Goodwin v. Strickland Paper Company, Inc.

Filing 49

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANT STRICKLAND PAPER COMPANY INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Anna M Manasco on 03/10/2025. (AKD)

FILED
2025 Mar-10 PM 12:47
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JONATHAN GOODWIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
STRICKLAND PAPER
COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.

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) Case No.: 2:22-cv-01486-AMM
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MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANT STRICKLAND PAPER
COMPANY INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by
defendant Strickland Paper Company, Inc. Doc. 37. For the reasons explained below,
the motion is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND
The facts material to Strickland’s motion, viewed in the light most favorable

to plaintiff Jonathan Goodwin, are as follows:
Mr. Goodwin was terminated from Strickland on May 6, 2021, after about two
years of employment. See Doc. 39-4 at 3. In June 2021, Mr. Goodwin entered into
an agreement with the law firm Edwards & Edwards, LLC, to represent him in an
employment discrimination lawsuit against Strickland. Doc. 38 ¶¶ 1, 3. Ms. Nicole
Edwards, a partner at the firm, represented Mr. Goodwin. Id. ¶ 4. On October 19,

2021, Ms. Edwards filed a charge of discrimination under Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on behalf of Mr. Goodwin. Doc. 39-2 at 25–
29. On August 1, 2022, Ms. Edwards received an email from Mr. Andre Williams,
investigator at the EEOC, which stated:
Based on the evidence, it is unlikely the EEOC will
proceed further with the investigation. If you wish to
provide additional evidence which you have not already
provided, please submit such evidence no later than
Monday, August 8, 2022. . . .
If no response is received, a Determination and Notice of
Rights may be issued. The Determination and the Notice
of Rights will provide you with the opportunity to pursue
your charge further in federal district court. If you decide
to pursue the case in federal district court, you must do so
within ninety (90) days from the date of receipt of the
Determination and Notice of Rights.
Please provide an email address for Jonathan Goodwin.
Id. at 29–30. On August 9, 2022, Ms. Edwards received a second email from Mr.
Williams following up on the email from August 1, 2022, and requesting Mr.
Goodwin’s email address. Id. at 31. On August 12, 2022, Ms. Edwards received a
third email from Mr. Williams requesting Mr. Goodwin’s email address as well as
his physical address. Id. at 32.
Ms. Edwards testified that she did not have Mr. Goodwin’s email address,
Doc. 39-1 at 40, Dep. 152:8–15, and had already provided his physical address when
2

submitting the Charge of Discrimination in October 2021, Doc. 39-2 at 26. Ms.
Edwards did not respond to these three emails. Doc. 39-1 at 15, Dep. 50:9–14,
51:17–19; id. at 17, Dep. 61:10–13; id. at 18, Dep. 62:11–13, 63:12–16; id. at 19,
Dep. 66:10–13.
On August 15, 2022, Ms. Edwards received an email from an EEOC
“noreply” email address stating that a “new document” was added to Mr. Goodwin’s
case, which could be viewed through the EEOC public portal. Doc. 39-4 at 17. Soon
after, Ms. Edwards attempted to retrieve the document through the portal, but she
testified that she was unable to gain access to her cases. Doc. 39-1 at 21, Dep. 77:1–
18. This prompted her to email Mr. Williams. Id.; id. at 22, Dep. 80:14–21. The next
morning, on August 16, 2022, Mr. Williams responded to Ms. Edwards’s email,
informing her that sometimes, when the EEOC does not have the charging party’s
(in this case, Mr. Goodwin’s) email address, “attorneys are unable to see the charge.”
Doc. 39-5 at 3. Ms. Edwards did not respond to this email, Doc. 39-1 at 22, Dep.
81:4–9, but testified that she continued her unsuccessful attempts to gain access to
the public portal multiple times, id. at 26, Dep. 95:6–14; Doc. 44 ¶ 31.
On August 23, 2022, at 10:01 p.m., Ms. Edwards received a second email
from the EEOC “noreply” email address, stating that the “EEOC has made a decision
[in this case]. It is very important that you download and retain a copy of this
document. You may review this decision by logging into the EEOC Public Portal.”
3

