Ruggieri v. City of Hoover, The et al

Filing 49

MEMORANDUM OPINION as more fully set out in order. Signed by Judge Liles C Burke on 05/03/19. (SPT )

FILED
2019 May-03 PM 02:32
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER TODD RUGGIERI
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF HOOVER,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:18-CV-0476-LCB

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff, Christopher Todd Ruggieri1, filed a complaint on March 26,
2018, pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against his former
employer, the City of Hoover (“City”). Ruggieri also named as defendants two
City employees in their individual capacities. The City moved to dismiss all of
Ruggieri’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., and filed a
counterclaim. The judge previously assigned to this case2 dismissed all claims
against the individual defendants as well as Ruggieri’s claim regarding purported
violations of HIPAA. However, the Court denied the City’s motion to dismiss
Ruggieri’s ADA claim and granted him leave to amend his complaint. On August
31, 2018, Ruggieri filed a document which contained a response to the defendant’s
answer, a response to the defendant’s counterclaim, and what appeared to be
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Mr. Ruggieri is appearing pro se.
This case was reassigned to the undersigned on October 23, 2018.

additional causes of action. (Doc. 29). However, the Court struck that filing
insofar as it constituted a response to the defendant’s answer, and again gave
Ruggieri leave to file a proper amended complaint. (Doc. 30). On October 19,
2018, Ruggieri filed another amended complaint.

However, that filing was

stricken for its failure “to comply with several of the requirements set out by the
Court” in its prior order granting leave to amend. (Doc. 33). On November 13,
2018, Ruggieri filed an “Amended Claim Statement” (Doc. 35), which this Court
will construe as his second amended complaint. In the present complaint, Ruggieri
re-alleged his ADA claim and added several additional claims related to his
termination. Before the Court is the City’s motion to dismiss Ruggieri’s Amended
Claim Statement. (Doc. 41). The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for
review.
In its motion, the City included a footnote in which it reasserted its claim
that Ruggieri’s ADA claim should be dismissed and noted that this Court could
revisit the ruling denying the previous motion. See (Doc. 41), citing Solutia, Inc. v.
McWane, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1328 (N.D. Ala. 2010). Because this Court
agrees with the reasoning set forth in the previous judge’s memorandum opinion
and order denying the City’s first motion to dismiss Ruggieri’s ADA claim, the
Court declines to revisit that ruling.

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However, for the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the City’s motion
to dismiss the remaining claims in Ruggieri’s Amended Claim Statement is due to
be GRANTED.
Background
Ruggieri was employed by the City in its information technology (“IT”)
department. Ruggieri alleged that, on July 7, 2017, the City required him to begin
anger-management counseling with Dr. Lita Clark. Ruggieri stated that Dr. Clark
informed him that he would be required to waive his HIPAA rights or the sessions
would end, and the City would terminate his employment. According to Ruggieri,
he attended three therapy sessions with Dr. Clark after which she released him and
“stat[ed] that there was nothing wrong with [him].” (Doc. 35). Ruggieri asserted
that he was the only employee in the IT department who was required to attend
such counseling; that the counseling was not consistent with his job requirements;
and that the counseling was not a business necessity for the City.
Ruggieri claimed that, on the day he was released from counseling, he spoke
to Mesha Dacus, the City’s Assistant Human Resources Director, to voice concern
over the City’s decision to send him to counseling. A week later, Ruggieri said, he
was called in to Melinda James Lopez’s office and told that his fears were
unfounded. According to Ruggieri, he had been recording his conversations with
people in his office as well as his therapy sessions with Dr. Clark. Ruggieri stated
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that Lopez told him that he was forbidden to record any more conversations at
work.
On October 11, 2017, Ruggieri was placed on administrative leave.
Ruggieri alleged that “[s]ome [] time between October 11, 2017, and November
16, 2017, the hard drives were pulled from [his] machine and subject[ed] to a
forensics search.” (Doc. 35). According to Ruggieri, his files were encrypted.
Therefore, he said, someone would have had to log in under his profile in order to
access his files. On November 16, 2017, Ruggieri claimed that the City leveled
“certain charges”3 against him and set a hearing in front of a tribunal for the
following Monday, November 20, 2017. Ruggieri opted not to attend the hearing
and resigned from his position on November 16, 2017.
Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint
against the “liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2).” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, a district court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and
construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Brophy v.
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Although not stated in his amended complaint, subsequent filings reveal that Ruggieri was
accused of improperly accessing emails between two of his supervisors.
4

Jiangbo Pharms. Inc., 781 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015).

