Hirad v. Napolitano et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 10/28/2013. (MSN)
FILED
2013 Oct-28 PM 02:35
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
NASIR ADAN HIRAD,
Petitioner,
)
)
)
)
v.
) Civil Action No. 4:13-cv-00555-LSC-JHE
ERIC HOLDER, et al.,
Respondents.
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On March 25, 2013, Petitioner Nasir Adan Hirad (“Hirad”) filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. At the time he filed his petition, Hirad, a
native of Somalia, was incarcerated at the Etowah County Detention Center, in the custody of the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). In his petition, Hirad alleged that he was
being illegally detained by ICE pending his deportation to Somalia. On October 22, 2013, Hirad was
released from ICE custody pursuant to an Order of Supervision. Docs. 10 at ¶2 and 10-1.
Respondents have filed a motion to dismiss the action as moot, since Hirad is no longer in ICE
custody. Doc. 10. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that Respondents’
motion be GRANTED and the action be dismissed as MOOT.
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to the consideration of
“cases” or “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The doctrine of mootness is derived from this
limitation because “an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy.”
Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997). A case is moot and must be
dismissed if the court can no longer provide “meaningful relief.” Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906,
913 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Hirad’s release from ICE custody rendered his petition
moot.
The relief sought by Hirad in his petition is to be released from ICE custody. Because Hirad
is no longer in ICE custody, his petition has been rendered moot, unless an exception to the mootness
doctrine applies. There are two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) collateral consequences and
(2) “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237, 88 S. Ct.
1556, 1559 (1968); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 1183-84 (1982). Neither
exception applies here. The collateral consequences exception does not apply because there are no
“disabilities or burdens which may flow” from the custody Hirad challenges. See Carafas, 391 U.S.
at 237, 88 S. Ct. at 1559. The exception for events “capable of repetition, yet evading review” does
not apply here either. Petitioner has been released from custody, and the potential circumstances of
this case happening again are too speculative to create an actual controversy sufficient to support a
claim for relief. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 348-49 (1975)
(holding that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception applies when (1) the
challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and
(2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same
action again.). Because there is no longer any relief that can be granted to Hirad, his petition must
be dismissed as moot.
Based on the foregoing, the Respondents’ motion to dismiss, doc. 10, is GRANTED. A
separate order will be entered.
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Done this 28th day of October 2013.
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
[160704]
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