Huntley v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 3/28/2016. (PSM)

FILED
2016 Mar-28 AM 11:43
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
CHARLES HUNTLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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4:14-cv-02480-LSC

Memorandum of Opinion
I.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Charles Huntley, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying his application
for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).

Mr. Huntley timely pursued and

exhausted his administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe
for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Mr. Huntley was forty-nine years old at the time of the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision, and he has a high school education. His past relevant
employment experience includes work as a Bobcat operator. (Tr. at 59.) Mr.
Huntley claims that he became disabled on June 6, 2011, due to shortness of breath,
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dizziness, poor balance, high blood pressure, left ankle pain and numbness, and
sleep apnea. (Tr. at 35, 117, 157).
The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential
evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled and thus
eligible for DIB or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v.
Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in
order until making a finding of either disabled or not disabled; if no finding is made,
the analysis will proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determine whether the
plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”).

See id. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the
evaluator moves on to the next step.
The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severity of
the plaintiff’s medically determinable physical and mental impairments. See id. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of
impairments that is not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy the durational
requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding
of not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The
decision depends on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart v.
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Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that “substantial medical
evidence in the record” adequately supported the finding that plaintiff was not
disabled).
Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the
plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal
to the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed
impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509
and 416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
If the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or
medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. See id.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine
whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the requirements of his past relevant
work.

See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).

If the plaintiff’s

impairment or combination of impairments does not prevent him from performing
his past relevant work, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See id.

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The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the plaintiff’s
RFC, age, education, and work experience in order to determine whether the
plaintiff can make an adjustment to other work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
416.920(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can perform other work, the evaluator will find
him not disabled. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff
cannot perform other work, the evaluator will find him disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Mr. Huntley
meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through
December 31, 2016. (Tr. at 16.) He further determined that he has not engaged in
SGA since the alleged onset date of his disability. (Id.) According to the ALJ,
Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: hypertension and status post 2010
open reduction and internal fixation of bimalleolar fracture of the left ankle. (Tr. at
16.) However, he found that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal
any of the listed impairments in 20 F.R.C. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at
17.) The ALJ did not find Mr. Huntley’s allegations to be totally credible, and he
determined that Mr. Huntley retained the RFC to perform light work with the
following limitations: lifting and carrying up to twenty pounds occasionally and ten
pounds frequently, sitting up to six hours, and walking and/or standing six hours;
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frequent climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, and pushing/pulling with the left
lower extremity; and no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds or work around
hazards (Tr. at 17.)
According to the ALJ, Mr. Huntley is unable to perform any of his past
relevant work, he is a “younger individual,” and he has a high school education, as
those terms are defined by the regulations (Tr. at 23.) He determined that
“[t]ransferability of job skills [was] not material to the determination of disability
because using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines as a framework supports a finding
that the claiming is ‘not disabled,’ whether or not the claimant has transferable job
skills.” (Id.) Because Plaintiff cannot perform the full range of light work, the ALJ
enlisted a vocational expert (“VE”) who testified that there are a significant
number of jobs in the national economy that Mr. Huntley is capable of performing,
such as bench assembler and inspector/packer. (Tr. at 24.) The ALJ concluded
his findings by stating that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in
the Social Security Act, from June 6, 2011, through the date of this decision.” (Id.)
II.

Standard of Review
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act

is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there
is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
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Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives
deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are
supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal
conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).
Nonetheless, this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute
its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210
(11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir.
2004)).

“The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision

makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen,
793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed.
Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the
proof preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, it must affirm if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin
v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

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However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard
[for review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its
entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v.
Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881,
883 (11th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is
grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
III.

Discussion

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded for
five reasons. First, he believes that the ALJ erred in substituting his own opinion
for that of both Dr. Patel and Dr. Ripka and that the ALJ erred in assigning more
weight to a non-examining physician’s opinion than to the opinions of two
examining physicians. (Doc. 8 at 21.) Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed
to state adequate reasons for finding him not credible. (Doc. 8 at 27.) Third, he
contends that the ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial evidence. (Doc. 8 at
32.) Fourth, Plaintiff believes that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by
substantial evidence. (Doc. 8 at 34.) Fifth, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ is biased
against the claimants. (Doc. 8 at 37.)

