Butler v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION: Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of Ms. Butler's applications for disability insurance benefits and SSI. Accordingly, the court WILL AFFIRM the Commissioner's decision. The court will enter a separate order consistent with this memorandum opinion. Signed by Judge Annemarie Carney Axon on 3/11/2025. (CLC)

FILED
2025 Mar-11 PM 02:56
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHEIANNE MARLENE-ELOISE
BUTLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMISSIONER,
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRTAION,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:24-cv-172-ACA

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Sheianne Marlene-Eloise Butler appeals the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security finding Ms. Butler not disabled. (Doc. 1). Based
on the court’s review of the administrative record and the parties’ briefs, the court
WILL AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February 2021, Ms. Butler applied for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income (SSI) benefits, alleging disability beginning May 14,
2006. (Doc. 6-3 at 11; doc. 6-7 at 15–32). The Commissioner initially denied both
claims (doc. 6-3 at 11; doc. 6-5 at 12–28), and Ms. Butler requested a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (doc. 6-5 at 50). After holding a hearing (doc.
6-3 at 45–65), the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision (id. at 26). The Appeals

Council denied Ms. Butler’s request for review (doc. 6-3 at 2), making the
Commissioner’s decision final and ripe for the court’s judicial review. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is
a narrow one. The court “must determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Winschel v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks
omitted). “Under the substantial evidence standard, this court will affirm the ALJ’s
decision if there exists such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Henry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264,
1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The court may not “decide the
facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].”
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quotation marks omitted). The court must affirm
“[e]ven if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings.”
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quotation marks omitted).
Despite the deferential standard for review of claims, the court must
“scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.” Henry, 802 F.3d at 1267 (quotation marks
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omitted). Moreover, the court must reverse the Commissioner’s decision if the ALJ
does not apply the correct legal standards. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143,
1145–46 (11th Cir. 1991).
To determine whether an individual is disabled, an ALJ follows a five-step
sequential evaluation process. The ALJ considers:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or
equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of
Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past
relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are
significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant
can perform given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work
experience.
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178.
III.

EVIDENCE AND ALJ’S DECISION

The court begins by describing the evidence submitted to the ALJ, followed
by the ALJ’s decision.
As a child, Ms. Butler’s “[m]ilestones occurred on time, except for speech as
there were some difficulties with articulation.” (Doc. 6-9 at 24). Beginning in 2006
at the age of four, Ms. Butler was sexually abused on at least two occasions, which
resulted in Ms. Butler’s posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and forced her
family to move to a different state. (Doc. 6-11 at 118; doc. 6-10 at 145; doc. 6-13 at
16, 18). Throughout Ms. Butler’s childhood, her family experienced significant
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stressors, including financial and mental health struggles (see, e.g., doc. 6-9 at 24,
82, 101–04). From elementary school through high school, Ms. Butler was in special
education and had an individualized education program (“IEP”). (Id. at 99; doc. 610 at 104).
Around 2010, Ms. Butler was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (“ADHD”), a learning disorder, and a phonological disorder. (Doc. 6-9 at
24, 29). At this time, Ms. Butler took medication for her ADHD, and “her report
card reflected all [satisfactory marks].” (Id. at 40). By the end of second grade,
however, Ms. Butler received unsatisfactory marks in reading and math. (Id. at 120–
21).
Also in 2010, the family was evicted from their home and moved across the
country, resulting in Ms. Butler’s exhibition of behavioral problems such as not
listening and using profanity. (Id. at 39). The cross-country move was unsuccessful,
and Ms. Butler’s family moved back to their previous state. (Doc. 6-9 at 57). The
record reflects that Ms. Butler has some suicidal ideation and/or attempted suicide
from she was a child. (See doc. 6-9 at 97 (discussing Ms. Butler’s past suicide
attempt prompting a change in medication in 2009); doc. 6-12 at 48 (stating that
“Ms. Butler has a history of suicidal thoughts but has never made an attempt”); but
see doc. 6-11 at 116 (stating that Ms. Butler “has no history of suicidal or homicidal

