Roddy et al v. City of Sheffield, Alabama et al

Filing 120

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING CASE that the motions for summary judgment are GRANTED; Defendants' motion to supplement their evidentiary submissions in support of summary judgment, and plaintiffs' motion to strike the affidavit of Madison County Assistant District Attorney James Tolleson, are DENIED as moot; Plaintiffs' claims are DISMISSED with prejudice; Costs are taxed to plaintiffs as more fully set out in order. Signed by Judge C Lynwood Smith, Jr on 5/23/2013. (AHI) Modified on 5/24/2013 (AHI).

FILED
2013 May-24 AM 08:13
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHWESTERN DIVISION
WILLIAM MEYER RODDY and
WENDY SUE RODDY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF HUNTSVILLE,
ALABAMA, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. CV-11-S-4355-NW

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Dr. William Meyer Roddy, M.D., and his wife, Wendy Sue Roddy, allege that
the City of Huntsville, Alabama, and two of its police officers violated rights
protected by the United States Constitution and state laws during a series of events
that flowed from a search of a Huntsville hotel room shared by the Roddys and their
children.1 That search resulted in plaintiffs’ arrests on drug charges that later were
voluntarily dismissed by an Assistant State District Attorney.2
Plaintiffs’ original complaint was not limited to just the three defendants
discussed in this opinion. Instead, it scattered claims like a shotgun blast at two
municipal corporations — the Cities of Sheffield and Huntsville, Alabama — and six

1

See doc. no. 72 (Second Amended Complaint).

2

Id. ¶ 29.

Huntsville police officers: i.e., Sergeant Jason Ramsey and uniformed patrol officers
Terry Lucas, Clarence Thornberry, Brett McCulley, Dewayne McCarver, and
Anthony E. McElyea.3 This court subsequently dismissed with prejudice the claims
against Officers Thornberry, McCulley, McCarver, and McElyea.4
Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint, again asserting claims against the
Cities of Sheffield and Huntsville, two Huntsville police officers (Sergeant Jason
Ramsey and Officer Terry Lucas), and a person not previously named, Madison
County Deputy Sheriff Eddie McDaniel.5 This court subsequently dismissed without
prejudice the claims against the City of Sheffield, pursuant to the parties’ joint
stipulation of dismissal.6 This court also granted the motion to dismiss filed by
Madison County Deputy Sheriff Eddie McDaniel, and dismissed with prejudice the
state-law claims asserted against him for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and
without prejudice the federal claims asserted against him for failure to comply with
federal pleading standards.7
3

See doc. no. 1 (Complaint).

4

The claims against Officer Thornberry were dismissed pursuant to plaintiffs’ motion for
dismissal, and the claims against Officers McCulley, McCarver, and McElyea were dismissed
pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation of dismissal. See doc. nos. 14 (Motion to Dismiss); doc. no.
16 (Order Dismissing Fewer than All Defendants); doc. no. 17 (Stipulation of Dismissal); doc. no.
18 (Order Entered February 21, 2012).
5

See doc. no. 26 (First Amended Complaint).

6

See doc. no. 27 (Stipulation of Dismissal); doc. no. 28 (Order Entered March 30, 2012).

7

See doc. no. 35 (Motion to Dismiss) ;doc. no. 66 (Memorandum Opinion and Order), at 18.

2

Plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint, asserting claims against the
City of Huntsville, two of its police officers (Sergeant Jason Ramsey and Officer
Terry Lucas), and Madison County Deputy Sheriff Eddie McDaniel.8 This court
subsequently dismissed without prejudice the claims against Deputy McDaniel in
accordance with plaintiffs’ motion for dismissal.9
Thus, the only claims that remain pending are those based upon the United
States Constitution and asserted through the remedial vehicle of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the City of Huntsville, Huntsville Police Sergeant Jason Ramsey, and
Huntsville Police Officer Terry Lucas for an illegal search, unlawful arrest, and false
imprisonment.10 In addition, the second amended complaint asserts supplemental
state-law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and
conversion against all three defendants,11 and an “outrage” claim against the
individual police officers.12
The action now is before the court on the defendants’ motions for summary

8

See doc. no. 72 (Second Amended Complaint). Although the second amended complaint
also includes the City of Sheffield in the caption of the case, that appears to be an error, because
plaintiffs do not address Sheffield in their discussion of each of the defendants, see id. ¶¶ 5-9, and
do not assert any claims against that municipal corporation. See id. ¶¶ 32-54.
9

See doc. no. 81 (Motion to Dismiss); doc. no. 83 (Order Entered February 19, 2013).

10

Doc. no. 72 (Second Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 32-41.

11

Id. ¶¶ 42-51.

12

Id. ¶¶ 52-54.

3

judgment.13 Defendants also have moved to supplement their evidentiary submissions
in support of summary judgment, and plaintiffs have moved to strike the affidavit of
Madison County Assistant District Attorney James Tolleson.14 Upon consideration,
this court will grant all motions for summary judgment, and deny the parties’
remaining motions as moot.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 indicates that summary judgment “should
be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[T]he
plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (alteration supplied).
In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and
13

See doc. no. 87 (Motion for Summary Judgment by the City of Huntsville); doc. no. 88
(Motion for Summary Judgment by Sergeant Ramsey); doc. no. 89 (Motion for Summary Judgment
by Officer Lucas).
14

See doc. no. 115 (Motion to Supplement Evidentiary Submissions); doc. no. 117 (Motion
to Strike).

4

make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary
judgment.
[However,] [t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not
defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an
issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of
substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine
issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable [factfinder] to return a
verdict in its favor.
Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal
citations omitted) (alterations and emphasis suppled).
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS
The claims in this case were precipitated by the actions of a person who was
not a party to the action: Mr. Rowdy Meadows, who was staying with his family at
the “Embassy Suites” hotel in Huntsville, Alabama on Saturday, March 20, 2010.15
Mr. Meadows escorted his children and those of his sister to the hotel pool.16 While
there, he saw an older boy dunking a younger boy.17 Something about the behavior
of the older boy caused Meadows to become concerned for the safety of the younger
one because, after Meadows witnessed the third dunk, he demanded that the older boy
“stop!”18 The boys turned out to be Asher and Cameron Roddy, two of the plaintiffs’
15

Doc. no. 91-13 (Deposition of Rowdy Meadows), at 28-29.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

5

three sons.19 The boys later said that Rowdy Meadows approached them, pointed at
Asher (presumably, the older boy), and repeatedly screamed, “You!”20 Meadows
demanded that both boys “get out of the pool.”21 He “appeared very angry,” and the
boys were “afraid” of him.22 They returned to their hotel room and told their parents
about the incident.23
The following morning, Dr. William Roddy approached Rowdy Meadows in
the hotel restaurant.24 Dr. Roddy said that he did so only because he wanted to
determine what had occurred at the pool, in order to decide whether to punish his sons
for “roughhousing.”25 Nevertheless, Meadows and Dr. Roddy later recounted very
different versions of the ensuing conversation.

19

See doc. no. 102-1 (Declaration of Asher Roddy); doc. no. 102-2 (Declaration of Cameron

Roddy).
20

Doc. no. 102-1 (Declaration of Asher Roddy) ¶ 4; doc. no. 102-2 (Declaration of Cameron
Roddy) ¶ 4.
21

Doc. no. 102-1 (Declaration of Asher Roddy) ¶ 4; doc. no. 102-2 (Declaration of Cameron
Roddy) ¶ 4.
22

Doc. no. 102-1 (Declaration of Asher Roddy) ¶¶ 4-4; doc. no. 102-2 (Declaration of
Cameron Roddy) ¶¶ 4-4. That testimony appears in two consecutive paragraphs, both designated
as “4.”
23

Doc. no. 102-1 (Declaration of Asher Roddy) ¶¶ 4-4; doc. no. 102-2 (Declaration of
Cameron Roddy) ¶¶ 4-4. As noted in the preceding footnote, that testimony appears in two
consecutive paragraphs, both designated as “4.”
24

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 53-54; doc. no. 91-13 (Deposition
of Rowdy Meadows), at 46-48, 52, 60; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1
(STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 1 [D7].
25

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 43, 50, 52; doc. no. 91-2
(Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 43.

6

Dr. Roddy says that he merely asked Rowdy Meadows to tell him what had
occurred at the hotel pool.26 Meadows, on the other hand, asserts that Dr. Roddy
introduced himself as “Judge William Roddy.”27 Meadows alleges that he explained
to Dr. Roddy what had occurred with the two boys at the hotel pool.28 When
Meadows attempted to leave, Dr. Roddy said, “I am not done with you . . . You are
not going to leave.”29 He then bumped into Meadows and flashed a gun from the left
front pocket of his pants.30
Dr. Roddy denies introducing himself as “Judge William Roddy.”31 He asserts
that he merely asked Rowdy Meadows what had transpired at the pool,32 in order “to
judge” whether Meadows or his sons were telling the truth.33 Before Dr. Roddy
understood Meadows’s version of the incident, Meadows attempted to leave the
area.34 Dr. Roddy alleges that he followed Meadows in order to give him a business

26

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 57-58.

27

Doc. no. 91-13 (Deposition of Rowdy Meadows), at 46-48, 52, 60; doc. no. 91-23
(Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 1 [D7].
28

Doc. no. 91-13 (Deposition of Rowdy Meadows), at 47-48, 51-55.

29

Id. at 61-62.

30

Id. at 63-67, 103-04; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC
Report Case No. V10-244), at 1 [D7].
31

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 58; doc. no. 102-3 (Declaration
of William Meyer Roddy) ¶ 2.
32

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 57-58.

33

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 57-58.

34

Id. at 59-60.

7

card.35 When Dr. Roddy said “Let me give you this,” and reached into his pants
pocket to retrieve the business card, the handle of Dr. Roddy’s handgun protruded
from the pocket.36 Dr. Roddy neither removed the gun from his pocket, nor aimed the
gun at Meadows.37
Regardless of Dr. Roddy’s subjective purpose when reaching into his pants
pocket, his possession of a pistol was revealed to Rowdy Meadows; and, when
Meadows saw the gun, he yelled “at the woman at the front desk to call the police .
. . . [because a] man had pulled a gun on [him] in the lobby.”38 The “woman at the
front desk” was Jolene Heckman, a manager at the Embassy Suites.39 Dr. Roddy then
approached Ms. Heckman and admitted to having a gun.40 He asserts that he also told
Ms. Heckman that he had a gun permit.41
Like Meadows, Hotel Manager Jolene Heckman alleges that Dr. Roddy
35

Id.

36

Id. at 63.

37

Id.; doc. no. 91-13 (Deposition of Rowdy Meadows), at 66-67, 104.

38

Doc. no. 91-13 (Deposition of Rowdy Meadows), at 64 (alterations supplied).

39

See doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 63, 65-66; doc. no. 91-13
(Deposition of Rowdy Meadows), at 64, 67-70, 73, 104; doc. no. 91-15 (Affidavit of Manager
Heckman) ¶ 3; doc. no. 91-18 (Affidavit of Captain Dauro), Tab 1 (911 Call), at [D1] [Track one,
0:25-0:35]; id., Tab 2 (Call for service); doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1
(STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 1 [D7].
40

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 65-66, 75; doc. no. 91-13
(Deposition of Rowdy Meadows), at 71-76; doc. no. 91-15 (Affidavit of Manager Heckman) ¶¶ 4,
6, 9.
41

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 66, 275.

8

claimed to be a “Judge.”42 Further, Ms. Heckman asserts that Dr. Roddy appeared to
her to be “under the influence of drugs and/or [have] mental problems because he
acted strangely, was fidgeting back and forth as Mr. Meadows was talking, and
seemed out of it, not focused, and confused about the situation. He also acted hypedup and jumpy.”43
Dr. Roddy denies telling Hotel Manager Jolene Heckman that he was a
“Judge,” but admits that he had ingested one 20 milligram Oxycontin pill earlier on
the morning of his confrontation with Rowdy Meadows44 — pain medication that is
treated as a form of synthetic heroin.45 Even so, he denies that he was under the
influence of drugs or any other intoxicants to the extent of impairment.46
In any event, a telephone call was placed to the “911” emergency response
center by either Hotel Manager Jolene Heckman or Guest Service Agent Tristan
Soto.47 Huntsville Police Officers David Anderson, Jason Brightwell, Bert Howle,
42

Doc. no. 91-15 (Affidavit of Manager Heckman) ¶ 9.

