Matthews v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 9/5/2019. (JLC)
FILED
2019 Sep-05 PM 04:38
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KATHY ALBERTA MATTHEWS, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ANDREW SAUL,
)
Commissioner of Social Security,
)
)
)
Defendant.
)
2:18-cv-00588-LSC
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
The plaintiff, Kathy Alberta Matthews, proceeding pro se, appeals from the
decision
of
the
Commissioner
of
the
Social
Security
Administration
(“Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”). Ms. Matthews timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies
and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Ms. Matthews was 53 years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ’s”) decision (tr. at 14, 120), she has a high school education (tr. at 152), and
she has no past relevant work (tr. at 44). Ms. Matthews claims that she became
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disabled on January 30, 2009 (tr. at 17), due to back problems, bulging discs,
hypertension, depression, and migraine headaches. (Tr. at 120, 150.)
The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential
evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled and thus eligible
for SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274,
1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order until making a
finding of either disabled or not disabled; if no finding is made, the analysis will
proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The first
step requires the evaluator to determine whether the plaintiff is engaged in
substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).
If the plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the evaluator moves on to the next step.
The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severity of
the plaintiff’s medically determinable physical and mental impairments. See id. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of
impairments that is not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy the durational
requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding
of not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The decision
depends on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d
2
1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that “substantial medical evidence in the
record” adequately supported the finding that plaintiff was not disabled).
Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the
plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal to
the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed
impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and
416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
If the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or
medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. See id.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine
whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the requirements of his past relevant
work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the plaintiff’s impairment
or combination of impairments does not prevent him from performing his past
relevant work, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See id.
The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the plaintiff’s RFC,
age, education, and work experience in order to determine whether the plaintiff can
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make an adjustment to other work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If
the plaintiff can perform other work, the evaluator will find him not disabled. Id.; see
also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff cannot perform other
work, the evaluator will find him disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms. Matthews
has not engaged in SGA since the application date. (Tr. at 19.) According to the ALJ,
Plaintiff’s obesity and hypertension are considered “severe” based on the
requirements set forth in the regulations. (Id.) However, she found that these
impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 22.) The ALJ did not find Ms.
Matthews’s allegations to be fully credible, and she determined that Ms. Matthews
has the following RFC: “full range of work at all exertional levels but with the
following nonexertional limitations: no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and no
unprotected heights or hazardous machinery.” (Id.)
According to the ALJ, Ms. Matthews does not have any past relevant work,
she is an “individual closely approaching advanced age,” and she has at least a high
school education, as those terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 22-23.) She
determined that “transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does
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not have past relevant work.” (Tr. at 23.) Because Plaintiff’s “ability to perform
work at all exertional levels has been compromised by nonexertional limitations,”
the ALJ enlisted a vocational expert (“VE”) and used Medical-Vocation Rule
204.00 as a guideline for finding that there are a significant number of jobs in the
national economy that she is capable of performing, such as cashier, assembler, and
postal worker. (Id.) The ALJ concluded her findings by stating that Plaintiff “has not
been under a ‘disability,’ as defined in the Social Security Act, since April 2, 2015,
the date the application was filed.” (Tr. at 24.)1
II.
Standard of Review
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is
a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives deference
to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are supported
The relevant period for Plaintiff’s SSI application is the month in which she filed her SSI
application (April 2015) through the date of the ALJ’s decision (May 25, 2017). (Tr. at 14, 120).
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.330, 416.335; Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005)
(explaining SSI appeal “require[d] a showing of disability between [claimant’s SSI application
date] and the date of the ALJ’s decision”).
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by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles
v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).
Nonetheless, this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute
its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210
(11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir.
2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers
to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding
from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181
(11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383
U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the proof preponderates
against the Commissioner’s decision, it must affirm if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520,
1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard [for
review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its entirety
to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d
622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir.
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1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal.
See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
III.
Discussion
In her initial complaint and subsequent brief, Ms. Matthews appears to
contend that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded because her
medical condition has worsened since the denial of her SSI application. She submits
additional evidence before this Court that she contends warrants reversal and
remand. Plaintiff attaches to her complaint: 1) a prior favorable Notice of Decision
for SSI dated September 24, 2010; 2) a letter from Max Michael, M.D., dated March
26, 2018, discussing Plaintiff’s condition and treatment; and 3) a radiological report
from Delbert Hahn, M.D., dated June 14, 2017, with results of a lumbar spine MRI
showing “[n]o evidence of significant degenerative disc disease.” (Doc. 1 at 8-12.)
As an initial matter, this Court cannot consider extra-record evidence
submitted by Plaintiff in conducting its substantial evidence review of the
Commissioner’s final decision. Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), expressly limits the Court’s jurisdiction to a review of the pleadings and
the certified administrative transcript, as follows:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a
review of such decision by a civil action. . . As part of the
Commissioner’s answer the Commissioner of Social Security shall file
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a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence
upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The
court shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript
of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Commissioner
of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court reviews a closed administrative record because,
under § 405(g), “neither party may put any additional evidence before the district
court.” Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The Eleventh Circuit has
confirmed that the district court is limited to a substantial evidence review of the
certified administrative record. See Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253,
1268 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining “a reviewing court is limited to the certified
administrative record in examining the evidence”) (quoting Caulder v. Bowen, 791
F.2d 872, 876 (11th Cir. 1986)).
