Williams v. Birmingham Board of Education

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Annemarie Carney Axon on 6/4/2024. (KAM)

FILED
2024 Jun-04 PM 04:39
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
YANCEY WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:22-cv-978-ACA

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Yancey 1 Williams is male, over the age of 40, and a current employee
of Defendant Birmingham Board of Education. Mr. Williams contends that the
Board intentionally promotes and pays younger, female assistant principals more
than the Board has paid and promoted him in violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). (Doc. 1).2
The Board moves for summary judgment as to all claims asserted against it,

1

During his deposition, Mr. Williams testified that his first name is Yancey. (See doc. 1811 at 2). The court therefore DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to update the docket to reflect that the
appropriate spelling of Mr. Williams’s name.
2

The complaint’s allegation of jurisdiction states that Mr. Williams also asserts claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 606(d); and Alabama state law. (See doc.
1 ¶ 1). Mr. Williams does not plead any of those claims in his claims for relief. (See id. ¶¶ 20–48).
Accordingly, the court’s analysis is limited to the claims Mr. Williams has pleaded.

contending that Mr. Williams has not exhausted his administrative proceedings for
his failure-to-promote claims and that the Board does not pay its assistant principals
with discriminatory intent. (Doc. 16). The court is persuaded by the Board’s first
argument but not its second. Accordingly, the court WILL GRANT IN PART and
DENY IN PART the Board’s motion and WILL ENTER SUMMARY
JUDGMENT in the Board’s favor as to Mr. Williams’s failure-to-promote claims.
This case will proceed to trial as to Mr. Williams’s disparate pay claims.
I.

BACKGROUND
When approaching a motion for summary judgment, the court “view[s] the

evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and resolve[s] all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the
non-movant.” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 897 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation
marks omitted). Where the parties have presented evidence creating a dispute of fact,
the court’s description of the facts adopts the version most favorable to the
nonmovant. See id.; see also Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th
Cir. 2020) (“The ‘facts’ at the summary judgment stage are not necessarily the true,
historical facts; they may not be what a jury at trial would, or will, determine to be
the facts.”).
Mr. Williams is male, over the age of 40, and a current employee of the Board.
(Doc. 18-14 at 49; doc. 18-11 at 3, 9). Mr. Williams has identified five other Board

2

employees, whom he contends are younger and of the opposite gender, holding the
same or a substantially similar title that he holds, and receiving better pay: (1) Fallin
Ladd (female, 41 years old); (2) Angelia Groves (female, 51 years old); (3) Erin
Evans (female, 43 years old); (4) Raynada Moss (female, 43 years old); and
(5) Nikedra Ward (female, 43 years old). (See doc. 26 at 7–10; see also doc. 18-1 at
11–13 ¶ 12, 16–17 ¶ 14, 25–26 ¶ 22, 28–29 ¶ 25, 29–30 ¶ 26). Before the court
examines each employee’s compensation history, the court will first describe the
Board’s compensation and promotion process. The court will then describe
Mr. Williams’s compensation history before examining his alleged comparators’
compensation histories in turn.
1. The Board’s Compensation & Promotion Policies
The Board pays its personnel through a pay schedule. (See doc. 18-1 at 2 ¶¶ 4–
5; accord doc. 18-12 at 10; doc. 18-13 at 37). According to this pay schedule,
employee compensation is determined based on three numbers: (1) the role of the
employee (i.e., teacher, assistant principal, etc.), (2) the “rank” of the employee
based on compensable certifications or education levels; and (3) the employee’s
“step,” which reflects the employee’s years of experience. (Doc. 18-1 at 2 ¶ 5).
Each year, the Board votes and approves a new pay schedule. (Id. at 2 ¶ 4; see
also, e.g., doc. 18-6 at 1–29) (the 2018 pay schedule). Relevant here, the pay
schedule includes: (1) the promotion policy for promotions to new employee roles;