43

Id. ¶ 10 (alteration supplied).

44

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 275; doc. no. 102-3 (Declaration
of William Meyer Roddy) ¶¶ 2-3.
45

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 275; see also Alabama Code § 202-23 (1975) (Listing of Schedule I Controlled Substances); id. § 20-2-25 (1975) (Listing of Schedule
II Controlled Substances).
46

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 66, 275; doc. no. 102-3
(Declaration of William Meyer Roddy) ¶¶ 2-3.
47

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 65-66; doc. no. 91-13 (Deposition
of Rowdy Meadows), at 70-71, 73-74, 75, 80; doc. no. 91-16 (Affidavit of Guest Service Agent
Soto) ¶ 2; doc. no. 91-18 (Affidavit of Captain Dauro), Tab 1 (911 Call), at [D1] [Track one,

9

and Robert Nelson were dispatched to the hotel.48 Rowdy Meadows provided a
description of the confrontation and of Dr. Roddy’s appearance to Officer Nelson.49
Neither Officer Nelson nor any other police officer questioned Meadows about
drugs.50
After the “911” center was called, Dr. Roddy left the front desk area and
returned to his hotel room on the tenth floor.51 He alleges that he did so because he
wanted to show the officers his gun permit when they arrived on the scene.52 Dr.
Roddy could not find the permit in his pants pockets, and assumed that he must have
left it in the pocket of a lab coat in his hotel room.53 Rather than searching the lab
coat for the permit, however, Dr. Roddy donned the coat.54

0:25-0:35, 1:10-1:23].
48

Doc. no. 91-6 (Deposition of Officer Anderson), at 13-14, 22-23; doc. no. 91-7 (Deposition
of Officer Howle), at 12; doc. no. 91-8 (Deposition of Officer Nelson), at 18; doc. no. 91-14
(Declaration of Officer Brightwell) ¶ 3; Ex. R, doc. no. 91-18 (Affidavit of Captain Dauro), Tab 1
(Radio Traffic ), at [D1] [Track two, 0:54-1:03]; id., Tab 2 (Calls for Service); id., Tab 3 (Event
Chronology), at 1-2 [D3-D4].
49

Doc. no. 91-8 (Deposition of Officer Nelson), at 20-26; doc. no. 91-13 (Deposition of
Rowdy Meadows), at 84-87.
50

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. I & II), at 94; doc. no. 91-7
(Deposition of Officer Howle), at 13-14; doc. no. 91-8 (Deposition of Officer Nelson), at 19-26; doc.
no. 91-13 (Deposition of Rowdy Meadows), at 86, 87, 89, 90-91, 94-95.
51

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 66-67, 75-77; doc. no. 91-2
(Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 55-56; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab
1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 1 [D7].
52

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 66, 76.

53

Id. at 74.

54

Id.

10

A.

The Discovery of Dr. Roddy Wearing a White Lab Coat and Carrying a
Gun, Various Controlled Substances, and $3,895 in Cash
Huntsville Police Officers David Anderson, Jason Brightwell, and Bert Howle

(possibly accompanied by Huntsville Police Officer Robert Nelson and Hotel
Manager Jolene Heckman) rode the elevator to the tenth floor, where they
encountered Dr. Roddy in the hallway.55 Dr. Roddy was wearing jeans, a white Tshirt, a flannel shirt, and a white lab coat embroidered with the words “Dr. William
Meyer Roddy, Int. Med/Psychiatry, Pain Treatment.”56 Dr. Roddy asserts that he told
one of the officers that he was a physician.57 Even so, Dr. Roddy does not remember
precisely when he made that statement, and does not recall the name of the officer to
whom he spoke.
Officer Brightwell conducted a pat-down search of Dr. Roddy and discovered
a gun in the left front pocket of his pants.58 Officer Brightwell also found a hard, gray
pill case with multiple prescription medications in the right front pocket of Dr.

55

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 77-78; doc. no. 91-6 (Deposition
of Officer Anderson), at 19-20, 26-27; doc. no. 91-7 (Deposition of Officer Howle), at 13-15, 19;
doc. no. 91-8 (Deposition of Officer Nelson), at 19-21, 27, 32; doc. no. 91-14 (Declaration of Officer
Brightwell) ¶ 4; doc. no. 91-15 (Affidavit of Manager Heckman) ¶ 13.
56

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 77-79; doc. no. 91-30
(Photographs, Part I), at [D69].
57

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 103.

58

Id. at 80, 82-87; doc. no. 91-6 (Deposition of Officer Anderson), at 24-25; doc. no. 91-7
(Deposition of Officer Howle), at 16-17; doc. no. 91-8 (Deposition of Officer Nelson), at 31; doc.
no. 91-14 (Declaration of Officer Brightwell) ¶ 4.

11

Roddy’s pants.59 The officers allege that the case contained a total of 21 pills of
various types: i.e., six Oxycontin pills; seven Adderall pills; three Focalin pills; one
Mirtazapine pill; two Lexapro pills; two Atenolol pills; and three unidentified white
pill fragments.60 Three of those medications are Schedule II controlled substances:
i.e., Oxycontin (the proprietary brand name for the drug that is generically known as
Oxycodone); Adderall (the brand-name for Amphetamine); and Focalin (the brandname for Methylphenidate).61
Plaintiffs argue that “[t]here is a question about the number and types of
medications that were in the pill case because no inventory was made at the scene,”
but admit that the case contained “Oxycontin and ADHD medication”:

i.e.

medications for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), presumably,

59

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 83-84, 87, 163; doc. no. 91-6
(Deposition of Officer Anderson), at 27-28; doc. no. 91-7 (Deposition of Officer Howle), at 17; doc.
no. 91-14 (Declaration of Officer Brightwell) ¶ 4; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver),
Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 2 [D8]; doc. no. 91-32 (Photographs, Part III), at[D79];
doc. no. 91-40 (Photographs, Part XI), at [D117].
60

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 83-84, 87, 163; doc. no. 91-6
(Deposition of Officer Anderson), at 27-28; doc. no. 91-7 (Deposition of Officer Howle), at 17; doc.
no. 91-14 (Declaration of Officer Brightwell) ¶ 4; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver),
Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 2 [D8]; doc. no. 91-32 (Photographs, Part III), at[D79];
doc. no. 91-40 (Photographs, Part XI), at [D117].
61

See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(1)(xiii) [Oxycodone], (d)(1) [Amphetamine], (d)(4)
[Methylphenidate]; Alabama Department of Public Health, Controlled Substances List (Jan. 16,
2013), www.adph.org/publications/assets/ControlledSubstancesList.pdf; Ala. Code § 20-2-20(a)
(1975); doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 151.

12

Adderall, Focalin, Mirtazapine, Lexapro, and Atenolol.62 Regardless, Dr. Roddy did
not dispute the allegations regarding the “number and types” of pills in the case at his
deposition, but, instead, testified as follows:
Q.

It’s my understanding that from your person a small gray plastic
container was seized, and it had approximately 21 pills in it,
which included six Oxycontin, seven Adderall, two Focalin, one
Mirtazapine, two Lexapro, two Atenolol, and three white
fragments of white pills that could not be identified. Do you have
any reason to dispute that?

A.

It don’t remember that many, but that — I’ll go with that.63

Dr. Roddy alleges that he discussed the prescriptions for the medications
contained in the pill case with Officer Brightwell. Specifically, Dr. Roddy stated,
“There’s [sic] prescriptions for those medications.”64 When asked by Officer
Brightwell, “Where are they?,” Dr. Roddy answered, “They’re in my room.”65
In addition to the gun and pills, the officers found crumpled, wadded-up cash
in various denominations aggregating the amount of $3,895 in the pockets of Dr.

62

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 7 (citing doc.
no. 91-5 (Deposition of Officer McDaniel), at 24).
63

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 163 (emphasis supplied).

64

Id. at 89.

65

Id.

13

Roddy’s pants.66 The officers assert that the cash was also “dirty,”67 but plaintiffs
dispute that portion of the officers’ allegations.68
The officers also found a bottle of injectable liquid in one of Dr. Roddy’s
pockets.69 The officers assert that the bottle’s label was illegible,70 but plaintiffs
argue that “the label could be read, at least in part.”71 Upon review, the cited
testimony cited by plaintiffs does not support their contention that the bottle’s label
was partially legible. Dr. Roddy testified as follows:
Q.

It’s my understanding also, from your person, a brown bottle with
an illegible label on it, and that was the injectable liquid. Do you
have any reason to dispute that?

A.

No.72

66

Id. at 87; doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 93; doc. no. 91-6
(Deposition of Officer Anderson), at 28-30; doc. no. 91-7 (Deposition of Officer Howle), at 17; doc.
no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 2 [D8].
67

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 87; doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of
Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 93; doc. no. 91-6 (Deposition of Officer Anderson), at 28-30; doc. no.
91-7 (Deposition of Officer Howle), at 17; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1
(STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 2 [D8].
68

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 7 (citing doc.
no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 104; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant
McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 2-3 [D8]; doc. no. 102-3 (Declaration of
William Meyer Roddy) ¶ 4).
69

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 87, 163-64; doc. no. 91-23
(Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 2-3 [D8].
70

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 87, 163-64; doc. no. 91-23
(Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 2-3 [D8].
71

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 7 (citing doc.
no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 83, 163-64).
72

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 163-64 (emphasis supplied).

14

The injectable liquid was later identified as Testosterone, a Schedule III controlled
substance.73
B.

The Arrest of Dr. Roddy for Possession of Controlled Substances
Sergeant Jason Ramsey was dispatched to the Embassy Suites for additional

investigation on behalf of the Huntsville-Madison County Strategic Counterdrug
Team (“STAC”): a multi-jurisdictional law-enforcement task force charged with
investigating drug crimes.74 (At the time of the events described here, Jason Ramsey
was a Huntsville Police Officer assigned to the STAC unit, but he later was promoted
to the rank of Sergeant and left the task force.75)
When Sergeant Ramsey arrived at the hotel, he was briefed by the other
officers on the scene about the confrontation between Dr. Roddy and Rowdy
Meadows, and the gun, pills, cash, and bottle of (then unidentified) injectable liquid
found on Dr. Rowdy’s person.76 There is no evidence that Sergeant Ramsey was told
73

Id. at 87, 163-64; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report
Case No. V10-244), at 2-3 [D8].
74

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. I), at 42, 45-46; doc. no. 91-6
(Deposition of Officer Anderson), at 29-30; doc. no. 91-7 (Deposition of Officer Howle), at 21; doc.
no. 91-9 (Deposition of Officer McCarver), at 14-15; doc. no. 91-14 (Declaration of Officer
Brightwell) ¶ 3; Ex. R, doc. no. 91-18 (Affidavit of Captain Dauro), Tab 1 (Radio Traffic ), at [D1]
[Track two, 6:44-6:50].
75

Doc. no. 90 (Brief in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment), at 6 n.4; doc. no. 91-3
(Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. I), at 12, 23.
76

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. I-II), at 51-52, 58-59, 62-63, 94-98;
doc. no. 91-7 (Deposition of Officer Howle), at 25; doc. no. 91-14 (Declaration of Officer
Brightwell) ¶ 5 ; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No.