Doc. 39-5 at 11. Ms. Edwards testified that she did not view this email on August
23, 2022, due to its timing. Doc. 39-1 at 39, Dep. 148:14–22; Doc 44 at 15 ¶ 6.
Neither did she attempt accessing it through the public portal, Doc. 39-1 at 43, Dep.
164:17–165:7, because one day later, on August 24, 2022, Ms. Edwards received a
Determination of Charge and a Notice of Right to Sue letter (“RTS”) from the
EEOC, Doc. 39-5 at 5, through United States mail, Doc. 38 ¶ 34, in hard copy form,
Doc. 44 at 12 ¶ 31. The hard copy RTS showed that it was issued on August 15,
2024. Doc. 39-5 at 5.
The RTS informed Ms. Edwards of the EEOC’s decision not to pursue Mr.
Goodwin’s charge any further and stated, “If you choose to file a lawsuit against the
respondent(s) on this charge . . . your lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of
your receipt of this notice. Receipt generally occurs on the date that you (or your
representative) view this document.” Id. On November 22, 2022, precisely ninety
days after receiving the hard copy RTS letter, Ms. Edwards, on behalf of Mr.
Goodwin, commenced this lawsuit against Strickland. Doc. 1.
Strickland moves for summary judgment on the ground that Mr. Goodwin
filed his lawsuit too late. Doc. 37. Strickland urges the court to find that Mr.
Goodwin received the RTS letter on August 15, 2022, or August 23, 2022, Doc. 38
at 12–13, 16, which would put Mr. Goodwin’s lawsuit past the ninety-day filing
period, making it untimely.
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the party moving for summary

judgment establishes “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc.,
929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). If the moving party has carried its burden,
Rule 56 requires that the nonmoving party “go beyond the pleadings” and establish
that there is a material fact in genuine dispute. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324–25; see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A fact is “material” if it could “affect the outcome” of
the case. Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2016)
(cleaned up). A material fact is in “genuine” dispute if “a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to
“weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986). “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014)
(cleaned up).
III.

ANALYSIS

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Before filing a complaint of discrimination against an employer under Title I
of the ADA, a plaintiff “must exhaust administrative remedies” by “filing a timely
charge of discrimination with the” EEOC. Stamper v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 863 F.3d
1336, 1339–40 (11th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). “If the [EEOC] determines after an
investigation ‘that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it
shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the [plaintiff].” Id. at 1340 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). “When the [plaintiff] receives a notice of dismissal from the
[EEOC], she has [ninety] days to file a civil action against the employer. Id.
Ordinarily, the receipt date is established by the plaintiff’s, plaintiff’s counsel’s, or
counsel’s law office’s actual receipt of the notice letter from the EEOC. See Irwin v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 92–93 (1990). When the date of receipt of a
mailed notice letter is in dispute, this court generally presumes that a mailing is
received three days after its issuance. See Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown,
466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1 (1984); see also Kerr v. McDonald's Corp., 427 F.3d 947, 953
n.9 (11th Cir. 2005).
In this case, it is undisputed that Ms. Edwards received the mailed RTS in her
mailbox on August 24, 2022. Doc. 38 ¶ 34; Doc. 44 ¶ 31. The issue is whether the
email notifications from August 15, 2022, or August 23, 2022, triggered the start of
the ninety-day period to file a lawsuit.

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The relevance of an emailed RTS to the ninety-day deadline is an issue of first
impression. As far as the court is aware, the only courts that have confronted this
issue are two district courts in Pennsylvania. See Paniconi v. Abington Hosp.Jefferson Health, 604 F. Supp. 3d 290 (E.D. Pa. 2022); McNaney v. Sampson &
Morris Grp., Inc., No. 2:21-cv-1809, 2022 WL 1017388 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2022).
Nevertheless, Eleventh Circuit precedents provide ample guidance for the
court’s analysis. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that it does not employ a rigid,
universal rule to determine when a complainant has received notice of the RTS,
because complainants are responsible for an “orderly and expeditious resolution” of
their claims. Kerr, 427 F.3d at 952 (cleaned up). The Eleventh Circuit has expressed
concern about providing complainants a “manipulable open-ended time extension
which could render the statutory minimum meaningless.” Id. (cleaned up). Courts
must analyze the ninety-day limitations period “on a case-by-case basis to fashion a
fair and reasonable rule for the circumstances of each case, one that would require
plaintiffs to assume some minimum responsibility without conditioning a claimant’s
right to sue on fortuitous circumstances or events beyond [their] control.” Id.
(cleaned up) (quoting Zilyette v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., 179 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th
Cir. 1999)).
In Kerr, the EEOC issued RTS letters that were dated December 31, 2002, but
the plaintiffs did not file their complaint until May 15, 2003, well over the ninety7