3

(2) the number of contract days for each employee; and (3) a set of tables for each
employee role, which dictates employee compensation based on the employee’s rank
and step. (Doc. 18-6 at 3, 6–29). Each year, all employees should3 receive a step
increase even if that employee is not promoted to a new position. (Doc. 18-1 at 3
¶ 7).
Although the Board has revised its new position promotion policy on a few
occasions (see doc. 18-1 at 4 ¶ 8), the same policy was in effect for all promotions
relevant to this lawsuit (see doc. 18-14 at 49) (indicating that the “earliest” date the
discrimination made the basis of Mr. Williams’s claims occurred is September
2020). That policy provides that when an employee is promoted, that employee will
be placed on step 1 of the new schedule unless step 1 would not result in a 5% pay
increase, in which case “the employee will be placed on the next appropriate step
that allows the employee to receive at least a 5% increase in pay[].” (Doc. 18-6 at 3,
32, 62; compare id. at 62, with doc. 18-7 at 3, and doc. 18-1 at 4 ¶ 8).4 The lack of
clarity in this case seems to stem from confusion about what “pay” means.
3

The court uses “should” because the Board’s compensation records reflect a substantial
number of “clerical error[s]” and a “payroll system error” in multiple employees’ compensation
calculations. (See, e.g., doc. 18-1 at 7–9 ¶ 10, 10 ¶ 11, 13 ¶ 13, 17 ¶ 14, 18 ¶ 15, 22 ¶ 19, 23 ¶ 20,
24 ¶ 21, 26 ¶ 23, 28 ¶ 24, 30 ¶ 26).
4

The Board did not provide the court with a complete copy of the FY2021 salary schedule,
which was the schedule in effect at the time three of Mr. Williams’s alleged comparators, were
promoted. (See doc. 18-6 at 90–117). The undisputed evidence is that the Board implemented a
revised promotion policy in 2012 (see doc. 18-4 at 31; accord id. at 60, 85, 112; doc. 18-5 at 3;
doc. 18-6 at 3, 32), and the Board did not change that policy again until October 1, 2021, which
was after each alleged comparator’s promotion (see doc. 18-7 at 3; doc. 18-1 at 4 ¶ 8, at 16 ¶ 14,
4

Board employees are paid a salary, but the Board also tracks employees’
“daily rate of pay” and “contract days.” (See doc. 18-1 at 4 ¶ 8; see also, e.g., doc.
18-9 at 12) (Mr. Williams’s personnel action form for his 2018 promotion). An
employee’s daily rate of pay is calculated by dividing his salary by his contract days.
(See doc. 18-1 at 12 ¶ 12). Different employees have different requirements for the
number of contract days they work: of relevance to this case, teachers work 187
contract days and assistant principals work 204 contract days. (See, e.g., doc. 18-6
at 32, 35, 49). And the Board’s policy about ensuring that an employee receives a
“5% increase in pay[ ]” when promoted does not explain whether “pay” refers to the
daily rate or the salary. (See, e.g., id. at 32); see also supra at 4–5 n.4. This matters
because if “pay” means “salary,” then the Board’s method of calculating employees’
post-promotion pay is not compliant with its policy, but if “pay” means “daily rate,”
it is.
All of Mr. Williams’s alleged comparators were promoted from teacher
positions to assistant principal positions. (See doc. 26 at 7–10; accord doc. 18-1 at
11–13 ¶ 12, 16–17 ¶ 14, 25–26 ¶ 22, 28–29 ¶ 25, 29–30 ¶ 26). Accordingly, when
the Board promoted Mr. Williams’s alleged comparators, the Board first gave those
employees a 5% increase to their daily rate, and then multiplied the daily rate by the

29 ¶ 26). The Board represents—and Mr. Williams does not dispute—that the promotion policy in
place for FY2021 was the same policy that was in place for Mr. Williams’s promotion in FY20219.
5