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ideation”)). In early 2011, Ms. Butler was treated for symptoms of ADHD, a
learning disorder, and a phonological disorder. (Doc. 6-9 at 39).
In 2013, Ms. Butler’s school psychologist evaluated her as having “clinically
significant” anxiety, attention, learning, and functional communication problems.
(Doc. 6-10 at 131). Ms. Butler was “at risk” for adaptability, social skills, leadership,
and study skills problems. (Id.). And Ms. Butler was “average” as to hyperactivity,
aggression, conduct problems, depression, and withdrawal problems. (Id.). In
October 2016, Ms. Butler’s school system notified Ms. Butler’s parents that she was
“eligible for special education services as a student . . . with a specific learning
disability.” (Doc. 6-10 at 123). In high school, Ms. Butler had a third grade reading
level and a fourth grade math level. (Id. at 109). In December 2017, Ms. Butler began
to see Sandhya Rajasekhara, M.D., who eventually diagnosed Ms. Butler with
PTSD. (Doc. 6-10 at 57, 59).
In September 2018, a student sent Ms. Butler a sexually explicit photo on
social media, which triggered her PTSD. (Doc. 6-10 at 143). At this time, Ms. Butler
had “trouble getting out of bed and going to school” due to paranoia, so
Dr. Rajasekhara ordered Ms. Butler to be educated via homebound special education
services, in which a special education teacher taught Ms. Butler at her house for a
few hours per week. (Doc. 6-3 at 56–57; doc. 6-10 at 73; doc. 6-11 at 20; doc. 6-10
at 88). Ms. Butler’s homebound teacher indicated that Ms. Butler had “serious”
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problems with math, expressing ideas in written form, and applying problem solving
skills; and “obvious” problems with understanding vocabulary, reading
comprehension, articulating explanations, learning new material, recalling
previously learned material, focusing long enough to finish assignments, carrying
out multi-step instructions, and working at a reasonable pace. (Doc. 6-10 at 89–90).
In all other areas, Ms. Butler had “no” or “slight” problems. (Id.). In February 2020,
Ms. Butler graduated from high school with a 1.6 grade point average. (Doc. 6-11 at
2–3).
Prior to reaching the age of eighteen, Ms. Butler applied for and received child
disability services for ADHD, bipolar disorder, and PTSD. (See doc. 6-11 at 115).
In December 2018, at the request of the Social Security Administration, Ms. Butler
saw Glenn Shean, PhD, who opined that she was “guarded,” her affect was flat, and
she was withdrawn from social contacts and refused to go to school due to the
pornographic photo incident described above. (Doc. 6-10 at 142–43). Dr. Shean
wrote that Ms. Butler had a low average to borderline functional cognitive
processing range, poor short- and long-term memories, and marginal working
memory. (Id. at 144). Ms. Butler could do serial threes and simple similarities, but
could not spell words backward, recall the capital of her home state, or do serial
sevens. (Id.). He diagnosed her with PTSD and recommended that Ms. Butler return
to counseling to deal with her anxiety and trauma. (Id. at 145). Finally, he found that
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Ms. Butler would not be able to function in a “school [or] work context” or interact
with coworkers and classmates. (Doc. 6-10 at 145).
After Ms. Butler turned eighteen, her benefits were discontinued. (See doc. 611 at 115). In order to continue her benefits, Ms. Butler submitted new applications
for disability and SSI benefits and subsequently saw several medical examiners.
(Doc. 6-7 at 15–32). In May 2021, Ms. Butler saw Daniel Walter, PsyD, who
diagnosed Ms. Butler with ADHD, a severe learning disorder, and severe traumaand stressor-related disorders. (Doc. 6-4 at 3, 6). He opined that the records showed
a learning disorder, PTSD, and ADHD, but that “[d]ue to failure to cooperate, there
[wa]s insufficient evidence to make a decision” about her claim. (Id. at 5).
In October 2021, Ms. Butler saw Karen Russell, PsyD, who diagnosed her
with an anxiety disorder. (Doc. 6-11 at 115). Dr. Russell remarked that Ms. Butler
enjoyed taking care of her family’s pets, cooking, and helping her mother clean. (Id.
at 116). Ms. Butler reported that her therapist encouraged her to get outside of the
house more and look for a job, although a recent trip to the pharmacy with her father
made her feel “overheated.” (Id.). Dr. Russell wrote that Ms. Butler was fully
independent with all activities of daily living, engaged in her own hygiene, had no
difficulty sleeping, and met no criteria for a manic episode. (Id. at 116). At this
examination, Ms. Butler reported no significant depression or anxiety symptoms,
stating that anxiety symptoms only occurred when “forced to be in social situations
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without one of her parents.” (Doc. 6-11 at 116). Dr. Russell stated that Ms. Butler
was hopeful to find a job coach and start leaving the house without her parents more
often. (Id.). At the appointment, Ms. Butler was “relaxed,” “alert,” and “fully
oriented.” (Id.).
Dr. Russell then administered a WAIS-IV intelligence test, on which
Ms. Butler scored a 71 on full scale IQ, 81 on verbal comprehension, 77 on
perceptual reasoning index, 60 on working memory index, and 81 on processing
speed index. (Id. at 117). These scores were in “extremely low” to “low average”
ranges. (Doc. 6-11 at 117). Dr. Russell found that Ms. Butler was “fully functional”
with strong verbal comprehension despite weak working memory and visual-spatial
planning. (Id.). Based on the results of the examination, Dr. Russell concluded that
Ms. Butler had the full mental capacity to maintain regular attendance in a work
setting, even if she needs to start working from home at first. (Id. at 118).
Upon reconsideration, in November 2021, Ms. Butler saw Stephen Saxby,
PhD, who also diagnosed her with a learning disorder and trauma- and stressorrelated disorders. (Doc. 6-4 at 14). After summarizing previous medical
examinations in the record, Dr. Saxby remarked that Ms. Butler had normal memory
and attention span, could occasionally accompany her mom on grocery store visits,
and could occasionally visit her family members. (Id. at 18).