day time limit. Id. at 948–49. The plaintiffs asserted that their complaint was timely
because they did not receive the letters until February 15, 2003. Id. at 949 n.3. The
court rejected the plaintiffs’ effort to start the ninety-day clock on February 15, 2003,
because the plaintiffs (1) had adequate notice that their RTS letters were
forthcoming, see id. at 953, (2) had actual knowledge that the EEOC had terminated
its investigation of their claims, id. at 954, (3) did not assume responsibility for their
claims and lacked diligence in following up with the EEOC on their RTS letters, id.
at 953, and (4) unnecessarily delayed filing their lawsuit, id. The court discussed
each factor in turn. Id. at 952–54.
First, the court ruled that “[t]he date of actual receipt is material to the
summary judgment analysis only if there was no adequate notice prior to actual
receipt.” Id. at 952. In Kerr, the plaintiffs received RTS letters on February 15, 2003.
Id. at 949 n.3. But they orally requested RTS letters a few days before December 30,
2002. Id. at 949. And by early January 2003, the plaintiffs submitted written requests
to receive their RTS letters. Id. at 949, 953. The court was satisfied that these events
provided plaintiffs adequate notice that their RTS letters were forthcoming, making
the date of actual receipt immaterial. See id. at 953.
Second, the court ruled that “actual knowledge on the part of a complainant
that the EEOC has terminated its investigation . . . may be sufficient to cause the
time for filing to begin running within a reasonable time after written notice of
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complainant’s [RTS] has been mailed.” Id. at 954. In Kerr, the plaintiffs knew that
the EEOC terminated its investigation by early January 2003. Id. at 951.
Consequently, the court concluded that the ninety-day clock began ticking around
that time, notwithstanding that the RTS letters had not then been physically received
by the plaintiffs. See id. at 953–54.
Third, the court ruled that complainants must assume “some minimum
responsibility for an orderly and expeditious resolution of their claims.” Id. at 952.
(cleaned up). This includes following up with the EEOC regarding delays, a step that
the Kerr plaintiffs did not take. Id. at 953. Accordingly, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs’ failure to receive the letters was “at least in part due to lack of diligence
in following up their requests.” Id.
Fourth, the court ruled that plaintiffs must not delay filing a lawsuit and force
timeliness issues unnecessarily. Id. When the Kerr plaintiffs “received copies of the
RTS letters in mid-February, they still had nearly two months during which they
could have filed” their lawsuits. Id. Had they done so, the timeliness issue could
have been avoided. See id. The court ruled that the plaintiffs “delayed filing and
forced the issue unnecessarily.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit has reiterated this rule in
later cases. See, e.g., Robbins v. Vonage Bus., Inc., 819 F. App’x 863, 869 (11th Cir.
2020) (dismissing suit as untimely and admonishing plaintiff for waiting the full

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ninety-day period to file the lawsuit, “despite knowing that the [RTS] had been
issued a full month before it was discovered”).
The court discusses the four Kerr factors in turn.
A. Adequate Notice
Strickland asserts that the three emails that Ms. Edwards received from Mr.
Williams between August 1, 2022, and August 12, 2022, put Ms. Edwards on notice
that a RTS was forthcoming. Doc. 38 at 12–13. So, when Ms. Edwards received the
EEOC’s email on August 15, 2022, notifying her that a “new document” had been
issued, Strickland asserts that she had to have known that it was the RTS. See id. at
15–16; Doc. 46 at 6–7. Accordingly, Strickland asserts that Ms. Edwards’s receipt
of the August 15, 2022, email triggered the ninety-day clock, making Mr. Goodwin’s
lawsuit untimely by eight days. See Doc. 38 at 16.
Ms. Edwards asserts that those three emails from Mr. Williams were
insufficient notice that the “new document” referenced in the email on August 15,
2022, was the RTS. Doc. 39-1 at 19–20, Dep. 69:1–70:21; Doc. 44 ¶ 23. She argues
that a “new document” could be any document. Doc. 44 ¶ 23. Although Mr.
Williams’s first email mentioned that a RTS “may” be issued, Ms. Edwards contends
that this was insufficient to alert her, especially considering that the email on August
15, 2022, did not state that a final decision had been made. Doc. 39-2 at 30; Doc.
39-4 at 17; Doc. 44 at 29–30. Ms. Edwards thus asserts that the email on August 15,
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2022, could not have triggered the ninety-day clock. See Doc. 44 at 29–30. The court
does not find that as of August 15, 2022, Ms. Edwards had adequate notice of the
issuance of an RTS.
But the email from August 23, 2022, expressly provided Ms. Edwards notice
that the RTS had been issued. The email stated that the “EEOC has made a decision
regarding [Mr. Goodwin’s case]” and that “[i]t is very important that you download
and retain a copy of this document.” Doc. 39-5 at 11. This issuance could not have
surprised Ms. Edwards: Mr. Williams sent multiple emails to her before August 23,
2022, and the August 1st email noted that a RTS “may be issued” if Ms. Edwards
did not provide further information about Mr. Goodwin’s case. Doc. 39-2 at 29–32.
B. Actual Knowledge
For the same reasons the August 23, 2022, email provided Ms. Edwards
adequate notice that the EEOC terminated its investigation of Mr. Goodwin’s claim,
it provided her actual knowledge of that fact. To be clear, the court does not find that
Ms. Edwards had actual knowledge on August 23, 2022; it finds that when she
learned of the EEOC’s decision (which she admits occurred on August 24, 2022),
she had actual knowledge that the EEOC had made that decision and communicated
it to her before then.
C. Diligence and Responsibility

