Vaughn v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 9/30/2013. (JLC)

FILED
2013 Sep-30 AM 10:08
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
GLENDA SUE VAUGHN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER,
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Defendant.

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) Case No.: 4:12-CV-1793-VEH
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff Glenda Sue Vaughn (“Ms. Vaughn”) brings this action under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. She seeks review of a
final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”), who denied her application for Disability Insurance Benefits

1

Carolyn W. Colvin was named the Acting Commissioner on February 14, 2013. See
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colvin.htm (“On February 14, 2013, Carolyn
W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security.”) (last accessed on September
16, 2013). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), “[a]ny action instituted in accordance with this subsection
shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of
Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”Accordingly, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and
Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court has substituted Carolyn W. Colvin
for Michael Astrue in the case caption above and HEREBY DIRECTS the clerk to do the same
party substitution on CM/ECF.

(“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).2 Ms. Vaughn timely pursued and
exhausted her administrative remedies available before the Commissioner. The case
is thus ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).3
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Vaughn was 44 years old at the time of her hearing before the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Tr. 26, 119. She has completed the seventh grade.
Tr. 158. Her past work experience includes employment as a nurse’s aide, cook, fast
food manager, fast food worker, cashier, food server, and laborer. Tr. 54-55, 151-152,
160-67. She claims she became disabled on September 19, 2008, due to anxiety and
a left knee injury arising from a car accident. Tr. 151. Her last period of work ended
on that same date. Id.
On August 28, 2009, Ms. Vaughn protectively filed a Title II application for
a period of disability and DIB. Tr. 10. She also protectively filed a Title XVI
application for SSI on that date. Id. On October 26, 2009, the Commissioner initially
denied these claims. Id. Ms. Vaughn timely filed a written request for a hearing on

2

In general, the legal standards applied are the same regardless of whether a claimant
seeks DIB or SSI. However, separate, parallel statutes and regulations exist for DIB and SSI
claims. Therefore, citations in this opinion should be considered to refer to the appropriate
parallel provision as context dictates. The same applies to citations of statutes or regulations
found in quoted court decisions.
3

42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) renders the judicial review provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) fully
applicable to claims for SSI.
2

November 10, 2009. Id. The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on November 17,
2010. Id. On January 20, 2011, he issued his opinion concluding Ms. Vaughn was not
disabled and denying her benefits. Tr. 26. She timely petitioned the Appeals Council
to review the decision on January 28, 2011. Tr. 5. On April 18, 2012, the Appeals
Council issued a denial of review on her claim. Tr. 1.
Ms. Vaughn filed a Complaint with this court on May 4, 2012, seeking review
of the Commissioner’s determination. Doc. 1. The Commissioner answered on
August 22, 2012. Doc. 4. Ms. Vaughn filed a supporting brief (Doc. 9) on October
29, 2012, and the Commissioner responded with her own (Doc. 14) on November 28,
2012. With the parties having fully briefed the matter, the court has carefully
considered the record and affirms the decision of the Commissioner.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed.
The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner
is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,
1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine
if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence
3

is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id.
This court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial
evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no
presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal
standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the
court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide
the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has
been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d
1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a
period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act
and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.4 The Regulations define “disabled” as
“the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

4

The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R.
Parts 400 to 499, revised as of April 1, 2007.
4

twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to
disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence about a “physical or mental
impairment” which “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant
is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in
sequence:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

whether the claimant is currently employed;
whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed
by the [Commissioner];
whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and
whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national
economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable
C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 56263 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).
The sequential analysis goes as follows:
Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will automatically be
found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment. If the claimant does not
have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the burden shifts to the
[Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job.

5

Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy
in significant numbers. Id.
FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ made the following findings:
1.

Ms. Vaughn met the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act through December 31, 2013.

2.

She had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 19,
2008, the alleged disability onset date.

3.

She had the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease of
the left knee; and major depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate.

4.

She did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5.

