Best Center Fairfield v. Steadfast Insurance Company

Filing 78

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Anna M Manasco on 03/10/2025. (AKD)

FILED
2025 Mar-10 PM 04:02
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BEST CENTER FAIRFIELD,
LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEADFAST INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:22-cv-00054-AMM

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case is before the court on a motion for summary judgment by defendant,
Steadfast Insurance Company. Doc. 61. For the reasons explained below, the motion
is GRANTED. Steadfast also filed a motion to preclude expert testimony, which is
DENIED as moot. Doc. 60.
I.

BACKGROUND
Facts set forth in the parties’ statement of undisputed facts are deemed

admitted for summary judgment purposes unless controverted by the response or
reply of the opposing party. These are the material facts construed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff Best Center Fairfield, LLC:
This case involves a dispute about coverage under a commercial insurance
policy issued to Best Center by Steadfast. Best Center is a limited liability company

located in Houston, Texas. Doc. 59-1 at 39. At its creation, Robin Parsley, the
founding member, had a ninety percent ownership interest and John Hammond had
a ten percent interest. Doc. 59-12 at 4; Doc. 59-1 at 7. Steadfast is an insurer, located
in Illinois that services persons, businesses, and governmental entities throughout
Texas and Alabama.1 Doc. 40 ¶ 2.
Best Center purchased property in Fairfield, Alabama that previously housed
a Wal-Mart supercenter, with plans to maintain it as a storage facility. Doc. 59-1 at
4–5. To insure this property, Best Center purchased a commercial insurance policy
from Steadfast to be effective from October 28, 2016, to October 28, 2017. Doc. 5911 at 15–16. Best Center renewed this policy on October 28, 2017, but it was
cancelled on March 15, 2018, due to nonpayment. Id. at 16.
In its second amended complaint, Best Center asserted that this facility was
subject to two separate incidents of vandalism and theft in 2017. Doc. 40 ¶¶ 12, 14.
Best Center asserted that the first incident occurred “on or around May 17, 2017,”
and the second incident occurred in either June or December of 2017. Id. Best Center
also asserted that “[a] police report regarding these theft incidences was filed [with