204 contract days associated with being an assistant principal. (See, e.g., doc. 18-1
at 12–13 ¶ 12). This calculation method resulted in annual salary increases of
14.55%–18.58% for Mr. Williams’s alleged comparators. (See, e.g., doc. 26 at 9);
see also infra at 10–11, 13, 15.
Unlike most of Mr. Williams’s alleged comparators, the Board does not
explain how it calculated Mr. Williams’s post-promotion salary. (Compare doc. 181 at 12 ¶ 12–13, with id. at 8 ¶ 10). During the time relevant to Mr. Williams’s claims
(see doc. 18-14 at 49), Mr. Williams already worked as an assistant principal (see
doc. 18-1 at 8 ¶ 10; doc. 18-9 at 12). So whether the Board relied on Mr. Williams’s
annual salary or daily rate to calculate his post-promotion salary, Mr. Williams did
not receive the additional benefit that his alleged comparators received, i.e., an
additional seventeen days when multiplying the post-promotion daily rate to his
contract days. (E.g., compare doc. 18-1 at 10 ¶ 10, with id. at 12–13 ¶ 12).
Accordingly, Mr. Williams received a 5.22% increase to his salary when the Board
promoted him. See infra at 8.
2. Mr. Williams’s Compensation History
In 1997, Mr. Williams began his employment as a teacher, which placed him
on salary schedule 16. (Doc. 18-1 at 5 ¶ 10). He did not have any compensable
certifications or education levels at that time, so he started at rank 1. (Id.). In 2003,
Mr. Williams received a master’s degree, which entitled him to a rank increase. (Id.;

6

see also doc. 18-9 at 4). In 2011, Mr. Williams earned a Double A (Class AA)
certification, which entitled him to another rank increase. (Doc. 18-1 at 7 ¶ 10; see
also doc. 18-4 at 17; doc. 18-9 at 8).
In 2018, Mr. Williams’s salary was $69,360.96, reflecting the amount in
salary schedule 72, rank 3, step 22. (Doc. 18-1 at 8 ¶ 10; accord doc. 18-9 at 12).
That year, the Board temporarily reassigned Mr. Williams to a high school assistant
principal position, resulting a move to salary schedule 67, rank 3. (See doc. 18-9 at
12). Assuming the Board followed its policy, then the Board moved Mr. Williams
to salary 67, rank 3, step 1. (See doc. 18-6 at 3, 32; but see doc. 18-1 at 8 ¶ 10; doc.
18-9 at 12). But that schedule, rank, and step resulted in a salary of $66,957 (doc.
18-6 at 49), which was less than his previous salary (see doc. 18-1 at 8 ¶ 10). So Mr.
Williams was entitled to “a 5% increase in pay.” (See doc. 18-6 at 32).
The court has already described the ambiguity about what the promotion
policy means by “a 5% pay increase.” (Doc. 18-6 at 3); see supra at 5–6. For
Mr. Williams’s promotion, this ambiguity is immaterial because the Board placed
Mr. Williams on the correct step either way.
If the Board used Mr. Williams’s daily rate of pay to give him “a 5% pay
increase” (see doc. 18-6 at 3), then the calculations are as follows: (1) Mr. Williams’s

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pre-promotion daily rate of pay was $340 (see doc. 18-9 at 12); 5 (2) a 5% increase
to this rate would result in a daily rate of pay of $357; and (3) $357 multiplied by
the 204 contract days for a high school assistant principal (see doc. 18-6 at 49;
accord doc. 18-9 at 12) creates an annual salary of $72,828. The salary step closest
to that amount in schedule 67, rank 3 is step 8, which results in an annual salary of
$72,984. (Doc. 18-6 at 49). And that is the step the Board placed Mr. Williams on.
(See doc. 18-9 at 12).6
If the Board used Mr. Williams’s annual salary to give him “a 5% increase in
pay” (see doc. 18-6 at 32), then the calculations are as follows: (1) Mr. Williams’s
was $69,360.96 (doc. 18-1 at 8 ¶ 10; accord doc. 18-9 at 12); and (2) a 5% increase
would result in a salary of $72,829. The salary step closest to that amount in schedule
67, rank 3 is step 8, which results in an annual salary of $72,984. (Doc. 18-6 at 49).
And again, that is the step the Board placed Mr. Williams on. (See doc. 18-9 at 12).
In total, Mr. Williams received a 5.22% pay increase for the 2018 promotion.

