Johnson v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING CASE that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and costs are taxed against claimant as more fully set out in order. Signed by Judge C Lynwood Smith, Jr on 8/23/2013. (AHI)

FILED
2013 Aug-23 AM 11:13
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
MARY C. JOHNSON,
Claimant,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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Case No. CV-10-S-2537-M

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Claimant, Mary Johnson, commenced this action on September 17, 2010,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of
the Commissioner, affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
and thereby denying her claim for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits.1
The court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is
a narrow one. The scope of review is limited to determining whether there is

1

This case has a unique procedural posture. The first administrative decision, denying
claimant’s benefits, was issued on July 14, 2009. Tr. 56-61. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal of that
decision in this court, but the case was remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to Sentence Six of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on January 4, 2011. Doc. no. 7. The reason for the remand was that the cassette
tape from the administrative hearing was defective. Id. at 2. The Commissioner conducted a
supplemental hearing on September 7, 2011, see Tr. 452-73, and the ALJ issued a new, unfavorable
decision on October 19, 2011. Tr. 6-14. The court’s present task is to review the ALJ’s October
19, 2011 decision.

substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Lamb v. Bowen,
847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th
Cir. 1983).
Claimant contends that the Commissioner’s decision is neither supported by
substantial evidence nor in accordance with applicable legal standards. Specifically,
claimant asserts that the ALJ improperly considered the opinion of her treating
physician and improperly evaluated her credibility and complaints of subjective
symptoms. Upon review of the record, the court concludes that these contentions lack
merit, and the Commissioner’s ruling is due to be affirmed.
A.

Treating Physician
The opinion of a treating physician “must be given substantial or considerable

weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d
1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Good cause exists when
“(1) [the] treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) [the]
evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) [the] treating physician’s opinion was
conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Id. Additionally,
the ALJ is not required to accept a conclusory statement from a medical source, even
a treating source, that a claimant is unable to work, because the decision whether a

2

claimant is disabled is not a medical opinion, but is a decision “reserved to the
Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e).
Social Security regulations also provide that, in considering what weight to give
any medical opinion (regardless of whether it is from a treating or non-treating
physician), the Commissioner should evaluate: the extent of the examining or treating
relationship between the doctor and patient; whether the doctor’s opinion can be
supported by medical signs and laboratory findings; whether the opinion is consistent
with the record as a whole; the doctor’s specialization; and other factors. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). See also Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir.
1986) (“The weight afforded a physician’s conclusory statements depends upon the
extent to which they are supported by clinical or laboratory findings and are consistent
with other evidence as to claimant’s impairments.”).
Dr. John Boggess, claimant’s primary care physician, submitted a letter to the
Commissioner on December 24, 2008, stating:
Ms. Charlene Johnson is under my care presently and has been so
since April of 1984. She had been gainfully employed until 1995 when
she began having difficulty with memory disturbance, depressive
symptomatology and back pain. She was having problems with
significant depression, lethargy and despite being on multiple
antidepressants she really failed to improve and from that point on Ms.
Johnson was unable to go back to work due to those problems.
She has continued to have the depressive symptomatology off and
on since that time and unfortunately in 2007 she developed an occluded
3

right internal carotid artery and had a CVA in the left frontal area. Since
that time she has had increasing impairment with memory and cognitive
abilities. At this point she remains completely and totally disabled. I
anticipate this is going to be a long term and permanent situation.2
Dr. Boggess submitted a similar letter on April 12, 2011, stating:
Ms. Johnson is currently under my care and has been under my
care since April 24, 1984. She began suffering from depressive
symptomatology as far back as 1995 and has been tried on a multitude
of antidepressants since that time. Back in 1995 she began having
difficulty with memory disturbance and profound lethargy. She was
having mood swings and disturbances. From that point on she continued
to suffer from depressive symptomatology. She continued under a lot of
stress with family issues and ultimately got [to] the point that Ms.
Johnson was unable to perform any work activities due to her depressive
symptoms. It continued to be a problem for Ms. Johnson through the
years. She continued under stress with a father with Alzheimer’s,
mother’s [sic] whose health was bad, a husband who suffered from other
medical problems, and raising a child. Ms. Johnson, despite being on
multiple antidepressants, really did not respond well to the medication.
She declined help from psychiatrist [sic]. She did in fact take medical
leave from her job to see if that would make her feel better as far as her
stress and depressive symptomatology.
Beginning in 1995 Ms. Johnson has continued with problems of
depression, chronic headaches and memory disturbance and this has all
been worsened by a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2007 which
resulted in her having an occluded right internal carotid artery and
significant closed-head injury. She continues to suffer from these same
symptoms today. She has been unable to work and was mentally unable
to work prior to 12/31/2001.3
The ALJ afforded little weight to Dr. Boggess’ opinion, reasoning that “the
course of treatment pursued by the doctor has not been consistent with what one
2

Tr. 449.

