Lawson v. I.C. System, Inc.,

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons explained within, ICS' 9 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED only as to Count II. Count II is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties are DIRECTED to file a Rule 26 report that sets a Discovery cutoff of 12/31/2018; Dispositive Motion deadline of 1/31/2019. This matter is SET for a pretrial conference on 6/20/2019 at 2:15 PM in the Hugo L. Black United States Courthouse; and Jury Trial on 7/29/2019 at 9:00 AM in US Post Office & Courthouse, Decatur, AL; BOTH before Judge Abdul K Kallon. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 8/24/2018. (AFS)

FILED
2018 Aug-24 PM 04:06
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHWESTERN DIVISION
DANIEL LAWSON, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff,

v.
I.C. SYSTEM, INC.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action Number
3:18-cv-00083-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Daniel Lawson brings claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., against I.C. System, Inc. (“ICS”). Briefly,
Lawson filed for bankruptcy and received discharge of his debts. Doc. 1 at 2. One
of these debts—which Lawson allegedly owed to Comcast—is at issue in this
litigation. After the discharge, ICS apparently reported the Comcast debt as
delinquent on Lawson’s credit reports, and also sent Lawson a collection letter
demanding payment of this debt. Id. at 2-3. Lawson filed this lawsuit contending
that ICS violated the FDCPA by demanding payment of a debt that is not owed, in
violation of § 1692e (Count I), and failing to cease communication and collections
after receiving notice to do so, in violation of § 1692c(c) (Count II). Id. at 4-5.
The court has for consideration ICS’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
doc. 9. “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts
1

in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cannon
v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). In ruling on the
motion, the court “must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view
them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. A Rule 12(c) motion
for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed under the same standard as that of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Griffin v. SunTrust Bank, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1294,
1295 (N.D. Ga. 2015). As such, to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Losey v. Warden,
521 F. App’x 717, 719 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying the Iqbal standard to an appeal
concerning a Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings). In other words the plaintiff
must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citation omitted). The complaint must establish “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Ultimately, this inquiry is a
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

2

Turning to the specifics here, ICS basically contends that it had a right to
rely on Comcast to determine the debt’s legitimacy, and that Lawson never
instructed ICS to cease further communications. The court agrees, in part.
A. The § 1692e Claim (Count I)
Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”
15 U.S.C. § 1692e. “A demand for immediate payment while a debtor is in
bankruptcy (or after the debt’s discharge) is ‘false’ in the sense that it asserts that
money is due, although . . . it is not.” Bacelli v. MFP, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 2d 1328,
1332 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (quoting Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 728 (7th
Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[n]owhere in the
FDCPA does the statute specifically require a debt collector to validate a debt prior
to seeking collection of such debt.” Cornette v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d
1362, 1369-70 (S.D. Fla. 2017). In fact, many courts “have found that debt
collectors are entitled to rely on the information they receive from the creditor.
They are not held strictly liable when they mistakenly attempt to collect amounts in
excess of what is due, if they reasonably relied on information provided by their
clients.” Id. (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is undisputed at this juncture that ICS demanded payment of a debt that
Lawson no longer owed. See docs. 1, 9. At issue here is ICS’ contention that it is
3

not liable because it is entitled to rely on information it received from Comcast.
This may well prove to be the case ultimately. At this juncture, however, there is
no evidence before the court that Comcast provided any information to ICS, or
what that information entailed. Therefore, it is premature to decide, as a matter of
law, that ICS reasonably relied on information provided by a creditor.
Accordingly, ICS’ motion is due to be denied as to Count I.
B. The § 1692c Claim (Count II)
Section 1692c provides that “[i]f a consumer notifies a debt collector in
writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the
debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt
collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such
debt,” outside of certain exceptions not applicable here. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c).
Lawson is not contending that ICS failed to follow the directions, if any, he
provided. Instead, Count II is based on Lawson’s bankruptcy filing alone. More
specifically, Lawson contends that filing for bankruptcy “set the necessary events
in motion, such that his creditors were notified that he was refusing to pay and
directing further communication to cease.” Doc. 22 at 13. Critically, Lawson cites
no authority to support this position, see doc. 22, which other courts have rejected,
see, e.g., Henderson v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-8194, 2015 WL
2375258, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2015) (“Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the
4

plain language of [§ 1692c(c)] therefore provides no indication that notice of
bankruptcy is also sufficient to trigger a duty to cease communications”); Shelley v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-506-RLY-DKL, 2013 WL 4584649, at
*8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 28, 2013) (“Plaintiffs do not allege that they or anyone within
this definition ever sent written notice to Ocwen. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on a notice
issued by a bankruptcy court, which, by the plain language of [§ 1692c(c)], is not
sufficient to provide notice”). Moreover, even if a notice issued by a bankruptcy
court is sufficient, Lawson does not plead that the court presiding over his case
sent such a notice to ICS. See doc. 1. Therefore, ICS’ motion is due to be granted
as to Count II.
For the reasons explained above, ICS’ motion, doc. 9, is GRANTED only as
to Count II. Count II is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The parties are DIRECTED to file a Rule 26 report that sets a discovery
cutoff of December 31, 2018, and a dispositive motion deadline of January 31,
2019. This matter is SET for a pretrial conference at 2:15 p.m. on June 20, 2019 in
Courtroom 4A of the Hugo L. Black United States Courthouse, and for trial at 9:00
a.m. on July 29, 2019, at the federal courthouse in Decatur, Alabama.
DONE the 24th day of August, 2018.

_________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5