15

that Dr. Roddy had claimed to be a physician, and to have prescriptions for the pills
in the case found in his pants pocket.77
Sergeant Ramsey alleges that Dr. Roddy stated that the vial of liquid was
Testosterone to be injected by his personal physician, and that his physician had
asked him to keep the bottle to prevent loss.78 Plaintiffs deny that Dr. Roddy gave the
officers “any suspicious information concerning the injectable testosterone,”79 but do
not specify what, if anything, Dr. Roddy did say about the bottle.
Sergeant Ramsey suspected, like Hotel Manager Jolene Heckman, that Dr.
Roddy was under the influence of drugs because he did not appear to be “engaged”
in the situation, and had messy hair and a slouched and unkempt appearance.80 After
Sergeant Ramsey read Dr. Roddy his Miranda rights and warnings, Dr. Roddy
declined to speak further.81
Dr. Roddy alleges that, at an unspecified point in time, he told Sergeant

V10-244), at 2 [D8].
77

See doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. I), at 58-60, 72 (describing the
content of Sergeant Ramsey’s briefing).
78

Doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No.
V10-244), at 2 [D8].
79

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 8.

80

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 139, 237-38; see also doc. no.
91-14 (Declaration of Officer Brightwell) ¶ 6.
81

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 98-99; doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition
of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. I), at 71-72; doc. no. 91-14 (Declaration of Officer Brightwell) ¶ 6.

16

Ramsey that he was a physician.82 Sergeant Ramsey denies that Dr. Roddy told him
that he was a physician at any time before he was read his Miranda rights.83 In any
event, Sergeant Ramsey arrested Dr. Roddy for possession of controlled substances.84
C.

The Search Warrant for Plaintiffs’ Hotel Room
Sergeant Ramsey then departed the Embassy Suites hotel and returned to his

office for the purpose of drafting a search warrant and supporting affidavit for the
Roddys’ hotel room.85 The section of the affidavit that explained Sergeant Ramsey’s
reasons for suspecting plaintiffs of using their hotel room as a “base of operations”
for selling controlled substances reads as follows:
I responded to assist Huntsville Police Patrol at the Embassy
Suites. They notified me that they had responded to a call of an armed
subject who pulled a gun on another guest of the hotel. The description
was of a white male wearing a green plaid shirt. Officers went to the
10th floor and saw a white male (William Roddy) wearing a green plaid
shirt go into Room 1020 and when he came out he was wearing a white
doctor coat over his green plaid shirt. They patted him down for officer
safety and found a loaded handgun in his left front pant pocket. They
also located approximately $3900 in cash in both pockets mostly in $100
bills. Inside his right front pant pocket was a small plastic container that
had 5 different pills in it. I was able to identify four of them through
82

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 103.

83

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. I), at 72.

84

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 89-90, 98-99; doc. no. 91-3
(Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. I), at 62-65, 69-73.
85

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 36-37; doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of
Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 91-93, 98-99, 101-04; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant
McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].

17

Poison Control as controlled substances such as generic Aderol,
Oxycontin 20 mg, and Focalin 15 & 20 mg. I read William Roddy his
Miranda rights and he stated he wished to have [a] lawyer present. I
placed him under arrest at that time and he stated he felt that he was
going to be sick and kept trying to have a conversation which I told him
I could not talk to him anymore.
Before being Mirandized he stated he did not know it was illegal
to have prescription pills that w[]ere not in the correctly labeled bottles
and that they belong to him and his family and were a two day supp[l]y.
Finding it unusual that a doctor would not know that and that he had a
large amount of cash (a lot of wadded up $100 bills in both his pockets)
I believe based on the totality of the circumstances that he is using
Room 1020 located at the Embassy Suites as his temporary base of
operation in the illegal s[a]l[e] of controlled substances namely pills.86
Warrant Magistrate Scott Rogers signed the search warrant for the hotel room.87
Huntsville Police Officer Terry Lucas and Madison County Deputy Sheriff
Eddie McDaniel (both of whom served on the STAC Team) assisted Sergeant Ramsey
in executing the search warrant.88 Officer Lucas was briefed on the fact that the
Huntsville Police received a 911 call alleging that Dr. Roddy pulled a gun on an
Embassy Suites guest, and that officers found Dr. Roddy with a gun, pills, and a large
amount of wadded-up cash in different denominations on his person.89
86

Doc. no. 91-28 (Search Warrant Affidavit), at 2 [D20] (capitalization omitted) (alterations
supplied). The court has included the alterations to correct spelling and grammatical errors.
87

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 103-06; doc. no. 91-27 (Search
Warrant); doc. no. 91-28 (Search Warrant Affidavit).
88

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 109-11; doc. no. 91-4
(Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 25; doc. no. 91-5 (Deposition of Deputy McDaniel), at 16-17.
89

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 146; Ex. D, doc. no. 91-4
(Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 29, 34-35.

18

Sergeant Ramsey, Officer Lucas, and Deputy McDaniel then performed a
search of plaintiffs’ hotel room.90 Specifically, Sergeant Ramsey and Officer Lucas
searched the room, while Deputy McDaniel took photographs and wrote down
information on the “search warrant return,” a written inventory of the items seized in
the course of the search.91 Officer Lucas was not otherwise involved in the criminal
case against plaintiffs.92
The officers found what appeared to be a permit to carry a concealed weapon
on a table in the hotel room.93 Sergeant Ramsey asserts that the document was in such
poor shape he could not verify its validity.94 Further, the officers found a briefcase
containing hundreds of pills and documents. The officers later inventoried those
items to include the following:
a.

Labeled prescription bottle for 90 count 40 milligram Oxycontin
pills issued to “Dr. Mike Roddy” on December 24, 2008, and

90

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 144-47; doc. no. 91-4
(Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 37-38; doc. no. 91-5 (Deposition of Deputy McDaniel), at 27-28;
doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3
[D9].
91

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 144-47; doc. no. 91-4
(Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 37-38; doc. no. 91-5 (Deposition of Deputy McDaniel), at 27-28,
31; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at
3 [D9]; doc. nos. 91-30-40 (Photographs), at [D67-D114].
92

Doc. no. 91-4 (Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 67.

93

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. I), at 61-62.

94

Id.

19

containing 74 Oxycontin pills;95
b.

Labeled prescription bottle for 90 count 20 milligram Oxycontin
pills issued to “Dr. Mike Roddy” on August 21, 2009, and
containing 60 Oxycontin pills;96

c.

Labeled prescription bottle for 90 count 40 milligram Oxycontin
pills issued to “Dr. Mike Roddy” on November 19, 2009, and
containing 19 Oxycontin pills;97

d.

Labeled prescription bottle for 90 count 20 milligram Oxycontin
pills issued to “Dr. Mike Roddy” on December 16, 2009, and
containing no pills;98

e.

Labeled prescription bottle for 90 count 40 milligram Oxycontin
pills issued to “Dr. Mike Roddy” on January 22, 2010, and
containing 50 Oxycontin pills;99

f.

Labeled prescription bottle for 90 count 20 milligram Oxycontin
pills issued “Dr. Mike Roddy” on January 22, 2010, and
containing 53 Oxycontin pills;100

g.

Labeled prescription bottle for 90 count 40 milligram Oxycontin
pills issued to “Dr. Mike Roddy” on February 17, 2010, and
containing 15 Oxycontin pills;101

95

Doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No.
V10-244), at 3 [D9].
96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 166; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of
Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].
99

Doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No.
V10-244), at 3 [D9].
100

Id.

101

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 167; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].

20

h.

Labeled prescription bottle for 90 count 20 milligram Oxycontin pills
issued to “Dr. Mike Roddy” on February 17, 2010, and containing 59
Oxycontin pills;102

i.

Labeled prescription bottle for 60 count 30 milligram Oxycodone pills
issued to “Dr. Mike Roddy” on January 22, 2010, and containing 14
Oxycodone pills;103

j.

Labeled prescription bottle for 60 count 30 milligram Oxycodone pills
issued to “Dr. Mike Roddy” on February 17, 2010, and containing no
pills;104

k.

Unlabeled bottle containing numerous unknown white pills;105

l.

Melatonin bottle containing 28 Divalproex pills and 52 unknown white
pills;106

m.

Unlabeled bottle containing 20 Focalin pills and 39 Alprazolam
pills;107

n.

Labeled prescription bottle issued to “A. Roddy,” and containing 19
Focalin pills and 17 Didanosine pills;108

102

Doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No.
V10-244), at 3 [D9].
103

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 172; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].
104

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 172; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].
105

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 173; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].
106

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 173; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].
107

Doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No.
V10-244), at 3 [D9].
108

Id.

21

o.

Unlabeled bottle containing 34 Viagra pills and 3 Carisoprodol pills;109

p.

Labeled prescription bottle issued to “C. Roddy,” and containing 22
Focalin pills;110

q.

Labeled prescription bottle for Methylphenidate issued to “Dr. Mike
Roddy,” and containing 20 Oxycodone pills, 1 Focalin pill, 2
Methylphenidate pills, and 1 Meperidine pill;111

r.

Unlabeled bottle containing 5 Clonazepam pills
Dexmethylphenidate Hydrochloride (Focalin) pills;112

s.

Labeled prescription bottle for Methylphenidate issued to “Dr. Mike
Roddy,” and containing 42 Valium pills and 1 Pristia pill;113

t.

Unlabeled bottle containing numerous unknown white pills;114

u.

Unlabeled bottle containing 1 Viagra pill and 19 Dexmethylphenidate
Hydrochloride (Focalin) pills;115

v.

Unlabeled bottle containing 3 Alprazolam pills, 3 unknown partial bars,
1 Lunesta pill, and 21 Clonazepam pills;116

and

2

109

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 175; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].
110

Id.

111

Doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No.
V10-244), at 3 [D9].
112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 183-84; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].
115

Doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No.
V10-244), at 3 [D9].
116

Id.

22

w.

Unlabeled bottled containing 27 Doxycycline Hyclate pills;117

x.

Unlabeled bottled containing 6 Ambien pills;118

y.

$900 in cash;119 and

z.

Various documents, many bearing the name “William Roddy,” and
some bearing the name “Mike Roddy.”120

Further, the officers allege that they found a yellow purse containing the
following:
a.

Ibuprofen bottle containing 99 Ibuprofen pills, 15 Metformin
hydrochloride pills, 20 unknown white pills, 5 Clonzepam pills,
3 Mirtazapine pills, 1 Alprazolam pill, 1 Acetaminophen
hydrocodone pill, and 1 unknown orange pill with blue dots;121
and

b.

Loose pills, including 1 Clonazepam pill, 3 Mirtazapine pills,
15 Adderall pills, 3 Metformin hydrochloride pills, 1
Alprazolam pill, 2 unknown pink pill fragments, and 10
unknown white pills.122

117

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 186; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].
118

Doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No.
V10-244), at 3 [D9].
119

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 287-88; doc. no. 91-4
(Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 62-63; doc. no. 91-29 (Search Warrant Return), at 2 [D28].
120

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 234-35; doc. no. 91-4
(Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 43; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC
Report Case No. V10-244), at 4 [D10]; doc. no. 107 (Stipulation), Tab I.
121

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 108-13; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of
Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 4 [D10].
122

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 108-13; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of
Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 4 [D10].

23

The officers assert that they found more pill bottles throughout the hotel room,
including the following:
a.

Labeled prescription bottle for Prednisone issued to “Dr. Mike
Roddy,” and containing 49 Prednisone pills;123

b.

Unlabeled bottle containing 19 Depakote pills, 2 Fluoxetine
pills, and 4 Trazodone pills;124 and

c.

Ibuprofen bottle containing Ibuprofen pills.125

In total, the officers allege that they found at least 987 pills in plaintiffs’ hotel
room, over 300 of which were Oxycontin or Oxycodone pills (Schedule II
controlled substances).126 Sergeant Ramsey concluded at some point during the
search that, due to the large number of pills found, it would be unreasonable to hold
the hotel room and remain there to count all of them.127
Thus, Deputy McDaniel documented the pill bottles found on the search

123

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 188; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].
124

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 189-91; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].
125

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 191; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9].
126

See supra; doc. no. 91-39 (Photographs, Part X), at [D115]; doc. no. 91-40 (Photographs,
Part XI), at [D119].
127

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 163-65, 169; doc. no. 91-4
(Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 46; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC
Report Case No. V10-244), at 3 [D9]).