Best Center’s members were residents of Texas at the time Steadfast filed this notice of removal.
Doc. 77 ¶ 4. Steadfast is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. Doc.
40 ¶ 2. Additionally, Best Center seeks over $75,000 in damages. Id. at 30–31. Accordingly,
jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332.
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the Fairfield Police Department] in 2017.” Id. ¶ 15. But “due to an old computer
system, the Department no longer had access to those files.” Id.
The record reflects that on June 5, 2019, Mr. Parsley filed a police report with
the Fairfield Police Department regarding vandalism and theft that the facility
allegedly suffered in 2017. Doc. 69-4. This report states:
The victim, Robin Parsley, contacted Fairfield Police
about damage to his property located at 7201 Aaron
Aronov Drive Fairfield, AL 35064. This location is
commonly referred to as the old Walmart Super Center.
Mr. Parsley stated someone unlawfully entered his
commercial building with the intent to steal copper wiring
and piping. The responsible person destroyed sheet rock,
destroyed industrial air conditioning units, and stole the
copper wiring and tubing within and connected to the
commercial building. The vandals / thieves destroyed and
stole approximately $3,000,000 worth of property. Mr.
Parsley stated the offense occurred between 02/01/2017
and 03/31/2017. Mr. Parsley stated he contacted Fairfield
Police at the time of the offense and made a police report.
Police were unable to retrieve the report and this report
was generated in order to document the theft and damages.
I, Deputy Chief Christopher Riddle, entered the property
around the time frame given by the victim and observed
the damages to the building. The damages were indicative
of someone stealing copper wiring and piping from the
commercial building. Also, it appeared several doors near
the automotive section of the building were forced open in
order to gain entry in to the building.
Id. at 2.
Steadfast received an “initial loss notice” from Best Center in 2019 regarding
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vandalism and theft that had allegedly occurred in 2017. Doc. 62 ¶¶ 23, 63. Steadfast
asserts that this was the first notice that Best Center provided regarding the alleged
incidents. Id. ¶ 21. Additionally, Steadfast disputes the number of vandalism and
theft incidents as well as the dates of their occurrence. Id. ¶¶ 66–67.
In its evidentiary submissions, Best Center includes a recorded statement from
Jeff Arnold, Best Center’s independent insurance agent from Magnolia Independent
Insurance, in which he states that around February 2017, Jeremy Sampson, a Best
Center employee, called Mr. Arnold to notify him that there had been a break-in.
Doc. 69-7 at 2. Following this phone call, Mr. Arnold states that he reached out to
Best Center’s employees on numerous occasions, requesting written confirmation of
the break-in. Id. at 2, 12, 15. Mr. Arnold states that he could not submit an insurance
claim to Steadfast unless Best Center provided further details in writing. Id. at 30–
31.
In its evidentiary submissions, Steadfast includes a recorded statement from
Mr. Sampson, in which he states that he did not make an official claim with Mr.
Arnold detailing the vandalism and theft. Doc. 59-13 at 32. Mr. Sampson states that
as an employee of Best Center, he did not have the authority to make an official
claim, and that Mr. Parsley, as the owner of Best Center, was the only individual
who possessed this authority. Id. Mr. Sampson states that his last understanding of
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the situation was that Mr. Arnold was awaiting approval from Mr. Parsley to open
an insurance claim with Steadfast. Id. at 33.
On January 15, 2019, Mr. Parsley filed a “property loss notice” with Mr.
Arnold and listed the “date of loss” as February 2017. See Doc. 59-8. The description
in the notice states that “[u]nknown persons vandalized premises and stole copper.”
Id. at 2. Steadfast acknowledged receipt of this property loss notice on January 16,
2019. Doc. 62 ¶ 23.
Steadfast’s corporate representative, Jeff Morrow, who served as an assistant
vice president and claim manager, testified that “the loss wasn’t reported until 2019”
and that their company did not “have any records of any other reporting of loss to
any of the Best Center Fairfield, LLC, property.” Doc. 59-10 at 19: 8–12, 99:13–14,
252:15–22.
Best Center’s corporate representative, Mr. Hammond, testified that he “first
[found] out that the company had sustained . . . losses, vandalism, [and] theft” in
2017. Doc. 59-1 at 30:13–19; 69:22–25; 70:1–6. Mr. Hammond also testified that he
did not believe that Best Center reported the vandalism and theft to Steadfast until
January 15, 2019, Doc. 59-12 at 111:9–12, and that Mr. Parsley “never told [him]
about the police report” and did not tell him that he had contacted Steadfast to report
the claim, id. at 22:1–22 and 23:14–16. When asked “whether there was anything
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that prohibited [Mr. Parsley] from being able to contact [Steadfast] and report the
claim” from 2017, Mr. Hammond testified that he knew of no reason. Id. at 23:17–
22. When asked whether “there was anything that prevented [Best Center] from
providing Steadfast as soon as possible with a description as to how, when and where
the loss or damage occurred resulting from that [February 2017] theft,” Mr.