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The record also contains treatment notes from Ms. Butler’s therapist,
Anthony Foy, LCSW, in from late 2019 through 2021. (See generally doc. 6-12).
Mr. Foy diagnosed Ms. Butler with bipolar II disorder and ADHD. (See e.g., id. at
50). Mr. Foy appears to be the only provider who has diagnosed Ms. Butler with
bipolar disorder. (See id.; but see doc. 6-11 at 116) (Dr. Russell describing
Ms. Butler’s bipolar disorder as “questionable”)).
At intake, Mr. Foy described Ms. Butler as “friendly, attentive,
communicative, and relaxed.” (Doc. 6-12 at 50). She exhibited “logical thinking”
and no signs of hallucinations, delusions, or other indicators of psychotic process.
(Id.). Mr. Foy wrote that she had “cognitive functioning in the normal range,” “no
signs of anxiety,” and no hyperactive or attentional difficulties. (Id.). From January
to March 2020, Ms. Butler worked with Mr. Foy to reprocess some of her traumatic
memories, leading her to feel stabilized at the end of the session, although she often
expressed anxiety during each session. (See e.g., doc. 6-12 at 36, 42). Ms. Butler
reported good medication compliance, normal family and friend relationships, wellcontrolled anger or no outbursts, no impulsive behaviors, and she was not confused.
(Id.). During her June 2020 visits with Dr. Foy, Ms. Butler reported no intrusive,
traumatic memories (id. at 28), though she had anxiety about job applications and
online dating (id. at 30, 32).

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In July 2020, Ms. Butler discussed family problems with Mr. Foy. (Doc. 6-12
at 24). She also reported social anxiety and told him that she did not feel comfortable
in crowds. (Id.). She did not feel depressed. (Id. at 26). Mr. Foy wrote that Ms. Butler
had anxiety about getting a job, but that she had the desire to work and had filled out
an application with the local humane society. (Id.). He also wrote that she was
“delayed in responding to questions and often needs to ask for clarification for
meaning of questions.” (Doc. 6-12 at 26). During her visits in July 2020, Ms. Butler’s
self-care skills were intact, she displayed well-controlled or no anger, had normal
friend and family relationships, and was sleeping regularly, though at times,
excessively. (Id. at 24, 26).
In August 2020, Ms. Butler and her mother spoke to Mr. Foy about medication
compliance because Ms. Butler was not letting her mother know ahead of time that
her medication needed refills. (Doc. 6-12 at 18). Ms. Butler displayed no anger and
was “not struggling with past memory related to childhood sexual trauma.” (Id. at
22). A month later, Ms. Butler reported some anger outbursts and indicated that her
anxiety that was keeping her from obtaining employment. (Id. at 16).
A year later, Ms. Butler displayed symptoms of anxiety, depression, and
PTSD at her sessions; felt irritable; reported recent anger outbursts; and verbalized
recurring traumatic memories. (Doc. 6-12 at 4). Mr. Foy explained that Ms. Butler
had made little progress getting out of the house and finding a job due to her social
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anxiety and “poor follow[-]through in getting applications in.” (Id. at 5). Despite her
“minimal response to treatment,” Mr. Foy reported that Ms. Butler exhibited no
signs of cognitive difficulty or abnormal attention span. (Id. at 4, 5).
In the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ determined that Ms. Butler had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since her May 14, 2006 alleged onset date. (Doc. 6-3 at
13). The ALJ found that Ms. Butler’s anxiety disorder and PTSD were severe
impairments, but that Ms. Butler’s borderline intellectual functioning and prior
diagnoses for major depressive disorder, bipolar II disorder, and ADHD were not
medically determinable impairments because they were not diagnosed by acceptable
medical sources since Ms. Butler turned eighteen. (Id. at 13–14). The ALJ then
concluded that Ms. Butler does not suffer from an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 13–16).
After considering the evidence in the record, the ALJ determined that
Ms. Butler “has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at
all exertional levels but with” several “nonexertional limitations,” such as limiting
work to “simple, routine tasks at a non-production rate pace”; “simple work-related
decisions”; only “occasional[] interact[ion] with supervisors and . . . coworkers, but
no tandem work”; no interaction with the public; and “few changes in a routine work
setting.” (Doc. 6-3 at 17). Based on this residual functional capacity and the
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testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Ms. Butler could perform jobs
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy such as laboratory cleaner,
hand bander, and sticker. (Id. at 25). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that
Ms. Butler had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,
from her alleged May 14, 2006 onset date through the date of the decision. (Id. at
26).
IV.