24

warrant return, and left a copy of that document in the hotel room.128 Sergeant
Ramsey completed a more detailed inventory at the STAC office, which included the
exact number and type of pills found in the hotel room.129 That process took Sergeant
Ramsey four days to complete.130
With regard to the briefcase, plaintiffs admit “that the prescription bottles
listed were in the briefcase.”131 Plaintiffs deny that the briefcase contained any
unlabeled bottles of prescription medication, and deny that it contained labeled
bottles with multiple types of prescription medication.132 Plaintiffs dispute the
“actual quantity and type of medications in some of the pill bottles,”133 but do not
object to the descriptions of the contents of any specific bottles, and do not offer an
alternative description of the medication found in those bottles.
With regard to the purse, plaintiffs admit that “it contained an Ibuprofen bottle

128

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 202; doc. no. 91-5 (Deposition
of Deputy McDaniel), at 30, 38.
129

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 163-65, 169; doc. no. 91-4
(Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 46; doc. no. 91-5 (Deposition of Deputy McDaniel), at 30, 39; doc.
no. 91-29 (Search Warrant Return).
130

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 215; doc. no. 91-10
(Deposition of Officer Sedham), at 59-60; 92; doc. no. 91-7 (Deposition of Officer Howle), at 46.
131

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 10 (emphasis

supplied).
132

Id. (citing doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 173-74, 185).

133

Id. (emphasis supplied).

25

containing some prescription medications.”134 In other words, plaintiffs admit that
the purse contained a non-prescription bottle containing multiple types of
prescription medications. Plaintiffs deny “that there were any loose pills unless they
were spilled after the bottle was opened by the officers.”135 Thus, plaintiffs do not
deny that the listed quantities and types of pills actually were in the purse, and dispute
only their designation as “loose pills.”
With regard to the pill bottles found throughout the hotel room, plaintiffs admit
the officers’ descriptions, and deny only “that prescription medications listed in 36
b [i.e., the 19 Depakote pills, 2 Fluoxetine pills, and 4 Trazodone pills] would have
been mixed.”136
D.

The Arrest of Mrs. Roddy
At some point during the search, Sergeant Ramsey brought Dr. Roddy’s wife,

plaintiff Wendy Roddy, into the hotel room.137 Mrs. Roddy admitted to owning the
purse, and the pills found within it.138 Sergeant Ramsey asserts that Mrs. Roddy could

134

Id. at 11.

135

Id. at 11 (citing doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 115, 117).

136

Id. at 11 (alteration supplied) (citing doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy),
at 176, 185).
137

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 95-96; doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of
Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 189-91, 193.
138

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 106-07; doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition
of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 191, 197.

26

not account for an Alprazolam pill found in her purse,139 but Mrs. Roddy alleges that
she told Sergeant Ramsey that the pill had been prescribed for her.140
Defendants argue that “[t]here were no prescription bottles in the hotel room
or yellow purse to indicate the pills found in Mrs. Roddy’s yellow purse were
possessed legally.”141 Plaintiffs respond that “[l]abeled bottles for Adderall and
Focalin were in the briefcase and on the bedside table.”142 Notably, however, that
response does not address evidence of plaintiffs’ prescription for Alprazolam.
In addition to the contents of the purse, Sergeant Ramsey questioned Mrs.
Roddy about the contents of Dr. Roddy’s pill case and the Roddy family’s hotel room.
Mrs. Roddy asserts that she told Sergeant Ramsey that the Roddys had prescriptions
for all of the medications in their possession,143 but Sergeant Ramsey denies that
allegation.144

139

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 197; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit
of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 4 [D10]).
140

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 111, 124, 153; doc. no. 102-4
(Declaration of Wendy Sue Roddy) ¶ 2.
141

Doc. no. 90 (Brief in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment), at 20 (alteration
supplied) (citing doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 108-09, 120-22, 152-53; doc.
no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No. V10-244), at 4 [D10]).
142

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 12 (emphasis
and alteration supplied) (citing doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 284; doc. no.
91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 122-24; doc. no. 91-4 (Deposition of Officer Lucas), at
53; doc. no. 91-29 (Search Warrant Return)).
143

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 102, 184.

144

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 226-27.

27

Further, as noted above, Dr. Roddy’s full name is William Meyer Roddy. Dr.
Roddy’s driver’s license, and his white lab coat, both stated his name as “William
Meyer Roddy.”145 Some of the pill bottles and documents found in the briefcase bore
the name “William Roddy.”146 Even so, other pill bottles and documents found in the
briefcase and elsewhere throughout the hotel room bore the name “Mike Roddy.”147
Mrs. Roddy alleges that she told Sergeant Ramsey that Dr. Roddy was also
known as “Mike.”148 Mrs. Roddy asserts that she then offered Sergeant Ramsey the
cell phone numbers of a physician and pharmacist who could verify Dr. Roddy’s
identity.149 Mrs. Roddy also alleges that she offered to allow Sergeant Ramsey to
access plaintiffs’ automobile, which contained documentation showing that “William
Meyer Roddy” and “Mike Roddy” are the same person, but that Sergeant Ramsey
declined to do so.150 Sergeant Ramsey denies that Mrs. Roddy offered him witness
telephone numbers, or voluntary access to the plaintiffs’ auto.151
Sergeant Ramsey suspected that Mrs. Roddy was under the influence of drugs

145

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 9-10, 77-79; doc. no. 91-30
(Photographs, Part I), at [D69]; doc. no. 91-33 (Photographs, Part IV), at [D84].
146

Doc. no. 107 (Stipulation), Tab I; doc. no. 108-1 (Stipulation), Tab II.

147

See the inventory in Part II(C), supra.

148

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 102.

149

Id. at 102, 189.

150

Id. at 102.

151

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 195-200, 241-43.

28

because she was not paying attention to or participating in the conversation, and was
laughing and smiling.152 Mrs. Roddy denies being under the influence of drugs or any
other intoxicants.153 In any event, Sergeant Ramsey read Mrs. Roddy her Miranda
rights.154 Sergeant Ramsey asserts that Mrs. Roddy then declined to speak further,155
but she alleges that she subsequently had a lengthy discussion with Sergeant
Ramsey.156 Sergeant Ramsey placed Mrs. Roddy under arrest and ordered both
plaintiffs to be transported to jail.157
Dr. Roddy asserts that, while in jail, he told Sergeant Ramsey that he is also
known as “Mike,” and that “William Meyer Roddy” and “Mike Roddy” are the same
person.158 Dr. Roddy alleges that he then asked Sergeant Ramsey to call his physician
and pharmacist to confirm his prescriptions and identity.159 According to Dr. Roddy,

152

Id. at 235-38.

153

Doc. no. 102-4 (Declaration of Wendy Sue Roddy) ¶ 3.

154

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 118-19; doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition
of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 197.
155

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 118-19; doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition
of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 197.
156

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 100, 119.

157

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 101; doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition
of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 118-19, 135; doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at
197-200, 233-34; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No.
V10-244), at 4 [D10].
158

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 107.

159

Id. at 108.

29

Sergeant Ramsey “didn’t say anything” in response to his offers.160 Sergeant Ramsey
denies that Dr. Roddy provided the names of his physician and pharmacist, and
testified that he and Dr. Roddy only discussed one subject at the jail: i.e., the amount
of Dr. Roddy’s bail.161
E.

Sergeant Ramsey Speaks with Captain Randy Butler Regarding Plaintiffs
On the day of plaintiffs’ arrests, Sergeant Ramsey contacted Sheffield Police

Captain Randy Butler as a professional courtesy, to inform him about the situation
unfolding at the Embassy Suites, and to ask whether he knew anything about
plaintiffs.162

Sergeant Ramsey and Captain Butler had several telephone

conversations during the course of the investigation.163
Sergeant Ramsey told Captain Butler “that Wendy Roddy stated that there was
a large amount of cash in a safe from sales, along with a large amount of
Medications,” at plaintiffs’ residence in Sheffield, Alabama.164 As a result, Captain
Butler decided to seek a search warrant for plaintiffs’ residence.165 Sergeant Ramsey
did not request that Captain Butler seek a search warrant, and was not otherwise
160

Id. at 102.

161

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 226-27, 241-44.

162

Id. at 293-95; doc. no. 91-12 (Deposition of Captain Butler), at 23-26.

163

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 293-301; doc. no. 91-12
(Deposition of Captain Butler), at 23-26, 42-43.
164

Doc. no. 91-12 (Deposition of Captain Butler), at 90.

165

Id. at 41-43, 86-91, 105.

30

involved in obtaining the search warrant for plaintiffs’ residence.166
F.

Sergeant Ramsey Receives Communications from the Alabama Board of
Medical Examiners
An employee of the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners named Jeff

Grimsley informed Sergeant Ramsey during the week of March 22, 2010 that Dr.
William Roddy was also known as “Dr. Mike Roddy.”167 Grimsley also mailed copies
of the patient prescription summaries for “William Meyer Roddy,” “A. Roddy,” and
“C. Roddy” to Sergeant Ramsey on March 25, 2010.168
The patient prescription summary for “William Meyer Roddy” shows
prescriptions for Oxycontin, Oxycodone, Testosterone, Methylphenidate, and several
other medications that were filled at the Shoals Pharmacy in Tuscumbia, Alabama
between January 1, 2009 and March 25, 2010.169 The prescription summary does not
show any prescriptions filled under the name “Mike Roddy.”170 Even so, the
information regarding the Oxycontin and Oxycodone prescriptions on the prescription

166

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 293, 301; doc. no. 91-12
(Deposition of Captain Butler), at 101, 104-05.
167

Doc. no. 103-1 (Declaration of Alabama Board of Medical Examiners Employee
Grimsley) ¶ 3.
168

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 315-16; doc. no. 91-41
(Facsimile from Alabama Board of Medical Examiners Employee Grimsley).
169

Doc. no. 91-41 (Facsimile from Alabama Board of Medical Examiners Employee
Grimsley), at 2-6 [D41-D45].
170

Id.

31

summary for “William Meyer Roddy” matches the information regarding those
prescriptions on the pill bottles for “Dr. Mike Roddy” found in Dr. Roddy’s
briefcase.171 That information includes the prescription date, prescribing physician,
dispensing pharmacy, prescription number, quantity, and dosage.172
Additionally, the information on the patient summaries for “A. Roddy” and “C.
Roddy” matches the information on the pill bottles for two of plaintiffs’ sons, Asher
Roddy and Cameron Roddy.173
G.

Plaintiffs are Each Charged with Trafficking in Illegal Drugs
Plaintiffs were charged with “trafficking in illegal drugs” in violation of

Alabama Code § 13A-12-231(3), because officers discovered more than four grams
of Oxycontin pills in their hotel room.174 Even so, the warrants issued for plaintiffs’
arrests and executed by Sergeant Ramsey on March 26, 2010 listed their charges as

171

Id. at 2-11; doc. no. 102-3 (Declaration of William Meyer Roddy) ¶ 6; doc. no. 107
(Stipulation), Tab I; doc. no. 108-1 (Stipulation), Tab II.
172

Id. at 2-11; doc. no. 102-3 (Declaration of William Meyer Roddy) ¶ 6; doc. no. 107
(Stipulation), Tab I; doc. no. 108-1 (Stipulation), Tab II.
173

Id. at 2-11; doc. no. 102-3 (Declaration of William Meyer Roddy) ¶ 6; doc. no. 107
(Stipulation), Tab I; doc. no. 108-1 (Stipulation), Tab II.
174

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 299; doc. no. 91-4 (Deposition
of Officer Lucas), at 91-92; doc. no. 91-22 (Affidavit of Captain Malone), Tab 1 (Arrest Report for
William Roddy), at [D34]; id., Tab 2 (Arrest Report for Wendy Roddy), at [D35]; doc. no. 91-25
(Arrest Warrant for William Roddy), at [D38]; doc. no. 91-26 (Arrest Warrant for Wendy Roddy),
at [D39]; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC Report Case No.
V10-244), at 1 [D7]; id. at 1 [D12].