5

Mr. Williams’s personnel action form indicates his daily rate of pay was $331.71. (See
doc. 18-9 at 12). As a mathematical matter, this calculation is erroneous because Mr. Williams’s
annual salary was $69,360.96 and he worked 204 contract days, which should result in a daily rate
of $340. (See id.). In any event, it does not appear the Board relied on this form to reach
Mr. Williams’s post-promotion salary because the Board arrived at the correct step for
Mr. Williams’s post-promotion salary.
6

The Board submitted an affidavit from its Employee Relations/District Investigator in
which she attests that Mr. Williams was placed on step 9. (See doc. 18-1 at 8 ¶ 10). Mr. Williams
was not placed on step 9; he was placed on step 8. (See doc. 18-9 at 12).
8

3. Ms. Ladd’s Compensation History
In January 2008, Ms. Ladd began her employment as a teacher, and in May
of that year, Ms. Ladd earned her master’s degree, which entitled her to a rank
increase. (Doc. 18-1 at 11 ¶ 12; doc. 18-9 at 22–23; see also doc. 18-3 at 124). In
2012, Ms. Ladd earned a Double A (Class AA) certification, which entitled her to
another rank increase. (Doc. 18-1 at 12 ¶ 12; doc. 18-9 at 24; see also doc. 18-4 at
33).
In 2017, Ms. Ladd’s salary was $59,097, reflecting the amount in salary
schedule 16, rank 3, step 10. (Doc. 18-9 at 25; accord doc. 18-5 at 6). And that year,
the Board promoted Ms. Ladd to assistant principal of a high school. (See doc. 18-1
at 12 ¶ 12; doc. 18-9 at 25). Instead of first placing Ms. Ladd on schedule 67, rank
3, step 1 (see doc. 18-5 at 3), which would have resulted in a salary of $65,323 (more
than 5% higher than her previous annual salary) (see doc. 18-5 at 19), the Board first
calculated what a 5% increase to Ms. Ladd’s daily rate would be (see doc. 18-1 at
12–13 ¶ 12).
The calculations proceeded as follows: (1) Ms. Ladd’s pre-promotion daily
rate of pay was $316.03 (see doc. 18-9 at 25; see also doc. 18-5 at 6); (2) a 5%
increase to this rate would result in a daily rate of pay of $331.83 (see doc. 18-1 at
12 ¶ 12); (3) $331.83 multiplied by the 204 contract days for a high school assistant
principal (see doc. 18-5 at 19; accord doc. 18-9 at 25) creates an annual salary of

9

$67,693.63 (doc. 18-1 at 13 ¶ 12). The salary step closest to that amount in schedule
67, rank 3 is step 6, which resulted in an annual salary of $70,077. (Doc. 18-5 at 19).
Because the Board calculated Ms. Ladd’s post-promotion salary based on her
daily rate, she received a 18.58% increase to her annual salary.
4. Ms. Groves’s Compensation History
In 1998, Ms. Groves began her employment as a teacher. (Doc. 18-1 at 16
¶ 14; doc. 18-9 at 36). She earned her master’s degree in 2003 and therefore received
a rank increase. (Doc. 18-1 at 16 ¶ 14; doc. 18-9 at 37). And in 2008, Ms. Grovers
earned a Double A (Class AA) certification, which entitled her to another rank
increase. (Doc. 18-1 at 16 ¶ 14; doc. 18-9 at 38).
In January 2021, Ms. Groves’s salary was $65,255, 7 reflecting the amount in
salary schedule 16, rank 3, step 23. (See doc. 18-9 at 39; but see doc. 18-6 at 92; doc.
18-1 at 16 ¶ 14). And that year, the Board promoted Ms. Groves to assistant principal
of an elementary school. (Doc. 18-1 at 16 ¶ 14; doc. 18-9 at 39). Placing Ms. Groves
on salary schedule 66, rank 3, step 1, see supra at 4–5 n.4, would have resulted in an
7

The Board submitted an affidavit from its Employee Relations/District Investigator in
which she attests as to the calculation methods for Mr. Williams’s alleged comparator’s salaries.
(See doc. 18-1). The affiant attests that “[p]rior to her promotion, [Ms.] Groves was on Teacher
Salary Schedule 16, Rank/Level 3, Step 23 with an annual salary of $65,254” (doc. 18-1 at 16
¶ 14), and the affiant relies on Ms. Groves’s personnel action form (doc. 18-9 at 39) for this
assertion. Although Ms. Groves’s personnel action form indicates that her salary was $65,254 (see
doc. 18-9 at 39), the Board’s salary schedule indicates that the assigned salary for Ms. Groves’s
rank and step was $65,255 (see doc. 18-6 at 92). For consistency purposes, the court uses the salary
on the Board’s salary schedule for all of Mr. Williams’s alleged comparators when there is a
discrepancy between the relevant salary schedule and the personnel action form.

