Fielding v. Prudential Insurance Company of America The

Filing 28

ORDER adopting the report of the magistrate judge and accepting his recommendations for reasons as setout within; The court DENIES the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on ERISA Preemption (doc. 7); The court DENIES the plaintiffs Motion for Jud gment on Count I (Benefit Claim) with Submission (doc. 11); the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 8); The court GRANTS the defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and ENTERS judgment in favor of the defendant on all claims, however, the court DENIES the defendants Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent it requests attorneys fees. Signed by Judge Karon O Bowdre on 9/17/12. (SAC )

FILED
2012 Sep-17 PM 01:46
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
WILLIAM FIELDING,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

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CASE NO: 4:10-cv-3505-KOB

ORDER
This case involves the plaintiff’s attempts to collect life insurance proceeds upon the
death of his wife, Freda Fielding. On March 23, 2012, the magistrate judge entered his report
and recommendation (doc. 23) regarding three summary judgment motions: the plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on ERISA Preemption (doc. 7); the defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (doc. 8); and the plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on Count I (Benefit Claim)
with Submissions (doc. 11). In that report, he recommended denying the plaintiff’s motions and
granting in part and denying in part the defendant’s motions.
Specifically, he recommended that the court DENY the plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on ERISA Preemption (doc. 7) because no evidence exists that Mrs. Fielding
converted the group policy to an individual policy, and, thus, the policy remained a group plan
preempted by ERISA, entitling the defendant to judgment as a matter of law on the bad faith
claim in Count II; DENY the plaintiff’s Motion for Judgement on Count I (Benefit Claim) with
Submission (doc. 11) because the defendant was de novo right in determining that Mrs. Fielding

was not covered by the life insurance policy in question because she was not actively working
during the relevant time period; and GRANT in part and DENY in part the defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment (doc. 8). Having found that the defendant was de novo right in its
determination, the magistrate judge recommended that the court GRANT the defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment and ENTER judgment in favor of the defendant on all claims. However,
because no evidence exists that the plaintiff brought this action in bad faith, the magistrate judge
recommended that the court DENY the defendant's request for attorney's fees against the
plaintiff.
The magistrate judge gave the parties fourteen days to file objections to his
recommendation. On April 6, 2012, the plaintiff filed objections to the report and
recommendation. (Doc. 25). The defendant filed responses to the plaintiff’s objections on April
19, 2012. (Doc. 27).
After careful consideration of the record in this case de novo, the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, the plaintiff’s objections, and the defendant’s response to the
objections, the court ADOPTS the report of the magistrate judge and ACCEPTS his
recommendations. The court finds that the life insurance policy in question remained a group
plan preempted by ERISA and DENIES the plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on ERISA
Preemption (doc. 7). The court agrees that the defendant was de novo right in determining that
Mrs. Fielding was not covered by the life insurance policy in question and DENIES the
plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on Count I (Benefit Claim) with Submission (doc. 11). Because
the court finds that the defendant was de novo right in denying coverage, the court GRANTS in
part and DENIES in part the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 8). The court
GRANTS the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and ENTERS judgment in favor of the

defendant on all claims. However, the court DENIES the defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment to the extent it requests attorney’s fees because the court does not find sufficient
evidence of bad faith to warrant the imposition of attorney’s fees against the plaintiff.
DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of September, 2012.

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KARON OWEN BOWDRE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE