Medina v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION, as set out. An Order affirming the decision of the Commissioner will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion. Signed by Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 3/24/15. (CTS, )

FILED
2015 Mar-24 PM 03:43
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
LETICIA MEDINA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 4:13-CV-1858-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Leticia Medina brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for
a period of disability and disability insurance benefits [“DIB”]. Upon review of the record
and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that the Commissioner’s decision is due to
be affirmed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Medina filed an application for a period of disability and DIB on June 23, 2010,
alleging disability beginning on March 24, 2010. (Doc. 6-3 at R.24.)1 Her application was
denied initially. (Id.) Thereafter, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge [“ALJ”], which was held on March 15, 2012. (Id.) After the hearing, the ALJ found

1

Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to each
document as it is filed in the court’s record. References to page numbers in the
Commissioner’s record are set forth as “R.___”.

that Ms. Medina was “capable of performing her past relevant work as a data entry clerk and
as a translator.” (Id. at R.38.) In light of these findings, the ALJ found that Ms. Medina
was not disabled. (Id. at R.39.)
Ms. Medina then requested the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s decision. (Id.
at R.19.)

The Appeals Council “found no reason under [its] rules to review the

Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Therefore, [it] denied [Ms. Medina’s] request for
review.” (Id. at R.1.) The ALJ’s decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id.)
Following denial of review by the Appeals Council, Ms. Medina filed an appeal in this
court. (See generally doc. 1.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act, this court’s role is a
narrow one: “Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to an inquiry into
whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner, and
whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221
(11th Cir. 2002); see also Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988). The court
gives deference to factual findings and reviews questions of law de novo. Cornelius v.
Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). The court “may not decide the facts anew,
reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner], rather [it]
must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)

2

(quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.1983))(internal quotations
and citations omitted). “The Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence.” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1221 (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520,
1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987)). “Substantial
evidence” is “more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Sec.,
631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)(internal quotations and citations omitted)
Conclusions of law made by the Commissioner are reviewed de novo. Cornelius, 936
F.2d at 1145. “No . . . presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] conclusions
of law.” Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982).
III. DISCUSSION
A. THE FIVE-STEP EVALUATION
The regulations require the Commissioner to follow a five-step sequential evaluation
to determine whether a claimant is eligible for a period of disability and DIB. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(1)-(2); see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986). “The
term ‘disability’ means – (A) [the] inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1). The
specific steps in the evaluation process are as follows:

3

1. Substantial Gainful Employment
First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in
“substantial gainful activity.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 137 (1987). The regulations
define “substantial gainful activity” as “work activity that is both substantial and gainful.”2
20 C.F.R. § 404.1572. If the claimant is working and that work is substantial gainful activity,
the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled, regardless of the claimant’s
medical condition or her age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
“Under the first step, the claimant has the burden to show that she is not currently engaged
in substantial gainful activity.” Reynolds-Buckley v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 457 Fed.
Appx. 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2012).3
2

The regulation states:

(a) Substantial work activity. Substantial work activity is work activity that
involves doing significant physical or mental activities. Your work may be
substantial even if it is done on a part-time basis or if you do less, get paid less,
or have less responsibility than when you worked before.
(b) Gainful work activity. Gainful work activity is work activity that you do
for pay or profit. Work activity is gainful if it is the kind of work usually done
for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.
(c) Some other activities. Generally, we do not consider activities like taking
care of yourself, household tasks, hobbies, therapy, school attendance, club
activities, or social programs to be substantial gainful activity.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1572.
3

Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2 provides, in pertinent part, “An opinion shall be
unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it. Unpublished opinions are
not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.
4

The ALJ found that Ms. Medina had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
March 24, 2010, the alleged onset date. (Doc. 6-3 at R.26.)
2. Severe Impairments
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must
next determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment or combination of
impairments that significantly limits her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). “[A] ‘physical or mental impairment’ is an impairment
that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). The regulations provide: “[I]f you do not have any impairment or
combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do
basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are,
therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). “An impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a
slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be
expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or
work experience.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1521(a). A claimant may be found disabled based on a combination of impairments
even though none of the individual impairments alone are disabling. Walker v. Brown, 826

R. 36-2 (emphasis added).
5

F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1985); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. A claimant has the burden
to show that she has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Reynolds-Buckley,
457 Fed. Appx. at 863.
The ALJ found that Ms. Medina had the following severe impairments: “obesity and
thyroid cancer status post-total thyroidectomy.” (Doc. 6-3 at R.27.) He also found that Ms.
Medina’s “mental impairment of depression does not cause more than minimal limitation in
the claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work activities and is therefore non-severe.”
(Id.)
3. The Listings
If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner must then determine
whether the claimant’s impairment meets the durational requirement and whether it is
equivalent to any one of the listed impairments, which are impairments that are so severe as
to prevent an individual with the described impairment from performing substantial gainful
activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e); see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1 [The Listings]. If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a Listing, the Commissioner
must find the claimant disabled, regardless of the claimant’s age, education, and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The claimant has the burden of proving that her
impairment meets or equals the criteria contained in one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley,
457 Fed. Appx. at 863.

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The ALJ found that Ms. Medina “does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals one of the impairments included in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §[§] 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526).”
(Doc. 6-3 at R.28.)
4. Residual Functional Capacity and Past Relevant Work
If the impairment does not meet or equal the criteria of a Listing, the claimant must
prove that her impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). At step four, the Commissioner “will first compare [her]
assessment of [the claimant’s] residual functional capacity [“RFC”] with the physical and
mental demands of [her] past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b). “Past relevant work
is work that [the claimant has] done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful
activity, and that lasted long enough for [her] to learn to do it. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1).
If the claimant is capable of performing her past relevant work, the Commissioner will find
she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(e). The claimant bears the burden of establishing
that the impairment prevents her from performing past work. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed.
Appx. at 863.
The ALJ found that Ms. Medina had the following RFC:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with the following deviations or
adjustments. The claimant can lift and/or carry up to twenty pounds
occasionally and up to ten pounds frequently with her upper right extremity.
She can sit for up to six hours at a time during an eight-hour workday, and can
stand and/or walk in combination for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday.
7

The claimant cannot use her left upper, non-dominant extremity for any
significant lifting and/or carrying on a regular basis, but she can use her left
upper extremity for assistive purposes such as balancing. The claimant has
decreased cervical range of motion such that there is very little horizontal or
vertical movement in her cervical spine.
(Doc. 6-3 at R.29.) Considering Ms. Medina’s RFC, the ALJ found that she could perform
her past relevant work as a data entry clerk and as a translator. (Id. at R.38.)
5. Other Work in the National Economy
If the claimant establishes that she is unable to perform her past relevant work, the
Commissioner must show that the claimant – in light of her RFC, age, education, and work
experience – is capable of performing other work that exists in substantial numbers in the
national economy. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. Appx. at 863; see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(c)(1). The regulations provide:
If we find that your residual functional capacity is not enough to enable
you to do any of your past relevant work, we will use the same residual
functional capacity assessment we used to decide if you could do your past
relevant work when we decide if you can adjust to any other work. We will
look at your ability to adjust to other work by considering your residual
functional capacity and your vocational factors of age, education, and work
experience. Any other work (jobs) that you can adjust to must exist in
significant numbers in the national economy (either in the region where you
live or in several regions in the country).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1). If the claimant is not capable of performing such other work,
the Commissioner must find the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If, however,
the Commissioner finds that the claimant can perform other work, the claimant has the
burden to prove she in not capable of performing such other work.

