Hampton v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 7/24/14. (ASL)

FILED
2014 Jul-25 AM 09:37
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
QUINCY BERNARD HAMPTON, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
)
Acting Commissioner of the
)
Social Security Administration,
)
)
Defendant.
)

Civil Action No.
4:13-cv-01473-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), claimant Bernard Hampton seeks judicial
review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of Social Security1
affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who denied Mr.
Hampton’s claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and
supplemental security income benefits. (Doc. 1). 2 As discussed below, the Court

1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013.
Therefore, she should be substituted for Commissioner Michael J. Astrue as Defendant in this
suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (“An action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in
an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending.
Later opinions should be in the substituted party’s name, but any misnomer affecting the parties’
substantial rights must be disregarded.”).
2

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides, in pertinent part:

Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a
hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review
of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice
of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.

finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, so the Court affirms
the Commissioner’s ruling.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The scope of review in this matter is limited. “When, as in this case, the
ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review,” the Court “review[s]
the ALJ’s ‘factual findings with deference’ and [his] ‘legal conclusions with close
scrutiny.’” Riggs v. Soc. Sec. Admin. Comm’r, 522 Fed. Appx. 509, 510-11 (11th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)).
The Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record
to support the ALJ’s findings. “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir.
2004). In making this evaluation, the Court may not “reweigh the evidence or
decide the facts anew,” and the Court must “defer to the ALJ’s decision if it is
supported by substantial evidence even if the evidence may preponderate against

Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in
which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal place of business, or, if he does not reside or have
his principal place of business within any such judicial district, in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.

2

it.” Gaskin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 4081321, *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 14,
2013).
With respect to the ALJ’s legal conclusions, the Court must determine
whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. If the Court finds an error in
the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide
sufficient reasoning to demonstrate that the ALJ conducted a proper legal analysis,
then the Court must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d
1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
On November 20, 2009, Mr. Hampton applied for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits. (Doc. 8-4, pp. 2-3;Doc. 8-6, pp. 2-13). Mr. Hampton
filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act and an application for supplemental security income benefits under
Title XVI. Id.
The Social Security Administration denied Mr. Hampton’s application on
January 22, 2010. (Doc. 8-5, pp. 2-4). At Mr. Hampton’s request, on June 6,
2011, an ALJ conducted a hearing concerning Mr. Hampton’s application. (Doc.
8-3, p. 54). Mr. Hampton and an impartial vocational expert, Norma Jill Jacobson,
testified at the June 6, 2011 hearing. (Doc. 8-3, p. 54). At the time of this hearing,
3

Mr. Hampton was 30 years old.3 Mr. Hampton has a high school education. (Doc.
8-3, p. 62).

His past relevant work experience is as an industrial cleaner, a

groundskeeper, a grocery bagger and general store helper, and a poultry worker.
He also has worked in construction. (Doc. 8-3, p. 72).
The ALJ held a second hearing on January 3, 2012. Mr. Hampton, Donald
Parsons, an impartial vocational expert, and Dr. James Anderson, an impartial
medical expert, testified at the January 3, 2012 hearing. (Doc. 8-3, p. 76).
On March 19, 2012, the ALJ denied Mr. Hampton’s request for disability
benefits, concluding that Mr. Hampton did not have an impairment or a
combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in, the
Regulations. (Doc. 8-3, p. 49). In his fifteen page decision, the ALJ described the
“five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is
disabled” and explained that “[i]f it is determined that the claimant is or is not
disabled at a step of the evaluation process, the evaluation will not go on to the
next step.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 36).