She had the residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work
with a sit/stand option. She could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds
but could occasionally climb ramps and stairs. She could occasionally
stoop. She could not kneel, crouch, or crawl. She was restricted to
simple routine and repetitive tasks.

6.

She was unable to perform any past relevant work.

7.

She was born on December 15, 1966, and was 41 years old, which is
defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability
onset date.

8.

She had a marginal education and was able to communicate in English.

6

9.

Transferability of job skills was not material to the determination of
disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework
supported a finding that she was “not disabled,” whether or not she had
transferable job skills.

10.

Considering her age, education, work experience, and residual
functioning capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers
in the national economy that she could perform.

11.

Ms. Vaughn had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, from September 19, 2008, through the date of this
decision.

Tr. 12-26.
ANALYSIS
I.

Introduction
The court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “This does not relieve the court of its
responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial
evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672
F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th
Cir. 1980)).5 However, the court “abstains from reweighing the evidence or
substituting its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted).

5

Strickland is binding precedent in this Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d
1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former
Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981).
7

Ms. Vaughn urges this court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision to deny
her benefits on two grounds: (1) her medical records and testimony reveal
psychological impairments that show her to be disabled; and (2) the ALJ’s RFC is
unsupported by the record evidence. Doc. 9 at 2, 5. The court agrees with the
Commissioner that neither of these objections have merit under the relevant standards
of review and will thus affirm the decision.

I.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of Ms. Vaughn’s
psychological limitations.

A.

The ALJ properly assessed Dr. Walker’s opinion.

Ms. Vaughn first argues that the ALJ improperly afforded “little evidentiary
weight” to the opinion of Dr. Guy Walker, ED.D, LPC, a vocational rehabilitation
expert who treated her through the Calhoun-Cleburne Mental Health Center
(“Calhoun-Cleburne”) between August 16, 2007, and February 25, 2008. Doc. 9 at
2 (citing Tr. 242-256). On February 16, 2009, he drafted an “Addendum to Disability
Evaluation Report” (“Report”) and filled out a “Medical Source Statement (Medical)”
(“MSS”) two days later, both of which concerned Ms. Vaughn and are thus relevant
here. Tr. 429-34. In the Report, he noted that she had not been able to work since her
second knee surgery on September 19, 2008. Tr. 429. Dr. Walker then diagnosed the

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following mental and emotional limitations:
Ms. Vaughn’s depression level has already increased significantly when I was
her counselor over a year ago because of her pain level and activity restrictions
after her injury. Since then, her physical limitations have gotten worse and her
depression has increased. She has reduced energy and a loss of interest in life.
Her anxiety level is worse also, due to pain, activity restrictions, and worry
about her family finances since she cannot work and has had her Workers’
Compensation benefits stopped. Ms. Vaughn is very frustrated by her inability
to contribute to the family finances.
Tr. 430. Dr. Walker further concluded the following about her employment
capabilities:
With regard to employment, the mental and emotional factors make it very
difficult for her to concentrate. Her alertness is compromised by the lack of
sleep due to her leg pain. She is no longer able to perform the type of work she
was doing, which involves extensive standing and walking, as well as
occasional lifting of over 20 pounds. Her physical impairments eliminate all
of the Medium, Heavy, and Very Heavy categories, which are 40% of the labor
market. She is also unable to perform most of the Light category of work
because of the standing and walking requirements. Ms Vaughn is not a good
candidate for clerical types of employment due to her difficulties with spelling
and grammar. In several conversations, I have tried to help Ms. Vaughn
discover some sort of employment that she could perform if her leg pain is
reduced and she was able to move about better. So far we have not been able
to come up with any alternative that would not worsen her symptoms. Unless
Ms. Vaughn is able to obtain some significant improvement in her pain and
physical limitations, I do not believe she will be able to obtain or maintain
employment in the future.
Tr. 430-31.
In his MSS, Dr. Walker offered several conclusions as to Ms. Vaughn’s
psychological limitations. He first noted that she no degree of impairment in her
9

ability to ask simple questions or request assistance. Tr. 432. He then concluded that
she had a “mild” degree of impairment in the following arenas:
•

her ability to get along with coworkers or peers;

•

her “constriction of interests”;

•

her deterioration in personal habits; and

•

her ability to make simple work-related decisions.

