White v. Lakeside Property Management LLC

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 5/30/12. (SAC )

FILED
2012 May-30 AM 11:36
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
BAMBI WHITE,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAKESIDE PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT LLC, d/b/a Val
Monte Lakeside Resort & Marina,
Defendant.

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) Case No.: 4:11-CV-3489-VEH
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction and Procedural History
Plaintiff Bambi White (“Ms. White”) initiated this Fair Labor Standards Act

(“FLSA”) case against Defendant Lakeside Property Management, LLC (“Lakeside”)
on September 27, 2011. (Doc. 1 at 1). The court file reflects that service of the
summons and complaint was perfected on Lakeside by way of an alias summons
issued c/o Eric Burkhalter, who was personally served on March 6, 2012, at the Floyd
County Education Center, 1910 Morrison Campground Road, Rome, Georgia 30161.
(Doc. 15 at 1, 2).
On April 9, 2012, the clerk entered a default (Doc. 18) due to Lakeside’s failure
to respond to Ms. White’s complaint after being duly served. (Id. at 1). Pending

before the court is a Motion for Default Judgment (the “Motion”) (Doc. 19) filed by
Ms. White on April 20, 2012. The Motion seeks to have a default judgment entered
by the court against Lakeside and “to set this matter for a hearing on damages.”1 (Id.
at 11).
On April 23, 2012, the court entered an order (Doc. 20), requiring Lakeside to
show cause no later than 20 days from the entry date of the order (i.e., May 14, 2012),
why the Motion should not be granted. This show cause deadline has passed, and no
legally adequate response to the order has been filed by Lakeside.2
II.

Standard on Default Judgment
“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has

failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made
to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party’s default.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(a). However, entry of default under Rule 55(a) does not entitle a party to
his requested relief. Either the clerk or the court must enter a default judgment under

1

Ms. White has demanded a jury trial. (Doc. 1 at 9).

The court acknowledges receipt of the unsigned letter dated April 26, 2012,
which apparently was sent by a non-lawyer named “Val-Monte” in response to the
show cause order. Such a document fails to demonstrate good cause why the Motion
should not be granted and constitutes the unauthorized practice of law as an entity
(unlike an individual) may not defend itself in a lawsuit without retaining legal
counsel.
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Rule 55(b). Here, the court, and not the clerk, acts pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2).
Generally, the entry of a default judgment is committed to the discretion of the
district judge. Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977).3 The factual
allegations of a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true; hence, the court must decide
if these accepted facts state a cause of action for which relief can be granted.
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1987);
Nishimatsu Const. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.
1975) (“There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.”)
(footnote omitted); Descent v. Kolitsidas, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1316 (M.D. Fla.
2005) (same). When the amount of damages due is uncertain, an evidentiary hearing
is often required to determine the sum the defaulting defendant must pay. S.E.C. v.
Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231-32 (11th Cir. 2005). On the other hand, if a specific sum
is sought, a hearing may not be necessary.
As explained by Judge William H. Steele of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama regarding default judgments:
The law is clear, however, that Lacey’s failure to appear and the
Clerk’s subsequent entry of default against her do not automatically
entitle plaintiffs to a default judgment. Indeed, a default is not “an
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former
Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff's
right to recover,” but is instead merely “an admission of the facts cited
in the Complaint, which by themselves may or may not be sufficient to
establish a defendant's liability.” Pitts ex rel. Pitts v. Seneca Sports,
Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004); see also Descent v.
Kolitsidas, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1316 (M.D. Fla.2005) (“the
defendants’ default notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default
judgment only if the complaint states a claim for relief”); GMAC
Commercial Mortg. Corp. v. Maitland Hotel Associates, Ltd., 218 F.
Supp. 2d 1355, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (default judgment is appropriate
only if court finds sufficient basis in pleadings for judgment to be
entered, and that complaint states a claim). Stated differently, “a default
judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.”
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir.
1997).
Virgin Records America, Inc. v. Lacey, 510 F. Supp. 2d 588, 591-92 (S.D. Ala. 2007)
(emphasis added).
III.

