment in Publix’s favor as
to its breach of contract counterclaim, but will deny summary judgment as to the
unjust enrichment counterclaim.
1.
Breach of contract
Starting with its breach of contract claim, Publix contends that Mr. Tamba
breached the “Relocation Package Repayment Agreement” by not returning any
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portion of the $15,246.57 that Publix paid him or moving companies on his behalf
as relocation benefits. The Repayment Agreement provided that Mr. Tamba would
reimburse Publix in full if he left the company within 12 months of transferring to
Alabama. Mr. Tamba, of course, left the company well before 12 months passed,
and he does not dispute that he has not returned any portion of his relocation
benefits in response to Publix’s requests for him to do so. So Publix seeks
$15,246.57 in breach of contract damages.
To state a breach of contract claim under Alabama or Florida law, Publix
must show “(1) the existence of a valid contract binding the parties in the action[;]
(2) [its] own performance under the contract[;] (3) the defendant’s
nonperformance[;] and (4) damages.” S. Med. Health Sys., Inc. v. Vaughn, 669 So.
2d 98, 99 (Ala. 1995); see Knowles v. C. I. T. Corp., 346 So. 2d 1042, 1043 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (Florida law requires the same elements).
Here, Mr. Tamba does not dispute the validity of the Repayment Agreement;
that the Agreement required him to pay back Publix in full if he “left” the company
within 12 months of his transfer; that he “left” the company under the terms of the
Agreement by being terminated within 12 months of his transfer; that Publix paid
him or moving companies on his behalf $15,246.57 pursuant to the Agreement; or
that he has not repaid Publix any portion of those funds.
Instead, in the less than one page of his opposition brief devoted to Publix’s
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breach of contract counterclaim, Mr. Tamba asserts that Publix cannot state a
breach of the Repayment Agreement because Publix did not perform under the
Commitment Form. (See Doc. 34 at 30). On the Commitment Form, Mr. Tamba
marked that he accepted a transfer to Alabama as a truck driver. So, according to
Mr. Tamba, because Publix transferred him as a truck driver trainee instead of a
truck driver, he does not have to repay Publix for any of his relocation benefits.
But, even if Publix did breach the Commitment Form by transferring him as
a truck driver trainee, no evidence shows how Publix’s breach of the Commitment
Form would affect Mr. Tamba’s obligations under the Repayment Agreement. The
undisputed facts remain that the Repayment Agreement was a valid contract, that
Publix performed under the contract by paying $15,246.57 of Mr. Tamba’s
relocation expenses, that Mr. Tamba has not performed under the contract by not
reimbursing Publix, and that Publix has suffered $15,246.57 of damages as a
result. (See Doc. 24-6 at 2) (uncontroverted payment record showing that Publix
paid Mr. Tamba $15,246.57 in relocation benefits). Thus, no genuine disputes of
material fact exist as to each element of Publix’s breach of contract claim and the
company is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2.
Unjust Enrichment
Turning finally to Publix’s unjust enrichment counterclaim, the company
contends that no genuine dispute exists that Mr. Tamba unjustly enriched himself
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by retaining the $15,246.57 in relocation benefits, $1,484.21 in wages that Publix
asserts it overpaid him by erroneously paying him the truck driver rate instead of
the truck driver trainee rate, and $1,049.89 that Publix paid Mr. Tamba in advance
to work holidays that he did not work. For the following reasons, the court
disagrees.
To state an unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
“knowingly accepted and retained a benefit . . . provided by another . . . who has a
reasonable expectation of compensation.” Matador Holdings, Inc. v. HoPo Realty
Investments, L.L.C., 77 So. 3d 139, 145 (Ala. 2011). Also, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant’s “retention of a benefit would be unjust.” Id. (citations and
quotations omitted). “Retention of a benefit is unjust if (1) the donor of the benefit
. . . acted under a mistake of fact or in misreliance on a right or duty[;] or (2) the
recipient of the benefit . . . engaged in some unconscionable conduct . . . .” Id. at
146 (citations and quotations omitted).
Here, Publix cannot recover the relocation funds under its unjust enrichment
counterclaim because the court found that Publix is entitled to those funds as
damages under its breach of contract counterclaim. See Cajun Steamer Ventures,
LLC v. Thompson, 2019 WL 3068430, at *16 (N.D. Ala. July 12, 2019) (a plaintiff
“cannot recover for breach of contract and unjust enrichment”) (emphasis in
original).
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Next, a genuine dispute over what Mr. Tamba’s position should have been at
the Alabama facility challenges whether Mr. Tamba retaining the truck driver pay
would be unjust. The Commitment Form shows that Mr. Tamba accepted a
transfer to the Alabama facility as a truck driver, as opposed to a truck driver
trainee. Publix’s Dispatch Superintendent signed the form. So, evidence exists
that could support the inference that Publix agreed to transfer and pay Mr. Tamba
as a truck driver. If a jury credited this evidence, then Mr. Tamba would not be
unjustly enriched by retaining the $1,484.21 in alleged overpayments; those funds
would not, after all, be overpayments.
Finally, Publix has not shown that Mr. Tamba would be unjustly enriched by
retaining the funds that Publix paid him in the form of paid time off from May 2 to
May 4, 2017. Publix gave him the paid time off in return for his promise to work
the holidays of Memorial Day, July 4, and Labor Day. But reasonable jurors could
find that Publix unreasonably risked not getting the three days’ worth of wages
back by paying Mr. Tamba, an at-will employee paid by the hour, well in advance
of those days. And Mr. Tamba could not possibly work July 4 and Labor Day as
he promised because Publix terminated him. So genuine disputes of fact as to
whether Mr. Tamba would be unjustly enriched preclude summary judgment on
Publix’s unjust enrichment counterclaim.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, by separate order, the court will GRANT IN
PART and DENY IN PART Publix’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 22).
Specifically, the court will GRANT Publix’s motion for summary judgment
as to Mr. Tamba’s claims against the company. The court will GRANT Publix’s
motion for summary judgment as to its breach of contract claim against Mr. Tamba
and will ENTER JUDGMENT against Mr. Tamba and in favor of Publix in the
amount of $15,246.57. And the court will DENY Publix’s motion for summary
judgment as to its unjust enrichment claim.
DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of September, 2019.
____________________________________
KARON OWEN BOWDRE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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