Calloway v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION. Signed by Judge Anna M Manasco on 9/7/21. (MRR, )

FILED
2021 Sep-07 PM 01:53
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PEARLIE MAE CALLOWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Commissioner,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:20-cv-00738-AMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Plaintiff Pearlie Mae Calloway brings this action pursuant to the Social
Security Act (the “Act”), seeking review of the decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her claim for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits (“benefits”). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Based on the
court’s review of the record, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.
I.

Introduction
On December 6, 2017, Ms. Calloway filed an application for benefits under

Title II of the Act, alleging disability as of May 1, 2017. R. 68, 152-58. Ms.
Calloway’s application alleges disability due to three bulging discs in her lower
back, depression, an annular tear on the left side of her back, and arthritis in her
thumb and back. R. 69-70, 152-58, 190-97. She has at least a high school education

and has past relevant work experience as an account representative, a substitute
teacher, and a babysitter. R. 29. She previously filed another application for benefits,
which was denied on February 15, 2017. R. 178. This appeal relates solely to Ms.
Calloway’s December 6, 2017, application.
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) initially denied Ms. Calloway’s
application on February 7, 2018. R. 22, 85-89. On March 22, 2018, Ms. Calloway
filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). R. 22, 9394. That request was granted. R. 95-100, 110-15. Ms. Calloway received a video
hearing before ALJ Steven M. Rachal on February 12, 2019. R. 22, 36-66. On April
4, 2019, ALJ Rachal issued an unfavorable decision, finding that Ms. Calloway was
not disabled from May 1, 2017 through the present. R. 19-31. Ms. Calloway was
fifty-three years old at the time of the ALJ decision. R. 27, 245.
Ms. Calloway appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied her request for
review on March 19, 2020. R. 1-3, 149-151. After the Appeals Council denied Ms.
Calloway’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision, R. 1-3, the ALJ’s decision
became the final decision of the Commissioner and subject to district court review.
On May 21, 2020, Ms. Calloway sought this court’s review of the ALJ’s decision.
See Doc. 1.
II.

