Ruggieri v. City of Hoover, The et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE 7 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Mesha Dacus, Melinda James Lopez AND 6 MOTION to Dismiss filed by City of Hoover, The. The Court ORDERS the following: The Citys motion to dismiss Mr. Ruggieris ADA claim is DENIED; Mr. Ruggieris HIPAA claim against the City is DISMISSED; Mr. Ruggieris ADA and HIPAA claims against Ms. Dacus and Ms. Lopez are DISMISSED; Mr. Ruggieri is granted 14 days to amend his Complaint, if he so chooses;The Citys deadline to answer the Complaint is 20 days from the date of this Order, or 20 days from the date Mr. Ruggieri files an Amended Complaint (if he does so), whichever is later. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 7/24/2018. (KWC)

FILED
2018 Jul-24 PM 02:40
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER TODD
RUGGIERI,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF HOOVER,
MELINDA JAMES LOPEZ,
MESHA DACUS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
) Case No.: 2:18-CV-0476-VEH
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Christopher Todd Ruggieri alleges a violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). (See Doc. 1 at 3).
Before the Court are two motions. Defendant City of Hoover (the “City”) filed
a Motion To Dismiss on May 1, 2018. (Doc. 6). Defendants Melinda James Lopez and
Mesha Dacus filed a Motion To Dismiss on the same day. (Doc 7). Plaintiff Ruggieri
responded on May 8. (Doc. 14). Defendants filed a joint reply on that same day. (Doc.
15). Mr. Ruggieri then filed a sur-reply three days later. (Doc. 16). Accordingly, this
Motion is ripe for review. For the reasons stated in today’s opinion, the motions are

due to be GRANTED in part and otherwise DENIED.
II.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Consistent with the standard at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court accepts

all the alleged facts in Mr. Ruggieri’s Complaint to be true for the purpose of these
motions. For the reader’s benefit, the Court summarizes what Mr. Ruggieri alleges
occurred.
Mr. Ruggieri worked for the City in Information Technology. (See Doc. 1 at 8).
Ms. Lopez and Ms. Dacus also worked for the City. (See id. at 2,8). In July 2017, Ms.
Lopez and Ms. Dacus ordered Mr. Ruggieri to “undergo psychiatric counseling.” (See
id. at 8). Mr. Ruggieri recorded this conversation and believes the counseling was
unrelated to job performance. (See id.).
Mr. Ruggieri attended counseling with Dr. Lita Clark. (See id.). Dr. Clark told
Mr. Ruggieri “that the City of Hoover, through Mesha Dacus, was requiring [him] to
waive [his] HIPPA [sic] rights.” (See id.). “Dr. Clark instructed [Mr. Ruggieri] that
if [he] refused then the sessions would terminate and the City would terminate [his]
employment.” (See id.). Mr. Ruggieri recorded his therapy sessions. (See id.).
“After the third session, [Mr. Ruggieri] was released from counseling with Dr.
Clark stating there was nothing wrong.” (Id.). “[Mr. Ruggieri] brought [his] concerns
over why [he] was sent to counseling . . . to Mesha Dacus, the City of Hoover
2

Assistant [Human Resources] Director the same day of [his] release.” (Id.). “Less than
a week later, [Mr. Ruggieri was] called into [Ms. Lopez’s] office again, told [his] fears
were unfounded, but that [he was] now forbidden from recording any further
communications.” (Id.).
Mr. Ruggieri filed an EEOC charge on December 21, 2017. (See Doc. 6-1).1
The EEOC issued a right to sue notice on January 3, 2018. (See Doc. 1 at 9). Mr.
Ruggieri filed this federal lawsuit on March 26, 2018. (See generally id.).2
III.

STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (“[A] party may assert the following defenses by motion: (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]”). The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “‘a short and plain statement

1

The rule is that:

[A] document attached to a motion to dismiss may be considered by the court
without converting the motion into one for summary judgment only if the
attached document is: (1) central to the plaintiff's claim; and (2) undisputed. See
Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802 n. 2 (11th Cir.1999).
Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002). The EEOC charge meets these two
requirements, and the Court considers it here.
2

Mr. Ruggieri has filed with the Court the oral conversations he recorded that were not
attached to his Complaint. (See Doc. 17). The Court does not address these oral recordings
because Mr. Ruggieri does not have to provide evidence for the Court to believe his allegations.
At this stage, the Court accepts the factual allegations in his Complaint as true.
3

of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103,
2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)), abrogated
by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 929 (2007); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (setting forth general pleading
requirements for a complaint including providing “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, Rule 8
does not mandate the inclusion of “detailed factual allegations” within a complaint.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.
Ct. at 103). However, at the same time, “it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). “[O]nce a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S. Ct. at 1969.
“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. “While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
4

factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief.” Id. (emphasis added). “Under Twombly’s construction of
Rule 8 . . . [a plaintiff’s] complaint [must] ‘nudge[] [any] claims’ . . . ‘across the line
from conceivable to plausible.’ Ibid.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51.
A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965).
IV.