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Strickland asserts broadly that Ms. Edwards did not act responsibly when
communicating with the EEOC on behalf of Mr. Goodwin. See Doc. 38 at 13–14.
Strickland alleges that Ms. Edwards did not adequately respond to Mr. Williams’s
emails, did not proactively request a copy of the “new document” added to the portal
that she was unable to access, and in total, reached out to Mr. Williams with a request
for help only once. Doc. 38 at 13–14; Doc. 46 at 7.
Ms. Edwards asserts that she attempted to access the “new document” on the
portal multiple times and followed up with Mr. Williams about her lack of success.
Doc. 39-1 at 25, Dep. 92:4–9, 14–23, 93:1–12; id. at 26, Dep. 95:6–14; Doc. 44 at
12 ¶ 31. Moreover, Ms. Edwards asserts that she was under no legal duty to respond
to Mr. Williams’s emails. Doc. 39-1 at 24, Dep. 86:4–17, 87:11–17. Each of his
emails requested Mr. Goodwin’s email address, and Ms. Edwards provided the
contact information that she had for Mr. Goodwin, including his home address and
phone number, on previous occasions. Doc. 39-2 at 26, 29–32. Consequently, Ms.
Edwards claims that under the circumstances, her actions were diligent. Doc. 44 at
31.
Diligence in this case is a closer call than it was in Kerr. Ms. Edwards emailed
Mr. Williams immediately after she was unable to access the document referenced
in the August 15, 2022, email, Doc. 39-5 at 3, and between August 15, 2022, and
August 24, 2022, she made multiple attempts to access the public portal, Doc. 39-1
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at 26, Dep. 95:6–14; Doc. 44 at 12 ¶ 31. Additionally, Ms. Edwards kept the EEOC
abreast of the pertinent contact information within her knowledge, including her
email address, physical address, and phone number, Doc. 39-2 at 25, as well as Mr.
Goodwin’s physical address and phone number, id. at 26. Presumably, the mailed
RTS reached Ms. Edwards on August 24, 2022, as a result of her efforts with the
EEOC. But based on Ms. Edwards’s conduct after August 24, 2022, the court cannot
find that she exercised diligence in putting forth the minimal effort to timely file Mr.
Goodwin’s lawsuit.
D. Unnecessary Delay
Strickland asserts that Ms. Edwards unnecessarily delayed filing this lawsuit
because she waited the full ninety days from the date she viewed the physical RTS,
August 24, 2022, even though the issued date that appeared on the RTS was nine
days earlier, August 15, 2022, and she had received an email from the EEOC on
August 23, 2022. Doc. 38 at 13–14. Ms. Edwards does not rebut this assertion.
The RTS that Ms. Edwards viewed on August 24, 2022, had an issued date of
August 15, 2022. Doc. 12-4 at 2. Ms. Edwards could have filed the lawsuit ninety
days from August 15, 2022, which is eighty-one days from August 24, 2022. In other
words, as of August 24, 2022, Ms. Edwards could have been sure that she had eightyone days to file this lawsuit without triggering any timeliness concern. That is
significantly longer than the approximately two months that the plaintiffs had in
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Kerr, 427 F.3d at 953, and in Robbins, 819 F. App’x at 869. In both of those