3

At 30 years of age, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c) and 416.963(c) designate Mr. Hampton as a
“younger person.” (See Doc. 8-3, p. 54; Doc. 8-4, p. 3).
4

The ALJ found that Mr. Hampton had not “engaged in substantial gainful
activity since November 8, 2009, the alleged onset date.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 37).4 In
addition, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Hampton has “the following severe
impairments: status post right wrist perilunate dorsal carpal distal dislocation with
chronic pain; status post gunshot wound to the right knee with chronic pain;
adjustment disorder with anxiety; and borderline to low average intellectual
functioning.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 37). The judge stated that these “impairments are
considered to be more than slight abnormalities and have more than a minimal
effect on the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 38).
Still, the ALJ opined that:
I have specifically considered listings 1.02, major
dysfunction of a joint (due to any cause); 1.03,
reconstructive surgery or surgical arthrodesis of a major
weight-bearing joint; and 1.06, fracture of the femur,
tibia, pelvis, or one or more of the tarsal bones…[and
found that Mr. Hampton] does not meet the stringent
criteria for these listings.
…
[Mr. Hampton’s] mental impairments, considered singly
and in combination, do not meet or medically equal the
criteria of listings 12.05 and 12.06.

4

The Court reviewed not only the ALJ’s decision, but also Mr. Hampton’s medical records. The
Court finds that the ALJ’s description of Mr. Hampton’s medical evaluations is accurate. In a
number of instances in this opinion, the Court has provided citations not only to the ALJ’s
decision but also to the underlying records to illustrate that there is no discrepancy between the
two.
5

(Doc. 8-3, pp. 40-41). Based on these factual findings, the ALJ concluded that Mr.
Hampton had the residual functional capacity to:
Perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)
and 416.967(b) with the following exceptions: he can
occasionally lift objects weighing up to 50 pounds;
frequently lift objects weighing up to 20 pounds; and
continuously lift objects weighing up to 10 pounds. He
can occasionally carry objects weight [sic] up to 20
pounds; and frequently and continuously carry objects
weighing up to 10 pounds. He can sit for a total of six
out of eight hours and stand/walk for a total of three out
of eight hours, but he is precluded from standing for
more than one hour at a time, from walking for greater
than 30 minutes at a time, and from sitting for greater
than two hours at a time. He is precluded from
continuous reaching or pushing and pulling. He is
limited to no more than occasional operation of foot or
leg controls with the right foot. He is limited to no more
than occasional climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, or crawling. He is limited to no more than
occasional exposure to unprotected heights, moving
mechanical parts, or operation of a motor vehicle. He is
limited to jobs requiring the performance of no more than
non-complex job tasks that do not require the worker to
read above the fourth grade level or to engage in greater
than simple math.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 43).
In reaching his conclusion, the ALJ considered a report from Dr. James
Anderson. The ALJ stated that he agreed with Dr. Anderson’s designation of Mr.
Hampton’s severe physical impairments based on his “thorough review of the
record.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 37). The ALJ noted that Dr. Anderson reported “minimal
6

residual deficits from [Mr. Hampton’s] wrist and knee injuries and [that Mr.
Hampton] would be able to perform work at the light exertional level.” (Doc. 8-3,
pp. 46, 89). Mr. Hampton also indicated that “a sit/stand option could be included
based solely upon the claimant’s pain allegations as opposed to the objective
medical evidence” and that “if the claimant were complaint [sic] with treatment,
the restrictions would be less.”

(Doc. 8-3, pp. 46, 89).

Dr. Anderson also

“explained that the natural history of a wrist fracture normally would not impair
reaching in any way.” (Doc. 8-3, pp. 46, 90). The ALJ gave great weight to Dr.
Anderson’s opinion, as “it is consistent with and supported by the record as a
whole.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 46).
The ALJ also considered a psychological consultative evaluation performed
by Dr. Mary Arnold.