Hammond testified that he knew of no reason. Id. at 23:23–25, 24:1–6. Finally, Mr.
Hammond testified that some information regarding the vandalism and theft
incidents was lacking because Mr. Parsley’s assistant, who had the relevant
documents, was terminally ill and may have died. Id. at 113:20–25; 114:1–5. Mr.
Hammond also testified that Mr. Parsley was hospitalized with serious health
problems as of 2024, and that his “health has deteriorated” since the purchase of Best
Center’s facility. Id. at 114:5–13.
Best Center “concedes that an official written notice of loss on the
February/March 2017 theft occurrence was not provided to Defendant until January
2019; thus, its notice was late as a matter of law.” Doc. 70 at 19; see also Doc. 40 ¶
16. Best Center attributes the delay in reporting to Mr. Parsley’s poor health as well
as his assistant’s poor health. Doc. 70 at 19–20.
Upon receiving the property loss notice from Best Center on January 15, 2019,
Steadfast commenced an investigation that developed over multiple years. The
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record contains evidence of emails, phone calls, a site visit, an examination under
oath, and numerous information requests that Steadfast made to Best Center as part
of this investigation. Doc 59-12 at 95–98, 100–106, 123–132; Doc. 59-19 at 95–97;
Doc. 59-21 at 47–48; Doc. 59-10 at 103; Doc 59-47 at 1–17; Doc. 59-43; Doc. 5944; Doc. 59-45.
On August 26, 2021, Steadfast issued a final decision denying Best Center’s
claim. Doc. 59-11 at 25–31. Steadfast attributed the denial, in part, to Best Center’s
delay in reporting the vandalism and theft. Id. at 27.
Best Center sued Steadfast and asserts twelve claims: Count I, Breach of
contract for failure to investigate and afford coverage, Doc. 40 ¶¶ 23–28; Count II,
Bad faith, Id. ¶¶ 29–32; Count III, Violations of Chapter 541.060(a)(7) of the Texas
Insurance Code, Id. ¶¶ 33–36; Count IV, Violations of Chapter 541.060(a)(2) of the
Texas Insurance Code, Id. ¶¶ 37–39; Count V, Violations of Chapter
541.060(a)(4)(A) of the Texas Insurance Code, Id. ¶¶ 40–41; Count VI, Violations
of Chapter 541.060(a)(3) of the Texas Insurance Code, Id. ¶¶ 42–43; Count VII,
Violations of Chapter 541.060(a)(1) of the Texas Insurance Code, Id. ¶¶ 44–45;
Count VIII, Violations of Chapter 542.055 of the Texas Insurance Code, Id. ¶¶ 46–
47; Count IX, Violations of Chapter 542.056 of the Texas Insurance Code, Id. ¶ 48;
Count X, Violations of Chapter 542.057 of the Texas Insurance Code, Id. ¶ 49; Count
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XI, Violations of Chapter 542.058 of the Texas Insurance Code, Id. ¶¶ 50–51; Count
XII, Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Id. ¶¶ 52–54.
Steadfast filed this motion for summary judgment, which is fully briefed.
Docs. 62, 70, 73. Steadfast filed a motion to preclude expert testimony should this
case proceed to trial. Doc. 60.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes “that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th
Cir. 1991). If the moving party has carried its burden, Rule 56 requires that the
nonmoving party “go beyond the pleadings” and establish that there is a material
fact in genuine dispute. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324–25; see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A). A fact is “material” if it could “affect the outcome” of the case. Furcron
v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A material fact is in “genuine” dispute if a reasonable jury could
return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to
“weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
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there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986). “[T]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014).
III.

ANALYSIS
A. Choice of Law
Steadfast argues that Alabama law controls this insurance policy even though