32

“Trafficking – Heroin.”175 That is incongruous, because it is undisputed that plaintiffs
did not possess heroin in any amount.176 As previously noted, however, Oxycontin
is treated as a form of synthetic heroin.177
H.

Madison County Assistant District Attorney James Tolleson Voluntarily
Dismisses the Criminal Charges Against Both Plaintiffs
Madison County Assistant District Attorney James Tolleson filed motions to

nolle prosse the criminal charges against plaintiffs on January 19, 2011, and the
motions were granted on January 21, 2011.178 The decision to prosecute or dismiss
the charges against plaintiffs rested with Tolleson, not the Huntsville Police
Department or its officers.179
I.

Plaintiffs Accuse Sergeant Ramsey of Stealing $275 in Seized Cash
At some point after their criminal charges were dismissed, plaintiffs attempted

to retrieve the evidence seized during the investigation from the Madison County
Courthouse.180 The Huntsville Police Department’s Evidence/Property Custody
175

Doc. no. 108-2 (Stipulation), Tab III.

176

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 285; doc. no. 91-4 (Deposition
of Officer Lucas), at 83; doc. no. 91-5 (Deposition of Deputy McDaniel), at 44.
177

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 275; see also Alabama Code §
20-2-23 (1975) (Listing of Schedule I Controlled Substances); id. § 20-2-25 (1975) (Listing of
Schedule II Controlled Substances).
178

Doc. no. 91-17 (Affidavit of Assistant District Attorney Tolleson), Tab I (Case Action
Summary Sheets with Court Orders); id., Tab II (Motions to Nolle Prosse), at [D3941-D3942].
179

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), 316-17, 329-31.

180

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 108; doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition
of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 147-48; doc. no. 91-22 (Affidavit of Captain Malone), Tab 6

33

Documents reflect that Sergeant Ramsey ordered the numerous pills seized to be
destroyed.181
Even so, the Roddys successfully retrieved items seized from Dr. Roddy’s
person (a gun, driver’s license, hotel key, pill case, bottle of liquid, documents, and
$3,895 in cash),182 and items seized later in the investigation (a briefcase, pill bottles,
documents, and $1,025 in cash).183 The $1,025 in cash allegedly was the sum of $900
seized from Dr. Roddy’s briefcase, and $125 seized from Mrs. Roddy’s purse.184
Plaintiffs informed Sergeant Ramsey and others who were present on the date
of retrieving their personal property from the police department that Mrs. Roddy had
seen Sergeant Ramsey remove an additional $200 from her purse, and $75 from a
son’s wallet, and place the money into his pocket.185 Dr. Roddy asked Sergeant
Ramsey what he had done with the allegedly missing money, and Sergeant Ramsey
denied taking it.186 Plaintiffs assert that $275 was not returned.187

(Incident/Investigation Report), at [D130].
181

Doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 3 (Evidnce/Property Custody
Documents), at 18-22 [D29-D33].
182

Id. at 21 [D32].

183

Id. at 18-20, 22 [D29-D30, D33].

184

Doc. no. 91-20 (Affidavit of Sergeant Stedham), Tab I (Internal Affairs File for Case No.
CC2011-13).
185

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 177-178, 180, 188.

186

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 110, 114.

187

Id.

34

As a result, plaintiffs filed an incident report and complaint with the Internal
Affairs Division of the Huntsville Police Department.188

Because plaintiffs’

complaint alleged criminal misconduct, the Major Crimes Unit of the Huntsville
Police Department launched a parallel criminal investigation into the matter.189 The
Major Crimes Unit was the first to complete its investigation.190 Its report, authored
by Captain JesHenry Malone, stated:
It is my opinion that although STAC Agents could have been
more thorough when documenting evidence seized, I can find no
evidence or provable fact to support the allegation that a criminal act
occurred. An Administrative investigation is currently being conducted
by Internal Affairs, and pending any evidence that may arise from that
investigation indicating criminal intent or action on the part of Officer
Ramsey, I see no further avenues to pursue in this case.191
Captain Malone’s report also stated:
Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, there is no
evidence to validate or support the claim of William Roddy and his wife
Wendy Sue Roddy. In fact, the evidence that has been produced
188

Id. at 126-28; doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at. 148; doc. no. 91-10
(Deposition of Sergeant Stedham), at 31-37, 39-43; doc. no. 91-20 (Affidavit of Sergeant Stedham),
Tab I (Internal Affairs File for Case No. CC2011-13); doc. no. 91-22 (Affidavit of Captain Malone),
Tab VI (Incident/Investigation Report), at [D123-35].
189

Doc. no. 91-10 (Deposition of Sergeant Stedham), at 22-23, 28-29, 44-45; doc. no. 91-22
(Affidavit of Captain Malone), Tab VI (Incident/Investigation Report), at [D123-35].
190

See Doc. no. 91-20 (Affidavit of Sergeant Stedham), Tab I (Internal Affairs File for Case
No. CC2011-13), at [D3729] (referring to the investigation previously concluded by the Major
Crimes Unit); doc. no. 91-22 (Affidavit of Captain Malone), Tab VI (Incident/Investigation Report),
at [D131, D135] (referring to the then ongoing investigation by the Internal Affairs Division).
191

Doc. no. 91-22 (Affidavit of Captain Malone), Tab VI (Incident/Investigation Report), at

[D131].

35

supports the sequence of events told by Inv. [i.e., Investigator] Ramsey.
The money that Officers seized was listed on the inventory sheets and
returned to them upon the dismissal of their case.
This case is Unfounded as there is no evidence to support that a
crime actually occurred. The Officers in this case were acting under the
confines of their duties and under the guidelines of the criminal code
and the search warrant.192
Likewise, the Internal Affairs report stated that “Internal Affairs can find no
HPD Written Directive or City Policy violated by any HPD employee. Huntsville
Police Major Crimes investigated the case and found that there was no criminal intent
and no warrants will be obtained.”193 The Huntsville Police Department ultimately
closed both investigations without taking action against any officer.194
III. PLAINTIFFS’ § 1983 CLAIMS
Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint asserts claims under the United States
Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an illegal search, unlawful seizure, arrest, and
imprisonment against the City of Huntsville, Alabama and the two remaining
individual defendants: i.e., Huntsville Police Sergeant Jason Ramsey and Huntsville
Police Officer Terry Lucas.195
192

Id. at [D135] (alteration supplied).

193

Doc. no. 91-20 (Affidavit of Sergeant Stedham), Tab I (Internal Affairs File for Case No.
CC2011-13), at [D3729].
194

Id.; doc. no. 91-22 (Affidavit of Captain Malone), Tab VI (Incident/Investigation Report),
at [D131, D135].
195

Doc. no. 72 (Second Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 32-41.

36

Sergeant Ramsey and Officer Lucas each contend that they are entitled to
qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ claims.196 The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects governmental officials who are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money
damages in their individual capacities, so long as “their conduct violates no clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Courts generally apply a two-part test for evaluating entitlement to qualified
immunity. The “threshold question” is whether the facts, viewed “in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury,” show that “the officer’s conduct violated
a constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).197 If the threshold
question is answered affirmatively, the court will proceed to analyze the second
aspect of the two-part inquiry: i.e., “whether the right was clearly established.” Id.198
196

Doc. no. 90 (Brief in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment), at 22.

197

The defendant claiming immunity must also “prove that ‘he was acting within the scope
of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.’” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Here, “[t]here is no question [that] Sergeant Ramsey and Officer Lucas were performing
discretionary functions with respect to the challenged actions in this case (i.e., executing a search
warrant and effecting warrantless arrests).” Doc. no. 90 (Brief in Support of Motions for Summary
Judgment), at 31 n. 32 (alterations supplied).
198

The Supreme Court has relieved the lower courts from mandatory adherence to the order
of the two-part analysis that was articulated in Saucier. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009) (“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence
set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”). It is now within
this court’s discretion to assume that a constitutional violation occurred for the purpose of addressing
whether that violation would be “clearly established.” Id. That said, and under the circumstances
of this case, the court will follow the sequence of analysis in Saucier.

37

A.

Illegal Search
Plaintiffs allege that:
Probable cause to search the Roddy family’s hotel room and to
arrest Dr. and Mrs. Roddy both depend on whether probable cause
existed, upon Dr. Roddy’s initial hotel encounter with the Huntsville
police, to believe that Dr. Roddy had committed a crime, i.e., illegally
possessed the scheduled medications found in the pill case in his pants
pocket. But, Defendants lacked even arguable probable cause then to
believe Dr. Roddy had committed a drug-related offense — and thus to
believe that contraband or evidence related to that non-existent crime
would be found in the Roddy family’s hotel room. Defendant Ramsey
thus lacked probable cause to seek a warrant to search the hotel room.199
Further, plaintiffs assert that Sergeant Ramsey omitted certain information from

the search warrant affidavit.200 The allegedly omitted information indicated that:
1) Dr. Roddy was informing the officers that he a) possessed all the pills
lawfully (i.e., stating he is a physician, the medications in the pill box
were prescribed to him and his children, and he has prescriptions for
each of the medications in the pill case); and b) had a ready way to
verify that (i.e., stating the labeled prescription bottles are in the
family’s hotel room — which the ensuing search confirmed); 2) nothing
prohibited Dr. Roddy carrying scheduled medications in unlabeled
containers such as his plastic pill case; and 3) Ramsey had taken no
steps to test the initial method Dr. Roddy offered to prove the
prescriptions, before Ramsey arrested him and then sought the search
warrant.201
Another district court within the Eleventh Circuit has observed that

199

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 25.

200

Id. at 33.

201

Id.

38

“qualified immunity does not protect an officer who seeks a warrant
where ‘a reasonably well-trained officer . . . would have known that his
affidavit failed to establish probable cause[202] and that he should not
have applied for the warrant.’” Kelly [v. Curtis], 21 F.3d [1544,] 1553
[(11th Cir. 1994)] (quoting Malley [v. Briggs], 475 U.S. [335,] 345
[(1986)]). Alternatively stated, an officer of the law must have
“arguable probable cause” to seek a warrant. Swint v. City of Wadley,
Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 996 (11th Cir. 1995). The determination is not unlike
a sufficiency of the evidence determination; the court should “determine
‘whether reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing
the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that
probable cause existed.’” Id.
O’Ferrell v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 1364, 1370 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (alterations and
footnote supplied). The Eleventh Circuit has also observed that:
A search warrant may be voided if the affidavit supporting the warrant
contains deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, see Franks
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d
667 (1978), and this rule includes material omissions, see United States
v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1980). Nonetheless, the
202

“Probable cause is defined in terms of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Id. (citing
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975)). Courts have recognized that “[t]he probable-cause
standard [often] is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals
with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S.
366, 371 (2003) (alterations supplied). See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)
(“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”) (alteration
supplied). The best that can be said is this: probable cause to effect an arrest exists if, at the moment
the arrest was made, “the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing” that
the person arrested either had committed, or was in the process of committing, an offense. Hunter
v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (alteration supplied) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964)). See also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“Whether probable cause exists
depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer
at the time of the arrest.”).

39

warrant is valid if, absent the misstatements or omissions, there remains
sufficient content to support a finding of probable cause. See Franks,
438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S. Ct. at 2684.
Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002).
Thus, in the context of “claims that the officers violated [the plaintiff’s] rights
under the Fourth Amendment both by including false statements in the search warrant
affidavit and by failing to disclose [exculpatory information] in the affidavit,” a
district court must answer two questions: one, whether the officer “deliberately or
recklessly misstated the evidence or omitted any material fact which would negate a
finding of probable cause; and two, whether “the omission of which [the plaintiff]
complains . . . defeat[s] the probable cause determination.” Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1235
(alterations supplied).
1.