The ALJ’s Decision

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The Act establishes a five-step test for the ALJ to determine disability. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging
in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Substantial work
activity is work activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a). “Gainful work activity” is work that is done for pay or
profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(b). If the ALJ finds that the claimant engages in
substantial gainful activity, then the claimant cannot claim disability. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(b). Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically
determinable impairment or a combination of medical impairments that significantly
limits the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). Absent such impairment, the claimant may not claim
disability. Id. Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s impairment
meets or medically equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. If
such criteria are met, the claimant is declared disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
If the claimant does not fulfill the requirements necessary to be declared
disabled under the third step, the ALJ still may find disability under the next two
steps of the analysis. The ALJ must first determine the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, which refers to the claimant’s ability to work despite her impairments. 20
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C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545. In the fourth step, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the ALJ determines that the claimant is capable of
performing past relevant work, then the claimant is deemed not disabled. Id. If the
ALJ finds the claimant unable to perform past relevant work, then the analysis
proceeds to the fifth and final step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In this step, the
ALJ must determine whether the claimant is able to perform any other work
commensurate with her residual functional capacity, age, education, and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). Here, the burden of proof shifts from the
claimant to the Commissioner to prove the existence, in significant numbers, of jobs
in the national economy that the claimant can do given her residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1),
404.1560(c).
The ALJ determined that Ms. Calloway would meet the insured status
requirements of the Act through December 31, 2022. R. 22, 24. Next, the ALJ found
that Ms. Calloway had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 1, 2017,
the alleged disability onset date. R. 24. The ALJ decided that Ms. Calloway had the
following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,
osteoarthritis, hypertension, anxiety, and depression. R. 24. The ALJ also stated that
Ms. Calloway had a body mass index of 31.4 kg/m2 at the time of application. R.
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24. The ALJ found that Ms. Calloway’s hypertensive disorder, gastroesophageal
reflux disease, solitary nodule of the lung, sciatica, superficial thrombophlebitis,
Vitamin D deficiency, and mixed hyperlipidemia were “not severe” impairments as
they “cause no more than minimal limitations in the ability to function.” R. 25.
Overall, the ALJ determined that Ms. Calloway did not have “an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments” to support a finding of disability. R. 25.
The ALJ did not find all of Ms. Calloway’s allegations credible and found that
Ms. Calloway had the “residual functional capacity to perform light work” with
certain limitations. R. 26-28. The ALJ determined that Ms. Calloway should avoid:
more than occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; climbing ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; more than occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, or
crawling; more than occasional exposure to extreme cold; unprotected heights; and
hazardous machinery. R. 26. The ALJ found that Ms. Calloway was limited to
unskilled work with the ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple
instructions and tasks for two-hour periods, with occasional work requiring
interaction with the public, and infrequent workplace changes. R. 26, 29.
According to the ALJ, Ms. Calloway is “unable to perform any past relevant
work,” she is “an individual closely approaching advanced age,” and she has “at
least a high school education,” as those terms are defined by the regulations. R. 29.
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The ALJ determined that “[t]ransferability of job skills is not material to the
determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a
framework supports a finding that the claimant is ‘not disabled,’ whether or not the
claimant has transferable job skills.” R. 29. Because Ms. Calloway’s “ability to
perform all or substantially all of the requirements of this level of work” was
impeded by additional limitations, the ALJ enlisted a vocational expert to ascertain
whether there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Ms.
Calloway would be capable of performing. R. 30. That expert testified that there are
indeed a significant number of such jobs in the national economy, such as an office
helper, a mail clerk, and a merchandise marker. R. 30.
Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Calloway does not have
a disability as defined in the Act, from May 1, 2017 through the date of the decision.
R. 30. Ms. Calloway now challenges that decision.
III. Factual Record
The medical records included in the transcript were made between 2015 and
2018, but the relevant period for the Commissioner’s disability determination is May
1, 2017 through the date of the decision, April 4, 2019. R. 19-31, 178, 191. Ms.
Calloway alleges she began having problems with bulging discs in her lumbar spine
in 2012. R. 43. Ms. Calloway was involved in two car accidents in October 2016
and one car accident in January 2017 and went to a hospital emergency department
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each time. R. 191, 283, 288, 293, 306, 315, 355, 396-97, 401, 598; Doc. 1 at 6. A C
spine CT following the first October 2016 car accident revealed “[n]o evidence of
acute cervical spine facture or subluxation,” although the report noted “[t]here is a
lobular area of right pleural thickening.” R. 359, 597. An X-ray following the second
October 2016 car accident revealed “no acute abnormalities” in the lumbar and
cervical spine. R. 399. Ms. Calloway reported “increased neck and back pain”
following these two accidents. R. 283. An X-ray following the car accident on
January 25, 2017 revealed “[d]egenerative changes [in the lumbar spine] without
acute abnormality.” R. 405.
An MRI of the lumbar spine on May 19, 2017 revealed “[d]isc desiccation
seen from L3-L4 through L5-S1 [with] . . . [f]atty endplate changes seen at L5-S1”
with mild disc bulges at L3-L5 R. 313-14, 390-91. Dr. Carter Harsh noted in a June
2017 assessment, “There is suggestion of both L4 as well as S1 radiculopathy [but]
MRI is not particularly impressive” and ordered an L spine CT. R. 329. The July
2017 L spine CT revealed “advanced degenerative disc changes at L5-S1 . . . grade
I anterolisthesis at L4-L5 with disc bulge and facet joint arthropathy which
encroaches on the exiting L4 nerve root.” R. 323-26. Dr. Harsh noted that the July
MRI showed “multilevel degenerative disc changes/spinal listhesis [with] . . .
multilevel foraminal narrowing.” R. 332. Ms. Calloway ambulated into the
emergency department in 2017, and the clinical impression from her visit notes she
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exhibited “[c]hronic left-sided low back pain with left-sided sciatica.” R. 411.
Overall, Ms. Calloway has been diagnosed with a herniated lumbar disc, lumbar
radiculopathy at L3, L4, and L5, and global weakness and numbness in her left thigh.
R. 318.
Additionally, Ms. Calloway has been treated for major depressive disorder,
anxiety, and insomnia. R. 27-28, 317, 362, 367, 371, 381, 417, 424, 428, 434, 437,
468, 473, 475, 498, 605. Although Ms. Calloway has had suicidal thoughts in the
past, R. 428, in September 2018 she reported that due to a change in her depression
medication “she is really happy with how she is feeling currently,” and medical
records reveal no further reported thoughts of suicide. R. 489.
IV.

Standard of Review
This court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Act is a narrow one.

