Calhoun v. Jefferson County Sheriff Department et al

Filing 58

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER - Accordingly, the plaintiff's 55 objections to the Magistrate Judge's 54 Report and Recommendation are OVERRULED. After careful consideration of the record in this case and the magistrate judge's re port and the plaintiff's objections, the court ADOPTS the report and ACCEPTS the recommendation. Consistent with that recommendation, it is ORDERED that: (1) The defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies are DENIED; (2) Pettway, Reach, and NaphCare's motions for summary judgment are GRANTED and the claims against these defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; (3) The plaintiff's motion to further a mend the complaint to name ACH (Doc. 53 ) is GRANTED and the plaintiff's claims against ACH and the unknown while female nurse who treated him on May 5, 2020, are REFERRED to the undersigned for further proceedings; and (4) The plaintiff's motion to further amend the complaint to name Jessica Young as a defendant and allege state law claims against the defendants (Doc. 53 ) is DENIED. This matter is REFERRED to the magistrate judge for further proceedings. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 9/26/2024. (MEB2)

FILED
2024 Sep-26 PM 02:27
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DAVID CALHOUN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK PETTWAY, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:22-cv-00571-LSC-JHE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff David Calhoun, Jr. filed a pro se complaint and amended complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his rights under the Constitution or
laws of the United States. (Docs. 1, 15). On August 8, 2024, the magistrate judge
entered a report recommending the court: (1) deny the defendants’ motions to
dismiss under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) based on failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; (2) grant defendants Pettway, Reach, and NaphCare’s motions for
summary judgment and dismiss the claims with prejudice; (3) grant the plaintiff’s
motion to amend the complaint in part to name Advanced Correctional Healthcare,
Inc. (“ACH”) as an additional defendant and refer the plaintiff’s claims against ACH
and the unknown white female nurse who treated him on May 5, 2020, to the
magistrate judge for further proceedings; and (4) deny the plaintiff’s motion to
amend the complaint to name Jessica Young as an additional defendant and allege

state law claims against the defendants. (Doc. 54). The plaintiff filed objections to
the report and recommendation. (Doc. 55). Defendant NaphCare filed a response
arguing that the plaintiff’s objections are due to be overruled. (Doc. 56).
The plaintiff first objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that the plaintiff
did not establish NaphCare had a policy, practice, or custom that led to the alleged
constitutional violations. (Doc. 55 at 1–2). The plaintiff contends NaphCare’s
failure to ensure that he received adequate medical treatment while at the Jefferson
County Jail and NaphCare’s alleged interference with his hospitalization were based
on NaphCare’s policy or custom. (Doc. 55 at 1–2).
To establish a policy or custom, the plaintiff must show that NaphCare
“advanced a policy or custom of deliberate indifference that led to the violation of
[the plaintiff’s] constitutional right.” Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1289 (11th
Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). “[T]o demonstrate a
policy or custom, it is generally necessary to show a persistent and wide-spread
practice.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
The plaintiff has only described incidents related to his personal medical
treatment. These incidents do not establish that NaphCare had a persistent and
widespread policy or custom which caused the alleged constitutional violations. See
Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that deprivations
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that constitute widespread abuse must be “obvious, flagrant, rampant and of
continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences”). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s
objection on this ground is OVERRULED.
Next, the plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that the record is
devoid of evidence that defendants Pettway and Reach failed to protect him from the
inmate assault on May 5, 2020. (Doc. 55 at 2–3). To state a failure to protect claim
under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) a substantial risk of
serious harm existed; (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that risk;
and (3) there was a causal connection between the defendants’ conduct and the
Eighth Amendment violation. Bowen v. Warden Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d
1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016). Courts use an objective standard when considering
whether there was a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate and an objective
and subjective standard to determine whether the defendant was deliberately
indifferent to that risk. Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019).
Concerning deliberate indifference, a defendant must both subjectively know of the
risk and disregard it by failing to respond in an objectively reasonable manner.
Bowen, 826 F.3d at 1320.
The plaintiff contends that Pettway and Reach should have “isolated” inmate
Ezell from the rest of the general population after he incurred three disciplinary
violations. (Doc. 2–3). Of Ezell’s three disciplinary violations, only one involved
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a physical altercation with another inmate and it could not be proven that Ezell was
the aggressor. (Doc. 32-1 at 178, 180–87). Thus, Ezell’s disciplinary violations do
not establish that Pettway and Reach were subjectively aware that Ezell posed a
substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff, and they were deliberately indifferent to that
risk. See Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that a generalized awareness of risk that an inmate is problematic may satisfy an
objective standard for failure to protect or negligence, but it does not satisfy the
subjective standard required). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s objection on this ground
is OVERRULED.
Finally, the plaintiff asserts that the Jefferson County Jail was generally
unsafe, and the assault on May 5, 2020, would not have occurred if there had been
adequate staffing and monitors. (Doc. 55 at 3). The magistrate judge determined
that the plaintiff did not establish more than a generalized risk of attack at the Jail
and there was no showing of a constant threat of inmate violence to suggest a
substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.
In his objections, the plaintiff cites Cohen v. Hill, 598 F. Supp. 3d 1349 (N.D.
Ala. Apr. 12, 2022) in support of his claim that the Jail posed an unsafe environment.
(Doc. 55 at 3–4). In Cohen, the plaintiff alleged that inmates at the Jefferson County
Jail subjected him to a brutal attack and the defendant jail officials were deliberately
indifferent to his safety in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
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Amendment. Cohen, 598 F. Supp. 3d at 1355. But the plaintiff overlooks that the
court in Cohen was considering the defendants’ motion to dismiss and did not
address the merits of the plaintiff’s failure to protect claims. Rather, the court
determined that the plaintiff had adequately pled Fourteenth Amendment due
process claims against Jefferson County Jail officials for failing to protect him from
an inmate assault. Id. at 1361–66. Thus, Cohen does not support the plaintiff’s
allegations that conditions at the Jail led to the inmate assault against him on May 5,
2020, and his objection on this ground is OVERRULED.
After careful consideration of the record in this case and the magistrate judge’s
report and the plaintiff’s objections, the court ADOPTS the report and ACCEPTS
the recommendation. Consistent with that recommendation, it is ORDERED that:
(1) The defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies are DENIED;
(2) Pettway, Reach, and NaphCare’s motions for summary judgment are
GRANTED and the claims against these defendants are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE;
(3) The plaintiff’s motion to further amend the complaint to name ACH (Doc.
53) is GRANTED and the plaintiff’s claims against ACH and the unknown while
female nurse who treated him on May 5, 2020, are REFERRED to the undersigned
for further proceedings; and
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(4) The plaintiff’s motion to further amend the complaint to name Jessica
Young as a defendant and allege state law claims against the defendants (Doc. 53)
is DENIED.
This matter is REFERRED to the magistrate judge for further proceedings.
DONE and ORDERED on September 26, 2024.

_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge

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