3

Tr. 451 (alterations supplied).
4

would expect if the claimant were truly disabled, as the doctor has reported.”4 The
ALJ also noted that she was not required to accept Dr. Boggess’ opinion that claimant
was disabled, as that is a decision reserved to the Commissioner.5 Finally, the ALJ
stated:
Dr. Boggess has treated the claimant since at least 1985. While that is
normally a factor in the claimant’s favor, the possibility always exists
that a doctor may express an opinion in an effort to assist a patient with
whom he or she sympathizes for one reason or another. Another reality
which should be mentioned is that patients can be quite insistent and
demanding in seeking supportive notes or reports from their physicians,
who might provide such a note in order to satisfy their patients’ requests
and avoid unnecessary doctor/patient tension. While it is difficult to
confirm the presence of such motives, they are more likely in situations
where the short summary opinion in question departs substantially from
the rest of the evidence of record, as in the current case.6
The ALJ’s findings are in accordance with applicable law. The ALJ evaluated
the extent to which Dr. Boggess’ opinion was consistent with his own medical records
and the other medical evidence of record, as discussed in Phillips, supra. The ALJ’s
findings also are supported by substantial evidence. As the ALJ pointed out, the
record indicates that the treatment claimant received from Dr. Boggess was sporadic,
routine, and conservative.7 While claimant no doubt has a history of depressive
symptoms and other mental impairments, there is no indication in the record that those
4

Tr. 12.

5

Id.

6

Tr. 12-13.

7

See Tr. 11-12, 365-429.
5

impairments were so severe that they would prevent her from performing work on a
sustained basis. There also is no indication that the ALJ improperly “played doctor”
by substituting her judgment for that of the medical professionals, as claimant asserts.8
The ALJ did not improperly make medical findings independent of the medical
record; instead, she properly evaluated the medical opinions in the record for their
consistency with the remainder of the medical evidence.
B.

Pain and Credibility
To demonstrate that pain or another subjective symptom renders her disabled,

a claimant must “produce ‘evidence of an underlying medical condition and (1)
objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from
that condition or (2) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such
severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.’” Edwards
v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d
1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986)). If an ALJ discredits subjective testimony of pain, “[s]he
must articulate explicit and adequate reasons.” Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011
(11th Cir. 1987) (citing Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1004 (11th Cir. 1986);
MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1054 (11th Cir. 1986)) (alteration supplied).
The ALJ in the present case properly applied these legal principles. She found
that claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably have been
8

See doc. no. 13 (claimant’s brief), at 7.
6

expected to produce the symptoms claimant alleged, but that claimant’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not
entirely credible.9 This conclusion was in accordance with applicable law. See
Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992) (“After considering a
claimant’s complaints of pain, the ALJ may reject them as not creditable, and that
determination will be reviewed for substantial evidence.”) (citing Wilson v. Heckler,
734 F.2d 513, 517 (11th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis supplied).
The ALJ also adequately articulated reasons to support her findings. She stated:
The claimant has not generally received the type of medical
treatment one would expect for a totally disabled individual. As shown
above, for both the claimant’s sciatica and depression, the record reflects
significant gaps in the claimant’s history of treatment. Further, the
treatment has been essentially routine and conservative in nature,
consisting of antidepressant medication and moderate pain medication.
. . .10
She also noted that claimant did not report any side effects from her depression
medication, and that she did not take any pain medication on a regular basis. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv). Finally, the ALJ found that claimant’s daily activities
were more extensive than would be expected from a person with claimant’s alleged
limitations.11 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). All of these conclusions were
supported by substantial evidence. As discussed in the preceding section, there simply
9

Tr. 11.

10

Tr. 12.

11

Id.
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is no evidence that claimant’s impairments actually caused disabling limitations.
C.

Conclusion and Order
Consistent with the foregoing, the court concludes the ALJ’s decision was

based upon substantial evidence and in accordance with applicable legal standards.
Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. Costs are taxed
against claimant. The Clerk is directed to close this file.
DONE this 23rd day of August, 2013.

______________________________
United States District Judge

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