DISCUSSION

Ms. Butler argues that the court should reverse and remand the
Commissioner’s decision on the ground that the ALJ erred in evaluating Ms. Butler’s
mental impairments under the five-step sequential evaluation process, specifically at
steps two, three, and four. (Doc. 12 at 15–24).
1.

The ALJ Did Not Err at Step Two

Ms. Butler argues that the ALJ erred at step two by finding that Ms. Butler’s
learning disorder and ADHD were not medically determinable impairments. (Id. at
16). Ms. Butler contends that the ALJ ignored several acceptable medical sources
who diagnosed her with a learning disability and/or severe ADHD. (Doc. 12 at 17;
see, e.g., doc. 6-4 at 11 (Dr. Walter); id. at 18 (Dr. Saxby); doc. 6-11 at 117
(Dr. Russell)). According to Ms. Butler, the ALJ’s finding involved the cherrypicking of facts in the record, which she argues is legal error. (Doc. 12 at 17) (citing
Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 869 (11th Cir. 2017)).
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But Ms. Butler has not demonstrated that the omission of other severe
impairments at step two resulted in “fundamental unfairness or prejudice.” Raper v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 89 F.4th 1261, 1274 n.11 (11th Cir. 2024); see also Flowers v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 97 F.4th 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2024) (finding harmless
error where the plaintiff failed to show that his argument would make any difference
to his application for disability benefits). When an ALJ recognizes at least one severe
impairment and proceeds to step three of the sequential evaluation process, he is not
required to identify additional impairments if he properly considered all impairments
at subsequent steps. See Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 Fed. App’x
949, 951 (11th Cir. 2014);1 see also Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir.
1987) (Step two serves as a “a filter” which, so long as any severe medical
impairment is found, allows the ALJ to proceed with the rest of the five-step
analysis.).
Here, the ALJ recognized Ms. Butler’s anxiety disorder and PTSD as severe
impairments, which allowed him to proceed with the evaluation process. (Doc. 6-3
at 14; see id. at 14–26). And the ALJ considered Ms. Butler’s learning disorder and
attention span at step four when he determined Ms. Butler’s residual functional
capacity. (See id. at 18 (noting that “Ms. Butler had an IEP [in high school] because

1

Although Tuggerson-Brown is an unpublished opinion, the court finds it persuasive. See
McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, 1060 (11th Cir. 2022).
13

of a specific learning disability”) (emphasis added); id. at 20, 21, 23 (describing
Mr. Foy’s psychotherapy notes indicating that Ms. Butler “had a normal attention
span”) (emphasis added); doc. 6-3 at 22 (considering Dr. Saxby’s finding that
Ms. Butler could “maintain concentration and attention for two[-]hour periods”)
(emphasis added)). Because the ALJ found at least one severe impairment and
properly considered the other impairments at subsequent steps, the ALJ did not err
at step two.
2.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Determination at Step
Three

Ms. Butler next argues that the ALJ erred at step three by finding that she
failed to meet Listing 12.05(B) found in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
(Doc. 12 at 18–24). As it relates to Ms. Butler, Listing 12.05(B) requires: (1) a full
scale IQ score of seventy through seventy-five; and (2) a qualifying part score—in
verbal, performance, or any comparable part—of seventy or below; and
(3) “significant deficits in adaptive functioning currently manifested by extreme
limitation of one, or marked limitation” in: (a) understanding, remembering, or
applying information; (b) interacting with others; (c) concentrating, persisting, or
maintaining pace; or (d) adapting or managing oneself; and (4) that the evidence
demonstrates the disorder began before age twenty-two. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
App’x. 1 at § 12.05(B)(1)–(2).