ANALYSIS
A.

The City’s Motion Is Due To Be Granted in Part and Otherwise
Denied
1.

ADA

The City argues that the ADA claim “is due to be dismissed because [Mr.
Ruggieri] failed to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging
discrimination based on disability.” (See Doc. 6 at 1). Indeed, Mr. Ruggieri’s EEOC
charge does not check the box indicating that he was alleging “discrimination based
on” “disability.” (See Doc. 6-1 at 2) (capitalization omitted). He checked the box for
5

“discrimination based on” “other.” (See id.) (capitalization omitted). Mr. Ruggieri
wrote the following:
I was hired by the above-named employer on July 6, 2015, as a Network
Systems Analyst. My immediate supervisor was Melinda James Lopez, CIO.
I reported that my organization was not PCI compliant of which Ms. Lopez was
aware. On July 6, 2017, I was forced into anger management counseling. I was
the only one in my department required to do so, thereby showing it was
inconsistent with job requirements and business necessity. Thereafter I was
consistently being subjected to verbal disciplines, and I did not receive my
annual review or step increase. On October 11, 2017, I was placed on
administrative leave pending an investigation. On November 16, 2017, I was
informed that internal documents were found on my computer and that I was
using my computer for personal gain. I was accused of unethical behavior and
it was at that point I resigned my position on November 16, 2017.
I believe that I was discriminated against and singled out however, I cannot
identify a basis for my filing my charge.
(Id.).
The City relies on the McWhorter decision to support dismissal. (See Doc. 6 at
2-5) (citing McWhorter v. Nucor Steel Birmingham Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (N.D.
Ala. 2018)). In that case, “the EEOC charge as drafted gave no notice whatsoever to
[d]efendant that [p]laintiff was claiming age or disability discrimination, or retaliation
because of opposition to age or disability discrimination or participation in any age
or disability proceeding.” See McWhorter, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 1192-93. This was
because the plaintiff did not check the box corresponding to “age” and “disability”
and his intent to bring those claims could not be gleaned from his written description.
6

See id. at 1191. Here, the Defendants argue that this case is factually analogous. (See
Doc. 6 at 2-5).3
However, this case is distinguishable in a significant way. Here, unlike in
McWhorter, Mr. Ruggieri is pro se. See McWhorter, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 1192; (see
Doc. 16 at 1) (implying that Mr. Ruggieri prepared the EEOC charge without the
benefit of an attorney). The court in McWhorter noted that “[c]ourts have broadly
interpreted the scope of administrative charges filed by unrepresented parties.” Id. at
1192 (citing Gregory v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir.
2004)). The Eleventh Circuit in Gregory noted that “[c]ourts are nonetheless
‘extremely reluctant to allow procedural technicalities to bar claims brought under
[Title VII].’” Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (citing another source).4 “As such, [the
3

Mr. Ruggieri submitted a letter he sent to the City regarding the possibility of
settlement. (See Doc. 13 at 3-4). He also argues that it gave the City notice of his ADA claim.
(See Doc. 14 at 3). The Defendants dispute that this was sufficient notice. (See Doc. 15 at 3). The
Court need not address this argument, as it finds that the EEOC Charge was sufficient for a pro
se litigant.
4

In Gregory, the Eleventh Circuit stated the following:

After a careful de novo reading of Dr. Gregory's EEOC charge prepared
without the assistance of counsel, and under the liberal EEOC charge strictures of
Sanchez, we hold that the district court did not err in finding that Dr. Gregory's
retaliation claim was not administratively barred by her failure to mark the
retaliation space on the EEOC template form. The facts alleged in her EEOC
charge could have reasonably been extended to encompass a claim for retaliation
because they were inextricably intertwined with her complaints of race and sex
discrimination. That is, she stated facts from which a reasonable EEOC
investigator could have concluded that what she had complained about is
retaliation because of her complaints of Dr. Fuller's disparate treatment to the
7