decisions, the court determined that the delay was unnecessary and dispositive. Kerr,
427 F.3d at 953; Robbins, 819 F. App’x at 869. Here, as there, the length of Ms.
Edwards’s intentional delay unnecessarily forced the timeliness issue.
Based on the foregoing, the court (1) declines to hold that the email from
August 15, 2022, started Mr. Goodwin’s ninety-day clock to file a lawsuit and (2)
nevertheless holds that Mr. Goodwin’s claim remains untimely because the email
from August 23, 2022, is the latest possible moment the clock started.
Ms. Edwards argues that the clock did not start on August 23, 2022, because
the email she received from the EEOC that day arrived in her inbox at 10:01 p.m.
and she did not check the email until the following morning. Doc. 39-1 at 27, Dep.
101:2–15; Doc. 44 at 15, 29–30. Essentially, Ms. Edwards argues that because she
did not see this email on August 23, 2022, it should not be considered as received
on August 23, 2022. See Doc. 39-1 at 27, Dep. 101:2–15; Doc. 44 at 15, 29–30. In
making this argument, Ms. Edwards urges this court to adopt a rule that a document
or email would not be considered received until it is actually viewed. Decades of
precedent have rejected such a rule.
In Law v. Hercules, Inc., the EEOC sent the RTS to the local post office by
certified mail. 713 F.2d 691, 692 (11th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff’s seventeen-yearold son picked it up from the post office and placed it on the plaintiff’s kitchen table.
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Id. The plaintiff viewed the RTS “one or two days later.” Id. He commenced the
lawsuit ninety-one days after the son had signed for the RTS. Id. The plaintiff urged
the court to adopt an “actual receipt rule,” contending that his complaint was timely
because “he did not receive the notice until ‘one or two days’ after it was picked up
at the post office.” Id. The court declined because “allow[ing] additional time based
on a claim that the letter was not actually received by [the plaintiff] until one or two
days later, would be to foster a manipulable open-ended time extension which would
render the statutory limitation meaningless.” Id. at 693 (cleaned up).
Similarly, in Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., the RTS was delivered to the
plaintiff’s residence, and accepted and signed for by his wife on December 18, 1979.
693 F.2d 1086, 1086 (11th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff claimed that he was out of town
on that date and did not learn of the RTS until December 26, 1979. Id. The plaintiff
filed his lawsuit on March 20, 1980, less than ninety days after he first learned of the
RTS, but more than ninety days after his wife signed for it. Id. The plaintiff argued
that the ninety-day period should begin from the date of his actual receipt of the
RTS. Id. at 1087. Once again, the court disagreed because adopting the plaintiff’s
argument would allow a “manipulable open-ended time extension” that would
relieve plaintiffs from assuming the “minimum responsibility” required “for an
orderly and expeditious resolution of [their] disputes.” Id. (cleaned up).