The only issues before this court are whether the record reveals substantial evidence
to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d
835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the correct legal standards were applied, see
Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d
129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The Act mandates that the Commissioner’s findings are
conclusive if supported by “substantial evidence.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520,
1529 (11th Cir. 1990); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This court may not reconsider the
facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the
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Commissioner; instead, it must review the record as a whole and determine if the
decision is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. See Martin, 894 F.2d
at 1529 (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a preponderance
of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Bloodsworth,
703 F.2d at 1239). If the Commissioner’s factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence, they must be affirmed even if the preponderance of the
evidence is against the Commissioner’s findings. See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. No
decision is automatic, for “[d]espite th[e] deferential standard [for review of claims],
it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the
reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th
Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir. 1984)). Failure to
apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748
F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
V.

Discussion
Ms. Calloway filed this action for judicial review on May 21, 2020 by filling

out a Pro Se Complaint for Review of a Social Security Disability or Supplemental
Security Income Decision. Doc. 1. She alleged that the denial of benefits was in error
because the SSA did not send her to a doctor; she did not have adequate time to
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speak with her lawyer; she did not believe that her illness was considered alongside
her medications that cause dizziness; the SSA combined her current disability
application with a previous application; and the SSA did not review past records.
Doc. 1 at 3-4. The Commissioner answered, and this Court directed Ms. Calloway
to file a brief in support of her claim within forty-five days of receipt of the Appeals
Council record. See Doc. 10, 11. Ms. Calloway did not do so. The Court also directed
the Commissioner to file a brief in support of its decisions within thirty days after
the expiration of the forty-five days for Mrs. Calloway’s brief. See Doc. 11. The
Commissioner did not do so. Deadlines for submission have passed, and the issues
in this case are now ripe for decision.
A. Lack of SSA-Directed Medical Examination
A disability is defined as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
An individual claiming benefits must prove that she is disabled. Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). The burden is on the claimant to introduce
evidence in support of her application for benefits. Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d
1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). The Commissioner is not required to hire an expert
medical source when determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
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404.1513a(b)(2), 404.1517; Klawinski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 772,
776 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that because “the ALJ ultimately found that [claimant]
was not disabled . . . SSR 83–20 only required the ALJ to obtain a medical expert in
certain instances to determine a disability onset date”).
In any event, the ALJ did consider additional input. The Division of Disability
Determination previously referred Ms. Calloway to Dr. John Neville for a
psychological evaluation. R. 603. Dr. Neville saw Ms. Calloway on February 3,
2017, and diagnosed her with Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent Episode, Mild.
R. 603, 605. The ALJ considered and discussed Dr. Neville’s findings in his
decision. R. 25, 27-29. Additionally, the state agency’s Disability Determination
Explanation included a consultative examination, which the ALJ cited and found
“very persuasive.” R. 29, 69-84.
Ms. Calloway’s argument regarding the necessity of a medical examination
fails. Throughout the benefits process, the burden was on Ms. Calloway to
demonstrate disability. The ALJ’s decision finding that she did not demonstrate
disability was based on substantial evidence, including input and findings from
consultative examinations.
B. Complaints Regarding Legal Representation
“Because a hearing before an ALJ is not an adversary proceeding, the ALJ
has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record.” Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d
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1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). “A Social Security claimant has a statutory right, which
may be waived, to be represented by counsel at a hearing before an ALJ.” Id. An
unrepresented claimant is not prejudiced, however, when the ALJ’s “decision is
based upon substantial evidence appearing in the record as a whole.” Edwards v.
Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 586 (11th Cir. 1991). The ALJ’s duty to develop the record
exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel. Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d
931, 934 (11th Cir. 1995).
Ms. Calloway was represented by counsel at her hearing before the ALJ. R.
36-66. Additionally, Ms. Calloway was represented through the Appeals Council
process, where her counsel filed a Memorandum in Support of Request for Review
of ALJ Decision. R. 245-47; see also Doc. 1 at 7-10. Further, Ms. Calloway does
not indicate what additional fact could have been submitted by her attorney that
might have changed the outcome, nor any evidentiary gaps in the record that the ALJ
should have developed. Accordingly, Ms. Calloway’s assertion about her limited
opportunity to consult with her attorney is not a basis for reversal of the ALJ’s
decision.
C. Consideration of Illness and Medication Side Effects
It is the claimant’s burden to introduce evidence in support of her application
for benefits. Ellison, 355 F.3d at 1276. While Ms. Calloway argues that the ALJ and
Appeals Council failed to consider her illness along with dizziness caused by her
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medications, the record does not contain any evidence that Ms. Calloway
complained of dizziness from her medications. Indeed, Ms. Calloway’s Disability
Report and her testimony at her hearing before the ALJ indicate that she did not so
complain. Ms. Calloway filled out her Disability Report – Appeal by hand and listed
“N/A” as “Side Effects You Have” for her current medications. R. 173. Her
medication-related testimony at the hearing was:
Q: Do you get side effects from the pain medication?
A: No.
....
Q: Okay. Now before you said you didn’t have any side
effects from your pain medication. Do you have any side
effects from any of your medications at all?
A: Yes. The gabapentin make[s] my mouth dry.
Q: Okay.
A: And the blood pressure medicine makes me kind of go
to the restroom.
....
A: . . . . And the medicine that I take makes me nauseated.
Q: What medicine makes you nauseated?
A: It’s the gabapentin and the muscle relaxer. I have to
take them three times a day. So when I take those I have,
I can’t function correctly.