Dr. Arnold found that Mr. Hampton’s “cognitive

functioning, fund of information, abstract reasoning, thought processing, thought
content, and judgment were within normal limits.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 38; Doc. 8-8, p.
91). The ALJ also noted that Dr. Arnold “diagnosed adjustment disorder with
anxiety (mild) and a Global Assessment of Functioning of 72, meaning that if
symptoms are present, they are transient and expectable reactions to psycho-social
stressors and no more than slight impairment in social, occupational, or school
functioning.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 39). The ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. Arnold’s
findings with respect to Mr. Hampton’s mental functional capacity to the extent it
7

is consistent with the ALJ’s recorded residual functional capacity assessment.
(Doc. 8-3, pp. 46-47).
The ALJ reviewed the results of Jack Bentley, Ph.D., who administered the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition to Mr. Hampton. (Doc. 8-3, p.
38). Dr. Bentley reported that “[Mr. Hampton] has a high school education but is
barely literate.”5 (Doc. 8-3, p. 38; Doc. 8-9, p. 69). The ALJ gave some weight to
Dr. Bentley’s medical conclusions “to the extent that it supports [the ALJ’s]
finding that [Mr. Hampton’s] intellectual functioning is in the borderline to low
average range.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 47).
The ALJ also considered the opinion that Norma Jill Jacobson, a vocational
expert, offered at Mr. Hampton’s June 6, 2011 SSA review hearing. The ALJ
noted that Ms. Jacobson testified that “[Mr. Hampton] is not able to perform his

5

The ALJ noted that there is no basis in Dr. Bentley’s report for the conclusion that Mr.
Hampton is barely literate. (Doc. 8-3, p. 38). Further, the ALJ also stated the following
regarding Dr. Bentley’s report:
I note that the claimant’s representative referred the claimant to Dr. Bentley for
testing after the January 3, 2012 hearing. Thus, the testing that formed the basis
of Dr. Bentley’s opinion was not administered in an attempt to seek treatment for
symptoms, but rather, through attorney referral and in connection with an effort to
generate evidence for the current appeal. Furthermore, Dr. Bentley presumably
was paid for the report. Although such evidence is certainly legitimate and
deserves due consideration, the context in which it was produced cannot be
entirely ignored. Moreover, it does not appear that Dr. Bentley reviewed any of
the records in the case, and he did not perform a mental status examination in
conjunction with the [Wechsler] testing.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 38).
8

past relevant work under…[the reported] residual functional capacity assessment.”
(Doc. 8-3, p. 47; Doc. 8-3, p. 98).
The ALJ considered the medical opinion of Steven Dobbs, Ph.D., the State
agency psychological consultant who completed a mental residual functional
capacity assessment for Mr. Hampton. Dr. Dobbs concluded that Mr. Hampton
“could understand and remember simple and detailed but not complex
instructions…could sustain attention/concentration for two hour periods to
complete a regular workday at an acceptable pace and attendance schedule.…[and]
could respond to at least simple/infrequent changes in routine.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 44;
Doc. 8-8, p. 73). The ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. Dobbs’ findings with
respect to Mr. Hampton’s mental functional capacity to the extent it is consistent
with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment. (Doc. 8-3, pp. 46-47).
The ALJ gave great weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Younus Ismail, a
physical consultative examiner.6 (Doc. 8-3, p. 46). Dr. Ismail diagnosed Mr.
Hampton with “chronic right knee pain and chronic right wrist pain.” (Doc. 8-3, p.
45;Doc. 8-9, p. 47). In Dr. Ismail’s opinion:
[Mr. Hampton] could occasionally lift up to 50 pounds;
frequently lift up to 20 pounds; and continuously lift up
to 10 pounds[;] . . . could occasionally carry up to 20
6

It appears that the ALJ afforded Dr. Ismail’s opinion great weight because “it is consistent with
and supported by the record as a whole.” (See Doc. 8-3, p. 46).
9

