Juddine v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 8/2/12. (KGE, )
FILED
2012 Aug-02 PM 01:57
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
WILLIE C. JUDDINE, JR,
Plaintiff.
vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
4:11-CV-02035-LSC
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff, Willie C. Juddine Jr., appeals from the decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying
his application for period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).
Mr. Juddine timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies, and the
decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3).
Mr. Juddine was forty years old at the time of the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision, and he has greater than a high school education. (Tr.
at 138.) His past work experiences include employment as a family services
Page 1 of 14
manager, residential advisor, motor vehicle assembler, and furniture packer. (Tr. at
25-26, 48, 151-55.) Mr. Juddine claims that he became disabled on February 1,
2006, due to neck problems causing pain and numbness. (Tr. at 133.)
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the
regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The first
step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful
activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), if he or she is, the claimant is not disabled
and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the Commissioner next considers
the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments combined. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). These impairments must be severe and must meet the
durational requirements before a claimant will be found to be disabled. Id. The
decision depends on the medical evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d
1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments are not severe, the analysis
stops. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis continues to step
three, which is a determination of whether the claimant’s impairments meet or
equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments fall
Page 2 of 14
within this category, he or she will be found disabled without further consideration.
Id. If they do not, a determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) will be made and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(e).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s
impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past relevant work, the
claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant cannot do past
relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five requires the
court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s age, education, and
past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do other work. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other work, the claimant is not
disabled. Id.
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Mr. Juddine
meets the nondisability requirements for a period of disability and DIB, and he was
insured through the date of his decision. (Tr. at 22.) He further determined that
Mr. Juddine has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of
his disability. (Id.) According to the ALJ, Plaintiff had the severe impairments of
Page 3 of 14
degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine fusion, hypertension, and mild left
ulnar neuropathy. (Id.) However, he found that these impairments or combination
of impairments neither met nor medically equaled one of the list of impairments in
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. (Tr. at 23.) The ALJ determined that the
plaintiff has the following residual functional capacity: “to perform light work
except that he could frequently push and pull with upper extremities, occasionally
perform postural changes, and occasionally reach with the bilateral upper.” (Id.)
The ALJ stated Mr. Juddine should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat
and cold vibration, should avoid all exposure to workplace hazards, and should have
the opportunity to alternate between sitting and standing in one-hour intervals.
(Id.)
According to the ALJ, Mr. Juddine is able to perform past relevant work as a
family services manager and residential advisor, as those terms are defined by the
regulations. (Tr. at 25.) The ALJ concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff was
not disabled from February 1, 2006, though the date of his decision. (Tr. at 26.)
II.
Standard of Review
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act
is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there
Page 4 of 14
is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the
Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions.
See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide
facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id.
“The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act
with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding
from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177,
1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision
is automatic, however, for “despite this deferential standard [for review of claims]
it is imperative that the Court scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the
reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th
Page 5 of 14
Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for
reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
III.
Discussion
Mr. Juddine alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and
remanded for two reasons. First, he believes that the ALJ erred in failing to find a
period of disability of at least twelve months. (Doc. 9 at 4.) Second, the plaintiff
contends that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity findings are not based on
substantial evidence. (Id.)
A. Period of Disability
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly determined that the evidence did
not establish a twelve-month period of disability. (Doc. 9 at 4.) Plaintiff argues that
the medical evidence of record reasonably supports a finding that a threshold period
of disability in excess of twelve months was established. (Id.) The regulations define
disability as “an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). See also Barnhart v.
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217 (2002) (A claimant’s impairments and inability to work
Page 6 of 14
must last for a continuous period of at least twelve months). Also, the claimant
bears the burden of providing evidence that he was disabled within the meaning of
the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). See also Moore v. Barhart, 405
F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
The ALJ properly considered all of the evidence of record when he found
that Mr. Juddine was not under a disability from the alleged onset date through the
date of the decision. (Tr. at 26.) Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury to the back
of his head on February 1, 2006, which resulted in the bulging of three discs in his
neck. (Tr. at 143.) He received physical therapy for this injury, and continued to
work for two months with the restrictions of five-pound lifting, pushing, and
pulling, and no reaching above the shoulder. (Tr. at 24, 360-71.)