Eleventh Circuit] has noted that ‘‘the scope of an EEOC complaint should not be
strictly interpreted.’’” Id. (citing another source); see also Jerome v. Marriott
Residence Inn, 211 F. App’x 844, 846 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e liberally construe
EEOC charges that are prepared without the assistance of counsel.”). Accordingly, the
Court reads Mr. Ruggieri’s EEOC charge in light of his pro se status.
In this case, Mr. Ruggieri focuses on 42 U.S.C. §12112(d)(4)(A) as the reason
he is entitled to relief. (See Doc. 1 at 3, 8). That statute states, in relevant part:
(d) Medical examinations and inquiries
...
(4) Examination and inquiry
(A) Prohibited examinations and inquiries
A covered entity shall not require a medical examination
and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether
such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the
nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination
or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with
business necessity.
hospital's administration. Specifically, shortly after being subjected to certain
allegedly discriminatory acts, she was terminated. An EEOC investigation of her
race and sex discrimination complaints leading to her termination would have
reasonably uncovered any evidence of retaliation. See Danner v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159, 161-62 (5th Cir.1971) (noting that employee filing
an EEOC complaint without the assistance of counsel are to be construed
liberally, and holding that EEOC charge complaining of discharge was
“reasonably related” to Title VII complaint that “she was discharged”).
Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280-81.
8

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). This litigation is based on Mr. Ruggieri’s EEOC charge
which states, in relevant part:
On July 6, 2017, I was forced into anger management counseling. I was
the only one in my department required to do so, thereby showing it was
inconsistent with job requirements and business necessity.
(See Doc. 6-1 at 2).5
What Mr. Ruggieri wrote in his EEOC charge matters. The rule is that “[a]
plaintiff's judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which
can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Muhall v.
Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 589 n.8 (11th Cir. 1994). However, the Eleventh
Circuit “has noted that judicial claims are allowed if they ‘amplify, clarify, or more
clearly focus’ the allegations in the EEOC complaint, but has cautioned that
allegations of new acts of discrimination are inappropriate.” Gregory, 355 F.3d at
1279-80 (citing another source).
At bottom, the City argues that Mr. Ruggieri’s EEOC charge is deficient. (See
Doc. 6 at 4-5). In order to evaluate whether this is so, the Court first examines what
the baseline for a sufficient EEOC charge is. The McWhorter court states that “[a]
charge must, at minimum, ‘be in writing and ... name the prospective respondent and

5

Mr. Ruggieri claims that he used “verbatim and the exact verbiage used in Title 42
U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).” (See Doc. 16) (emphasis added). That is not correct. A side-by-side
comparison shows that he used language similar to, but not verbatim from, the statute.
9

... generally allege the discriminatory act(s).’” McWhorter, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 1191
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1626.6). This is because “[t]he purpose of the administrative
charge is to (1) notify the employer that a charge has been filed and (2) initiate an
EEOC investigation.” Id. at 1191 (citing EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 63, 104
S.Ct. 1621, 80 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984)).
Guided by the aforementioned legal authority, the Court determines that Mr.
Ruggieri’s EEOC charge is sufficient. (See Doc. 6-1 at 2). Mr. Ruggieri’s EEOC
charge is in writing. (See id.). It names the respondent – the City. (See id.). It generally
alleges the discriminatory acts. (See id.) (“On July 6, 2017, I was forced into anger
management counseling. I was the only one in my department required to do so,
thereby showing it was inconsistent with job requirements and business necessity.
Thereafter I was consistently being subjected to verbal disciplines, and I did not
receive my annual review or step increase.”). It states several dates in connection to
the alleged discrimination. (See id.).
The City argues that “the charge of discrimination . . . does not mention
disability discrimination or retaliation.” (See Doc. 6 at 5). The City is right in that Mr.
Ruggieri did not cite any statute in his EEOC charge. (See Doc. 6-1 at 2). He also did
not check the “disability” box. (See id.). It appears that Mr. Ruggieri was reluctant to
check that box because he is not alleging that he is disabled. (Cf. Doc. 14 at 2). Of
10