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A.

Medical Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in affording more weight to the opinion
of Dr. Heilpern, a non-examining state agency physician, than was afforded to the
opinions of Dr. Patel and Dr. Ripka, examining physicians. As a general matter, the
weight afforded to a medical opinion regarding the nature and severity of a
claimant’s impairments depends upon, among other things, the examining and
treating relationship the medical source had with the claimant, the evidence the
medical source presents to support the opinion, how consistent the opinion is with
the record as a whole, and the specialty of the medical source. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(d), 416.927(d).
Within the classification of acceptable medical sources are the following
different types of sources that are entitled to different weights of opinion: 1) a
treating source, or a primary physician, which is defined in the regulations as “your
physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides you, or
has provided you, with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an
ongoing treatment relationship with you;” 2) a non-treating source, or a consulting
physician, which is defined as “a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable
medical source who has examined you but does not have, or did not have, an
ongoing treatment relationship with you;” and 3) a non-examining source, which is
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a “a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who has not
examined you but provides a medical or other opinion in your case . . . includ[ing]
State agency medical and psychological consultants . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502.
The regulations and case law set forth a general preference for treating sources’
opinions over those of non-treating sources, and non-treating sources over nonexamining sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Ryan v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 939,
942 (11th Cir. 1985). However, the opinions of a one-time examiner or of a nonexamining source are not entitled to any deference. McSwwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d
617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987). Further, an ALJ “may reject the opinion of any physician
when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” McCloud v. Barnhart, 166 F.
App’x 410, 418–19 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233,
1240 (11th Cir. 1983)). Procedurally, the ALJ must articulate the weight given to
different medical opinions and the reasons therefore. See Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011).
The Court must also be aware that opinions such as whether a claimant is
disabled, the claimant’s RFC, and the application of vocational factors “are not
medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the
Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a
case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R.
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§§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). The Court is interested in the doctors’ evaluations of
the claimant’s “condition and the medical consequences thereof, not their opinions
of the legal consequences of his [or her] condition.” Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. Such
statements by a physician are relevant to the ALJ’s findings, but they are not
determinative, as it is the ALJ who bears the responsibility for assessing a
claimant’s RFC. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c).
Dr. Patel examined Plaintiff on July 22, 2013. (Tr. at 338.) On examination,
Dr. Patel diagnosed Plaintiff with hyperlipidemia and hypertension, but determined
that the hypertension was under control with medication. Dr. Patel also conducted
an electrocardiogram and noted left ventricular hypertrophy. (Tr. at 339.) In a
Medical Source Statement, Dr. Patel limited Plaintiff to ten pounds lifting and
carrying, one hour sitting, and less than one hour standing and walking within an
eight-hour workday. (Tr. at 340–45.) The Medical Source Statement further
indicated that Plaintiff could occasionally perform activities requiring fine and gross
motor functioning skills but could never perform most postural activities. (Id.) The
Medical Source Statement also notes that Plaintiff has severe environmental
limitations. (Id.)
The ALJ articulated several reasons for giving Dr. Patel’s opinion little
weight. (Id.) He explained that Dr. Patel’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s physical,
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postural, and environmental limitations were inconsistent with the fact that
Plaintiff travelled to Dr. Patel’s office and participated in the examination “without
physically rebutting such extreme and non-functional limitations.” (Tr. at 19.) Dr.
Patel himself noted that Plaintiff’s hypertension was under control with
medication. (Id.) Dr. Patel also diagnosed hyperlipidemia, yet blood work taken six
months before that diagnosis “showed unremarkable lipid and cholesterol levels.”
(Tr. at 19.)
Here, the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Patel’s opinions is
supported by substantial evidence. As noted above, Dr. Patel’s opinions are
contradicted by other medical records. And, apart from documenting what Plaintiff
himself complained of, Dr. Patel’s notes and the Medical Source Statement lack
any explanation of the medical determinations supporting the limitations Dr. Patel
placed upon Plaintiff. 20 C.F.R. § 416.027(d)(3) (stating that more weight should
be given to opinions supported by explanations). As a result, it is impossible to
determine whether Dr. Patel used objective tests to reach his conclusions, or
whether he relied on Plaintiff’s own reports of his symptoms, which appears more
likely. See Crawford v. Comm’s of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1159–60 (11th Cir. 2004)
(one factor that an ALJ may consider in determining that good cause exists not to
give a physician’s opinion substantial weight is if the physician’s opinion was based
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primarily on the plaintiff’s subjective complaints).Thus, the ALJ did not err in
according little weight to Dr. Patel’s opinions.
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in giving little weight to the
opinions of Dr. Ripka, who examined Plaintiff on March 19, 2013 at the request of
Plaintiff’s counsel. During this examination, Plaintiff complained of weakness,
shortness of breath, fatigue, blurred and double vision, chest pain, muscle spasms,
hand and foot pain, depression, anxiety, memory loss, headaches, morning
stiffness, and rapid heartbeats. (Tr. at 333–35.) Dr. Ripka’s physical examination
showed no abnormalities other than lack of dorsiflexion and tenderness of the left
foot and a fifteen degree loss of dorsiflexion of the right foot. (Id.)
Dr. Ripka diagnosed Plaintiff with the following: recurrent migraine
headache, traumatic arthritis in the left ankle with status post open reduction
internal fixation, possibility of seizure disease as indicated by periods where
Plaintiff is confused and tends to fall asleep, atrial fibrillations versus anxiety, lower
extremity pain that may be gout, pain from hardware in the ankle that causes great
difficulty walking without intense pain, and signs of possible heart failure as shown
by rapid heart rate, atrial fibrillation, high blood pressure and weight changes. (Id.)
Dr. Ripka also filled out a Physical Capacities Form, noting that during an eight-