10

annual salary of $62,945 (see doc. 18-6 at 105), which was less than Ms. Groves’s
pre-promotion salary. So Ms. Groves was entitled to placement on a step that
resulted in a 5% increase to her salary, see supra at 4–5 n.4, which would have been
step 8 at $68,746 (see doc. 18-6 at 105).
Instead, the Board calculated the 5% increase based on Ms. Groves’s daily
rate. (See doc. 18-1 at 16–17 ¶ 14). The calculations proceeded as follows: (1) Ms.
Groves’s pre-promotion daily rate of pay was $348.96 8 (see doc. 18-6 at 92); (2) a
5% increase to this rate would result in a daily rate of pay of $366.41 (see doc. 18-1
at 17 ¶ 14); (3) $366.41 multiplied by the 204 contract days required for an
elementary school assistant principal (see doc. 18-6 at 105; doc. 18-9 at 39) creates
an annual salary of $74,747.64 (see doc. 18-1 at 17 ¶ 14). But this amount exceeded
the available salary ranges in schedule 66, rank 3, so the Board paid Ms. Groves
$74,747. (Doc. 18-1 at 17 ¶ 14; accord doc. 18-9 at 39).
Because the Board calculated Ms. Groves’s post-promotion salary based on
her daily rate, she received a 14.55% promotion to her annual salary.

8

Ms. Groves’s personnel action form indicates that her daily rate was $348.95. (Doc. 189 at 39). The court assumes this calculation error derives from the fact that Ms. Groves’s annual
salary is incorrect on this form. See supra at 10 n.7. The Board’s salary schedule provides that
teachers work 187 contract days and Ms. Groves was at a rank 3, step 23, so her salary was
$65,255. (See doc. 18-6 at 92). Her daily rate therefore should have been $348.96.

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5. Ms. Evans’s Compensation History
In 2004, Ms. Evans began her employment as a teacher. (Doc. 18-1 at 25 ¶ 22;
doc. 18-9 at 74). She earned a Double A (Class AA) certification, which entitled her
to a rank increase. (Doc. 18-1 at 25 ¶ 22; see also doc. 18-9 at 75). It appears that
Ms. Evans may have also earned a master’s degree, which may have entitled her to
another rank increase. (See doc. 18-9 at 75) (indicating that Ms. Evans was at a rank
3 and that her highest degree was a “6 Year Degree”).
In January 2021, Ms. Evans’s salary was $65,255, reflecting the amount in
salary schedule 16, rank 3, step 17. (See doc. 18-9 at 76; but see doc. 18-6 at 92).9
And that year, the Board promoted Ms. Evans to assistant principal of a middle
school. (See doc. 8-1 at 25 ¶ 22; doc. 18-9 at 76). Placing Ms. Groves on salary
schedule 72, rank 3, step 1, see supra at 4–5 n.4, would have resulted in an annual
salary of $63,138 (see doc. 18-6 at 106), which was less than Ms. Evans’s prepromotion salary. So Ms. Evans was entitled to placement on a step that resulted in
a 5% increase to her salary, see supra at 4–5 n.4, which would have been step 8 at
$68,944 (see doc. 18-6 at 106).
Instead, the Board calculated the 5% increase based on Ms. Evans’s daily rate.
(See doc. 18-1 at 25 ¶ 22). The calculations proceeded as follows: (1) Ms. Evans’s

9

As discussed above, supra at 10 n. 7, the court uses the salary on the Board’s salary
schedule. (Doc. 18-6 at 92).

12

pre-promotion daily rate was $348.96 10 (see doc. 18-6 at 92); (2) a 5% increase to
this rate would result in a daily rate of pay of $366.41; (3) $366.41 multiplied by the
204 contract days required for a middle school assistant principal (see doc. 18-6 at
106; doc. 18-9 at 76; doc. 18-1 at 25 ¶ 22) creates an annual salary of $74,747.64
(see doc. 18-1 at 25 ¶ 22). But this amount exceeded the available salary ranges in
schedule 72, rank 3, so the Board paid Ms. Evans $74,747. (Doc. 18-1 at 25 ¶ 22;
accord doc. 18-9 at 76).
Because the Board calculated Ms. Evans’s post-promotion salary based on her
daily rate, she received a 14.55% promotion to her annual salary.
6. Ms. Moss’s Compensation History
In 2003, Ms. Moss began her employment as a teacher. (Doc. 18-1 at 29 ¶ 26;
doc. 18-10 at 10). She then earned a master’s degree, which entitled her to a rank
increase. (Doc. 18-1 at 29 ¶ 26; doc. 18-10 at 7).
In 2021, Ms. Moss’s salary was $60,548.00, reflecting the amount in salary
schedule 16, rank 2, step 18. (Doc. 18-10 at 8). And that year, the Board promoted
Ms. Moss to an assistant principal position. (Doc. 18-1 at 29 ¶ 26). The Board does
not explain how Ms. Moss’s post-promotion salary was calculated. (See id. at 29–30
10