In August of 2006, Dr. Thomas Francavilla performed a diskectomy and
fusion with instrument at C3-4 on the plaintiff to address a herniated disc at that
level. (Tr. at 24, 355-56.) At the end of his physical therapy in November 2006,
after the surgery, Plaintiff’s range of motion of his cervical spine were essentially
normal, however there was some limitation in extension and rotation. (Tr. at 24,
353.) The Plaintiff reported that his cervical spine pain was better. (Tr. at 353.)
Page 7 of 14
The ALJ noted that no treatment records were submitted by the plaintiff’s surgeon,
Dr. Francavilla, aside from those documenting the surgery itself. (Tr. at 24.)
On February 2, 2007, the plaintiff received a functional capacity evaluation
(“FCE”) from his neurosurgeon, Dr. Cezayirli. (Tr. at 346-47.) The report of that
evaluation stated that Plaintiff’s major muscle groups strength was 5/5, and that he
demonstrated no evidence of sensory loss or neurological deficit. (Tr. at 24, 34647.) Plaintiff also displayed normal grasp, fingering, and feeling with both hands
during fine repetitive fine motor task performances. (Tr. at 24, 352.) Dr. Cezayirli
then deemed the plaintiff capable of performing light exertional activity. (Tr. at 24.)
This FCE report was accepted and endorsed by Dr. Francavilla. (Tr. at 24.)
The plaintiff returned to work during this time period and did show
improvement after his 2006 surgery. Therefore, the evidence of record for the 12month period following Plaintiff’s work-related injury simply does not show that he
had a period of disability from February 2006 to February 2007.
The plaintiff asserts he did not improve after his 2006 surgery sufficiently in
order to work as originally anticipated in the FCE, and that his medical records
from June and September 2007 support a finding that he was disabled in excess of
twelve months. (Doc. 8 at 6.) A June 2007 MRI shows development of a herniated
Page 8 of 14
disc at C6-7. (Tr. at 373.) In September of 2007, the plaintiff was evaluated by Dr.
Cezayirli, and diagnosed with left ulnar neuropathy and carpal tunnel syndrome
bilaterally. (Tr. at 24.) Dr. Cezayirli stated that the plaintiff had only mild left ulnar
neuropathy and merely cautioned him regarding how he should rest his arm on an
armrest without prescribing any specific treatment. (Tr. at 24, 395.) Further, Dr.
Cezayirli stated the plaintiff’s neck was healing well and expected to further
improve over the next six months. (Tr. at 395.) Dr. Cezayirli recommended pain
management if Plaintiff continued to have pain, and noted that cervical epidural
steroid blocks might be beneficial. (Tr. at 24, 395.) Dr. Cezayirli indicated that the
plaintiff would likely continue to experience improvement in his symptoms over the
next six to twelve months. (Tr. at 24.)
The plaintiff received pain management treatment from Dr. Thomas Kraus
from December 2007 through August 2008. (Tr. at 24, 397, 399, 401, 402.) Dr.
Kraus indicated that Plaintiff was limited to light work following surgery, but his
employer offered no light work; therefore he was seeking continuation of chronic
pain management. (Tr. at 24, 402.) In December of 2007, Dr. Kraus noted the
plaintiff had good strength and reflexes, although he had axial compression with
paraspinal muscle spasms and non-dermatomal pain to the bilateral upper
Page 9 of 14
extremities. (Id.) Then, in January 2008, Dr. Kraus noted Plaintiff was doing well
with no significant side effects from medication and no “problems.” (Tr. at 24,
401.) Finally, during the plaintiff’s last visit to Dr. Kraus in August 2008, Plaintiff
stated that he was doing well overall with pain at a level of 3 to 4 out of 10 with no
side effects from the pain medication. (Tr. at 25, 397.)