To the extent Plaintiff’s submission of additional evidence can be construed
as an implied motion to remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also
Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1267-68, the implied motion is not due to be granted. Sentence
six of section 405(g) provides the sole means for a district court to remand to the
Commissioner to consider new evidence presented for the first time in the district
court:
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The court may . . . at any time order additional evidence to be taken
before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing
that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause
for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior
proceeding . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “The sixth sentence of § 405(g) plainly describes an entirely
different kind of remand [from the fourth sentence], appropriate when the district
court learns of evidence not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of
the administrative proceeding that might have changed the outcome of that
proceeding.” Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626 (1990); see Melkonyan v.
Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98 (1991) (The sixth sentence allows the taking of “new
evidence . . . that was not available to the claimant at the time of the administrative
proceeding.”). To satisfy the criteria for a remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), a claimant must establish: (1) the evidence is new and non-cumulative, (2)
the evidence is material such that a reasonable possibility exists that it would change
the administrative result, and (3) there was good cause for the failure to submit the
evidence at the administrative level. See Caulder, 791 F.2d at 877.
Some of the evidence Plaintiff attaches to her complaint is cumulative and all
of it is immaterial. First, the excerpts from a 2010 favorable ALJ decision—which
would have adjudicated the period up to the date of the ALJ’s 2010 decision—are
immaterial because they do not relate to Plaintiff’s condition during the period
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before the ALJ in this case (April 2015-May 2017). Cf. Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
Comm’r, 808 F.3d 818, 822 (11th Cir. 2015) (“In light of our deferential review, there
is no inconsistency in finding that two successive ALJ decisions are supported by
substantial evidence even when those decisions reach opposing conclusion.”).
Likewise, Dr. Michael’s March 2018 letter—issued almost a year after the
ALJ’s decision—is immaterial because the letter addresses Plaintiff’s condition as
of that later time; the letter does not indicate Dr. Michael reviewed any records from
the relevant period before the ALJ or otherwise tied his opinion to Plaintiff’s
condition during the relevant period. Indeed, the Appeals Council considered this
additional evidence and concluded it was chronologically irrelevant to the ALJ’s
May 25, 2017, decision, (Tr. at 2, 13). Evidence is “chronologically relevant” if “it
relates to the period on or before the date of the [ALJ’s] hearing decision.” Stone v.
Soc. Sec. Admin., 658 F. App’x 551, 553 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§
404.970(b), 416.1470(b)). Further, Dr. Michael’s opinion that Plaintiff is “currently
unable to maintain gainful employment” would not be a medical opinion entitled to
any special significance. Statements that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to
work” are not medical opinions; rather, they are administrative findings within the
ALJ’s discretion and entitled to no special deference. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d).
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Third, the June 2017 MRI report is also not grounds for a sentence six remand
as it is merely duplicative of evidence submitted to and considered by the Appeals
Council. (Tr. at 2, 13.) Furthermore, Plaintiff has not shown the additional records
are material. Even assuming the June 2017 MRI results were new, and not
cumulative, they reflect Plaintiff’s condition as of the time of the testing—a time
period after the ALJ’s decision—and indicate no significant abnormality. (Tr. at 2,
13). Accordingly, the evidence is immaterial because there is no reasonable
possibility it would change the administrative result. See Caulder, 791 F.2d at 877.
For these reasons, none of the additional evidence provided to this Court
would materially alter the ALJ’s decision and does not warrant a sentence six
remand.
The plaintiff also alleges in her complaint that the medical evidence provided
to the ALJ gave an incorrect diagnosis and did not accurately reflect her physical
condition. The plaintiff does not specify which doctor provided inaccurate
information and does not point to any specific piece of evidence in the certified
transcript that she believes to be erroneous. Regardless of the plaintiff’s lack of
specificity in her allegations, this argument does not provide a basis for challenging
the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ is limited to evaluating the evidence and testimony
provided prior to and during the hearing to make a determination of the plaintiff’s
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disability status. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 405; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.945, 416.920b. In
making her determination, the ALJ considered evidence provided by the plaintiff to
include statements by both the plaintiff and her daughter as well as relevant medical
records from April 3, 2015 to July 10, 2015. (Tr. at 20-22.) Additionally, the
plaintiff’s medical records were further developed with the Administration’s referral
of the plaintiff for both a psychiatric and physical consultative exam. (Tr. at 21.) At
the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from the plaintiff regarding her symptoms and
from a Vocational Expert about the number of jobs available in the national economy
that the plaintiff could perform. (Tr. at 30-46.) The VE’s testimony was made in
response to a hypothetical question posed by the ALJ that comprised all of the
plaintiff’s impairments. (Tr. at 30-46.) In her Notice of Decision, the ALJ
thoroughly discusses the relevant medical evidence and expert testimony providing
the basis for her findings and conclusions of law. After reviewing the certified
administrative record, the Court finds that the record contains ample evidence to
support the ALJ’s findings at all stages of the evaluation process.
IV.
Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms.
Matthews’s arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported
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by substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will
be entered.
DONE and ORDERED on September 5, 2019.
_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
160704
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