Claim against Sergeant Jason Ramsey

This court will begin by discussing plaintiffs’ illegal search claim against
Huntsville Police Sergeant Jason Ramsey. As noted in the block-quoted text
accompanying note 87, supra, Sergeant Ramsey’s search warrant affidavit explained
his basis for suspecting plaintiffs of using their hotel room as a “base of operations”
for selling controlled substances. In substance, he stated that the Huntsville Police
had received a 911 call alleging that Dr. Roddy pulled a gun on an Embassy Suites
guest, and that officers found Dr. Roddy with a gun, pills, and a large amount of
40

wadded-up cash in different denominations on his person.203 Those facts plainly
support a finding that Sergeant Ramsey had “arguable probable cause to seek a
warrant” to search the Roddys’ hotel room. O’Ferrell, 998 F. Supp. at 1370.
Plaintiffs argue that Sergeant Ramsey’s affidavit omitted Dr. Roddy’s assertion
that he “possessed all the pills lawfully.”204 However, the affidavit stated that Dr.
Roddy claimed that the pills “belong to him and his family and were a two day
supp[l]y.”205 While Sergeant Ramsey could have written the affidavit more clearly,
the quoted sentence conveys Dr. Roddy’s claim that he possessed the pills lawfully
because they were prescribed for him or members of his family.
Plaintiffs next assert that Sergeant Ramsey omitted the fact that he “had a ready
way to verify” Dr. Roddy’s “lawful possession” claim, because Dr. Roddy was
“stating the labeled prescription bottles are in the family’s hotel room — which the
ensuing search confirmed.”206 Further, plaintiffs argue that Sergeant Ramsey should
have stated in the search warrant affidavit that he “had taken no steps to test the initial
method Dr. Roddy offered to prove the prescriptions.”207 However, plaintiffs do not

203

See supra note 86 and accompanying text. See also doc. no. 91-28 (Search Warrant
Affidavit), at 2 [D20] (capitalization omitted) (alterations supplied).
204

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 33.

205

Id. (alteration suppplied).

206

Id.

207

Id.

41

cite any evidence to show that Dr. Roddy “offered” to allow Sergeant Ramsey to
access his hotel room in order to find the labeled prescription bottles. Further,
plaintiffs cite no law requiring an officer to state in a search warrant affidavit that he
has not searched the very premises for which he seeks a search warrant. Thus, neither
omission “defeat[s] the probable cause determination.” Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1235
(alteration supplied).
Plaintiffs also argue that Sergeant Ramsey omitted the fact that “nothing
prohibited Dr. Roddy carrying scheduled medications in unlabeled containers such
as his plastic pill case.”208 However, the Dahl inquiry focuses on whether an officer
“deliberately or recklessly misstated the evidence or omitted any material fact which
would negate a finding of probable cause.” Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1235 (emphasis
supplied). The Dahl inquiry does not ask whether the officer fully and accurately
stated the governing law. Indeed, while the magistrate who signed the search warrant
for the hotel room had to rely on Sergeant Ramsey’s statement of the evidence and
facts, because only the officers on the scene had knowledge of those matters, the
magistrate did not have to rely on Sergeant Ramsey’s statement of the governing law
on possession of controlled substances, because he could have performed independent
research on that issue. Thus, Sergeant Ramsey’s omission of law does not “defeat the
208

Id.

42

probable cause determination.” Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1235.
For all of the foregoing reasons, this court will grant summary judgment on
plaintiffs’ illegal search claim against Sergeant Ramsey.
2.

Claim against Officer Terry Lucas

The record is devoid of evidence that Huntsville Police Officer Terry Lucas
played any part in applying for the warrant to search the Roddys’ hotel room. Officer
Lucas testified, without contradiction, that his only involvement was assisting in the
execution of the search warrant for the hotel room.209 Accordingly, this court will
grant summary judgment on plaintiffs’ illegal search claim against Officer Lucas. See
Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1235 (“The warrant affidavit upon which this claim is based was
submitted only by Beeson, and Dahl points to no evidence that the other officers
played any role in applying for the warrant. On this basis alone, the other officers
were entitled to summary judgment.”).
3.

Claim against the City of Huntsville

Plaintiffs’ illegal search claim against the City of Huntsville requires the
commission of an unlawful search by Sergeant Ramsey or Officer Lucas.210 In the
absence of proof that either defendant violated plaintiffs’ federally-protected rights,

209

Doc. no. 91-4 (Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 67.

210

Doc. no. 72 (Second Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 32-36.

43

this court must grant summary judgment on plaintiffs’ illegal search claim against the
City of Huntsville.
B.

Unlawful Seizure, Arrest, and Imprisonment
Plaintiffs allege that:
Defendant Ramsey first arrested Dr. Roddy without a warrant
after the pat-down in the hotel’s tenth floor hallway, but before he left
to get the warrant to search the family hotel’s room. Ramsey’s lack of
even arguable probable cause to believe Dr. Roddy committed a crime
rendered Ramsey’s original arrest illegal.211

Plaintiffs also assert that Sergeant Ramsey arrested Mrs. Roddy after searching the
hotel room, despite “abundant” proof that the plaintiffs lawfully possessed the 987
pills found therein. Further, plaintiffs allege that:
At the hotel during the search, Wendy Roddy told Ramsey that Dr.
Roddy is commonly called Mike, and William Meyer and Mike are the
same person. Dr. Roddy’s briefcase, searched by Defendant Lucas,
contained paperwork with the names “William Roddy” and “Mike
Roddy,” with the (same) correct residence address; as well as some
prescription bottles in the name of “Mike Roddy” and others in the name
of “William Roddy.” Wendy Roddy offered Ramsey cell phone
numbers for Dr. Roddy’s physician and pharmacist, to confirm there
were valid prescriptions and that “Mike” and “William” are the same
person, but Ramsey refused the numbers. Mrs. Roddy also offered
Ramsey access to their vehicle, where Ramsey could find paperwork in
the name of “Mike Roddy,” but Ramsey rejected that too. After arguing
with Mrs. Roddy at length and refusing to believe “William” and
“Mike” are not the same person, Ramsey arrested Mrs. Roddy (charging
her with trafficking controlled substances – heroin) . . . . [At the jail,] Dr.
211

Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).

44

Roddy too told Ramsey he is commonly called “Mike,” and Mike Roddy
and William Meyer Roddy are the same person. He too begged Ramsey
to take the cell phone numbers for his physician and pharmacist and call
them[.]212
The Eleventh Circuit has held that, even though an arrest made without
probable cause is unconstitutional,
officers who make such an arrest are entitled to qualified immunity if
there was arguable probable cause for the arrest. Lindsey v. Storey, 936
F.2d 554, 562 (11th Cir.1991); Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503,
1505 (11th Cir.1990). Qualified immunity will shield [the arresting
officers] from a claim of false arrest without probable cause if there was
arguable probable cause, i.e., if a reasonable police officer, knowing
what [the arresting officers] knew, could have believed there was
probable cause for the warrantless arrest. Gold v. City of Miami, 121
F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, [525] U.S. [870], 119 S.
Ct. 165, 142 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1998); Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155,
158 (11th Cir.1995).
Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999) (alterations supplied)
(footnotes omitted). “[W]hat counts for qualified immunity purposes relating to
probable cause to arrest is the information known to the defendant officers or officials
at the time of their conduct, not the facts known to the plaintiff then or those known
to a court later.” Id. (alteration supplied).
1.

Claim against Sergeant Jason Ramsey

This court will begin by discussing plaintiffs’ unlawful seizure, arrest, and
212

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 38
(alterations supplied).

45

imprisonment claim against Huntsville Police Sergeant Jason Ramsey. As noted in
Section III(A)(1), supra, the Huntsville Police received a 911 call alleging that Dr.
Roddy pulled a gun on an Embassy Suites guest.213 When officers responded to the
call, they found Dr. Roddy with a gun, pills, and a large amount of wadded-up cash
in different denominations on his person.214 Those facts unquestionably support a
finding that Sergeant Ramsey had at least arguable probable cause (if not probable
cause) to arrest Dr. Roddy. O’Ferrell, 998 F. Supp. at 1370.
Further, when police officers searched the Roddys’ hotel room, they found at
least 987 pills, over 300 of which were Oxycontin or Oxycodone pills, Schedule II
controlled substances.215 Although Dr. Roddy’s full name is Dr. William Meyer
Roddy, many of the pills were prescribed to “Dr. Mike Roddy.”216 Officers also found
various documents, some bearing the name “William Roddy,” and others the name
“Mike Roddy.”217 Those facts likewise supports a finding that Sergeant Ramsey had
at least arguable probable cause to continue to detain Dr. Roddy and arrest Mrs.
213

See, e.g., doc. no. 91-28 (Search Warrant Affidavit), at 2 [D20].

214

See id.

215

See supra; doc. no. 91-39 (Photographs, Part X), at [D115]; doc. no. 91-40 (Photographs,
Part XI), at [D119].
216

See supra; doc. no. 91-39 (Photographs, Part X), at [D115]; doc. no. 91-40 (Photographs,
Part XI), at [D119].
217

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), at 234-35; doc. no. 91-4
(Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 43; doc. no. 91-23 (Affidavit of Sergeant McCarver), Tab 1 (STAC
Report Case No. V10-244), at 4 [D10]; doc. no. 107 (Stipulation), Tab I.

46

Roddy.
Plaintiffs have not established that Sergeant Ramsey ignored “abundant” proof
that plaintiffs lawfully possessed the 987 pills found in their hotel room.218
While [the Eleventh Circuit] recognize[s] that “[a]n arresting officer is
required to conduct a reasonable investigation to establish probable
cause,” Rankin [v. Evans], 133 F.3d [1425,] 1435, [(11th Cir. 1998)]
“once an officer makes an arrest based on probable cause, he need not
investigate every claim of innocence.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
An officer does not have to take “every conceivable step . . . at whatever
cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person.”
Tillman v. Coley, 886 F.2d 317, 321 (11th Cir. 1989) . . . . [W]hile a
police officer should consider a suspect’s explanation in evaluating the
existence of probable cause, he “is under no obligation to give any
credence to a suspect’s story nor should a plausible explanation in any
sense require the officer to forego arrest pending further investigation
if the facts as initially discovered provide probable cause.” Criss v. City
of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has
explained: “The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty
will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for
every defendant acquitted — indeed, for every suspect released.” Baker
v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433
(1979).
Williams v. City of Homestead, 206 F. App’x 886, 888-89 (11th Cir. 2006)
(alterations supplied).
Because “the facts as initially discovered provide probable cause,” Sergeant
Ramsey had no duty to “give credence to” Mrs. Roddy’s story that Dr. Roddy is also
known as “Mike.” Williams, 206 F. App’x at 888-89. Likewise, Sergeant Ramsey
218

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 38
(alterations supplied).

47

had no obligation to take “every conceivable step” to investigate her story by calling
Dr. Roddy’s physician and pharmacist or searching the Roddys’ auto for documents
confirming Dr. Roddy’s identity. Id.
Further, the fact that some pills and documents bore the name “Dr. William
Roddy,” and others the name “Dr. Mike Roddy,” is susceptible to multiple reasonable
interpretations, one of which is that Dr. Roddy obtained the pills under a false name.
Finally, Dr. Roddy’s attempts to prove the Roddys’ lawful possession of the pills
after they were arrested and transported to jail do not affect the issue of whether
Sergeant Ramsey had arguable probable cause to make the arrests.
For all of the foregoing reasons, this court will grant summary judgment on
plaintiffs’ unlawful seizure, arrest, and imprisonment claim against Sergeant Ramsey.
2.