8

Because the ALJ found Ms. Medina was capable of performing her past relevant
work, the ALJ did not address whether other jobs existed in the national economy that an
individual of Ms. Medina’s age and with her RFC, education, and work experience could
perform.
B. MS. MEDINA’S ISSUES ON APPEAL
Ms. Medina raises a number of issues on appeal:
1. The ALJ erred by failing to order a consultive psycholoigical
examination. (See doc. 10 at 14-17.)
2. The ALJ erred by substituting his opinion for that of Ms. Medina’s
treating sources and he failed to state adequate reasons for discounting their
opinions. (See id. at 17-24.)
3. The ALJ’s finding that Ms. Medina can perform her past relevant
work is not supported by substantial evidence and is based on improper
application of the appropriate legal standard. (See id. at 24-27.)
4. The ALJ erred in failing to consider Ms. Medina’s severe
impairments of low back pain radiating to her right thigh, neck pain, left arm
weakness, limited range of motion of her cervical spine, bilateral shoulder
pain, and severe depression. (See id. at 27-28.)
5. The ALJ erred in not considering Ms. Medina’s severe impairments
as a combina5tion of impairments. (See id. at 28-30.)
6. The ALJ erred by failing to state adequate reasons for finding Ms.
Medina’s testimony was not credible. (See id. at 30-34.)
The court has reviewed the entire record before the ALJ, as well as the parties’ briefs, and
it finds that the Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed.

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1. DUTY TO ORDER CONSULTATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION
Ms. Medina contends, The ALJ had a duty to order a consultative exam based on
diagnosis and treatment of severe depression.” (Doc. 10 at 14.) The Commissioner argues,
“Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit because the record was sufficiently developed for the ALJ
to derive a dispositive RFC.” (Doc. 11 at 32.)
“[T]he ALJ generally has an obligation to develop the record . . . .” Ingram v.
Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007).
The ALJ’s duty to develop the record encompasses an obligation to
order a consultative evaluation “when the evidence as a whole is insufficient
to allow [the Commissioner] to make a determination or decision on [the]
claim.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a(b). When the record . . . contain[s] sufficient
evidence to make an informed decision, the ALJ is not required to order a
consultative examination. See Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1210 (11th
Cir. 1988)( “[T]he [ALJ] is not required to order a consultative examination
unless the record establishes that such an examination is necessary to enable
the [ALJ] to render a decision.” (citing Ford v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 659 F.2d 66, 69 (5th Cir.1981))). Sufficient evidence does not mean
“absolute certainty” regarding a claimant’s condition; the Social Security Act
“requires only substantial evidence.” Id. at 1210.
Rollins v. Colvin, Case No. 4:13-CV-1979-VEH, 2014 WL 3689787, *4 (N.D. Ala. July 22,
2014). “Even though Social Security courts are inquisitorial, not adversarial, in nature,
claimants must establish that they are eligible for benefits. The administrative law judge has
a duty to develop the record where appropriate but is not required to order a consultative
examination as long as the record contains sufficient evidence for the administrative law
judge to make an informed decision.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1269 (citing Doughty v. Apfel,
245 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001)).
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The court finds that the evidence in the Commissioner’s record provided sufficient
information regarding Ms. Medina’s depression to allow the ALJ to reach an informed
decision. In this case, the ALJ addressed Ms. Medina’s depression and explained his reasons
for finding this mental impairment was not severe. (See doc. 6-3 at R.27-28, 37, 38.) He
found, “The medical records show that the claimant generally has only mild symptoms of
depression and that her depression is generally well controlled with medication.” (Id. at 38.)
Also, he found:
The claimant’s first episode of depression lasted less than three months, and
she was only recently again found to have symptoms of depression in April of
2012. There is no indication that this condition will not be successfully treated
with medication as it had been in the past. There is no evidence suggesting
that this impairment will last long enough to meet the 12-month durational
requirement, and thus far, this condition has constituted, at most, only a slight
abnormality that cannot reasonably be expected to produce more than minimal,
if any, work-related limitations.
(Id. at R.27.) These findings are supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, the court
finds that Ms. Medina has not identified any unfair prejudice caused by the failure to obtain
a consultative psychological examination. See Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir.
1995).
The court finds no error as a result of the ALJ’s failure to obtain a consultive
psychological examination.