Ms. Evans’s personnel action form indicates that her daily rate was $348.95. (Doc. 18-9
at 76). The court assumes this calculation error derives from the fact that Ms. Evans’s annual salary
is incorrect on this form. See supra at 12 n.9. The Board’s salary schedule provides that teachers
work 187 contract days and Ms. Evans was at a rank 3, step 17, so her salary was $65,255. (See
doc. 18-6 at 92). Her daily rate therefore should have been $348.96.

13

¶ 26). The Board acknowledges that Ms. Moss was overcompensated and contends
that her overcompensation was “due to a clerical error.” (Id.).
Whatever the method of calculation, Ms. Moss received a 14.55% increase to
her annual pay.
7. Ms. Ward’s Compensation History
In 2015, Ms. Ward began her employment as a teacher and had already earned
her master’s degree at that point. (See doc. 18-9 at 87; doc. 18-1 at 28 ¶ 25). She then
earned an educational specialist degree, which entitled her to another rank increase.
(Doc. 18-1 at 28 ¶ 25; doc. 18-10 at 3).
In 2019, Ms. Ward’s salary was $65,255.00, reflecting the amount in salary
schedule 16, rank 3, step 15. (Doc. 18-6 at 65; see also doc. 18-10 at 3–5).11 And
that year, the Board promoted Ms. Ward to interim assistant principal of a middle
school. (Doc. 18-1 at 28 ¶ 25; doc. 18-10 at 4). Placing Ms. Ward on salary schedule
72, rank 3, step 1 (see doc. 18-6 at 62), would have resulted in an annual salary of
$63,138 (see doc. 18-6 at 78), which was less than Ms. Ward’s pre-promotion salary.
So Ms. Ward was entitled to placement on a step that resulted in a 5% increase to

11

The personnel action form for Ms. Ward’s promotion to interim assistant principal does
not indicate Ms. Ward’s placement on the FY2020 salary schedule and indicates that Ms. Ward’s
“annual salary” was $1,000. (See doc. 18-10 at 4). But the personnel action form is not blank for
FY2019 and indicates that Ms. Ward was on salary schedule 16, rank 3, step 14 that year. (See id.
at 3). Because an employee receives a step increase for each year of employment (see doc. 18-1 at
3 ¶ 7), the court’s recitation of the facts assumes Ms. Ward was on salary schedule 16, rank 3, step
15 and that she received the salary assigned to that salary schedule (see doc. 18-6 at 65).

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her salary (see doc. 18-6 at 62), which would have been step 8 at $68,944 (see doc.
18-6 at 78).
Instead, the Board calculated the 5% increase based on Ms. Ward’s daily rate.
(See doc. 18-1 28 ¶ 25). The calculations proceeded as follows: (1) Ms. Ward’s prepromotion daily rate was $348.96 (see doc. 18-6 at 65); (2) a 5% increase to this rate
would result in a daily rate of pay of $366.41; (3) $366.41 multiplied by the 204
contract days required for a middle school assistant principal (see doc. 18-6 at 78;
doc. 18-10 at 4; doc. 18-1 at 28 ¶ 25) creates an annual salary of $74,747.64 (see
doc. 18-1 at 25 ¶ 22). But this amount exceeded the available salary ranges in
schedule 72, rank 3, so the Board paid Ms. Ward $74,747. (Doc. 18-1 at 28–29 ¶ 25;
accord doc. 18-10 at 4).
Because the Board calculated Ms. Ward’s post-promotion salary based on her
daily rate, she received a 14.55% promotion to her annual salary. And in 2020, the
Board transitioned Ms. Ward from interim assistant principal to permanent assistant
principal. (See doc. 18-10 at 5; doc. 18-1 at 29 ¶ 25). The Board continued to pay
her the $74,747 post-promotion salary. (See doc. 18-10 at 5; doc. 18-1 at 29 ¶ 25).
II.