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hour workday, Plaintiff was limited to lifting ten pounds, sitting for two hours, and
standing or walking for less than thirty minutes. (Tr. at 336.)
Dr. Ripka also testified at Plaintiff’s hearing, stating that Plaintiff has
fractured his left ankle twice, with one fracture requiring surgery in 2010, and that
Plaintiff has hardware in his left ankle causing residual pain, loss of mobility, and
loss of dorsiflexion. (Tr. at 47–57.) Dr. Ripka further testified that Plaintiff’s
medical records show a diagnosis of hypertension and that Plaintiff’s sudden
weight loss could be attributable to heart failure or other heart problems like
tachycardia or atrial fibrillation. (Tr. at 48.) Dr. Ripka also stated that Plaintiff
appeared to experience brief transient ischemic attacks, and that Plaintiff’s
complaints of excessive sleepiness could indicate the existence of a seizure
disorder. (Tr. at 54.) Further, Dr. Ripka attributed his diagnosis of recurrent
migraines to Plaintiff’s headaches accompanied by sensitivity and nausea. (Tr. at
55.)
As with his decision to give little weight to Dr. Patel’s opinions, the ALJ
articulated several reasons for giving Dr. Ripka’s opinions little weight. The ALJ
noted that Dr. Ripka’s physical examination of Plaintiff was fairly unremarkable,
and thus,Dr. Ripka’s diagnoses appeared to be based primarily on Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints. (Tr. at 21.) Further, Dr. Ripka’s report contained
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inconsistent statements. For example, Dr. Ripka diagnosed Plaintiff with atrial
fibrillation and rapid heart rate despite the fact that his examination of Plaintiff
showed normal heart activity. (Tr. at 333–35.) Further, medical records from the
Etowah Free Community Clinic do not support Dr. Ripka’s opinions, as those
records indicate that Plaintiff’s hypertension was under control with medication,
that he had no cardiovascular problems, and that he only occasionally complained
about headaches and pain in his left ankle. (Tr. at 317–18, 322–30, 347–51.)
The ALJ’s lengthy discussion of Dr. Ripka’s opinions, as well as his
reasoned justifications for according them little weight in his evaluation of Plaintiff,
demonstrate that the ALJ properly considered the evidence contained within the
record and that substantial evidence supports his determination. Therefore, the
ALJ did not err in according little weight to Dr. Ripka’s opinions.
Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ erred in assigning more weight to the
opinion of Dr. Heilpern, a non-examining physician and state agency consultant,
than he assigned to the opinions of Dr. Patel and Dr. Ripka. State agency
consultants are highly qualified specialists who are also experts in the Social
Security disability programs, and their opinions may be entitled to great weight if,
as here, the evidence supports their opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(3)(2)(i),
416.927(e)(2)(i); SSR 96-6p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,466-01 (July 2, 1996). Dr. Heilpern
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stated that Plaintiff could perform light work with limited pushing and pulling in
the lower left extremity, could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, could perform
up to frequent climbing of stairs or ramps, and could not be exposed to hazards.
(Tr. at 304–05.) The ALJ afforded significant weight to Dr. Heilpern’s opinions,
which were based on Plaintiff’s own allegations regarding the severity of his
symptoms and limitations and were consistent with Plaintiff’s medical records and
treatment reports. (Tr. at 22.) Substantial evidence thus supports the ALJ’s
decision to give Dr. Heilpern’s opinions significant weight.
Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ improperly substituted his own
opinion, as opposed to relying on medical evidence, in his decision to assign little
weight to Dr. Patel and Dr. Rapka’s opinions. However, as explained above, the
ALJ in fact relied on medical evidence in the record and did not substitute his own
medical opinion in deciding to assign little weight to Dr. Patel and Dr. Ripka’s
opinions.
B.