pounds and frequently and continuously carry up to 10
pounds[;] . . . in an eight-hour workday, [Mr. Hampton]
could sit for a total of six hours; stand for a total of two
hours; and walk for a total of one hour[;] . . . sit for two
hours at one time without interruption; could stand for
one hour at one time without interruption; and could walk
for 30 minutes at one time without interruption[;] . . .
could occasionally reach with the right or left hand and
occasionally push or pull with the right or left hand[;] . . .
could frequently handle, finger, and feel with the right or
left hand[;] . . . could occasionally operate foot controls
with the right foot and frequently operate foot controls
with the left foot[;] . . . could occasionally climb,
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl[;] . . . could
occasionally tolerate exposure to unprotected heights,
moving mechanical parts, and operation of a motor
vehicle[;] . . . could frequently tolerate exposure to
humidity and wetness; dust, odors, fumes, and pulmonary
irritants; extreme cold; extreme heat; and vibrations.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 45; Doc. 8-9, pp. 48-53). Dr. Ismail also found that:
[Mr. Hampton] could perform activities like shopping;
could travel without a companion for assistance; could
ambulate without using a wheelchair, walker, two canes,
or two crutches; could walk a block at a reasonable pace
on rough or uneven surfaces; could use standard public
transportation; could climb a few steps at a reasonable
pace with the use of a single hand rail; could prepare a
simple meal and feed himself; could care for his personal
hygiene; and could sort, handle, and use paper/files.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 45; Doc. 8-9, p. 53).
Ultimately, the ALJ determined that Mr. Hampton “is unable to perform any
past relevant work.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 47). The ALJ reasoned that, based on the

10

testimony of the impartial vocational expert and Mr. Hampton’s residual functional
capacity assessment, Mr. Hampton “is not able to perform his past relevant work.”
(Doc. 8-3, pp. 47, 72-73, 93-97). This determination was made after considering
each of Mr. Hampton’s areas of past relevant work. (Doc. 8-3, p. 47).
Though the vocational expert, Donald Parsons, testified that Mr. Hampton
has no transferrable job skills, the ALJ considered Mr. Hampton’s “age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity,” and decided that “there are
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Mr. Hampton]
can perform.” (Doc. 8-3, pp. 47-48). The ALJ explained that:

The vocational expert testified that given all of these
factors the individual would be able to perform the
requirements of representative occupations such as
parking lot cashier (ODT 211.462-010), light exertional
level, unskilled, SVP 2, GED 2 level, of which there are
900 such jobs in Alabama and 110,000 nationally; table
worker (seated) (DOT 739.687-182), sedentary exertional
level, unskilled, SVP 2, GED 1 level, of which there are
50 such jobs in Alabama and 2,500 nationally; and gate
guard (DOT 372.667-030), light exertional level,
semiskilled, SVP 3, GED 2 level, of which there are
2,200 such jobs in Alabama and 157,000 nationally. The
vocational expert also testified that he based his
testimony on sit/stand options with respect to each job on
his extensive experience.
Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, I have determined that the
vocational expert’s testimony is consistent with the
information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles.
11

Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, I
conclude that, considering [Mr. Hampton’s] age,
education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, [he] is capable of making a successful
adjustment to other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy. A finding of ‘not
disabled’ is therefore appropriate under the framework of
the above-cited rule.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 48). Consequently, the ALJ decided that Mr. Hampton “is not
disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act,” or “under
section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 49).
On June 17, 2013, this became the final decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration when the Appeals Council refused to review the
ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 8-3, p. 2). Having exhausted all administrative remedies,
Mr. Hampton filed this action for judicial review pursuant to § 205(g) and §
1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §405(g) and § 1383(c)(3).
ANALYSIS:
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must be disabled.
Gaskin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 4081321, *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013).
“A claimant is disabled if he is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by
reason of a medically-determinable impairment that can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at
least 12 months.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A claimant must prove

12

that he is disabled. Id. (citing Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir.
2003).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security

Administration applies a five-step sequential analysis. Gaskin, 2013 WL 4081321
at *1.

This process includes a determination of whether the claimant (1) is
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe and
medically-determinable physical or mental impairment; (3) has such
an impairment that meets or equals a Listing and meets the duration
requirements; (4) can perform his past relevant work, in the light of
his residual functional capacity; and (5) can make an adjustment to
other work, in the light of his residual functional capacity, age,
education, and work experience.
Id. (citation omitted).