Generally, a

complaint should include “enough information regarding the material elements of a
cause of action to support recovery under some ‘viable legal theory.’” Am. Fed'n
of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, Fla., 637 F.3d 1178, 1186
(11th Cir . 2011), quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d
678, 683–84 (11th Cir. 2001). In reviewing this case, this Court notes that “[p]ro
se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”

Tannenbaum v. United

States, 148 F. 3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)(per curiam)(citation omitted).
Ruggieri’s Claims and the City’s Counterclaim
In his amended complaint, Ruggieri first reasserted his ADA claim.
Additionally, Ruggieri raised the following claims: (1) “Tampering with
Evidence”; (2) “False Light Defamation of Character”; (3) a violation of the
Electronic Communication Privacy Act (“ECPA”); (4) invasion of privacy; (5) a
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; (6) slander and libel; (7) and
“Targeting.” (Doc. 35). The City asserted a counterclaim against Ruggieri in
which it asserted that Ruggieri is required to reimburse the City for tuition
payments that it made for Ruggieri to attend classes at the University of Alabama
at Birmingham. Although Ruggieri denied that he owes any money to the City, he
has not moved to dismiss its counterclaim.
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The City’s Motion to Dismiss
In its motion to dismiss, the City addressed each of Ruggieri’s claims in
turn. As noted, this Court declines to revisit the previous judge’s ruling in which
she denied the City’s motion to dismiss Ruggieri’s ADA claim. The Court will
now proceed to address each of the City’s arguments for dismissing Ruggieri’s
claims.
Tampering with Evidence
The City asserted that there is no cause of action under state or federal law
for “tampering with evidence.” This Court agrees. In his response to the City’s
motion, Ruggieri argued that his “Tampering with Evidence” claim arises under 18
U.S.C. 1519, entitled, “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal
investigations and bankruptcy.” However, 18 U.S.C. 1519, is a criminal statute
and does not authorize a civil cause of action. Although Courts are directed to
liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se parties, nothing in the paragraph that
Ruggieri submitted in support of this claim can be construed as an independent
cause of action. Accordingly, Ruggieri’s “Tampering with Evidence” claim is due
to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., because it fails to state a
claim for which relief can be granted.
In his filings with this Court, Ruggieri goes into great technical detail to
explain his contention that the City’s method of accessing his computer rendered
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useless any information taken from the hard drive.

Although the Court is

dismissing this claim as a separate cause of action, Ruggieri is certainly entitled to
challenge the admissibility of any of this evidence should the City attempt to offer
it at trial. The Court expresses no opinion at this time regarding the admissibility
of any evidence purportedly taken from Ruggieri’s computer.
False Light Defamation of Character
The City expressed confusion regarding the exact claim Ruggieri was
attempting to raise in this count. The City stated: “It isn’t clear whether Ruggieri
is asserting a defamation claim, a false-light invasion-of-privacy claim, or both….”
(Doc. 41, p. 4). In his sur-reply brief, Ruggieri clarified that his allegations
“qualify as both.” (Doc. 45, p. 2). Because pro se pleadings are to be liberally
construed, the Court will consider Ruggieri’s claims as such.
The City first addressed Ruggieri’s claim for false light invasion of privacy.
The City correctly noted that, “[t]o establish false light invasion of privacy, a
plaintiff must show (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or
acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false
light in which the other would be placed.” Horne v. Russell Cty. Comm’n 379 F.
Supp. 1305, 1342 (M.D. Ala. 2005), aff’d 180 F. App’x 903 (11th Cir. 2006). The
City argued that Ruggieri failed to plead that the City communicated or publicized
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anything about him to any third party. The City further asserted that Ruggieri
failed to specifically identify in his amended complaint the information that he
claimed cast him in a false light.
In his amended complaint, Ruggieri stated that “[p]erforming the above
actions casts a False Light on the Plaintiff and Defames the Character of the
Plaintiff with no actual, verifiable evidence.” This is the entirety of his claim for
false light invasion of privacy and defamation. The Court will assume that the
actions Ruggieri is referring to are the City’s search of his computer and
subsequent accusations against him.

However, the City correctly notes that

Ruggieri does not specify which of the “above actions” constitutes false light
invasion of privacy. In his responses to the City’s motion to dismiss, Ruggieri
included additional facts in an attempt to cure the defects alleged by the City. The
proper course for Ruggieri to take would have been to again seek leave to amend
his complaint. However, Ruggieri has had several chances to amend his complaint
in the present case and was given specific instructions by the previously-assigned
judge on the proper way to do so. See (Doc. 30, p. 7-8). Accordingly, the Court
will not consider the additional facts and allegations raised in Ruggieri’s replies as
part of his amended complaint.
As claimed by the City, Ruggieri’s amended complaint did not allege that
false information about him was publicized to any third parties. Publication of
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false material is an essential element to this type of claim. Thus, even accepting all
of the allegations in Ruggieri’s amended complaint as true and construing them in
the light most favorable to him, Ruggieri has still failed to allege sufficient facts to
establish false light invasion of privacy. Accordingly, this claim is due to be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.
Ruggieri’s defamation claim suffers from the same defects. In Alabama, the
elements of defamation are:
1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; 2) an
unprivileged communication of that statement to a third party; 3) fault
amounting at least to negligence on the part of the defendant; and 4)
either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication of the statement.
Adams v. Bank of Am., N.A., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1202 (N.D. Ala. 2017), quoting
Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 872 So. 2d 833, 840 (Ala. 2003), quoting in
turn McCaig v. Talladega Publ'g Co., 544 So. 2d 875, 877 (Ala. 1989). As noted
above, there are no allegations in Ruggieri’s amended complaint that the City
communicated any false statements to any third parties. Thus, for the same reasons
Ruggieri failed to state a claim for false light invasion of privacy, he also failed to
state a claim for defamation4. See Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.