Credibility Determination

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to state adequate reasons for
discrediting his allegations of pain and other symptoms. Disability benefits may not
be paid solely on the basis of a claimant’s own self-serving complaints. See 42
U.S.C § 423(d)(5)(A). However, subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms
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may establish the presence of a disabling impairment if it is supported by medical
evidence. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). To establish
disability based upon pain and other subjective symptoms, the Eleventh Circuit has
set forth a two-part standard: “The pain standard requires (1) evidence of an
underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that
confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the
objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be
reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.
1991)); see also Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).
Once the plaintiff has met the pain standard, the ALJ then considers the
plaintiff’s subjective testimony of his symptoms. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2013). The ALJ may discredit Plaintiff’s subjective testimony,
but he must provide sufficient reasons for this decision. Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225;
see also Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (1996) (“[T]he adjudicator must
carefully consider the individual’s statements about symptoms with the rest of the
relevant evidence in the case record in reaching a conclusion about the credibility of
the individual’s statements.”). There is no precise formula that the ALJ must
follow when explaining why he has discredited a plaintiff’s testimony. However
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“the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court.” Tieniber v. Heckler, 720
F.2d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 1983). In determining credibility, the ALJ may consider
evidence such as a plaintiff’s medical history, medical treatment plan, and reported
daily activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (2013). The credibility determination
does not need to refer to “every piece of evidence in his decision [regarding
credibility], so long as the ALJ’s decision . . . is not a broad rejection which is not
enough to enable [the district court] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered [his]
medical condition as a whole.” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210-1211.
Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff presented evidence of medically
determinable underlying impairments that could reasonably be expected to cause
his alleged pain. (Tr. at 18.) However, as noted, meeting the pain standard does not
automatically end the ALJ’s analysis if the ALJ rejects the plaintiff’s complaints for
lack of credibility. See Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560-61 (meeting the judicial pain standard
is only a threshold inquiry and the ALJ may reject the complaints by offering
specific reasons); Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir.1992) (“After
considering a claimant’s complaints of pain [under the above standard], the ALJ
may reject them as not credible, and that determination will be reviewed for
substantial evidence.”) (citing Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 517 (11th Cir.1984)).
The ALJ correctly continued the analysis of whether Plaintiff’s complaints
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regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were
credible by taking his subjective testimony into account. During this analysis, the
ALJ found that “[a]lthough the claimant alleges debilitating symptomatology and
limitations associated with his impairments, the evidence as a whole fails to
confirm a disabling level of functional limitations caused by any physical
impairment.” (Tr. at 19.)
Plaintiff contends that “[t]he ‘reasons’ set out in the body of the decision by
the ALJ are not adequate reasons for finding the claimant not credible.” (Doc. 8 at
31.) However, the ALJ provided detailed reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s
testimony, such as pointing out that Plaintiff’s subjective allegations of debilitating
symptoms and limitations were inconsistent with his medical records. (Tr. at 19–
22.)
Plaintiff testified to the following symptoms and limitations: left ankle pain