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2. Opinions of Treating Physicians
Ms. Medina contends, “The ALJ substituted his opinion for the opinions of treating
physician Dr. Teschner, Nurse Practitioner Carol James . . . and the IME4 [independent
medical examination] Evaluator Dr. Wilson,” and he “failed to state adequate reasons for
discrediting [these] opinions.” (Doc. 10 at 17 [footnote added].) The Commissioner
disagrees on the ground that the ALJ founds these individuals were not treating physicians,
and the ALJ stated specific reasons supported by the substantial evidence for the weight
accorded each source. (See doc. 11 at 20-23.)
Ms. Medina states:
In the Eleventh Circuit, the opinion of a treating physician “must be
given substantial or considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the
contrary” and that”:
“‘good cause exists when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not
bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding;
or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with
the doctor’s own medical records. Id. When electing to disregard the
opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must clearly articulate its
reasons. Id.”
Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2003), citing Lewis
v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997).
In Lewis, the Eleventh Circuit held that the ALJ must clearly articulate
the reasons for giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician, and
the failure to do so is reversible error. Lewis, 125 F3d at 1440.

4

“IME” is an “independent medical evaluation” or an “independent medical
examination.” Watkins v. Astrue, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263 (N.D. Ala. 2013); Riggins v.
Astrue, Case No. 3:09-cv-856-J-TEM, 2010 WL 3768365, *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2010).
12

Absent good cause to the contrary, the Commissioner must accord
substantial or considerable weight to the treating physician’s opinion. Lamb
v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 1988); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996,
1000 (11th Cir. 1987).
(Doc. 10 at 18-19.) Although Ms. Medina has correctly stated the law, this law does not
compel reversal of the Commissioner’s decision because the ALJ specifically found these
individuals were not treating physicians whose opinions are entitled to entitled to great or
conclusive weight.
First, the ALJ found that neither James nor Wilson was a “treating physician.” (See
doc. 6-3 at R.37 [James is a nurse Practitioner, not a physician];id. at R.34, R.38 [Wilson
performed a consultive examination].) Second, he discounted Teschner’s opinion based in
part on the extremely limited length of her treatment of Ms. Medina. (Id. at R.38 [citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(i)].) These findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Moreover, Ms. Medina’s contention that the ALJ failed to specify the weight given
to these medical source opinions and explain his reason for so doing is contrary to the ALJ’s
Decision. In his decision, the ALJ states:
The opinions of Carol James, C.R.N.P., are given little weight. The opinion
of Ms. James, that the claimant is “unable to work” or that she is “disabled”,
is a determination that is reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security.
Furthermore, Ms. James is a nurse practitioner and not a medical doctor or
specialist. Therefore, this opinion is given little weight. A simple statement
by a medical source that the claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” does
not mean that the claimant will be found disabled, as this is an opinion
reserved to the Commissioner . . . .
Likewise, the opinions of Jane Teschner, M.D., are also given little weight.
While Dr. Teschner is a qualified medical source, her opinions appear to be
13

based on nothing more than the subjective complaints of the claimant. There
is no evidence of any objective testing of any kind being conducted by Dr.
Teschner.5 Furthermore, the opinion us based on only two office visits, and
this short length of treatment is a consideration . . . .
...
The findings of Dr. Wilson that the claimant has depression and anxiety are
given some weight. Dr. Wilson is a licensed psychologist, and he is deemed
by regulation to be a “highly qualified expert in Social Security disability
evaluation.” His opinion, however, that the claimant had a Global Assessment
of Functioning score of only 48, is not supported by the overall medical
evidence as a whole and is, therefore, afforded only some weight. There is no
evidence contained within the longitudinal record that shows the existence of
more than mild mental symptoms or limitations. The medical records show
that the claimant generally has only mild symptoms of depression and that her
depression is generally well controlled with medication.
(Doc. 6-3 at 37-38 [footnote added; internal citations omitted].)
The court finds that the ALJ’s decision regarding the weight accorded these medical
sources is supported by substantial evidence and in conformity with the law. Therefore, the
court finds no error with regard to the ALJ’s assessment of the medical source opinion
statements.
3. Past Relevant Work
Ms. Medina alleges that the ALJ’s “the finding that claimant can perform past work
is not supported by substantial evidence,” and the “ALJ failed to apply proper legal standard