Tr. 432-33. According to Dr. Walker, Ms. Vaughn had “moderate” impairment in:
•

her ability to interact appropriately with the general public;

•

her ability to understand, remember, and carry out repetitive tasks;

•

her ability to sustain a routine without special supervision;

•

her ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting; and

•

her ability to be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate
precautions.

Tr. 432-34. Dr. Walker further opined that Ms. Vaughn had “marked” restrictions or
impairments in:
•

her daily activities;

•

her ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions;

•

her ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex instructions;

•

her ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods;

10

•

her ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular
attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances;

•

her ability to respond to customary work pressures.

Tr. 433-34. Dr. Walker ultimately concluded that Ms. Vaughn had an “extreme”
degree of impairment in her “ability to complete a normal workday and workweek
without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms and to perform at a
consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods.” Tr. 433.
He added that her impairments caused her limitations that lasted or could be expected
to last for 12 months or longer at the severity level he indicated. Tr. 434.
In her brief, Ms. Vaughn faults the ALJ for giving Dr. Walker’s opinion “little
weight” and for instead crediting that of Dr. Robert Summerlin, Ph.D., a licensed
pyschologist who examined Ms. Vaughn on one occasion. Doc. 9 at 4. “Generally,
a treating doctor’s opinion is entitled to more weight than a consulting doctor’s.”
Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 518 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Relatedly, a court does not need to defer to a one-time examiner’s opinion. McSwain
v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
However, the Commissioner correctly observes in her brief that Dr. Walker, as a
“licensed professional counselor” and a “vocational rehabilitation expert,” was not
an “acceptable medical source” under the Regulations. Doc. 14 at 8 (citing 20 C.F.R.

11

§§ 404.1513(a)(1)-(5), 416.913(a)(1)-(5)). The ALJ was thus free to discount Dr.
Walker’s assessment. See Johnson v. Apfel, No. CIV. A. 98-0674-AH-G, 2000 WL
208741, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2000) (citation omitted) (holding that a licensed
professional counselor was not an “acceptable medical source” under the
Regulations); see also Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (holding that the ALJ properly discredited
the claimant’s chiropractor’s opinion because he was not an “acceptable source” and
thus his opinion could not establish an impairment for Social Security disability
purposes).

B.

Other record evidence substantially supports the ALJ’s assessment of Ms.
Vaughn’s psychological limitations.
The ALJ in fact relied on several credible sources in concluding that Ms.

Vaughn’s psychological limitations were not as dire as Dr. Walker described. As
indicated, he gave “substantial weight” to Dr. Summerlin’s diagnosis. Tr. 23. Dr.
Summerlin examined Ms. Vaughn on October 21, 2009. Tr. 356. He first observed
that she drove herself to the appointment, arrived 15 minutes early, and was
cooperative throughout the meeting. Id. He then recorded that she had been
committed twice to a mental health hospital – the first time in 1989 after threatening
suicide and the second time a year later “after having taken pills in another suicide
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gesture.” Id. He also noted that she was presently an outpatient at Calhoun-Cleburne
but was not then taking any psychotropic drugs to address emotional symptoms. Id.
During his “mental status examination,” he made the following observations:
•

Ms. Vaughn was “oriented in regards to person, place, time, and
circumstance.”

•

She had no abnormalities in her speech pattern.

•

Her attention, concentration, and memory functioning were “well within
normal limits.”

•

Her abstract thinking ability, fund of general information, computational
skills, and vocabulary “were reflective of an individual with average
intelligence and a high school education.”

•

Her thought processes were “logical, coherent, and focused,” and her
thought content was “responsive to questioning.”

•

When asked to describe her mood, she replied, “Okay.”

•

Her affect was “broad and appropriate.”