that he ranked as an eight on a scale of one-to-ten, constant shortness of breath,
dizziness, high blood pressure, difficulty standing in one spot and the inability to
stand for more than ten minutes at a time, lifting up to ten pounds and sitting tento-fifteen minutes at a time, the inability to perform housework due to shortness of
breath when climbing stairs, constant headaches, the inability to drive due to
headaches and dizziness, and sleep apnea causing him to sleep about four hours
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during the day, stay awake for a few hours, and then go back to sleep. (Tr. at 34–
42.)
The ALJ compared Plaintiff’s subjective complaints to his medical records.
The ALJ pointed to the fact that medical records from the Etowah Free
Community Clinic indicate that Plaintiff’s hypertension was being controlled with
medication, and medical records from consultative examinations by Dr. Tariq in
January 2011 and Dr. Ripka in March 2013 show that Plaintiff’s blood pressure was
normal. (Tr. at 310, 317–18, 322–30, 334.) Further, the ALJ noted that records from
the Etowah Free Community Clinic between September 2011 and February 2013
show that Plaintiff did not complain about shortness of breath and his complaints of
dizziness and fatigue were limited to April 2012 and February 2013. (Tr. at 317–30.)
Similarly, records from the Etowah Free Community Clinic show that Plaintiff was
prescribed headache medication in August 2011 and did not complain about
headaches during a follow-up appointment in September 2011, denied having
headaches in October 2012, and did not need further treatment for headaches until
January 2013. (Id.)
Similarly, Plaintiff complained of excessive sleepiness in October 2012 but
his medications were then changed, and no further complaints of sleepiness appear
in the Etowah Free Community Clinic records. (Tr. at 317–30.) Records from a
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February 2013 visit to the Etowah Free Community Clinic indicate that while
Plaintiff complained of problems with blood pressure, headaches, and eye pain, the
only medical restriction given was that Plaintiff was restricted from driving. (Tr. at
330.)
Further, the ALJ noted that while Plaintiff complained of debilitating left
ankle pain and related problems, medical records indicate that after Plaintiff’s postsurgery follow-up appointment in May 2010, Plaintiff did not seek treatment for his
ankle until April 2012. (Tr. at 323.) A physical examination of the ankle at that time
showed mild tenderness and no swelling. (Id.) When Plaintiff complained of ankle
pain again in October 2012, he indicated that Advil helped relieve the pain. (Tr. at
326.) And consultative examiner Dr. Tariq noted during his November 2011
examination that Plaintiff was able to walk without assistance (exhibiting a mild
antalgic gait with slow, short steps), sit comfortably, and get on and off of the
examination table without assistance. (Tr. at 309–12.) Further, Dr. Tariq noted
that Plaintiff showed a 4/5 of motor and muscle strength of the left lower extremity
and some loss of deep tendon reflex in the left ankle. (Id.)
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff had no significant medical complaints until
he was evaluated by Dr. Ripka at the request of Plaintiff’s counsel. (Tr. at 22.)
Additionally, ALJ considered Plaintiff’s limited daily and social activities in his
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credibility determination, finding that two factors weighed against those activities
being strong evidence of disability: (1) those limited activities could not be
objectively verified with any reasonable certainty, and (2) even if those activities
were as limited as Plaintiff reported, the weak medical evidence indicated that
those limitations were attributable to reasons other than medical disability. (Tr. at
22.)
In sum, the ALJ explained in detail his reasons for finding Plaintiff’s
allegations of subjective symptoms not credible. He stated the extent to which he
gave Plaintiff’s allegations credence, engaging in an extended discussion of the
medical evidence inconsistent with those allegations. The objective evidence
provides support for the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s condition did not cause
disabling limitations and instead shows that he could perform a reduced range of
light work. (Tr. at 18–23.) Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility
determination.
C.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Five Step Finding