it was issued in Texas. Doc. 62 at 20. Steadfast asserts that the policy insures
property located in Alabama, provides that the policy is “registered and delivered as
surplus lines coverage under Alabama surplus lines insurance law,” includes
Alabama-specific endorsements, and was subject to an Alabama surplus insurance
tax. Id. Best Center argues that Texas law applies because that was the place of
issuance. Doc. 70 at 13–14.
This court has diversity jurisdiction over this action because it arises between
a Texas limited liability company, Best Center, and an Illinois insurance company,
Steadfast, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Doc. 1 at 3–4.
Accordingly, this court must apply Alabama choice of law rules to conflict issues.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); see also Wadley
Crushed Stone Co., LLC, v. Positive Step, Inc., 34 F.4th 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2022).
“Alabama law has long recognized the right of parties to an agreement to
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choose a particular state’s laws to govern an agreement.” Cherry, Bekaert & Holland
v. Brown, 582 So. 2d 502, 506 (Ala. 1991). “The law of the state chosen by the
parties . . . will be applied” so long as it is not contrary to the fundamental public
policy of the forum state. Id. at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This policy repeatedly references Alabama law. The Common Policy
Declarations within the policy state, “[t]his contract is registered and delivered as a
surplus line coverage under Alabama Surplus Lines Insurance Law.” Doc. 59-4 at 6.
The policy also states that a legal action against Steadfast is allowed if “[t]he action
is brought within the time limitations prescribed by Alabama law.” Doc. 59-5 at 22.
Additionally, the policy includes Alabama-specific endorsements and notes that it
was subject to an Alabama surplus insurance tax. Doc. 59-2 at 8–9; Doc. 59-1 at 50.
These references manifest the parties’ intention that Alabama law would control the
interpretation of the contract. There are no such references to the law of Texas.
Although these provisions are not the same as a single, traditional choice-oflaw provision, see, e.g., Homes of Legend, Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So. 2d 741, 743
(Ala. 2000), the court does not assign them less weight than it would such a
traditional provision. They manifest the parties’ intentions about being controlled by
Alabama law, and they are not ambiguous. Further, they would be meaningless and
impliedly invalidated if the court were to apply Texas law despite them.
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B. Capacity To Sue
Steadfast argues that Best Center lacks capacity to sue because on October 19,
2018, the Texas Secretary of State forfeited its charter and recorded the notice of
forfeiture in Best Center’s permanent files and records. Doc. 59-48 at 2; Doc. 62 at
21. Best Center responds that it cured this defect and reinstated its corporate
privileges, including its capacity to bring lawsuits, by making the requisite
payments. Doc. 69-1 at 2; Doc. 70 at 19.
The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined “by the
law under which it was organized.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). Best Center was organized
under Texas law, Doc. 69-1 at 1, so this court turns to Texas law to determine
whether Best Center had capacity to bring this lawsuit.
Under Texas law, a corporation whose charter is forfeited is entitled to have
its charter and corporate privileges revived if the corporation pays the tax, penalty,
and interest that is imposed by the tax code. Tex. Tax Code Section 171.312. Once
the corporation pays the delinquent taxes and is reinstated, this payment will relate
back and revive whatever rights the corporation had previously forfeited. Mello v.
A.M.F. Inc., 7 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. App. 1999); see also Hourani v. Katzen, 305
S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. App. 2009); Highline Innovation Invs. P’ship, LLC v. Biolert,
Ltd., No. 4:21-CV-00615, 2022 WL 3354775, at *4–*5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2022);
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NexBank, SSB v. Bank Midwest, N.A., No. 3:12-CV-1882-D, 2012 WL 4321750, at
*3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2012).
The Texas Secretary of State forfeited Best Center’s charter on October 19,
2018. Doc. 59-48 at 2. As a result, Best Center lacked capacity to sue when it filed
this lawsuit on December 2021. But on April 10, 2024, the Texas Secretary of State
certified Best Center’s application for reinstatement and found it to conform to law.
Doc. 69-1 at 2. Under Texas law, this reinstatement revived Best Center’s corporate
privileges, including its capacity to sue, and related back to the time this lawsuit was
filed. See Mello, 7 S.W.3d at 331.
C. Prompt Notice
Steadfast argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because providing
prompt notice of Best Center’s damage is a condition precedent to bringing suit, and
Best Center failed to provide prompt notice. Doc. 62 at 22. Under Alabama law, a
condition precedent is defined as “[a]n act or event, other than a lapse of time, that