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R. 48, 61-62. Additionally, Ms. Calloway’s attorney did not include an argument
regarding dizziness to the Appeals Council. R. 245-47; see also Doc. 1 at 7-10.
Because Ms. Calloway did not present evidence of dizziness at any stage of the
administrative process and, when explicitly asked to testify about the side effects
from her medication, she did not discuss dizziness, she cannot now prevail on her
argument that the ALJ failed to develop the record in this regard, nor that the ALJ
failed to consider evidence.
D. Prior Benefits Application
The SSA regulations govern how ALJs are to “consider and articulate medical
opinions and prior administrative medical findings.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.
Although an ALJ is not to “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight . . . to . . .
prior administrative medical finding(s),” the ALJ may consider them. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(a). An ALJ must “articulate . . . how persuasive” he found both medical
opinions and prior administrative medical findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b).
Ms. Calloway alleges that it was error to combine this application for benefits
with her previous application, but the ALJ’s decision complied with the regulations.
ALJ Rachal noted that he “fully considered the medical opinions and prior
administrative medical findings,” and then went on to specify how persuasive he
found both Dr. Neville’s medical opinion and the state agency’s disability
determination. R. 28-29. Additionally, the record contains no evidence that there
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was any improper consideration of her previously rejected benefits application, and
Ms. Calloway has not set forth any arguments related to this claim. Finally, there
can be no argument of inconsistent or contradictory benefits decisions by the SSA
because Ms. Calloway was denied benefits in both instances.
E. Review of Past Records
Ms. Calloway also alleges that the ALJ did not consider her past medical
records and instead focused on her more recent records from Cahaba Medical Care.
Doc. 1 at 4. This argument is not supported by the record before the court. In addition
to records from Cahaba Medical Care, the ALJ’s decision specifically cited and
discussed medical evidence from Princeton Baptist Medical Center made between
October 11, 2016 and November 9, 2017, R. 396-413; UAB Highlands from October
4, 2016, R. 597-601; St. Vincent’s Radiology and Neurosurgery throughout 2017,
R. 313-33; and Dr. David W. Cosgrove, PainSouth, Inc. from February 3, 2016
through July 13, 2017, R. 250-309.
F. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Decision
The parties did not submit briefing or legal arguments. Nonetheless, the court
has thoroughly reviewed both the ALJ’s opinion and the evidentiary record.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding Ms. Calloway had the residual
functional capacity to perform a range of light work with certain limitations. R. 26.
In making his determination, the ALJ considered Ms. Calloway’s testimony, Ms.
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Calloway’s treatment history, and the consultative examinations. R. 22-31, 36-66,
73-84, 603-06; see Graham, 129 F.3d at 1423 (holding that the plaintiff’s ability to
perform light work was properly found based on medical history and plaintiff’s
testimony).
The ALJ first considered Ms. Calloway’s testimony. Ms. Calloway testified
to several significant limitations, but these limitations are not consistent with the
objective evidence. Although Ms. Calloway claimed she could not lift over ten
pounds, bend over, walk, or stand, the evidence shows that she is still able to take
care of herself, go shopping, prepare meals, do household chores, drive, and go out
alone on a daily basis. R. 44, 51-52, 57-59, 61, 74, 77, 206-09, 425, 432, 436, 456,
459, 464, 467, 472, 475, 481, 483, 488, 492, 497. Additionally, Dr. Cosgrove noted
that she was able to bend over during examinations, and Ms. Calloway testified in
her hearing that she could kneel on one knee with support. R. 52, 295, 308.
Ms. Calloway further testified she experienced weekly symptoms of
depression and anxiety that prevent her from focusing for longer than ten minutes,
completing tasks, and “participating in family events or going shopping.” R. 44-45,
54-56, 210-11. However, the record reflects that Ms. Calloway regularly attends
family gatherings and repeatedly indicated to doctors that her physical and emotional
health “never” limited her social activities with family or friends. R. 210, 425, 428,
432, 436, 456, 459, 464, 467, 470, 472, 475, 481, 484, 488, 493, 497. These findings
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of Ms. Calloway’s daily activities support the ALJ’s finding of Ms. Calloway’s
residual functional capacity. See Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1212 (finding the