As well as referencing his contentions that the ALJ erred by (1) substituting
his own opinion in place of the opinions of Dr. Patel and Dr. Ripka, (2) rejecting
Plaintiff’s opinion, and (3) assigning more weight to a non-examining physician
than the two examining physicians (all discussed and rejected above), Plaintiff
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contends that the ALJ improperly relied on the VE’s testimony, which was based
on an invalid hypothetical question. (Doc. 8 at Page 32.) “In order for a vocational
expert’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a
hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.”
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wilson
v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1229 (11th Cir. 2002)). However, the ALJ’s
hypothetical need not reference symptoms that the claimant “alleged to suffer but
were either not supported by her medical records or were alleviated by
medication.” Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir.
2007).
Here, Plaintiff’s arguments are based on the ALJ’s decision not to include
Dr. Patel’s opinions as to Plaintiff’s limitations in the hypothetical question.
However, as the Court discussed in Part A, supra, there is substantial evidence to
support the little weight given to Dr. Patel’s opinions because those opinions were
not supported by Plaintiff’s medical records. Thus, the ALJ’s hypothetical
question appropriately referenced all of Plaintiff’s relevant symptoms and
impairments.

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D.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Assessment

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s assessment that Plaintiff had the RFC
to perform restricted light work was conclusory because the ALJ did not explain his
RFC finding as required in Social Security Ruling 96-8p. This ruling states the
Commissioner’s policies regarding the assessment of a claimant’s RFC and calls
for the ALJ to describe how the evidence supports his conclusion and why
“reported symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions can or cannot
reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical and other evidence.” Social
Security Ruling 96-8p. While Plaintiff states that “[t]here is no evidence that [he]
can perform light work [and t]he findings of the ALJ are conclusions without
analysis” (Doc. 8 at 37), the ALJ thoroughly discussed the medical evidence
supporting his conclusions. As discussed in the sections above, the ALJ articulated
the weight given to evidence and reasons for giving that weight, and he described
his reasons for finding Plaintiff’s allegations of subjective symptoms not credible
including pointing to specific medical records within Plaintiff’s treatment history.
(Tr. at 18–23.) The ALJ’s RCF assessment is thus supported by substantial
evidence and in accord with the applicable law.

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E.

Bias

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ was biased because he “failed to
consider all of claimant’s severe impairments, failed to consider claimant’s
combination of impairments in determining disability, failed to state adequate
reasons for finding claimant not credible, made a decision based on an incomplete
hypothetical to the vocational expert, and erred in assigning more weight to a nonexamining physician than to an examining physician.” (Doc. 8 at 39.) The Eleventh
Circuit has held that a claimant is entitled to both a full and fair hearing and that an
ALJ shall not conduct a hearing if he or she is prejudiced with respect to a party to a
case or has any interest in the outcome of the pending matter. Miles v. Chater, 84
F.3d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.940). The ALJ plays a
crucial role in the disability review process and “not only is he duty-bound to
develop a full and fair record, he must carefully weigh the evidence, giving
individualized consideration to each claim that comes before him.” Id. The ALJ’s
impartiality is integral to the system. Id.
However, ALJs are presumed to be unbiased and exercise their decisionmaking authority with honesty and integrity. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188,
195-196 (1982); see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). These
presumptions can only be overcome by demonstration of either a conflict of interest
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of the ALJ or another specific reason for disqualification. McClure, 457 U.S. at 195.
The burden of overcoming these presumptions rests with the plaintiff. Id. at 196.
Even if a hearing is “less than totally satisfactory,” remand is unwarranted unless
the claimant can show prejudice. Kelley v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1538, 1540-41 (11th Cir.
1985). A showing of prejudice “at least requires a showing that the ALJ did not
have all of the relevant evidence before him, or that the ALJ did not consider all of
the evidence in the record in reaching his decision.” Id. at 1540. The main concern
is whether there are any evidentiary gaps which would result in unfairness. Id.
A review of the hearing transcript, the evidence submitted, and the ALJ’s
written decision shows that the ALJ considered all of the evidence in the record
when reaching his decision and that Plaintiff does not contend that he was
prevented from or otherwise unable to submit evidence relevant to his claim.
Further, Plaintiff’s specific complaints that he contends exemplify the ALJ’s bias
are themselves without merit, as discussed above in Parts A through D, supra.
Plaintiff has thus not met his burden of overcoming the presumption that the ALJ
was unbiased.
IV. Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Mr.
Huntley’s arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
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substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be
entered.
DONE and ORDERED on March 28, 2016.

_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
182184

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