5

Dr. Teschner first saw Ms. Medina on September 9, 2011. (Doc. 6-3 at 430.) She
returned on September 14, 2011, for “follow up on x-rays,” which Ms. Medina “didn’t get
done,” but “she brought x-rays she had from” another health-care provider. (Id. at 428.) Dr.
Teschner’s notes appear to state that Ms. Medina needs an MRI, (see id. at 434), but the
record does not indicate that she had one done.
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for determining whether claimant can perform past work.” (Doc. 10 at 24.) This contention
is not supported by specific citation to the record, except reference to a physical residual
capacity evaluation prepared sometime before the hearing before the ALJ. Rather, Ms.
Medina sets forth a discussion of Eleventh Circuit and Alabama district court opinions and
then states, “The ALJ did not apply the proper legal standards in determining that claimant
can perform her past work and the finding was not supported by substantial evidence.” (Id.
at 27.) The Commissioner disagrees “because the ALJ properly determined her RFC finding
and relied upon VE [vocational expert] testimony to find she could perform past relevant
work.” (Doc. 11 at 35.)
As set forth above, the ALJ found Ms. Medina had the following RFC:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with the following deviations or
adjustments. The claimant can lift and/or carry up to twenty pounds
occasionally and up to ten pounds frequently with her upper right extremity.
She can sit for up to six hours at a time during an eight-hour workday, and can
stand and/or walk in combination for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday.
The claimant cannot use her left upper, non-dominant extremity for any
significant lifting and/or carrying on a regular basis, but she can use her left
upper extremity for assistive purposes such as balancing. The claimant has
decreased cervical range of motion such that there is very little horizontal or
vertical movement in her cervical spine.
(Doc. 6-3 at R.29.) This RFC is substantially similar to a Medical Source Statement of
Ability to Do Work-Related Activities (Physical), prepared by Henry M. Born, M.D.
(Compare id. with doc. 6-9 at R.492-R.497.) Indeed, the ALJ found:
The findings and opinion[s] of Drs. Thomas, Born, and Russell are given great
weight. These findings and opinion[s] are based upon direct observation and
15

examination of the claimant, as well as review of her entire medical record and
course of treatment. Dr. Born’s and Dr. Russell’s findings and opinions are
consistent with each other, as well as internally consistent with the evidence
as a whole. While Dr. Thomas did not offer any opinion as to the claimant’s
limitations, her findings were nonetheless useful in determining the full scope
of the claimant’s impairments. As these opinions are well supported and
largely uncontradicted by other objective evidence, they are entitled to great
weight.
(Doc. 6-3 at R.38 [internal citations omitted].)
The court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard to determine Ms.
Medina’s RFC, and his factual finding regarding her RFC is supported by substantial
evidence.
Ms. Medina also contends that ALJ failed to make the required findings regarding the
physical and mental demands of her past relevant work. (See doc. 10 at 26-27.) Although
the ALJ’s decision does not enumerate the demands of Ms. Medina’s past relevant work, the
court finds that he was aware of the physical and mental demands of her past relevant work
and relied on the VE to determine that Ms. Medina could perform her past relevant work
despite the limitations set forth in her RFC. At the hearing, the VE testified that Ms.
Medina’s past relevant work as a data entry clerk was “sedentary” and “semiskilled,” with
a “SVP [Specific Vocational Preparation] of 4.”6 (Doc. 6-3 at 64.) He noted that Ms.