must exist or occur before a duty to perform something promised arises.” Lemoine
Co. of Ala., L.L.C. v. HLH Constructors, Inc., 62 So. 3d 1020, 1025 n.5 (Ala. 2010)
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary). “Whether a provision in a contract is a condition
precedent depends, not upon formal words, but upon the intent of the parties, to be
deduced from the instrument as a whole.” Gamble v. Corley, Moncus, & Ward, P.C.,
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723 So. 2d 627, 631 (Ala. 1998). “[T]he failure of an insured to comply within a
reasonable time with . . . conditions precedent in an insurance policy requiring the
insured to give notice of an accident or occurrence releases the insurer from
obligations imposed by the insurance contract.” Reeves v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 539 So. 2d 252, 254 (Ala. 1989).
Steadfast’s insurance policy states that the insured must “[g]ive [Steadfast]
prompt notice of the loss or damage[, including] a description of the property
involved.” Doc. 59-4 at 27. Additionally, the insured must “[a]s soon as possible,
give [Steadfast] a description of how, when and where the loss or damage occurred.”
Id. Finally, “[n]o one may bring a legal action against [Steadfast] under this
Coverage Part unless: There has been full compliance with all of the terms of this
Coverage Part.” Doc. 59-5 at 22.
Steadfast’s policy does not use the words, “condition precedent,” but it is
evident from the provision that “[n]o one may bring a legal action against [Steadfast]
under this Coverage Part unless: There has been full compliance with all of the terms
of this Coverage Part,” that the parties intended for “prompt notice” to be a
precondition to suit. Doc. 59-4 at 27; Doc. 59-5 at 22; accord Sharp Realty & Mgmt.,
LLC v. Cap. Specialty Ins. Corp., 503 F. App’x 704, 707–08 (11th Cir. 2013).
Under Alabama law, a “prompt notice” requirement in an insurance policy
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has been “interpreted to mean that notice [of an accident or occurrence] must be
given within a reasonable time in view of the facts and circumstances of the case.”
Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Miller, 86 So. 3d 338, 342 (Ala. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Estate of
Files, the insured was injured on May 1, 2001. 10 So. 3d 533, 533 (Ala. 2008). The
insurance company first learned of this incident on October 1, 2001, from the
individual’s attorney. Id. The insurance company refused coverage because
providing notice “as soon as practicable” was a condition precedent to coverage and
the insured failed to satisfy this condition. Id. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed
with the insurance company, reasoning that “[a] five-month delay in giving notice is
sufficiently protracted as to require the insured to offer evidence of a reasonable
excuse for the delay.” Id. at 536. The insured provided no such evidence, prompting
the court to hold that he failed to comply with the notice requirement of his insurance
policy and was not entitled to coverage. Id.
Steadfast argues that Best Center breached the prompt notice condition when
it waited over one year to report the incidents of vandalism and theft. Doc. 62 at 22–
23. Steadfast argues that by failing to satisfy this condition, Best Center is precluded
from maintaining this action. Id.
In response, Best Center “concedes that an official written notice of loss on
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the February/March 2017 theft occurrence was not provided to Defendant until
January 2019; thus, its notice was late as a matter of law.” Doc. 70 at 19.
Nevertheless, Best Center urges this court to excuse this delay because it was
unintentional and did not prejudice Steadfast. Id. at 20.
Consistent with Best Center’s concession, there is no evidence in the record
that Steadfast was notified of the 2017 incidents before January 2019, which is over
one year after the facility experienced vandalism and theft, Doc. 59-8 at 2, and Best
Center was aware of that vandalism and theft, Doc. 59-1 at 30:13–19; 69:22–25;
70:1–6; Doc. 59-31 at 4. Moreover, Best Center’s delay in reporting is significantly
longer than the delay involved in Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., which the
Alabama Supreme Court found “sufficiently protracted as to require the insured to
offer evidence of a reasonable excuse for the delay.” 10 So. 3d at 536. Accordingly,
there is no dispute that Best Center failed to provide Steadfast prompt notice.
Under Alabama law, when notice is not prompt, the insured must furnish a
reasonable excuse for the delay to have coverage. Reeves, 539 So. 2d at 255. “Only
two factors are to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a delay in
giving notice to the insurer: the length of the delay and the reasons for the delay.”
Travelers Indem. Co., 86 So. 3d at 342. “Prejudice to the insurer from any such delay
in providing notice is not a factor.” Id. “If the insured offers excuses for the delay
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and those excuses may reasonably be said to justify the length of the delay in giving