Tr. 357. When discussing her emotional issues, Ms. Vaughn reported to Dr.
Summerlin that she “has had a difficult time getting over her mother’s death” and that
her children make frustrating demands on her. Id. After considering the information
he gleaned from this examination, Dr. Summerlin made the following diagnosis:
•

Axis I

Parent-Child Relational Problem

•

Axis II

Diagnosis Deferred

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•

Axis III

General Medical Condition(s): Please See Available
Medical Records

•

Axis IV

Psychosocial and Environmental Stressors: None Reported

•

Axis V

Global Assessment of Functioning: Not Applicable

Tr. 358. He further concluded, “It is my opinion that she does not have a
psychological disorder which would cause her to be unemployable. On the basis of
that opinion, I believe that her request for benefits should hinge upon physical rather
than emotional symptoms.” Id. The ALJ afforded this opinion “substantial weight”
because it was “well supported by his own clinical examinations and testing.” Tr. 23.
The ALJ also privileged it because Dr. Sumerlin was a specialist in the arena of
psychological and mental disorders. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(5),
416.927(d)(5)).
The ALJ cited other relevant evidence in finding that Ms. Vaughn was not
psychologically disabled. Although she had been diagnosed at Calhoun-Cleburne
with “major depression, recurrent, moderate,” Tr. 377, she testified at her disability
hearing that she had not yet seen a doctor to get on medication for her depression. Tr.
42.While she testified that she had taken medication for depression “years ago,” Id.,
she reported to Dr. Summerlin that she was not presently taking any psychotropic
drugs. Tr. 356. She further had not “required any recent mental hospitalizations, crisis

14

intervention, inpatient treatment, or counseling by a mental health professional on a
continuing basis.” Tr. 23. Finally, Dr. Eugene E. Fleece, Ph. D., a State Agency
psychologist who reviewed Ms. Vaughn’s records, also concluded that she did not
have a severe mental impairment. Tr. 359-72. Specifically, while she complained of
disabling anxiety, stress, and fatigue, Dr. Fleece determined that these complaints
were “not credible” or “beyond normal limits.” Tr. 371. Altogether, these facts
substantially support the ALJ’s assessment of Ms. Vaughn’s psychological
limitations.

II.

The ALJ’s vocational questions were adequately comprehensive.
Ms. Vaughn next argues that the ALJ’s questions to the vocational expert

(“VE”) were reversibly inadequate. Doc. 9 at 5-6. Specifically, she asserts that the
questions did not reflect the evaluation of Dr. Jeffrey C. Davis, M.D, who examined
her on at least two occasions (September 15, 2010, and October 20, 2010) for her left
knee pain. Id. In his treatment notes, Dr. Davis concluded that he did not think Ms.
Vaughn could return to a job where she was required to stand all day. Tr. 513. He
instead opined that she could “probably tolerate” either “a sedentary type job, or a job
she would be allowed to change positions from seated to standing position . . . as long
as there was no significant squatting, kneeling, crawling or climbing involved.” Id.

15

He also endorsed the functional capacity evaluation (“FCE”) performed by Mr. Dave
Bledsoe, Tr. 516, an occupational therapist who examined Ms. Vaughn on January
9, 2009. Tr. 284-88. Mr. Bledsoe had concluded in his FCE that Ms. Vaughn could
(1) frequently stand, walk, or sit; (2) occasionally lift 20 lbs, carry 32 lbs (or procure
such weight from 35 inches), push and pull “light/medium” weight, climb stairs,
crouch, or stoop; and (3) rarely kneel. Tr. 285. He further determined that her worker
fitness was “fair.”6 Tr. 288. As Ms. Vaughn notes, the ALJ gave Dr. Davis’s opinions
“substantial weight” because it was “well supported by his own clinical examinations
and testing.” Doc. 9 at 5 (citing Tr. 24). Ms. Vaughn nevertheless maintains that the
ALJ did not include Dr. Davis’s findings – about the types of jobs she could do and
the functional restrictions under which she labored – in his questions to the VE. Id.
at 6.
After reviewing the hearing transcript, the court finds this complaint baseless.
In order for the testimony of a VE “to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must