The ALJ noted that the plaintiff’s current part time work requires postural
changes and exertion in excess of the RFC, but that his daily activities support a
capacity for sustained light exertional activity. (Tr. at 25.) The plaintiff testified
that he washes cars and operates a hand-held vacuum for work several days a week.
(Id.) The ALJ found the plaintiff’s claimed limitations beyond the RFC were not
credible. (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ’s findings and his conclusion that the Plaintiff
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the
alleged onset date through the date of the decision is supported by substantial
evidence.
B. Plaintiff’s RFC
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC findings are not based on substantial
evidence because the only definitive statement about Plaintiff's RFC was by a
non-medical single decision maker (Doc. 8 at 7.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that
Page 10 of 14
the ALJ did not have in the record any RFC opinions from treating, examining, or
reviewing physicians. (Id.)
The assessment of a claimant’s RFC is “based on all relevant evidence in the
claimant’s case record,” and is not simply a doctor’s opinion. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a)(1). The RFC is not a medical assessment, and the responsibility for
deciding issues such as a claimant’s RFC rests with the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(e), 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p. Requiring an ALJ’s RFC finding to be based
on a doctors opinion “would, in effect, confer upon the [doctor] the authority to
make the determination or decision about whether an individual is under a
disability, and this would be an abdication of the Commissioner’s statutory
responsibility to determine whether an individual is disabled.” Langley v. Astue, 777
F. Supp.2d at 1258, 1261. His decision must be based not only upon the medical
evidence, but also upon all the evidence in the record. SSR 96-8p. Further, while
medical opinions are to be weighed by the ALJ, an RFC finding will not be
invalidated due to the absence or discrediting of a medical opinion. Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “is required to review and accord weight to
medical opinion[s],” and that a “[medical source opinion] of some kind is crucial to
Page 11 of 14
the analysis of functioning based on the medically determinable impairments.” (Tr.
at 7.) However, there is no requirement for an RFC by a medical examiner to be in
the record in order for the ALJ to determine an RFC finding, because that decision
belongs to the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e). The plaintiff failed to show that a
doctor’s opinion regarding his functional limitations was necessary in order for the
ALJ to make an informed decision, and failed to show that the ALJ was hampered
regarding the development of the record. The ALJ did not need a doctor’s opinion
regarding Plaintiff’s limitation before assessing the RFC. Langley v. Astrue, 777 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1257-58 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
The record provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination
that the plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work. (Tr. at 23-25, 397, 399.) The
ALJ noted that the plaintiff’s current part-time work requires postural changes and
exertion in excess of the RFC. (Tr. at 25.) The ALJ carefully considered the
evidence and the plaintiff’s testimony. (Tr. at 24.) The ALJ found the plaintiff’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms, but found the claimant’s statements concerning intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not credible, and were
inconsistent with the RFC assessment. (Id.)
Page 12 of 14
Further, the ALJ stated the plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant
work as a family services and residential advisor and this work does not require the
performance of work related activities precluded by the claimants RFC. (Tr. at 25.)
Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention that the RFC finding was unsupported,
the ALJ reviewed the records provided by Dr. Cezayirli, Dr. Frankavilla, and Dr.
Kraus, along with the physical RFC performed by Jennifer Redding, in making his
determination. The ALJ took into consideration that the treating, examining, and
reviewing sources of record all agreed that the plaintiff could meet the demands of
light exertional activity. (Tr. at 24.) The ALJ also assigned nonexertional
limitations consistent with the record and at least as restrictive as those assigned by
the state agency reviewing physician. (Id.)
Page 13 of 14
IV.
Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Mr.
Juddine’s arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be
entered.
Done this 2nd day of August 2012.
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
167458
Page 14 of 14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?