Claim against Officer Terry Lucas

This court will grant summary judgment on the claim against Officer Lucas for
the same reasons as the claim against Sergeant Ramsey, as well as for the numerous
other reasons discussed below. Plaintiffs allege that:
while Mrs. Roddy was in the hotel bedroom trying at length to convince
get Ramsey to understand Mike and William are the same person, Ex.
B (Wendy Roddy Dep.), at 102, Lucas was also in the bedroom
searching through Dr. Roddy’s briefcase. Ex. C (Ramsey Dep.), at
194-95. Between Lucas hearing the extended conversation about
whether Mike is William, finding numerous Oxycontin prescription
bottles in the briefcase in Mike Roddy’s name, and seeing numerous
48

papers in the briefcase in both the names of both Mike and William and
with the same address, a jury could find Lucas was aware that i) Mike
and William are the same, ii) Dr. Roddy in fact had valid prescriptions
for all the Oxycontin the officers found, iii) there was no probable cause
to arrest either Dr. or Mrs. Roddy for unlawful possession, iv) Lucas had
an opportunity to intervene to prevent or undo an unlawful arrest, e.g.,
by instructing his junior officer Ramsey not to arrest Mrs. Roddy and to
release Mr. Roddy, but v) Lucas failed to take any steps to intervene.219
To establish § 1983 liability for false arrest, the Eleventh Circuit requires a
plaintiff to show:
“proof of an affirmative causal connection” between a government
actor’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional violation, which
“may be established by proving that the official was personally involved
in the acts that resulted in the constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v.
Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986). Merely being present
with the arresting officers at the scene is not enough, unless the plaintiff
can show that the defendant officer was part of the chain of command
authorizing the arrest action.
Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 737 (11th Cir. 2010). Where an officer
“did not arrest [the plaintiff] and had no supervisory control over the officer who did,
qualified immunity is appropriate.” Id. (alteration supplied).
Here, Officer Lucas “did not arrest [plaintiffs].” Id. (alteration supplied). He
did not arrive at the Embassy Suites until after Dr. Roddy’s arrest, and he did not
make the decision to place either plaintiff under arrest.220 Further, Officer Lucas “had
219

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 45 n.60.

220

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 89-91; doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition
of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 118-19.

49

no supervisory control over the officer who did [arrest plaintiffs]”: i.e., Sergeant
Ramsey. Brown, 608 F.3d at 737 (alteration supplied). Plaintiffs do not cite any
evidence to support their argument that Sergeant Ramsey was the “junior officer” of
Officer Lucas.221 At the time of plaintiffs’ arrests, both Ramsey and Lucas were
Huntsville Police Officers who served on the Huntsville-Madison County Strategic
Counterdrug Team (“STAC”).222 (Since the arrests, Ramsey was promoted to
Sergeant and left the STAC, but Lucas remains an Officer with the task force.223)
Because Ramsey and Lucas held the same rank, neither had “supervisory control”
over the other. Brown, 608 F.3d at 737.
Officer Lucas had no clearly established duty to intervene to prevent, much less
undo, an unlawful arrest by a police officer of equal rank. See Jones, 174 F.3d at
1286 (“There is no controlling authority clearly establishing that once a police officer
knows another officer has fabricated a confession in a police report for a warrantless
arrest, that police officer has a constitutional duty to intervene to stop the other
officer’s conduct.”); Mehta v. Foskey, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1380 n.12 (S.D. Ga.

221

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 45 n.60.

222

Doc. no. 90 (Brief in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment), at 6 n.4; doc. no. 90
(Brief in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment), at 6 n.4; doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of
Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. I), at 12; doc. no. 91-4 (Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 4.
223

Doc. no. 90 (Brief in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment), at 6 n.4; doc. no. 90
(Brief in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment), at 6 n.4; doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of
Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. I), at 23; doc. no. 91-4 (Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 4..4.

50

2012) (“[T]he Court is aware of [no authority], from the Eleventh Circuit or the
Supreme Court, holding that a law enforcement officer can be liable under § 1983 for
failing to intervene when another officer performs an unlawful arrest.”) (alterations
supplied); McGuire v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:11-CV-1027-WKW, 2013 WL
1336882, *14 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2013) (“[I]t is unclear whether the duty to
intervene exists for constitutional deprivations other than excessive force.”)
(alteration supplied); Lewis v. Blue, No. 2:09-CV-862-WKW, 2010 WL 730210, *6
(M.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2010) (“[C]ase law seems to indicate that failure to intervene
claims are cognizable only when related to excessive force violations.”) (alteration
supplied).
Further, even assuming that Officer Lucas had a duty to intervene to prevent
(or undo) unlawful arrests by Officer Ramsey, and that either “the extended
conversation about whether Mike is William,” or the “numerous papers in the
briefcase in both the names of both Mike and William and with the same address”
showed the absence of arguable probable cause for the arrests of both plaintiffs,224
plaintiffs cite no evidence to support their argument that Officer Lucas heard that
“conversation,” or saw those “ papers.” Accordingly, plaintiffs have not proven that
Officer Lucas knew that the arrests were unlawful, as plaintiffs contend; and, thus, he
224

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 45 n.60.

51

had no duty to intervene.225 See Exford v. City of Montgomery, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1210,
1226 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (“Shoupe’s uncontradicted affidavit states that he never saw
the altercation, meaning that he had no basis to gauge whether Norgard lacked
probable cause to arrest Exford to begin with. This alone entitles Shoupe to qualified
immunity.”).
For all of the foregoing reasons, this court will grant summary judgment on
plaintiffs’ unlawful seizure, arrest, and imprisonment claim against Officer Lucas.
3.

Claim against the City of Huntsville

Plaintiffs’ unlawful seizure, arrest, and imprisonment claim against the City of
Huntsville requires the commission of an illegal seizure, arrest, and imprisonment by
Sergeant Ramsey or Officer Lucas.226 In the absence of such proof, this court must
grant summary judgment on plaintiffs’ unlawful seizure, arrest, and imprisonment
claim against the City of Huntsville.
IV. PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL STATE-LAW CLAIMS
Plaintiffs assert supplemental state-law claims for false arrest/false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and conversion against the City of Huntsville,
Huntsville Police Sergeant Jason Ramsey, and Huntsville Police Officer Terry

225

Doc. no. 91-4 (Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 41-43, 57-58.

226

Doc. no. 72 (Second Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 37-41.

52

Lucas.227 Further, plaintiffs assert a state-law claim for “outrage” against Sergeant
Ramsey and Officer Lucas.228
In response to defendants’ motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs “do not
dispute that Defendant [the] City [of Huntsville] cannot be liable for malicious
prosecution, conversion, or outrage[.]”229 Accordingly, and assuming that plaintiffs
stated such claims against the City, this court will grant summary judgment on those
claims.
The City of Huntsville, Sergeant Ramsey, and Officer Lucas each assert that
they are entitled to state-agent immunity from plaintiffs’ remaining claims.230 Stateagent immunity extends to “governmental units . . . authorized to appoint
[law-enforcement] officers,” and also to individual law enforcement officers. Telfare
v. City of Huntsville, 841 So. 2d 1222, 1227 (Ala. 2002) (alteration in original)
(interpreting Ala. Code § 6-5-338(b) (1975)).
The Alabama Supreme Court held in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala.
2000), that:
A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her
227

Id. ¶¶ 42-51.

228

Id. ¶¶ 52-54.

229

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 50 n.71
(alterations supplied).
230

Doc. no. 90 (Brief in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment), at 40.

53

personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against
the agent is based upon the agent’s
(1)

formulating plans, policies, or designs; or

(2)

exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a
department or agency of government, including, but not limited
to, examples such as:
(a)

making administrative adjudications;

(b)

allocating resources;

(c)

negotiating contracts;

(d)

hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising
personnel; or

(3)

discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute,
rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation
prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State
agent performs the duties in that manner; or

(4)

exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers’
arresting or attempting to arrest persons; or

(5)

exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute,
rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing
persons of unsound mind, or educating students.

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement of
the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
(1)

when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the
Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this
54

State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities of a governmental agency require otherwise; or
(2)

when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken
interpretation of the law.

Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405 (emphasis supplied). The Alabama Supreme
court also established
“a ‘burden-shifting’ process when a party raises the defense of
State-agent immunity.” Giambrone [v. Douglas], 874 So. 2d [1046,]
1052 [(Ala. 2003)]. Under this process, [the defendant officer] “bears
the burden of demonstrating that [the plaintiff’s] claims arise from a
function that would entitle [him] to immunity.” 874 So. 2d at 1052[.] “If
[he makes] such a showing, the burden then shifts to [the plaintiff], who,
in order to deny [the officer] immunity from suit, must establish that [the
officer] acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,” 874 So.
2d at 1056[,] or that he “was not exercising his . . . judgment in the
manner set forth in the examples in Cranman.” Ex parte Hudson, 866
So. 2d [1046,] 1118 [(Ala. 2003)].
Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 205 (Ala. 2003) (emphasis and alterations
supplied). “Allegations of negligence are not sufficient to remove the immunity the
City is provided for [an officer’s] performance of a discretionary function.” City of
Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834 So. 2d 755, 762 (Ala. 2002) (emphasis and alteration
supplied) (citing Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So. 2d 565, 570 (Ala. 1999)).
A.

False Arrest/False Imprisonment
Under Alabama law, the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment

55

have different elements. See Walker v. City of Huntsville, 62 So.3d 474,
492 (Ala. 2010) (explaining that Alabama Code § 6-5-170 “defines false
imprisonment as ‘the unlawful detention of the person of another for any
length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty’”); see also
Higgins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 512 So.2d 766 (Ala. 1987) (“in a cause
of action for false arrest, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant caused
him to be arrested without probable cause”), overruled on other
grounds, Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 619 So.2d 1280 (Ala.
1993).
Griffin v. Beasley, No. 2:12-CV-196WHA, 2012 WL 2339779, *15 (M.D. Ala. June
19, 2012). As described in Section III(B)(1), supra, in the context of plaintiffs’ 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful seizure, arrest, and imprisonment, plaintiffs have
not shown that their detentions were “unlawful,” or that their arrests were “without
probable cause.” Griffin, 2012 WL 2339779, at *15. Accordingly, this court will
grant summary judgment on plaintiffs’ state-law claims for false arrest/false
imprisonment against all three defendants.
B.

Malicious Prosecution
The Eleventh Circuit has compared federal and Alabama law and held that:
To establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff
must prove two things: (1) the elements of the common law tort of
malicious prosecution; and (2) a violation of his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Kingsland v. City of Miami,
382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004); Wood [v. Kesler], 323 F.3d [872,]
881 [(11th Cir. 2003)]. As to the first prong, the constituent elements
of the common law tort of malicious prosecution are: “(1) a criminal
prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with
malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff
56

accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Wood
323 F.3d at 882. The elements under Alabama law for the common-law
tort of malicious prosecution are the same, except that they require only
a “judicial proceeding” not a “criminal prosecution.” Delchamps, Inc.
v. Bryant, 738 So. 2d 824, 831-32 (Ala. 1999).
Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted)
(alterations and emphasis supplied).
With respect to the requirement that the criminal prosecution be “instituted or
continued by the present defendant,” Officer Lucas’s only involvement in plaintiffs’
criminal case was that of assisting in the execution of the search warrant for their
hotel room.231 Further, Sergeant Ramsey testified, without contradiction, that the
decision to prosecute or dismiss the charges against plaintiffs rested with Madison
County Assistant District Attorney James Tolleson, not the Huntsville Police
Department or its officers.232 The Alabama Supreme Court has held that:
If a defendant merely gives the district attorney’s office
information regarding an alleged crime, leaving the decision to
prosecute entirely to the uncontrolled discretion of the district attorney,
who thereafter makes his own independent investigation and thereupon
takes the information before the grand jury which returns indictments
against the suspects, the defendant, in a malicious prosecution action, is
not regarded as having instigated the criminal proceeding.
See Alabama Power Co. v. Neighbors, 402 So. 2d 958, 962 (Ala. 1981). Thus,
plaintiffs have not established that Sergeant Ramsey or Officer Lucas “instituted or
231

Doc. no. 91-4 (Deposition of Officer Lucas), at 67.

232

Doc. no. 91-3 (Deposition of Sergeant Ramsey, Vol. II), 316-17, 329-31.