DISCUSSION
The Board moves for summary judgment as to all claims. (See doc. 16).

Summary judgment is appropriate when a movant shows that there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

15

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Board contends that Mr. Williams failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies to the extent that his claims are based on a failure-topromote theory. (See doc. 17 at 34–35). Because exhaustion is a threshold issue
regarding whether Mr. Williams’s claims are properly before the court, see
Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2022), the court considers
that argument first.
a. Failure to Promote
Mr. Williams contends that the Board refused to promote him because of his
age and gender in violation of the ADEA and Title VII. (See doc. 1 ¶¶ 24, 38). The
Board argues that Mr. Williams has not exhausted his administrative remedies as to
this discrimination theory because this theory was neither included in his EEOC
charge nor reasonably expected to grow from the allegations in his EEOC charge.
(See doc. 17 at 34–35). Mr. Williams responds the scope of an EEOC investigation
into his charge alleging disparate pay could give rise to a failure-to-promote claim.
(See doc. 26 at 4).
Before filing a gender discrimination or age discrimination claim, a plaintiff
must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC. Patterson, 38 F.4th at 1345 (gender discrimination); Bost v. Fed. Express
Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (age discrimination). “Because of that
exhaustion requirement, a plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the

16

EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.” Patterson, 38 F.4th at 1345 (quotation marks omitted).
This limitation fulfills the purpose of the exhaustion requirement: “that the
EEOC should have the first opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory
practices to permit it to perform its role in obtaining voluntary compliance and
promoting conciliation efforts.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277,
1279 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted; alterations accepted). Although
federal courts “are reluctant to allow procedural technicalities to bar [employment
discrimination] claims,” “[t]he facts alleged in the charge matter most for
determining what can reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC charge.”
Patterson, 38 F.4th at 1345. So “judicial claims are allowed if they amplify, clarify,
or more clearly focus the allegations in the EEOC complaint, but . . . allegations of
new acts of discrimination are inappropriate.” Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1279–80
(quotation marks omitted).
In Mr. Williams’s EEOC charge, Mr. Williams asserted that he worked as an
assistant principal and “ha[d] more tenure than any other person in the [Birmingham
School] District in that position.” (Doc. 18-14 at 49). Mr. Williams stated his “pay
was lower than other co-workers performing the same work.” (Id.). Specifically,
Mr. Williams identified four other assistant principals whom he contended were
younger than him or of the opposite gender, had less experience or education than

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he did, and received a higher salary than him. (See id. at 49–50). But Mr. Williams
does not identify any promotions that the Board denied him. (See id.). Indeed, the
sole focus of Mr. Williams’s charge is that other assistant principals, some of whom
were younger and of the opposite gender, “were making more [money] than [he was]
with less experience and the same or less[er] degree.” (Doc. 18-14 at 49).
Mr. Williams has not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to
any failure-to-promote claims. Accordingly, the court WILL GRANT the Board’s
motion and WILL ENTER judgment in the Board’s favor as to that aspect of his
claims.
b. Discriminatory Pay
Mr. Williams contends that the Board intentionally paid him less than
younger, female assistant principals who performed substantially similar work in
violation of the ADEA and Title VII. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 24, 38). The Board contends that
summary judgment is appropriate on these claims because (1) the Board
compensates Mr. Williams’s alleged comparators differently due to their different
employment histories and (2) the Board has produced a pay schedule which accounts
for its compensation practices. (See doc. 17 at 39–42). The court rejects the Board’s
first argument because it is not adequately briefed, and the court rejects the Board’s
second argument because a reasonable jury could find that the Board did not adhere
to its pay schedule.