course, under the section of the ADA he is litigating, he does not have to allege that
he is disabled. In the Eleventh Circuit, Ҥ 12112(d)(4)(A) protects employees who are
not disabled.” See Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir.
2013) (citing Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth., 691 F.3d 809, 816 (6th Cir.2012);
Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir.2007); Conroy v. New York State Dep't
of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir.2002); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference
Resort, 124 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir.1997)) (emphasis added).
The City points to the sentence in the EEOC charge referring to PCI compliance
to argue that it is irrelevant to an ADA claim. (See Doc. 6 at 4). However, the City
overlooks the next sentence where Mr. Ruggieri essentially complains that the City
forced him into “anger management counseling” without justification. (See Doc. 6 at
4); (Doc. 6-1 at 2).
Finally, the City argues the following:
[T]he fact that the EEOC’s Dismissal and Notice of Rights (Doc. 1 at p.
9) was issued on January 3, 2018 (less than two weeks after the charge
was submitted), without asking Hoover for a position statement, shows
that the charge of discrimination was not sufficient to provide grounds
for the EEOC to initiate an investigation. (Ex. A; Doc. 1 at p. 9.)[.]
(Doc. 6 at 5-6). This argument is unpersuasive for three reasons. First, the City has not
provided the Court with any legal authority supporting the proposition that a quick
dismissal can give an inference of an insufficient EEOC charge. (See id.). Second, the
11

City states that it was never “ask[ed] . . . for a position statement.” (See id.). However,
the City has not cited evidence showing this to be the case and “[s]tatements by
counsel in briefs are not evidence.” Skyline Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 613 F.2d 1328, 1337
(5th Cir.1980).6 Third, and most importantly, the text of the EEOC Dismissal and
Notice of Rights states:
Based upon its investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the
information obtained establishes violations of the statutes.
(Doc. 1 at 9) (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. Ruggieri’s EEOC charge was sufficient for
the EEOC to conduct an investigation, however short. (See Doc. 1 at 9).
Today’s decision is fact specific. The Court declines to find Mr. Ruggieri’s
EEOC charge deficient when it was not drafted by an attorney, meets the requirements
in the Code of Federal Regulations, outlines allegations and facts tracking a provision
in the ADA, and provides enough facts for the EEOC to conduct an investigation.
Under these circumstances, the Court will not dismiss the case because Mr. Ruggieri
did not check the “disability” box. Accordingly, the City’s Motion To Dismiss the
ADA claim is denied.
2.

HIPAA

The City also argues that the HIPAA claim fails because “[t]here is no private
6

See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding
that decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on
September 30, 1981, are binding in the Eleventh Circuit).
12

cause of action under HIPAA.” (See Doc. 6 at 2). The City is right.
To begin with, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Alexander v. Sandoval
informs this Court’s analysis:
Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce
federal law must be created by Congress. Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578, 61 L. Ed. 2d 82, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979)
(remedies available are those "that Congress enacted into law"). The
judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine
whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a
private remedy. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 15, 62 L. Ed. 2d 146, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979). Statutory intent on
this latter point is determinative. See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102, 115 L. Ed. 2d 929, 111 S. Ct. 2749
(1991); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,
812, n. 9, 92 L. Ed. 2d 650, 106 S. Ct. 3229 (1986) (collecting cases).
Without it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create
one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how
compatible with the statute. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145, 148, 87 L. Ed. 2d 96, 105 S. Ct. 3085
(1985); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, supra, at 23;
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, at 575-576. "Raising up causes
of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function
for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals." Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365, 115 L. Ed.
2d 321, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (emphasis added). “HIPAA
contains no express provision creating a private cause of action.” Sneed v. Pan
American Hosp., 370 F. App’x 47, 50 (11th Cir. 2010). Ergo, “no private right of
action exists under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.”
13

Crawford v. City of Tampa, 397 F. App’x 621, 623 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Acara v.
Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir.2006)).
Mr. Ruggieri replies by citing to two cases from state courts in Connecticut and
New York. (See Doc. 14 at 2-3) (citing Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics and
Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32 (Conn. 2014); Arons v. Jutkowitz, 880 N.E.2d 831
(N.Y. 2007)). However, those cases are not binding authority because this Court is a
federal district court in the Eleventh Circuit. Moreover, from reading Mr. Ruggieri’s
brief, he does not say where in these opinions these state courts have held that an
individual can bring a lawsuit directly under HIPAA. (See Doc. 14 at 2-3). In fact, as
the Defendants note, Byrne says quite the opposite. (See Doc. 15 at 4) (citing Byrne,
102 A.3d at 35); see also Byrne, 102 A.3d at 45 (calling the fact that there is no
private right of action “well settled”). There is a difference between a federal statute
guiding a state court’s standard of care and a federal statute providing an individual
the right to sue in federal court under that statute.
Additionally, any claim that Mr. Ruggieri attempts to bring under the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (the “HITECH Act”)
also fails for two reasons. First, nowhere in Mr. Ruggieri’s Complaint is the HITECH
Act mentioned. (See generally Doc. 1). Instead, Mr. Ruggieri mentions it in his briefs.
(See Doc. 14 at 2-3); (Doc. 16 at 1). Second, Mr. Ruggieri has not provided the Court
14