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In this case, the EEOC’s August 23, 2022, email provided Ms. Edwards with
notice that the EEOC had terminated the investigation of Mr. Goodwin’s claim and
that a RTS had been issued. That Ms. Edwards first viewed the email at a later date
is inconsequential. She could have viewed it a day later, a week later, or a month
later. Whenever she viewed it, the email charged her with notice that at the latest, a
lawsuit had to be commenced within ninety days of August 23, 2022. Accordingly,
the deadline to file a lawsuit was November 21, 2022. Instead, Ms. Edwards filed it
on November 22, 2022, ninety-one days from August 23, 2022. Because of this delay
(which was unnecessary), Mr. Goodwin’s lawsuit is untimely by one day.
To hold otherwise would allow precisely what the Eleventh Circuit has
consistently disallowed for decades—“a manipulable open-ended time extension
which would render the statutory limitation meaningless,” Law, 713 F.2d at 693
(cleaned up), and enable plaintiffs to abdicate the “minimum responsibility” they
must assume “for an orderly and expeditious resolution” of their dispute, Kerr, 427
F.3d at 952 (cleaned up). Documents are often viewed after they are received, and
the statutory deadline does not shift to the lawyer’s circumstances or convenience.
Ninety days is ample cushion to allow the timely preparation and filing of a lawsuit
even if a lawyer does not view an RTS the exact day it is received. A “received when
viewed” rule would be ripe for the kind of manipulation that circuit precedent has
guarded against.
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This rule does not obligate parties to check their emails late into the evening
or refrain from attending to other responsibilities or going on vacations to monitor
email. It merely requires that once a lawyer or party has knowledge that an important
communication was transmitted on a particular date, they must perform their duties
timely thereafter.
There is no dispute that on August 24, 2022, Ms. Edwards had knowledge that
as of August 23, 2022, a final decision had been made and the RTS had been issued.
Doc. 12-4 at 2; Doc. 39-5 at 11; Doc. 39-1 at 27, Dep. 101:2–15. This required her
to file the lawsuit within ninety days of August 23, 2022. By filing this lawsuit
ninety-one days from August 23, 2022, she did not assume the minimum
responsibility for an orderly and expeditious resolution of Mr. Goodwin’s dispute.
This court’s ruling aligns with Paniconi as well as another district court in
Pennsylvania. See McNaney v. Sampson & Morris Grp., Inc., No. 2:21-cv-1809,
2022 WL 1017388 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2022). In McNaney, the plaintiff’s counsel
received an email notification from the EEOC on August 20, 2021, stating that the
“EEOC has made a decision [in this case]. It is very important that you download
and retain a copy of this document. You may review this decision by logging into
the EEOC Respondent Portal.” Id. at *2 (cleaned up). Counsel made no attempts to
access the document. Id. at *4. On September 15, 2021, the plaintiff received a hard
copy of the RTS. Id. at *3. The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit more than ninety days
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after August 20, 2021. Id. She argued that the lawsuit was timely because it was filed
within ninety days of receiving the hard copy RTS on September 15, 2021. Id. The
court held that the ninety-day period began on August 20, 2021, when the EEOC
emailed counsel to notify him that a decision had been made in the plaintiff’s case
and provided him access to that decision. Id. at *4. The court highlighted from that
email the phrase, “[i]t is very important that you download and retain a copy of this
document.” Id. (cleaned up). The relevant email in McNaney is identical to the
EEOC’s email of August 23, 2022, in this case. Compare Doc. 39-5 at 11, with
McNaney, 2022 WL 1017388, at *4.
E. Equitable Tolling
Ms. Edwards argues that equitable tolling applies in the event that this court
finds Mr. Goodwin’s lawsuit untimely. Doc. 44 at 30–32. “Equitable tolling is
appropriate when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances
that are both beyond [their] control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Stamper,
863 F.3d at 1342 (cleaned up). The movant “bears the burden of proving that
equitable tolling . . . is appropriate,” id., and “must establish that tolling is warranted”
because it “is an extraordinary remedy which should be extended only sparingly,”
Bost v. Fed. Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up); see
also Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., 232 F.3d 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the EEOC’s reissuance of a second RTS to correct a technical defect did not
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equitably toll the statutory filing period under Title VII or the ADEA, because the
complainant had actual knowledge of the first RTS); Espinoza v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co.,
754 F.2d 1247, 1250–51 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the mere fact that the employee
was out of town when the RTS arrived at his home did not serve to toll the ninetyday period because the employee still had eighty two days remaining following his
return home); Adebiyi v. City of Riverdale, No. 1:09-cv-0025-RWS-JFK, 2010 WL
11493635, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2010) (holding that a slight delay of fifteen days
in receiving the RTS did not toll the period because plaintiff still had seventy-nine
days to file a timely complaint).
Ms. Edwards argues that equitable tolling applies because she was unable to
access Mr. Goodwin’s documents on the online portal despite several attempts. Doc.
44 at 30–32. She attributes this issue to a glitch in the EEOC’s system, not any fault
of her own, and characterizes the issue as an extraordinary circumstance. See id.
Strickland asserts that the inability to access the portal is not extraordinary,
especially considering that Ms. Edwards had eighty-nine days after receiving the
hard copy RTS on August 24, 2022, to file the lawsuit. See Doc. 38 at 16–18.
Glitch or not, there is no basis for equitable tolling here. Ms. Edwards admits
that she had actual notice of the RTS on August 24, 2022, and she makes no
argument that eighty-nine days was insufficient.
IV.

CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Goodwin’s lawsuit is untimely. Accordingly,
Strickland’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and the Clerk of the
Court is DIRECTED to close the case.
DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of March, 2025.

_________________________________
ANNA M. MANASCO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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