“The claimant’s residual functional capacity is an

assessment, based upon all relevant evidence, of the claimant’s ability to do work
despite his impairments.” Id. at *2 (citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440
(11th Cir. 1997); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)).
Here, in assessing whether Mr. Hampton is disabled, the ALJ found that Mr.
Hampton’s status post right wrist perilunate dorsal carpal distal dislocation with
chronic pain, status post gunshot wound to the right knee with chronic pain,
adjustment disorder with anxiety, and borderline to low average intellectual
functioning constitute severe physical impairments that “are considered to be more
than slight abnormalities and have more than a minimal effect on the claimant’s
13

ability to perform basic work activities.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 38). Nevertheless, the ALJ
concluded that Mr. Hampton is not disabled because he can perform jobs that exist
in significant numbers in the national economy.
The ALJ based his decision on the following substantial evidence: Dr.
Anderson’s report that Mr. Hampton suffered from “minimal residual deficits from
. . . wrist and knee injuries,” but that Mr. Hampton “would be able to perform work
at the light exertional level”; Dr. Anderson’s report that “a wrist fracture normally
would not impair reaching in any way”; Dr. Arnold’s finding that Mr. Hampton’s
“cognitive functioning, fund of information, abstract reasoning, thought
processing, thought content, and judgment were within normal limits;” Dr.
Arnold’s “diagnos[is] [of] adjustment disorder with anxiety (mild) and a Global
Assessment of Functioning of 72, meaning that if symptoms are present, they are
transient and expectable reactions to psycho-social stressors and no more than
slight impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning”; Dr. Bentley’s
report that Mr. Hampton “is barely literate,” albeit “to the extent that it supports
[the ALJ’s] finding that [Mr. Hampton’s] intellectual functioning is in the
borderline to low average range”; Dr. Ismail’s finding that Mr. Hampton is able to
perform certain activities in spite of his impairments; and the vocational expert’s
opinion that a person of Mr. Hampton’s age, education, and work experience with

14

Mr. Hampton’s residual functional capacity can perform jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy.
Mr. Hampton argues that despite this substantial evidence, he is entitled to
relief from the ALJ’s decision because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Mr.
Hampton’s case pursuant to Listing 12.05C of the Regulations. (Doc. 10, pp. 6-8).
The Court finds that this contention is without merit.
The applicable listing states the following:
12.05 Mental retardation: Mental retardation refers to
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested
during the developmental period; i.e., the evidence
demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before
age 22.
The required level of severity for this disorder is met
when the requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied.
20 C.F.R. § 404 app. 1, § 12.05. “To be considered for disability benefits under
section 12.05, a claimant must at least (1) have significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning; (2) have deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) have
manifested deficits in adaptive behavior before age 22. Crayton v. Callahan, 120
F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997). The requirements of 12.05C include:
C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60
through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment
imposing an additional and significant work-related
limitation of function;
15

20 C.F.R. § 404 app. 1, § 12.05C. In Crayton, the Eleventh Circuit explained:
Generally, the claimant meets the criteria for presumptive
disability…under section 12.05(c) when the claimant
presents a valid IQ score of 60 through 70 inclusive, and
when the claimant presents evidence of an additional
mental or physical impairment significantly affecting
claimant's ability to work. See Lowery v. Sullivan, 979
F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.1992) (a valid IQ score need not
be conclusive of mental retardation, where the IQ score is
inconsistent with other evidence in the record concerning
the claimant's daily activities and behavior).
Id. at 1219-20.
To decide whether Mr. Hampton meets the requirements for Listing 12.05C,
the ALJ first examined the IQ score requirement. The ALJ noted that “[a]lthough
the IQ scores obtained by Dr. Bentley initially appear to satisfy the criteria of
paragraph C, the evidence clearly shows that [Mr. Hampton] is not mentally
retarded.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 42).

The ALJ continued, “[Mr. Hampton] does not

exhibit the degree of deficits of adaptive functioning needed to support a finding of
mental retardation.”