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A claimant bears the burden of proving that she meets or equals a listed
impairment. Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 229 (11th Cir. 1991). “To meet a
Listing, a claimant must have a diagnosis included in the Listings and must provide
medical reports documenting that the conditions meet the specific criteria of the
Listings and the duration requirement.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224
(11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). “To equal a listing, the medical findings
must be at least equal in severity and duration to the listed findings.” Id. at 1224
(quotation marks omitted).
Ms. Butler makes three criticisms of the ALJ’s determination at step three.
First, Ms. Butler argues the ALJ’s finding of moderate deficits in adaptive
functioning lacks substantial evidence on the record. (Doc. 12 at 19–25); see 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x. 1 at § 12.05(B)(2). The ALJ acknowledged that
although Ms. Butler struggled to leave the house on her own because of her anxiety,
she could handle many activities by herself, such as personal care, household chores,
online communication, eating and sleeping, and caring for pets. (See doc. 6-3 at 15).
In support of this finding, the ALJ cited to Dr. Russell’s evaluation of Ms. Butler.
(Id.) (citing doc. 6-11 at 116 (noting that Ms. Butler “enjoys taking care of all of her
animals” and cooking, “is fully independent with all activities of daily living,” “can
navigate her cell phone,” and has no difficulty sleeping)). Accordingly, substantial

15

evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. Henry, 802 F.3d at 1267 (11th Cir.
2015).
Second, Ms. Butler asserts that the ALJ failed to recognize her working
memory index score of sixty as a qualifying “comparable part” score. (Doc. 12 at
18); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x. 1 at § 12.05(B)(1). The ALJ found that
although Ms. Butler had a qualifying full scale IQ score of seventy-one, she did not
have an accompanying verbal or performance IQ score of seventy or below. (Doc.
6-3 at 17). The ALJ then noted that Ms. Butler received a working memory score of
sixty. (Doc. 6-3 at 17). Ms. Butler argues that her working memory score of sixty
was a qualifying comparable part score that entitled her to meet Listing 12.05(B)(1).
Ms. Butler again fails to show how this error prejudiced her. See Raper, 89
F.4th at 1274 n.11; Flowers, 97 F.4th at 1307. Regardless of whether Ms. Butler
meets Listing 12.05(B)(1) with a working memory score of sixty, the ALJ found that
Ms. Butler did not meet Listing 12.05(B)(2) because her deficits in adaptive
functioning were only moderate. (Doc. 6-3 at 14–16). As discussed above, the court
finds that the ALJ’s determination about Ms. Butler’s moderate deficit in adaptive
functioning is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, any error in the ALJ’s
identification of qualifying IQ scores is harmless.
Third, Ms. Butler contends that the ALJ incorrectly applied Social Security
Administration regulations when he used activities requiring assistance or
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accommodations as the bases for finding only moderate deficits in adaptive
functioning. (Doc. 12 at 22–24) (citing 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x. 1 at
§ 12.00(F)(2), 12.00(H)(3)(d)(2)). But as stated in the preceding section, the ALJ
relied, at least in part, on Dr. Russell’s evaluation of Ms. Butler. (Doc. 6-3 at 17).
And Dr. Russell explicitly found that Ms. Butler was “fully independent with all
activities of daily living.” (Doc. 6-11 at 116). The ALJ’s determination of
Ms. Butler’s moderate deficit in adaptive functioning is therefore supported by
substantial evidence. Henry, 802 F.3d at 1267.
3.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Determination at Step
Three

Finally, Ms. Butler argues that the ALJ erred in his residual functional
capacity determination for the same reason that he erred in finding that Ms. Butler
had only moderate deficits in adaptive functioning: he did not consider her ability to
function independently. (Doc. 12 at 24). But this argument fails for the same reason
it fails above. The ALJ specifically considered Dr. Russell’s notes on Ms. Butler’s
“full[] independen[ce] in activities of daily living,” including cooking and “taking
care of all of her animals,” in determining Ms. Butler’s residual functional capacity.
(Doc. 6-3 at 20) (citing doc. 6-11 at 116). Thus, the ALJ’s residual functional
capacity determination is supported by substantial evidence. Henry, 802 F.3d at
1267.

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V.

CONCLUSION

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s denial of Ms. Butler’s applications
for disability insurance benefits and SSI. Accordingly, the court WILL AFFIRM
the Commissioner’s decision.
The court will enter a separate order consistent with this memorandum
opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this March 11, 2025.

_________________________________
ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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