6

The SVP, or Specific Vocational Preparation, “is defined as the amount of lapsed
time required by a typical worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and
develop the facility needed for average performance in a specific job-worker situation.”
Specific Vocational Preparation, Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Appendix C, found at
1991 WL 688702. SVP of 4 equates to “Over 3 months up to and including 6 months,” and
SVP of 7 equates to “Over 2 years up to and including 4 years.” Id.
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Medina “was doing some translating as well” at this job; translating is a sedentary, skilled
job with an SVP of 7. (Id. at 64-65.) The VE testified as follows:
Q. . . . If we have a hypothetical individual, this individual is a
younger individual with a high school education, the individual . . . can
perform light exertion as it’s defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles,
but there are additional limitations in that the individual could not use the left
non-dominant upper extremity for any significant lifting on a regular basis,
could use that extremity to balance something being lifted by the right
dominant upper extremity; additionally this individual has the pre-cervical ...
range of motion such that there is very little rotational movement of the neck;
and a reduced range of vertical or up and down [movement]; given that
combination of limitations, could this hypothetical individual perform any of
these jobs that you’ve described for the claimant’s work history?
A. . . . That person would be able to do the translator job. And in most
data entry jobs – the one that she had was – included other tasks than data
entry, but if it’s strictly data entry there would not be significant lifting in the
non-dominant lifting in the non-dominant hand and I’m assuming that person
could still do handling and fingering, which was the primary function required
in that job, so I would say that job would be possible. . . .
(Id. at 66-67.)
The court finds no error in the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Medina could perform her past
relevant work as a data entry clerk and a translator as those job are customarily performed.
4. Claimant’s Impairments
Ms. Medina contends that the ALJ “failed to consider all of [her] severe
impairments.” (Doc. 10 at 27.) Specifically, she contends the ALJ should have considered:
“claimant’s excruciating lower back pain with radiation of pain to right thigh after being
involved in an auto accident on [August 2, 2010], her neck pain from thyroid surgery, left
arm weakness; [l]imited range of motion at the cervical spine; bilateral shoulder pain and
17

severe depression with a GAF [of] 48.” (Id. [citing doc. 6-9 at R.484].) The court finds that
the ALJ actually considered her neck pain, left arm weakness, limited range of motion and
left arm pain. (Doc. 6-3 at R.29-R.37.) Therefore, it finds no error.
At the hearing, Ms. Medina stated that her main complaints were the residual effects
of her neck surgery, including pain and reduced range of motion in her neck and left arm.
(Doc. 6-3 at R.50.)

She did not testify regarding low back pain or depression.7 (See

generally id. at R.50-63.) As to plaintiff’s low back pain, the court notes that the record
contains evidence that Ms. Medina sought treatment for back pain on June 2, 2008. (Doc.
6-9 at R.439.) This record predates her alleged onset date. As to depression, the ALJ
specifically discussed the alleged impairment and found it was not severe. (Doc. 6-3 at . 2728, 38.) This finding is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the court finds no
error in the ALJ’s failure to find Ms. Medina had severe impairments of low back pain or
depression.
For the reasons set forth above, the court finds no error in the ALJ’s determination and
consideration of Ms. Medina severe impairments.

7

When asked how she was doing emotionally, Ms. Medina testified, “It’s very
depressing, I try not to cry in front of the kids but it’s hard.” (Doc. 6-3 at 61.) At the
hearing, she did not testify regarding any diagnosis, treatment, and symptoms of clinical
depression.
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5. Combination of Impairments
Ms. Medina contends, “The ALJ failed to consider claimant’s combination of
impairments in determining disability.” (Doc. 10 at 28.) Without citation to the record, she
states, “The ALJ failed to acknowledge pain and depression as severe impairments.” (Id. at
30 [emphasis added].) For the reasons set forth above, the court finds the ALJ considered
Ms. Medina’s complaints of pain and that he found her depression was not a severe
impairment. Therefore, her contention that the ALJ failed to “acknowledge” her pain and
depression is simply incorrect.
Moreover, the court finds the ALJ specifically stated he considered her severe
impairments in combination and his RFC reflects those limitations. (See doc. 6-3 at R.28,
R.29.) The court finds no error in the ALJ’s alleged failure to consider Ms. Medina’s
impairments in combination.
6. Credibility of Allegations of Pain
Ms. Medina contends, “The ALJ failed to state adequate reasons for finding claimant
not credible.” (Doc. 10 at 30.) She quotes her hearing testimony and the ALJ’s decision, (id.
at 32-34), but she does not explain her objection to the ALJ’s findings or explain why his
reasons for finding her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects
of [her] symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with [the ALJ’s]
residual functional capacity assessment,” (doc. 6-3 at 30.)

