Terry v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Inge P Johnson on 9/20/12. (ASL)

FILED
2012 Sep-21 AM 07:57
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHWESTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL SHAYNE TERRY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration,

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CV 12-J-365-NW

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on the record and the brief of the defendant. The
court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405. The plaintiff is seeking reversal and
remand of the final decision of the Commissioner. All administrative remedies have been
exhausted.

The plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging an

inability to work since November 2, 2009,1 due to a prior severe injury to left hand resulting
in a partial amputation, diabetic neuropathy in his feet, pain in his right hand and arthritis
in his hip and knee (R. 40, 43, 45-46, 66, 77-78). The application was denied initially (R.
96-101) and again by an Administrative Law Judge on May 20, 2011 (R. 14-27). The ALJ’s
determination became the final decision when the Appeals Council denied the plaintiff’s
request for review (R. 1-3).

The court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is
a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining: 1) whether there is

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This is an amended onset date due to the res judicata effect of a prior Social Security denial R.37-38.

substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and 2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 843 (1971);
Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir.1988). The Court may not decide facts,
reweigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.1983). However, this limited
scope does not render affirmance automatic,
for “despite [this] deferential standard for review of claims . . . [the]
Court must scrutinize [the] record in its entirety to determine
reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d
622 (11th Cir.1987).
Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701. Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is
grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 634 (11th Cir.1984).
The court has carefully reviewed the entire record in this case and is of the opinion
that the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and that the proper
legal standards were applied in reaching that decision.
The evidence before the court reveals that the plaintiff had a severe injury to his
right hand in 1996, which resulted in partial amputation of that hand and further surgery
several years later (R. 285-301, 319-324, 338-348). He has been treated for a diabetic
ulcer on the bottom of one foot and suffers from diabetic neuropathy (R. 48-49, 395). The
plaintiff’s complaints of hip and knee pain do not appear in the medical records (R. 68), and
a consultative evaluation in May 2010 noted the plaintiff could get on and off the exam
table without difficulty and had a normal gait (R. 370). The only limitations noted in the

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May 2010 consultative examination was the absence of the majority of plaintiff’s left hand
(R. 370). The plaintiff was laid off from his last job and collected unemployment benefits
until 2010 (R. 65).
At the hearing, the ALJ inquired of the Vocational Expert (VE) whether someone
with the plaintiff’s age, education and work experience, who is limited to light work with
further limitations of no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolding; who is unable to use his
left hand for fine or gross manipulation, and who is limited from all industrial hazards, could
return to any of the plaintiff’s past work (R. 83). The VE responded that the plaintiff’s past
work as a shift manager and as a delivery driver remained viable under those limitations
(R. 83). Because the plaintiff was capable of returning to his past relevant work, the ALJ
found the plaintiff had not been under a disability at any time from November 2, 2009,
through the date of the decision (R. 27).
Given the evidence presented to the ALJ and this court, the court cannot conclude
the decision of the ALJ was against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the decision
of the Commissioner must be affirmed.
Done, this 20th day of September, 2012.

INGE PRYTZ JOHNSON
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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