Analysis
The court has reviewed the complaint and it appears that Ms. White has averred

sufficient facts that, due to their admission as a result of Lakeside’s failure to appear
after being duly served, judgment is due to be entered in favor of Ms. White as to
liability. More specifically, in her complaint, Ms. White alleges that Lakeside “owns
and operates Val Monte Lakeside Resort & Marina in Guntersville, Alabama[,]” (the
“Resort”) and that it is “a covered entity with regard to the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the FLSA.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 4, 3).
Ms. White also asserts that “from April 2010 to on or about August 13,
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2010[,]” Lakeside employed her as a front desk clerk at the Resort. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 5, 6).
She further maintains that during her tenure as a Lakeside employee, she “was
classified as non-exempt under the FLSA” and “regularly worked more than forty
hours per week.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 8, 7).
Although Ms. White originally received overtime pay, this practice changed
“in or around June of 2010” when one of Lakeside’s owners, Walt Busby (“Mr.
Busby”) “directed [her] to create a form for [Lakeside]’s employees . . . to sign
waiving their right to overtime pay.” (Id. ¶¶ 11, 15). Ms. White drafted the form as
instructed and then she and the other Lakeside employees signed the waiver. (Id. ¶¶
16, 17).
On more than one occasion, Ms. White raised concerns about and challenged
this change in compensating staff as a violation of the FLSA. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 13, 27). Ms.
White also objected to being switched from hourly to a salary-based status. (Id. ¶¶
21, 33).
Subsequently, on July 8, 2010, Ms. White received a disciplinary action from
Cory Spurlin (“Mr. Spurlin”), Lakeside’s General Manager, which she contends “was
based on false and pretextual grounds.” (Id. ¶¶ 35, 36). Mr. Spurlin was one of the
managers who Ms. White had notified about the overtime waiver practice
implemented by Mr. Busby. (Id. ¶ 26).
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Mr. Spurlin then discharged Ms. White on August 10, 2012, per Mr. Busby’s
decision. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 38). Mr. Spurlin’s “reason given [for the separation] was so that
[Ms. White] could spend time with her ailing mother.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 39). Ms. White
disagreed and “told Spurlin that she needed her job and asked not to be terminated.”
(Id. ¶ 40).
The complaint contains one FLSA count for Ms. White’s unpaid wages (Doc.
1 ¶¶ 41-50) and a second one for retaliatory discharge. (Id. ¶¶ 52-56). Ms. White’s
requested relief includes lost overtime compensation with interest, liquidated
damages for Lakeside’s willfulness, a permanent injunction, frontpay, backpay,
attorneys’ fees, and costs. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 50, 51(i)-(iii); id. ¶¶ 55, 56(i)-(iv)).
The court finds based upon the admitted allegations contained in Ms. White’s
complaint (Doc. 1) that Lakeside violated the FLSA by failing to pay her overtime
compensation and by illegally discharging her from employment on the basis of her
protected activity under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (“[I]t shall be unlawful
for any person . . . to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to
be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter . . . [.]”). Because Ms.
White has demanded a jury trial (Doc. 1 at 9), and because the damages are not “for
a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation,” see Fed. R. Civ. P.
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55(b)(1), the case will be set for a jury trial, as to damages only.
IV.

Conclusion
Accordingly, the Motion is due to be granted with leave for Ms. White to prove

her damages at trial to a jury. By separate order, the court will set this case for a jury
trial solely on the issue of damages.4 The court also will enter a separate order of
partial final judgment under Rule 54(b).
DONE and ORDERED this the 30th day of May, 2012.

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge

The court notes that Ms. White has asked that the court to “withhold setting
of the requested hearing on damages” (Doc. 23 at 2 n.1) in light of her efforts to add
Mr. Busby as a co-defendant to her lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 2).
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