Nail v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION - The court WILL REVERSE the Commissioner's decision and WILL REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion. The court will enter a separate order consistent with this opinion. Signed by Judge Annemarie Carney Axon on 4/27/2021. (KEK)

FILED
2021 Apr-27 AM 08:56
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LAURA MARIE NAIL,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
COMMISSIONER,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:20-cv-00788-ACA

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Laura Marie Nail appeals the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying her claims for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits,
and supplemental security income. Based on the court’s review of the administrative
record and the parties’ briefs, the court WILL REVERSE the Commissioner’s
decision.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 2016, Ms. Nail applied for a period of disability, disability

insurance benefits, and supplemental security income alleging that her disability
began on August 30, 2015. (R. at 247, 254). The Commissioner initially denied
Ms. Nail’s claims (id. at 145–54), and Ms. Nail requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (id. at 155). The ALJ to whom Ms. Nail’s case
originally was assigned conducted an initial hearing and ordered a consultative
examination. (R. at 15, 63–83). After that examination, Ms. Nail’s case was
assigned to a different ALJ. That ALJ conducted a supplemental hearing and issued
an unfavorable decision. (R. at 12–62). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Nail’s
request for review (id. at 1), making the Commissioner’s decision final and ripe for
the court’s judicial review, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is

a narrow one. The court “must determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Winschel
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks
omitted). “Under the substantial evidence standard, this court will affirm the ALJ’s
decision if there exists such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Henry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264,
1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The court may not “decide the
facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].”
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quotation marks omitted). The court must affirm
“[e]ven if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings.”

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Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quotation marks omitted).
Despite the deferential standard for review of claims, the court must
“scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.” Henry, 802 F.3d at 1267 (quotation marks
omitted). Moreover, the court must reverse the Commissioner’s decision if the ALJ
does not apply the correct legal standards. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143,
1145–46 (11th Cir. 1991).
III.

ALJ’S DECISION
To determine whether an individual is disabled, an ALJ follows a five-step

sequential evaluation process. The ALJ considers:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or
equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of
Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past
relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are
significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant
can perform given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work
experience.
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178.
Here, the ALJ determined that Ms. Nail had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since her alleged onset date of August 30, 2015. (R. at 18). The ALJ found
that Ms. Nail’s degenerative disc disease, lumbar radiculopathy, and fractures of the
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right wrist and left clavicle were severe impairments, but that her rib fractures,
depression, and anxiety were non-severe impairments. (Id.). The ALJ also found
that Ms. Nail’s hand numbness was not a medically determinable impairment. (Id.).
The ALJ then concluded that Ms. Nail does not suffer from an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 19).
After considering the evidence of record, the ALJ determined that Ms. Nail
has the residual functional capacity to lift 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds
frequently; sit, stand, and walk for at least six hours in an 8-hour work day; and push
and pull as much as she can lift and carry. (Id.). The ALJ concluded that Ms. Nail
also can frequently lift overhead on both sides; frequently handle items with her right
hand; and occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crawl, and crouch. (Id.).
The ALJ found that Ms. Nail cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding, and that
she can never work at unprotected heights or with moving mechanical parts, but that
she can work in extreme heat, cold, and vibrations on a limited basis. (R. at 19).
Based on this residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that Ms. Nail can
perform her past relevant work as a bookkeeper. (Id. at 23). Accordingly, the ALJ
determined that Ms. Nail has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, from her alleged onset date through the date of the decision. (Id. at
23–24).
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IV.

DISCUSSION
Ms. Nail argues that the court should reverse and remand the Commissioner’s

decision because the ALJ: (1) did not give proper weight to the opinions of her
treating physician or the agency’s consultative examiner and (2) did not adequately
explain why she rejected certain portions of the state agency consultant’s opinion.
(Doc. 11 at 3–13; Doc. 14 at 1–4). Because Ms. Nail’s second argument is
dispositive and requires remand, the court does not address Ms. Nail’s first
argument.
In evaluating Ms. Nail’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ considered a
number of medical opinions, including that of state agency consultant Dr. Thomas
G. Amason. (R. at 22; see also id. at 88–95; 134–37). Dr. Amason reviewed the
evidence available in support of Ms. Nail’s claims through December 2016. (R. 88–
95; 134–37). Among other restrictions, Dr. Amason opined that Ms. Nail could only
occasionally handle objects with her right hand and arm due to somewhat decreased
range of motion, strength, and grip strength and previous surgery to repair her broken
wrist. (Id. at 94, 136). The ALJ assigned “good weight” to Dr. Amason’s opinions.
(R. at 22). The ALJ noted that “Dr. Amason did not have the benefit of personally
examining” Ms. Nail or reviewing more recent medical evidence” but found that his
“opinions are generally consistent with the evidence received at the initial level.”
(Id.).
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Ms. Nail argues that the ALJ committed reversible error because although the
ALJ gave “good weight” to Dr. Amason’s opinion, the ALJ did not incorporate Dr.
Amason’s occasional handling limitation into Ms. Nail’s residual functional
capacity and the ALJ did not mention or explain why she rejected this portion of Dr.
Amason’s opinion. (Doc. 11 at 11; Doc. 14 at 2–3). Ms. Nail further contends that
the error is not harmless because if she can only occasionally handle—instead of
frequently as the ALJ determined—then, as the vocational expert testified, she
cannot return to her relevant work as a bookkeeper which requires the ability to
frequently handle. (Doc. 11 at 11; see r. at 52).
In determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity assessment, an ALJ
“must always consider and address medical source opinions.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL
374184, at *7. In addition, if the residual functional capacity “assessment conflicts
with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion
was not adopted.” Id.; see also Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (“[T]he ALJ must state
with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons
therefor.”). Here, despite giving “good weight” to Dr. Amason’s opinion, the ALJ
does not reference Dr. Amason’s occasional handling restriction or explain why the
ALJ rejected that opinion and instead determined that Ms. Nail could frequently
handle items with her right hand—a finding that conflicts with Dr. Amason’s
opinion.
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The Commissioner responds that other evidence in the record does not support
Dr. Amason’s occasional handling limitation. (Doc. 13 at 13–14). Even if true, the
ALJ did not compare Dr. Amason’s occasional handling limitation with any other
evidence in the record, and she offered no explanation or justification for rejecting
Dr. Amason’s opinion about Ms. Nail’s handling limitation. While it is possible that
the ALJ considered and rejected Dr. Amason’s opinion that Ms. Nail can
occasionally handle, “without clearly articulated grounds for such a rejection,” the
court “cannot determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were rational and supported
by substantial evidence.”

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179; see also SSR 96-8p.

Accordingly, the court must remand.
V.

CONCLUSION
The court WILL REVERSE the Commissioner’s decision and WILL

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion. The
court will enter a separate order consistent with this opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this April 27, 2021.

_________________________________
ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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