(Doc. 8-3, p. 42). The Regulations state that “adaptive

activities” include “cleaning, shopping, cooking, taking public transportation,
paying bills, maintaining a residence, caring appropriately for your grooming and
hygiene, using telephones and directories, and using a post office.” 20 C.F.R. §
404 app. 1, § 12.00C(1).
With respect to Mr. Hampton’s adaptive activities, the ALJ noted that:
16

[T]he evidence establishes that [Mr. Hampton] played
football and ran track in high school as well as work[ed]
part-time; [Mr. Hampton] is able to drive and testified
during the hearing that he has a valid driver’s license and
does drive; [Mr. Hampton’s] social skills are refined per
Dr. Arnold; prior to his wrist injury, [Mr. Hampton]
played golf, fished, and hunted; and [Mr. Hampton] has
maintained long-term relationships with significant
others and his children. [Mr. Hampton] is independent in
his activities of daily living and reported to Dr. Arnold
that he reads the newspaper. [Mr. Hampton’s] cognitive
functioning, fund of information, abstract reasoning,
thought processing, thought content, and judgment per
Dr. Arnold’s report…[and his] work history [do] not
support a finding of mental retardation.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 43). On this evidence, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Hampton does not
meet the criteria for Listing 12.05 despite the semblance of a qualifying IQ test
score. (Doc. 8-3, p. 42).
The record confirms that Mr. Hampton has a valid driver’s license (Doc. 8-3,
pp. 43, 60-61), drives (Doc. 8-3, pp. 43, 61; Doc. 8-8, p. 92), played football and
ran track in high school (Doc. 8-8, p. 90), worked part-time in high school (Doc. 83, p. 62; Doc. 8-8, p. 90), grooms and dresses himself independently (Doc. 8-8, p.
92), is independent in his activities of daily living (Doc. 8-3, p. 42; Doc. 8-8, p.
92), does his own laundry (Doc. 8-8, p. 92), picks up after himself (Doc. 8-8, p.
92), has the ability manage funds (Doc. 8-8, p. 92), spends time at a friend’s house
watching television (Doc. 8-8, p. 92), and has maintained long-term relationships
with significant others and his children (Doc. 8-3, pp. 42, 59-60, 82; Doc. 8-8, pp.
17

90, 92). Though Mr. Hampton points to responses to questions that may indicate
some degree of intellectual challenge, he has not overcome the substantial
evidence in the record that demonstrates that he is capable of performing a wide
range of adaptive activities without assistance or supervision. (See Doc. 10, pp. 68). Thus, Mr. Hampton cannot establish a colorable claim under Listing 12.05.
Mr. Hampton argues that the ALJ relied on an outdated consultative report
from Dr. Arnold to reach his conclusions. The argument is not persuasive. Section
12.05C requires claimants to demonstrate that deficits in adaptive functioning first
manifested prior to age 22. Although Dr. Arnold issued her report four years
before Mr. Hampton applied for benefits, Mr. Hampton was 25 years old when Dr.
Arnold examined him. (Doc. 8-8, pp. 89-90). Consequently, Dr. Arnold’s report
sheds light on whether Mr. Hampton demonstrated deficits in adaptive behavior
prior to age 22. Dr. Arnold’s four-year-old consultative report does not undermine
the ALJ’s conclusions. See Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F. 3d 1265, 1266 (11th Cir.
2001) (holding that “there is a presumption that mental retardation is a condition
that remains constant throughout life”).
Mr. Hampton also argues that the ALJ failed to assess Mr. Hampton’s
residual functional capacity properly. (Doc. 10, pp. 8-10). Mr. Hampton contends
that under 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), “the assessment of Dr. Ismail
limits [Mr. Hampton] to sedentary work, not light work as indicated by the ALJ.”
18