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Ruggieri includes a separate section in his amended complaint alleging “Slander and Libel.”
(Doc. 35, p. 3). The analysis regarding defamation applies to those allegations as well.
Accordingly, Ruggieri’s slander and libel claims are due to be dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.
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Invasion of Privacy
In paragraph 18 of Ruggieri’s amended complaint, he claims that the search
of his computer and hard drive “both by City officials and Law Enforcement
Officers, was a violation of [his] ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ as described
in both the 4th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the
Electronics Communication Privacy Act [(“ECPA”)].

Therefore, Invasion of

Privacy and an ECPA claim is added to this case.” (Doc. 35, p. 3). The Court will
address each of these claims in turn.
The Alabama Supreme Court has held that the tort of invasion of privacy
consists of the following: “1) the intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or
seclusion; 2) publicity which violates the ordinary decencies; 3) putting the
plaintiff in a false, but not necessarily defamatory, position in the public eye; and
4) the appropriation of some element of the plaintiff's personality for a commercial
use.”

Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala.

1983)(footnote omitted).
As best the Court can determine, Ruggieri has alleged that the City invaded
his privacy by improperly searching the hard drive and other related equipment on
his City-issued computer thereby intruding upon his physical solitude or seclusion.
However, Ruggieri never asserted that the City accessed any of his personal
devices or that it somehow accessed personal information about him. As noted in
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the previous section, Ruggieri never alleges what information was even accessed.
Thus, there is no allegation that the City intruded upon Ruggieri’s physical solitude
or seclusion. Rather, by his own admission, the City searched Ruggieri’s computer
– that was issued to him by the City – on City property while Ruggieri was on
administrative leave. Accordingly, Ruggieri alleged no facts which, if true, would
demonstrate that the City intruded upon his physical solitude or seclusion.
Accordingly, this claim is due to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R.
Civ. P.
Finally, Ruggieri alleged no facts that, if true, would demonstrate that the
City publicized a matter “which violates the ordinary decencies … put[] the
plaintiff in a false, but not necessarily defamatory, position in the public eye … [or
appropriated] some element of the plaintiff's personality for a commercial use.” Id.
Accordingly, Ruggieri has failed to state a claim for invasion of privacy.
Therefore, this claim is due to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ.
P.
Ruggieri also alleged that the search of his computer and hard drive was a
violation of his “‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ as described in … the
Electronic Communication Privacy Act.” (Doc. 35, p. 3). Although Ruggieri does
not identify the specific provision of the ECPA under which he seeks relief, the
Court surmises, as does the defense, that Ruggieri seeks the recovery of civil
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damages authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2520, which provides in relevant part: “any
person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the
person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation such
relief as may be appropriate.”
Again,

Ruggieri’s

amended

complaint

does

not

identify

what

communication or other information was allegedly intercepted by the city.
Additionally, Ruggieri does not allege that anything was “disclosed, or
intentionally used in violation of” the ECPA. As noted, Ruggieri’s complaint
simply alleged that the City’s investigation was improper and that it invaded his
expectations of privacy. Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to
Ruggieri, the Court concludes that he has failed to state a claim for a violation of
the ECPA. See Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.
Fourth Amendment
Ruggieri next alleged that the City’s search was performed without a court
order and, therefore, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Ruggieri
claimed that this “illegal search and seizure … adds a 4th Amendment claim to this
case.” (Doc. 35, p. 3). However, this is a civil case, and the Fourth Amendment
itself does not create a private cause of action for a violation of its provisions.
Ruggieri does not identify any statute under which he purports to assert a claim for
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relief. Therefore, he has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted as to
this particular count. See Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.
“Targeting”
Finally, Ruggieri claimed that no other City employees were treated in a
manner similar to him, i.e. being sent to counselling. Therefore, Ruggieri claimed,
he “can only interpret these actions as willful targeting…. Therefore, a claim of
Targeting is added to this case.” The Court is not aware of any such cause of
action under Alabama or Federal law. When a plaintiff asserts a claim that courts
do not recognize, the claim must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) Fed. R.
Civ. P. See Smith v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 7:16-CV-00572-LSC, 2016
WL 3144082, at *2 (N.D. Ala. June 6, 2016).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, all of Ruggieri’s claims except for his ADA claim
are due to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. Thus, the City’s
motion in that regard is due to be GRANTED. Insofar as the City has moved to
dismiss Ruggieri’s ADA claim by asking this Court to revisit the previous judge’s
ruling, that motion is due to be DENIED.
contemporaneously herewith.

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A separate order will issue

DONE and ORDERED May 3, 2019.

_________________________________
LILES C. BURKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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