6

In her brief, Ms. Vaughn, relying on Dr. Walker’s summary, claims that Mr. Bledsoe’s
FCE indicated “restrictions of no work over 5 hours a day with a maximum of 25 hours per
week.” Id. at 6. She is correct that Dr. Walker characterized Mr. Bledsoe’s conclusions this way.
Tr. 429. But, in response, the Commissioner is also correct that Dr. Walker does not reference
how (or where) he derived his interpretation of Mr. Bledsoe’s findings. Doc. 14 at 12. Ms.
Vaughn cites generally to that part of the record containing Mr. Bledsoe’s FCE, but she does not
pinpoint where his specific conclusion regarding her daily and weekly hours capabilities was
located. See Doc. 9 at 6. As the court is unable to find any such reference, it will not consider this
claimed restriction in its analysis.
16

pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.”
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation
omitted). In this case, the ALJ posed the following hypothetical to the VE:
Let’s assume that an individual with the claimant’s age, education and work
experience who could perform light work, except that the person would require
a sit-stand option, could never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, could only
occasionally climb ramps or stairs, occasionally stoop, and never kneel or
crouch or crawl. Assume that individual also is restricted to simple routine and
repetitive tasks.
Tr. 55 (emphasis added). In light of Dr. Davis’s evaluation, this hypothetical is
adequately comprehensive. Ms. Vaughn incorrectly claims that the ALJ’s questions
did not reflect Dr. Davis’s judgment that Ms. Vaughn would be restricted to “a
sedentary type job, or a job she would be allowed to change positions from seated to
standing position . . . as long as there was no significant squatting, kneeling, crawling
or climbing involved.” Tr. 513. By including a sit-stand option, the ALJ did
incorporate Dr. Davis’s diagnosis – in fact, Dr. Davis prescribed either a sedentary
position or one with a sit-stand option. Furthermore, the other restrictions the ALJ
included encapsulate the limitations identified by Mr. Bledsoe in his FCE. Given
these facts, the ALJ did not err in his questions to the VE.

III.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.
Ms. Vaughn finally argues that the record supports a more restrictive RFC than
17

the ALJ derived. Doc. 9 at 6. After considering the evidence, the ALJ concluded that
Ms. Vaughn had the RFC “to perform light work7 with a sit/stand option. She cannot
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds but can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. She
can occasionally stoop. She cannot kneel, crouch, or crawl. She is restricted to simple
routine and repetitive tasks.” Tr. 13. Ms. Vaughn contends that “a careful review of
the medical records from Dr. Davis and Dr. Sparks provides more restrictive
restrictions than ‘light.’” Doc. 9 at 6. According to Ms. Vaughn, the ALJ’s RFC
determination is “not located anywhere in the medical testimony, vocational
testimony or claimant’s testimony.” Id.
These conclusory assertions do not notify the court how and why the ALJ’s
RFC finding was specifically deficient. Further, after reviewing the record evidence
provided by Dr. Davis and Dr. Sparks, the court finds that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s RFC finding. The ALJ meticulously reviewed the evidence

7

The Regulations define “light work” in the following manner:

Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very
little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or
when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg
controls . . . If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do
sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity
or inability to sit for long periods of time.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
18

provided by Dr. Davis and Dr. Sparks. He also extensively reviewed the claimant’s
testimony, including her daily activities description and her subjective pain
complaints. He justified his discounting of her complaints based on several grounds
– all uncontested by Ms. Vaughn in her brief. He assigned particular weight to the
various medical opinions and explained why he did so. Considered altogether, the
ALJ has offered “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support” his RFC conclusion. Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the court’s evaluation of the evidence in the record and the parties’
submissions, the court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence and that she applied proper legal standards in arriving at it.
Accordingly, the decision is due to be AFFIRMED.
DONE and ORDERED this the 30th day of September, 2013.

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge

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