19

[C]redibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d
1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005), and [the court] will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility
finding supported by substantial evidence, Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th
Cir.1995).” Mitchell v. Commissioner, Social Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir.
2014). In this case, the ALJ “clearly articulated” and “pointed to specific reasons for

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discrediting [Ms. Medina’s] subjective complaints of disabling pain.”8 See id.; see also doc.

8

With regard to Ms. Medina subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ found:

After considering the medical evidence in its entirety, the [ALJ] concludes that
the claimant’s allegations of experiencing chronic and daily pain are simply
not supported by the medical evidence as [a] whole. The evidence shows that
the claimant underwent radical surgical treatment secondary to thyroid cancer
in March 2010; however, there is no objective evidence available that would
account for her continued allegations of experiencing “10/10” pain. The
record as a whole is void of consistent complaints of chronic and debilitating
pain, and she told Dr. Russell that she only takes her pain medications about
three time a week. Records from the claimant’s regular treating physicians
show that she has never been placed on any physical restrictions due to her
medical conditions. The medical evidence shows that the claimant was
referred to occupational therapy for ten visits, but the claimant only attended
the initial session and never returned for follow-up therapy. She testified at the
hearing that the physical therapist told her that she likely had nerve damage
from her surgery, but records from the therapist told her that the claimant is the
one who alleged possible nerve damage. When the case was reviewed by Dr.
Haas at the lower level adjudication, he noted that an x-ray of her cervical
spine was normal and there was no muscle atrophy present. Dr. Haas also
noted that the claimant prepares meals for her family, performs household
chores, drives a car and shops for groceries. The claimant also testified that
she is the primary caregiver for her infant son, although she does receive
assistance from other family members.
The claimant’s testimony and other allegations of pain and functional
restrictions are simply disproportionate to the objective medical evidence. The
record does not contain objective signs and findings that could reasonably be
expected to produce the degree and intensity of pain or limitations alleged.
There are no diagnostic studies to show abnormalities that could be expected
to produce such severe and chronic symptoms. The physical findings in the
record do not establish the existence of significant neurological deficits,
significant weight loss, muscle atrophy, or other observable signs often
indicative of protracted pain of the intensity, frequency, and severity alleged.
The claimant betrayed no obvious evidence of pain of discomfort while
testifying at the hearing. This apparent lack of discomfort during the hearing
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-3 at R.29-R.30, R.36-R.37. His findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The court finds no error in the ALJ’s determination of Ms. Medina’s credibility.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Commissioner is due to be
affirmed.

An Order affirming the decision of the Commissioner will be entered

contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.
DONE this 24th day of March, 2015.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

is given some slight weight in reaching the conclusion regarding the credibility
of the claimant’s allegations and residual functional capacity.
Taking all of the above into consideration, including the claimant’s testimony,
the Administrative Law Judge concludes that, although the evidence
establishes the presence of an underlying medical condition capable of
producing some pain and limitations, the preponderance of the evidence does
not confirm disabling pain or other limitations arising from the claimant’s
alleged impairments. The claimant’s alleged inability to perform all substantial
gainful activities is simply not corroborated by substantial evidence. Giving
the claimant the benefit of the doubt, the Administrative Law Judge finds no
reason that the claimant cannot perform work activity as defined in the residual
functional capacity.
(Doc. 6-3 at R.36-R.37; see also id. at 30 [finding “the claimant’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause [pain and the inability to to move her
neck and arm]; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with
the above [RFC] assessment”].)
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