57

continued” plaintiffs’ criminal proceedings. Grider, 618 F.3d at 1256.
Further, Madison County Assistant District Attorney James Tolleson
successfully moved to nolle prosse plaintiffs’ criminal charges.233 A nolle prosse “is
a procedural dismissal of the charges without prejudice — not a bona fide
termination in the defendant’s favor.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 173 (5th
Cir. 2009) (emphasis supplied). Thus, plaintiffs have not proved that the proceedings
were terminated in their favor. Grider, 618 F.3d at 1256.
Moreover, as discussed in Section III(B)(1), supra, in the context of plaintiffs’
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful seizure, arrest, and imprisonment, plaintiffs’
arrests were supported by “probable cause.” As a result, plaintiffs’ seizures were
legal. Thus, plaintiffs have not shown that any of the defendants violated their
“Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Grider, 618 F.3d
at 1256.
For all of the foregoing reasons, this court will grant summary judgment on
plaintiffs’ state-law claims for malicious prosecution against all three defendants.
C.

Conversion
Alabama Code § 6-5-260 provides a cause of action in tort for conversion.234
233

Doc. no. 91-17 (Affidavit of Assistant District Attorney Tolleson), Tab I (Case Action
Summary Sheets with Court Orders); id., Tab II (Motions to Nolle Prosse), at [D3941-D3942].
234

Alabama Code § 6-5-260 states as follows: “The owner of personalty is entitled to
possession thereof. Any unlawful deprivation of or interference with such possession is a tort for

58

Alabama Code § 6-5-260 (1975); see also Dawson v. City of Montgomery, No.
2:06-CV-1057-WKW [WO], 2008 WL 659800, *25-30 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 6, 2008)
(addressing a motion for summary judgment on claim for conversion against an
arresting police officer and city).
At some point after their criminal charges were dismissed, plaintiffs attempted
to retrieve the evidence seized during the investigation from the Madison County
Courthouse.235 The facts relevant to the present discussion were described in Part
II(I) of this opinion, supra. In summary, the plaintiffs do not connect their claim that
Sergeant Ramsey converted $200 from Mrs. Roddy’s purse and $75 from a son’s
wallet to an act or omission by Officer Lucas. Indeed, plaintiffs argue that a jury
“could find Ramsey liable for conversion,” not Lucas.236 Accordingly, this court will
grant summary judgment on plaintiffs’ state-law claim for conversion against Lucas.
Plaintiffs’ claim against Sergeant Ramsey will fare no better than their claim
against Officer Lucas, because neither plaintiff knew the total amount of money
seized during the search of their hotel room, or articulated a reasonable, nonspeculative basis for believing that some of the money was not returned. For
which an action lies.”
235

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 108; doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition
of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 147-48; doc. no. 91-22 (Affidavit of Captain Malone), Tab 6
(Incident/Investigation Report), at [D130].
236

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 50 (emphasis

supplied).

59

example, Mrs. Roddy testified as follows:
Q.

How much money total was taken? Bad question. How much
total money was seized?

A.

I don’t know.

Q.

How did you know — if you didn’t know how much was seized,
how did you know an amount that was taken?

A.

Because I had seen it written down, and the $275 was not a part
of it[.]237

Mrs. Roddy then testified:
Q.

Did you come to [the Madison County Courthouse to retrieve
your belongings] with an understanding, you personally, with an
understanding about how much money you were expecting to get
back, or is that something Dr. Roddy did?

A.

That’s something Dr. Roddy did.238

When questioned about Mrs. Roddy’s testimony, Dr. Roddy testified as
follows:
Q.

I think I asked your wife something to the effect of, you know,
“Did you know the exact amount?” And she said, “No. My
husband did.” And I asked her, “Did he have it written down?”
And I think she said, “No. He had it memorized” or he
remembered it or something to that effect. Is that true?

A.

No. That’s a gross misunderstanding or something because I
couldn’t tell you what’s in my pocket any day, any time, any week.

237

Doc. no. 91-2 (Deposition of Wendy Sue Roddy), at 150 (alteration supplied).

238

Id. at 151 (emphasis and alteration supplied).

60

Q.

I think I asked a bad question. When you went to retrieve your
belongings, did you go there with a number in your head or
written down on a piece of paper as to how much money you
needed to get back total, regardless of how many counts it came
to you in?

A.

I could — I had a theory at best, and that which was on the police
report plus the [$]275, since it wasn’t documented anywhere, and
it went in his pocket.

Q.

And what do you mean when you say “a theory at best?” I don’t
understand that.

A.

I’m saying I have a great deal of certainty that if it was on the —
that I knew what to expect coming back if what was on the police
report was accurate in terms of dollars, because I was cognizant
of those numbers prior to receipt of evidence. Are you with me?

Q.

Yes.

A.

But on neither, on the inventory sheet or the police report, was
there anything about the [$]200 coming out of my wife’s purse
and into Ramsey’s pocket, nor the [$]75 out of my son’s wallet
into his pocket. So, I patiently waited and the amount on the
police report was correct, but the [$]275 was not — was not there.

Q.

And how did you know about the $275?

A.

From what my wife said.

Q.

Well, what do you mean? When?

A.

When? When she — when we went home driving, after we got
out of jail, said he — you know, she was recalling the events that
happened and said he took [$]200 out of her wallet and Eric, my
son, had [$]75 designated for some specific things that day in his
wallet. The money from his wallet was taken.
61

Q.

How do you know that the $200 that was taken from your wife’s
purse, and the $75 you say was taken from your son’s purse, was
not taken and put with the other money that was taken from your
briefcase and your person?

A.

Go ahead. I’m just — I’m clearing my throat.

Q.

It was notated in the report and that you received all of that back.
How do you not know that that happened?

A.

Well, and again, you can surmise as well as I. When that Ramsey
was asked where is the [$]200 from my wife’s purse and the [$]75
from my son’s wallet, he denied taking it. So, why would he deny
it if it were put back into evidence?239

Dr. Roddy also testified:
Q.

Regardless of how it was removed from your wife’s purse,
regardless of how it was maintained in your wife’s purse, it does
not change the fact that you don’t know the total amount that you
had?

A.

And I was truthful with you. I don’t know, and I’m not going to
pretend to know.240

In sum, without knowing the total amount of money seized, plaintiffs’ claim
that some of the money was not returned amounts to (in Dr. Roddy’s telling term)
pure “surmise.”241 Of course, “[w]here the circumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom create a genuine issue of material fact for trial, summary
239

Doc. no. 91-1 (Deposition of William Meyer Roddy), at 111-14 (emphasis and alterations

supplied).
240

Id. at 124-25 (emphasis supplied).

241

Id. at 114.

62

judgment is improper.” Chapman v. American Cyanamid Corp., 861 F.2d 1515,
1518-19 (11th Cir. 1988) (alteration supplied). “However, an inference based on
speculation and conjecture is not reasonable.” Id. at 1518. Accordingly, this court
will grant summary judgment on plaintiffs’ state-law claim for conversion against
Sergeant Ramsey.
D.

Outrage
“The intentional infliction of emotional distress is also known as the tort of

outrage” under Alabama law. Ex parte Bole, 103 So. 3d 40, 52 (Ala. 2012). “In order
to recover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct ‘(1) was
intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional
distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.’” Id.
(quoting Little v. Robinson, 72 So. 3d 1168, 1172-73 (Ala. 2011)).
The tort of outrage is an extremely limited cause of action. It is
so limited that this Court has recognized it in regard to only three kinds
of conduct: (1) wrongful conduct in the family-burial context, Whitt v.
Hulsey, 519 So. 2d 901 (Ala. 1987); (2) barbaric methods employed to
coerce an insurance settlement, National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen,
447 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1983); and (3) egregious sexual harassment, Busby
v. Truswal Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1989).
Ex parte Bole, 103 So. 3d at 52 (quoting Little, 771 So. 3d at 1172-73).
That is not to say, however, that the tort of outrage is viable in
only the three circumstances noted . . . . It is clear, however, that the tort
of outrage is viable only when the conduct is “‘so outrageous in
63

character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized society.’”
Ex parte Bole, 103 So. 3d at 52-53 (quoting Little, 771 So. 3d at 1172-73).
To establish their claim of “outrage,” plaintiffs allege that:
Dr. Roddy, a respected physician, and his wife (and office
manager) were falsely charged with felony drug trafficking for nearly a
year, even though Defendants knew or clearly should have known Dr.
Roddy lawfully possessed all the drugs he was accused [of possessing];
refused to investigate or pursue evidence of innocence; and virtually
destroyed his medical practice and the family’s livelihood.242
Given this court’s holding that plaintiffs’ arrests were supported by probable
cause, the actions of Sergeant Ramsey and Officer Lucas were not “‘so outrageous
in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.’” Ex
parte Bole, 103 So. 3d at 52-53. Accordingly, this court will grant summary
judgment on plaintiffs’ state-law claims for “outrage” against Sergeant Ramsey and
Officer Lucas.
V. EVIDENTIARY MOTIONS
Defendants have moved to supplement their evidentiary submissions in support
of summary judgment by filing two exhibits: i.e., an affidavit from Warrant

242

Doc. no. 99 (Response in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment), at 51 (alteration

supplied).

64

Magistrate Lee S. Leggett further explaining why plaintiffs’ charges of trafficking in
Oxycontin pills were listed as “Trafficking – Heroin”; and, the remainder of the
documents found in Dr. Roddy’s briefcase during the search of plaintiffs’ hotel
room.243 Plaintiffs oppose the filing of Leggett’s affidavit, but do not oppose the
filing of the documents from the briefcase.244
Further, plaintiffs have moved to strike the affidavit of Madison County
Assistant District Attorney James Tolleson on the grounds that:
other than the first two paragraphs (identifying Tolleson by name and
employment background) and the first three sentences of the third
paragraph (concerning the arrest and charging of Dr. and Mrs. Roddy
and the assignment of their cases to Tolleson to prosecute), nearly the
entire remainder of Tolleson’s affidavit consists of opinion testimony.245
Plaintiffs’ motion does not address the exhibits attached to Tolleson’s affidavit.
This court’s ruling does not rely on the affidavit from Warrant Magistrate Lee
S. Leggett, the remainder of the documents found in Dr. Roddy’s briefcase, or the
affidavit from Madison County Assistant District Attorney James Tolleson. (It does,
however, cite to the “Case Action Summary Sheets with Court Orders” and “Motions
to Nolle Prosse,” attached as Tab I and Tab II to the Tolleson affidavit, the

243

Doc. no. 115 (Motion to Supplement Evidentiary Submissions), at 1.

244

Id.

245

Doc. no. 117 (Motion to Strike), at 1.

65

admissibility of which is not in dispute.246 ) Accordingly, this court will deny all
parties’ evidentiary motions as moot.247
VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS
For the reasons explained above, the motions for summary judgment filed by
the City of Huntsville, Sergeant Jason Ramsey, and Officer Terry Lucas are
GRANTED. Defendants’ motion to supplement their evidentiary submissions in
support of summary judgment, and plaintiffs’ motion to strike the affidavit of
Madison County Assistant District Attorney James Tolleson, are DENIED as moot.
Plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Costs are taxed to plaintiffs.
The Clerk is directed to close this file.
DONE this 23rd day of May, 2013.

______________________________
United States District Judge

246

Doc. no. 91-17 (Affidavit of Assistant District Attorney Tolleson), Tab I (Case Action
Summary Sheets with Court Orders); id., Tab II (Motions to Nolle Prosse), at [D3941-D3942].
247

This court recognizes that defendants have not yet responded to plaintiffs’ motion to strike
the affidavit of Madison County Assistant District Attorney James Tolleson. However, a court may
deny a motion “as moot, without requiring a formal response from [the opposing party].” Waldman
v. Pitcher, No. 1:10-CV-238, 2011 WL 4337046, *13 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2011) (alteration
supplied); see also United States v. Salawu, No. 04-261-JJF, 2005 WL 1421819, *2 (D. Del. June
17, 2005) (“[T]he Court will deny Defendant’s motion to recall the mandate and deny as moot his
motions for bail, without further response from the Government, because it is apparent to the Court
at this juncture that relief is not warranted.”) (alteration supplied).

66