ALJ properly considered the plaintiff’s daily activities).
Ms. Calloway’s testimony is also inconsistent with her physical exams that
were generally normal. R. 329, 455-58. For example, the ALJ noted Ms. Calloway’s
recent physical exams, even in spring and summer 2018, were generally normal. R.
28, 455-58, 493-94. Ms. Calloway’s treatment history repeatedly reveals moderate
objective findings, namely lumbar degenerative disc disease, hypertension,
sciatica/radiculitis, anxiety, and depression. R. 254, 272, 274, 276, 283, 300, 306,
314, 317, 318, 322, 324, 325, 332, 362, 367, 371, 391, 405, 411, 417, 424, 428, 434,
437, 473, 498-99, 605. The ALJ properly used this information as part of making his
determination about Ms. Calloway’s residual functional capacity. See Wolfe v.
Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1078 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that a claimant’s conservative
treatment history supports the ALJ’s decision); see also Pennington v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 652 F. App’x 862, 873 (11th Cir. 2016) (affirming the ALJ’s decision,
which was based on plaintiff’s records of mild treatment).
Ms. Calloway’s consultative examination concluded that she was capable of
light, unskilled work, and properly informed the ALJ’s residual functional capacity
assessment of light, unskilled work with certain limitations. The ALJ found the
consultative evaluation “very persuasive” because the evidence as a whole supported
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its conclusions. R. 29; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (noting that more weight
will be given to a medical opinion in which the medical source presents relevant
evidence to support that opinion); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“Generally, the more
consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will
give to that medical opinion.”). Although the consultative examination noted that
Ms. Calloway had physical impairments of DDD (Disorders of Back-Discogenic and
Degenerative), unspecified arthropathies, and hypertension, the record reflects that
Ms. Calloway had “5/5 strength” in both lower extremities and normal, if slow,
ambulation. R. 76, 80, 438. Accordingly, the consultative examination concluded
that Ms. Calloway was capable of light work, which includes occasionally lifting
twenty pounds and standing or sitting about six hours in an eight-hour workday. R.
78.
The examination further noted that although Ms. Calloway had mental
impairments of depressive disorder and anxiety disorder, she was still “able to drive,
shop[,] and prepare meals”; her “memories were intact along with insight[] [and]
judgment”; and “overall evidence supports a not severe impairment.” R. 76-77.
Considering these non-severe mental impairments, the consultative examination
concluded Ms. Calloway was able to carry out simple tasks for up to two hours,
receive non-confronting criticism, and operate under casual contact with the public.
R. 82. This conclusion is consistent with an evaluating psychiatrist’s report in
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February 2017, which indicated Ms. Calloway’s “ability to maintain concentration
and sustain a reasonable work pace did not appear impaired,” although her ability to
“respond appropriately to coworkers” and “cope with ordinary work pressures” was
mildly to moderately impaired. R. 606. Notes from a March 2018 counseling session
are also consistent with this analysis, stating that while Ms. Calloway’s mood was
“irritable,” her insight and judgment were “fair.” R. 460. Accordingly, the
consultative examination and overall record provide substantial evidence that
supports the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination of light, unskilled
work with certain limitations. See Stone v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F.App’x 839,
843 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that when an ALJ relied on a consultative examination
and opinion, that was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination of
claimant’s condition).
Altogether, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Ms.
Calloway has the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light work with
certain limitations articulated by the ALJ. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision applies
the proper legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ did
not err when he concluded that Ms. Calloway is not disabled.
VI.

Conclusion

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Upon review of the administrative record, the court finds the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law.
A separate order will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of September, 2021.

_________________________________
ANNA M. MANASCO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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