Gyamfi v. Acosta et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/16/2018. (KAM)

FILED
2018 Aug-16 PM 03:38
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

KWAME GYAMFI,
Plaintiff,
v.
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:18-cv-00778-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Improper
Venue and Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. # 11). Plaintiff has responded to Defendants’ Motion
(Doc. # 15), and it is ripe for review. After careful review, and for the reasons explained below,
Defendants’ Motion (Doc. # 11) is due to be granted in part, and this action is due to be
transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is a software engineer who currently works at the Department of Labor’s

headquarters in Washington D.C. (Doc. # 1 at 3). Plaintiff’s address of record is in Bowie,
Maryland. (Id. at 1). In April 2016, Plaintiff filed a wage garnishment complaint against Astor
& Sanders Corporation with the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (“WHD”). (Id.
at 15; Doc. # 1-6 at 2).

He submitted the complaint at the Francis Perkins Building in

Washington D.C. (Doc. # 1-1 at 2). He also submitted a copy of the complaint to the WHD’s
office in Hyattsville, Maryland. (Doc. # 1-6 at 2). According to Plaintiff, in August 2016, he
received a response to the complaint from a “Senior Official” in the Department of Labor’s

“FMLA Division,” but no response from WHD. (Doc. # 1 at 16). He now claims that WHD
failed to investigate and adjudicate the wage garnishment complaint. (Id. at 9).
In September 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Labor’s Office of
the Inspector General (“OIG”). (Doc. # 1-6 at 2). He submitted the complaint to an office in
Washington D.C. (Id.). He complained that an official had abused her authority by “not
allowing the divisional investigator from the Hyattsville, Maryland office” to investigate his
earlier wage garnishment complaint.

(Id. at 2-3).

According to Plaintiff, OIG has not

investigated or adjudicated the claims in his September 2016 complaint. (Doc. # 1 at 9).
Plaintiff’s pleading, styled as a mandamus petition, names six individual defendants, who
are sued in their official capacities: (1) Secretary of Labor R. Alexander Acosta, (2) White House
Chief of Staff John F. Kelly, (3) Teresa McKay, the Director of the Defense Financial
Accounting Services, (4) Scott S. Dahl, the Inspector General, (5) Brian Jarret, the head of
WHD, and (6) Bruce Dory, an assistant director of WHD. (Doc. # 1 at 10-13). Defendants
Acosta, Kelly, Dahl, and Jarret work in Washington D.C. (Id. at 36). Defendant Dory works in
Hyattsville, Maryland. (Id.). Defendant McKay works in Indianapolis, Indiana. (Id.). Plaintiff
asks the court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the appropriate officials to rule on his WHD
and OIG complaints. (Id. at 13-14). Plaintiff also asks the court to review the Department of
Labor’s actions under the Administrative Procedure Act. (Id. at 18). Finally, Plaintiff requests
relief under the Whistleblower Protection Act. (Id. at 3).
II.

Analysis
Defendants first argue that this court is not the appropriate venue for this action. (Doc. #

11 at 1-4). Because Plaintiff has sued Defendants in their official capacities, the venue issue is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), which provides:

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A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States
or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity . . . may, except as otherwise
provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in
the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action
is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.
Plaintiff appears to concede that venue is not appropriate in this district unless the court finds
that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in the Northern District of
Alabama. (Doc. # 15 at 1-2). “Only the events that directly give rise to a claim are relevant” to
determining whether venue is appropriate in a particular district. Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer,
321 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2003). The court has reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations regarding
the events he claims occurred in this district (see Doc. # 15 at 1-3), and finds that none of them
directly give rise to the mandamus, APA, and Whistleblower Act claims presented in Plaintiff’s
pleading. Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the Defendants reside in this district, nor does he
reside in this district. Accordingly, this court is not a proper venue for this action. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e)(1).
Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s action on venue grounds. (Doc. # 11 at 4).
When a plaintiff files a case in the wrong venue, the court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest
of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a). Although Defendants argue for dismissal on venue grounds, “the standard
remedy for improper venue is to transfer the case to the proper court rather than dismissing it—
thus preserving a [plaintiff’s] ability to obtain review.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Browner, 237 F.3d
670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The “interest of justice” standard requires the court to weigh private
factors, such as the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and “public-interest factors of
systemic integrity and fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-30 (1988).

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From the court’s review of Plaintiff’s filings, it appears that the district courts in
Maryland, the District of Columbia, and the Southern District of Indiana are each a forum in
which this action could have been brought under § 1391(e)(1). Overall, the court finds that the
most convenient forum for the parties is the District of Columbia.

Many of the events

underlying this suit occurred in Washington D.C., while others occurred in Maryland. Most of
the officials sued appear to work (and possibly reside) in Washington D.C. Plaintiff alleges that
he works in Washington D.C., and Plaintiff submitted his WHD and OIG complaints to offices in
Washington D.C. For these reasons, the court finds that the interest of justice supports transfer
of this suit to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the court concludes that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Complaint for Improper Venue and Failure to State a Claim (Doc. # 11) is due to be granted in
part. Because this court is an improper venue for this action, and the interest of justice supports
transferring this action to the District of Columbia, the court will transfer this action to the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The
court need not address -- and does not address -- the merits of Plaintiff’s pleading, including
whether it states a claim for relief. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be
entered.
DONE and ORDERED this August 16, 2018.

_________________________________
R. DAVID PROCTOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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