any authority showing that a private individual has a right of action under that statute.
Accordingly, the HIPAA claim is dismissed.
B.

The Dacus/Lopez Motion Is Due To Be Granted
1.

ADA

Ms. Dacus and Ms. Lopez argue that they cannot be liable under the ADA
because they are individuals. (See Doc. 7 at 2-3) (citing Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d
1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir.
2007)). Generally, “[the ADA] does not provide for individual liability, only for
employer liability.” Mason, 82 F.3d at 1009; see also Tobar v. Federal Defenders
Middle Dist. of Ga., 618 F. App’x 982, 985 n.2 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing sources)
(“[T]here is no individual liability under . . . the ADA.”).
Mr. Ruggieri specifically complains of a violation of 42 U.S.C. §
12112(d)(4)(A) and no other section in the ADA. (Doc. 1 at 3). Again, the relevant
provision states that “[a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and
shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual
with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such
examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (emphasis added). The key word here is a
“covered entity.” The ADA defines a “covered entity” as “an employer, employment
15

agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.” 42 U.S.C. §
12111(2). When the ADA refers to an “employee,” it is referring to “an individual
employed by an employer.” Id. at §12111(4). Ms. Dacus and Ms. Lopez are
individuals, not entities.
Mr. Ruggieri has not put forward any legal authority that detracts from the
Court’s conclusion that he cannot sue an individual under § 12112(d)(4)(A) of the
ADA. (See Doc. 14 at 2-3); (Doc. 16 at 1-2). Instead, he argues that dismissing the
individual defendants would provide the City “another legal loophole and trick to
avoid taking responsibility.” (See Doc. 16 at 2). This argument does not detract from
legal precedent and the plain language of the ADA– authority that the Court must
follow. For that reason, this argument is unpersuasive.
Since the ADA does not provide for individual liability under the provision that
Mr. Ruggieri alleges, the ADA claim against Ms. Dacus and Ms. Lopez is due to be
dismissed.
2.

HIPAA

The Court previously discussed how Mr. Ruggieri cannot bring a private right
of action under HIPAA. That analysis is relevant here. For that reason, the HIPAA
claim is dismissed.

16

C.

The Court Grants Mr. Ruggieri Leave To Amend his Complaint

Mr. Ruggieri asks the Court for leave to amend the Complaint “if the Court
determines [he] has failed to state a claim.” (Doc. 14 at 3). Today’s opinion is actually
favorable to Mr. Ruggieri on his ADA claim against the City. While the Court
dismissed Mr. Ruggieri’s other ADA and HIPAA claims, amending those claims
would be futile because of the legal framework stated above. See Bryant v. Dupree,
252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)) (“A district court need not, however, allow an amendment . . . where
amendment would be futile.”).
To the extent not futile, the Court will permit Mr. Ruggieri to submit an entirely
new operative amended complaint that would totally replace the original Complaint
submitted to the Court. Accordingly, the Court will grant him 14 days to amend his
Complaint, if he so chooses.
V.

CONCLUSION
After consideration of the parties’ arguments, this case will proceed on Mr.

Ruggieri’s ADA claim against the City.
In short, the Court ORDERS the following:
•

The City’s motion to dismiss Mr. Ruggieri’s ADA claim is DENIED.

•

Mr. Ruggieri’s HIPAA claim against the City is DISMISSED.
17

•

Mr. Ruggieri’s ADA and HIPAA claims against Ms. Dacus and Ms.
Lopez are DISMISSED.

•

Mr. Ruggieri is granted 14 days to amend his Complaint, if he so
chooses.

•

The City’s deadline to answer the Complaint is 20 days from the date of
this Order, or 20 days from the date Mr. Ruggieri files an Amended
Complaint (if he does so), whichever is later.

DONE and ORDERED this the 24th day of July, 2018.

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge

18