notice, then the issue of the reasonableness of the delay is for a jury to
determine.” Reeves, 539 So. 2d at 255. “However, there are certain instances in
which the excuse offered by the insured to justify the delay are unreasonable as a
matter of law and afford no basis for submitting the issue to the jury.” Id.
Best Center asserts three excuses. Although Best Center does not rely on
Alabama law, the court construes its factual assertions about excuses as raising a
reasonableness argument under Alabama law. First, Best Center asserts that Mr.
Parsley’s administrative assistant was given a terminal prognosis. Doc. 70 ¶ 4.
Second, it asserts that Mr. Parsley “was dealing with monetary and health issues.”
Id. at 19. Third, it asserts that Best Center’s “employee, Jeremy Sampson believed
that the [independent] insurance agent[, Mr. Arnold,] would turn in the claim in
2017.” Id. Steadfast argues that “Best Center has not and cannot show any reasonable
excuse.” Doc. 62 at 23. The court discusses each excuse in turn.
As to Best Center’s first excuse, there is no evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find the health of Mr. Parsley’s assistant a reasonable excuse. Best Center
cites to an email correspondence between insurance adjusters from March 28, 2019,
which states that Mr. Parsley’s assistant “was out due to a serious illness for several
weeks.” Doc. 69-2; Doc. 70 ¶ 4. Best Center also asserts that the assistant was given
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a “terminal prognosis” on April 24, 2019. Doc. 70 ¶ 4. But there is no evidence that
the assistant’s 2019 illness could have caused a delay in reporting the 2017 incidents
of vandalism and theft because there is no evidence that the assistant was ill before
2019.
As to Best Center’s second excuse about Mr. Parsley’s poor health and
monetary issues, there is a similar evidentiary deficit. Id. at 19. Best Center cites to
Mr. Hammond’s deposition from February 23, 2024, in which he states, Mr. Parsley
“is hospitalized at this point, just had a new kidney put in . . . He has severe diabetes
. . . . he has either totally lost his eyesight or he cannot drive . . . . And his health has
deteriorated ever since this project has started.” Doc. 59-12 at 114:5–13. But there
is no evidence that Mr. Parsley’s hospitalization and related health issues in 2024
caused a delay in reporting the 2017 incidents of theft and vandalism. And indeed,
when asked “whether there was anything that prohibited [Mr. Parsley] from being
able to contact [Steadfast] and report the claim” from 2017, Mr. Hammond testified
that he knew of no reason. Id. at 23:17–22. When asked whether “there was anything
that prevented [Best Center] from providing Steadfast as soon as possible with a
description as to how, when and where the loss or damage occurred resulting from
that [February 2017] theft,” Mr. Hammond testified that he knew of no reason. Id.
at 23:23–25, 24:1–6.
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Best Center’s third excuse is that Mr. Sampson’s belief that the independent
insurance agent, Mr. Arnold, would turn in the claim in 2017 excuses the delay in
reporting. Doc. 70 at 19–20. But the record does not contain evidence that this was
Mr. Sampson’s belief. In his recorded statement, Mr. Sampson does not express a
belief that Mr. Arnold would submit an insurance claim to Steadfast after their
conversation. See Doc. 59-13 at 32–33. To the contrary, Mr. Sampson states that his
“last understanding with [Mr.] Arnold was he was waiting for [Mr. Parsley] to say
go open an insurance claim.” Id. at 33.
Finally, Best Center argues that its delay should nevertheless be excused
under Texas law because it did not prejudice Steadfast. Doc. 70 at 20. But Alabama
law applies to the interpretation of this insurance policy, and under Alabama law,
prejudice need not result from delayed notice to extinguish a lawsuit. See Correll v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 529 So. 2d 1006, 1008–09 (Ala. 1988) (“The question of
whether the insurer was prejudiced by the delay is immaterial [in a case] where . . .
the giving of reasonably timely notice is expressly made a condition precedent to
any action against the insurer.”) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, Alabama law directs the court to disregard this argument. Nationwide Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 10 So. 3d at 535 (“Absence of prejudice to the insurer from the delay
is not a factor to be considered.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A precondition to bringing a lawsuit against Steadfast was providing “prompt
notice of the loss or damage.” Doc. 59-4 at 27; Doc. 59-5 at 22. By waiting over one
year to report the vandalism and theft incidents, Best Center did not provide “prompt
notice” to Steadfast. Accordingly, under Alabama law, Best Center is precluded
from maintaining this lawsuit. And in any event, Best Center has provided no excuse
for the delay.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, Doc. 61.
DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of March, 2025.

_________________________________
ANNA M. MANASCO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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