(Doc. 10, p. 8). The Court notes that Dr. Ismail’s medical assessment states that
Mr. Hampton can occasionally lift up to 50 pounds, frequently lift up to 20 pounds,
continuously lift up to 10 pounds, occasionally carry up to 20 pounds, and
continuously carry up to 10 pounds. (Doc. 8-9, p. 48). Dr. Ismail’s assessment
also opines that Mr. Hampton, at one time without interruption, can sit for 2 hours,
stand for 1 hour, walk for 30 minutes, and in an 8-hour work day can sit for 6
hours, stand for 2 hours, and walk for 1 hour. (Doc. 8-9, p. 49).
Under the regulations, “sedentary work” is:
work [that] involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a
time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like
docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a
sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a
certain amount of walking and standing is often
necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if
walking and standing are required occasionally and other
sedentary criteria are met.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). “Light work,” alternatively is:
work that involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a
time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing
up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be
very little, a job is in this category when it requires a
good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves
sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of
arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of
performing a full or wide range of light work, you must
have the ability to do substantially all of these activities.
If someone can do light work, we determine that he or
she can also do sedentary work, unless there are
19

additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or
inability to sit for long periods of time.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
The ALJ did not conclude that Mr. Hampton can perform the full range of
light work. Instead, the ALJ found that “[Mr. Hampton] has the residual functional
capacity to perform light work … with … exceptions.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 43). The
exceptions are as follows:
[H]e can occasionally lift objects weighing up to 50
pounds; frequently lift objects weighing up to 20 pounds;
and continuously lift objects weighing up to 10 pounds.
He can occasionally carry objects weight [sic] up to 20
pounds; and frequently and continuously carry objects
weighing up to 10 pounds. He can sit for a total of six
out of eight hours and stand/walk for a total of three out
of eight hours, but he is precluded from standing for
more than one hour at a time, from walking for greater
than 30 minutes at a time, and from sitting for greater
than two hours at a time. He is precluded from
continuous reaching or pushing and pulling. He is
limited to no more than occasional operation of foot or
leg controls with the right foot. He is limited to no more
than occasional climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, or crawling. He is limited to no more than
occasional exposure to unprotected heights, moving
mechanical parts, or operation of a motor vehicle. He is
limited to jobs requiring the performance of no more than
non-complex job tasks that do not require the worker to
read above the fourth grade level or to engage in greater
than simple math.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 43).

20

SSR 83-10 explains that “the primary difference between sedentary and
most light jobs” is that light jobs “require[] a good deal of walking or standing.”
SSR 83-10 at *5. Because Mr. Hampton is limited to standing/walking up to 3
hours in an 8-hour day, his RFC falls somewhere between the Regulatory
definition of sedentary work and light work. In such a situation, the ALJ should
rely on vocational expert testimony. 7 SSR 83-12 at *3. By relying on vocational
expert answers to hypothetical questions reflecting an accurate RFC, the ALJ did
not err. (See Doc. 8-3, pp. 73-74, 96-98). Because Mr. Hampton’s RFC prevented
him from performing all of the requirements for a full range of light work, and “to
determine the extent to which these limitations erode the unskilled light
occupational base, [the ALJ] asked the vocational expert whether jobs exist in the
national economy [that Mr. Hampton can perform].” (Doc. 8-3, p. 48). The ALJ
properly relied on the vocational expert’s affirmative answers to find that Mr.
Hampton is not disabled. (Doc. 8-3, p. 48).
The ALJ examined the available evidence thoroughly and determined that
Mr. Hampton is not disabled. That finding rests on substantial evidence. The
7

The entire portion of the SSR 83-12 adjudicative guidance states, in pertinent part:
In situations where the rules would direct different conclusions, and the
individual's exertional limitations are somewhere “in the middle” in terms of the
regulatory criteria for exertional ranges of work, more difficult judgments are
involved as to the sufficiency of the remaining occupational base to support a
conclusion as to disability. Accordingly, V[ocational] S[pecialist] assistance is
advisable for these types of cases.
21

Court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner.
CONCLUSION:
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court concludes the ALJ’s decision was
based upon substantial evidence and consistent with applicable legal standards.
Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Court will
enter a separate order consistent with this memorandum of opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of July, 2014.

_________________________________
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22