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A party must adequately brief an argument by citing authority, referring to the
facts of the party’s case, and providing a “meaningful explanation” for how the legal
authority “appl[ies] to [the party’s] claim.” Harner v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 38
F.4th 892, 899 (11th Cir. 2022). “[P]assing references” simply do not suffice.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). And
when a party fails to adequately brief an argument, that argument is forfeited. United
States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); United States v.
Esformes, 60 F.4th 621, 635 (11th Cir. 2023) (“declin[ing] to address the merits” of
a “skeletal argument” that included only “a bare citation” to the record); Christmas
v. Harris Cnty., 51 F.4th 1348, 1354 n.4 (11th Cir. 2022) (holding that the plaintiff
had forfeited an argument when she “dedicate[d] just two sentences to” it).
Here, the Board asserts that Mr. Williams’s comparators are not “similarly
situated to [Mr.] Williams because the differences in their respective employment
histories that are used to determine placement on the Board’s salary schedule are
substantially different than his, and thus, they are compensated different steps on the
Board’s salary schedule.” (Doc. 17 at 39). In essence, the Board asserts that Mr.
Williams has not identified similarly situated employees because the employees he
has identified are different and thus were treated differently. (See id.). But the Board
fails to explain why Mr. Williams and his alleged comparators are different beyond
a reference to “their respective employment histories.” (See id.).

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In many ways, Mr. Williams and his alleged comparators are similar. For
example, other than Ms. Moss (who was on rank 2), Mr. Williams and his alleged
comparators were all on rank 3 at the time of their promotion. (See doc. 18-9 at 12;
see also id. at 25, 39, 76; doc. 18-10 at 3–5; but see doc. 18-10 at 8). Mr. Williams
had more years of employment with the Board than any of his alleged comparators.
(See doc. 18-9 at 1; see also id. at 22, 36, 74, 87; doc. 18-10 at 10). Yet Mr. Williams
experienced a substantially smaller increase to his annual pay when he was promoted
than each of his alleged comparators, including Ms. Moss.
Perhaps the Board intended to argue that this different compensation occurred
because unlike his alleged comparators, Mr. Williams was not promoted from a
teacher position to an assistant principal position. But it is impossible for the court
to discern the precise basis for the Board’s argument because the Board generally
references differences in “employment histories” without further explanation. (Doc.
17 at 39). And the court cannot make arguments on the Board’s behalf. See Fils v.
City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts cannot
concoct or resurrect arguments neither made nor advanced by the parties.”).
Accordingly, the Board has forfeited this argument by failing to adequately brief it.
The Board’s second argument fares no better. The Board contends that its
compensation practices are non-discriminatory because the Board adhered to its
salary schedules. (See doc. 17 at 41–42). But the problem with this argument is that

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a reasonable jury could find, based on the evidence the Board has submitted, that the
Board did not adhere to its promotion policy. (E.g., compare doc. 18-5 at 3) (“Upon
promotion to a new position, an employee will be placed on ‘step 1’ of the new
salary schedule . . . .”), with (doc. 18-1 at 12 ¶ 12) (skipping this step and calculating
a 5% increase to Ms. Ladd’s daily rate). So the court rejects this argument because
it is not supported by the evidence.
The Board highlights that Mr. Williams cannot assert claims based on clerical
errors in compensation calculations. (See, e.g., doc. 17 at 42). Generally, that
statement of law is true. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
756 (1998) (explaining that workplace discrimination claims require “intentional
conduct”). Although the record is replete with “clerical errors” (doc. 17 at 42), the
Board misinterprets Mr. Williams’s claim. Mr. Williams contends that the Board has
not compensated its employees in accordance with the promotion policy. (See, e.g.,
doc. 26 at 6). The Board argues that it has adhered to its promotion policy and pay
schedules (see doc. 17 at 41–42), and the evidence does not clearly support the
Board’s position.
The court has limited its analysis to what the Board has argued. See Fils, 647
F.3d at 1284. As the movant, the Board must demonstrate that it is entitled to
summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

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and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”) (emphasis added). The
Board has not carried that burden with the arguments it has made; accordingly, the
court WILL DENY the Board’s motion as to Mr. Williams’s discriminatory pay
claims.
III.

CONCLUSION

The court WILL GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the Board’s
motion. (Doc. 16). The court WILL ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT in the
Board’s favor as to Mr. William’s failure-to-promote claims. This case will proceed
to trial as to Mr. Williams’s discriminatory pay claims.
The court will enter a separate partial summary judgment consistent with this
memorandum opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this June 4, 2024.

_________________________________
ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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