Christopher v. Logan's Roadhouse, Inc.
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 7/20/2016. (JLC)
2016 Jul-20 PM 01:38
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
HAZEL B. CHRISTOPHER,
LOGAN’S ROADHOUSE, INC, et
) Case No.: 4:15-CV-436-VEH
This civil action was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Etowah County,
Alabama, on February 6, 2015, by the Plaintiff, Hazel B. Christopher, against the
Defendant, Logan’s Roadhouse, Inc. (“Logan’s”), and various fictitiously named
Defendants. (Doc. 1-1). The Complaint contains counts alleging Negligence (Count
One), Recklessness and Wantonness (Count Two), “Premises Liability” (Count
Three), and Negligent, Reckless, and Wanton Supervision and Training (Count
Four).1 All claims arise out of injuries sustained by the Plaintiff when she slipped and
fell in the restroom of one of the Defendant’s restaurants in Gadsden, Alabama.
The case is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary
The Complaint also contains a fifth count which adopts all previous allegations and
makes a claim solely against the “[f]ictitious party Defendants.” (Doc. 1-1 at 12). It is not
relevant to the resolution of the issues currently before the Court.
Judgment. (Doc. 15 at 1). For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper if there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgment is proper if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The party requesting summary judgment always bears
the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings that it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the
moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go
beyond the pleadings in answering the movant. Id. at 324. By its own affidavits – or
by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file – it must
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.
The underlying substantive law identifies which facts are material and which
are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All
reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor
of the non-movant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023. Only disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id. If the evidence presented by the non-movant to rebut the moving party’s
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment
may still be granted. Id. at 249.
How the movant may satisfy its initial evidentiary burden depends on whether
that party bears the burden of proof on the given legal issues at trial. Fitzpatrick v.
City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). If the movant bears the burden
of proof on the given issue or issues at trial, then it can only meet its burden on
summary judgment by presenting affirmative evidence showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact – that is, facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict
if not controverted at trial. Id. (citation omitted). Once the moving party makes such
an affirmative showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce
“significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.”
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
For issues on which the movant does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can
satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. Id. at 1115-16.
First, the movant may simply show that there is an absence of evidence to support the
non-movant’s case on the particular issue at hand. Id. at 1116. In such an instance, the
non-movant must rebut by either (1) showing that the record in fact contains
supporting evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, or (2)
proffering evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on
the alleged evidentiary deficiency. Id. at 1116-17. When responding, the non-movant
may no longer rest on mere allegations; instead, it must set forth evidence of specific
facts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996). The second method a movant in this
position may use to discharge its burden is to provide affirmative evidence
demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.
Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. When this occurs, the non-movant must rebut by offering
evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict at trial on the material fact sought
to be negated. Id.
The Defendant’s Proffered Facts Which Were Admitted by the
The following facts, as set out by the Defendant, have been admitted by the
Hazel B. Christopher (“Plaintiff”) lives in Hodgkins, Illinois.
Plaintiff’s claimed incident at Logan’s occurred on April 27,
Thomas Christopher . . . is Plaintiff’s son.
Mr. Christopher was with Plaintiff at the Logan’s Roadhouse on
April 27, 2013.
Plaintiff Arrived At The Restaurant And Immediately Used The Restroom
16. On April 27, 2013, Plaintiff stopped at the Logan's restaurant on
Rainbow Drive for dinner with her husband and two sons.
Plaintiff arrived at the restaurant between 4:00 and 6:00.
18. After arriving at the restaurant, and before being seated, Plaintiff
went to use the ladies’ restroom.
Plaintiff was in a hurry to use the restroom.
Plaintiff Fell While Checking The Restroom Stalls
20. Plaintiff entered the restroom and bent down to look under the
door for the handicapped stall.
The Plaintiff specifically disputed only Defendant’s proffered facts number 26 and 48.
(Doc. 18 at 1-2). Those numbered facts have been omitted from this block quote. Further, facts 515, which were immaterial, have been omitted from this quote.
Plaintiff saw feet below the door for the handicapped stall.
22. Concluding that the handicapped stall was occupied, Plaintiff bent
down to look under the doors to the other restroom stalls.
23. To look under the doors to the stalls, Plaintiff bent down from the
Plaintiff did not place her hands on anything while bending down.
25. Plaintiff was holding a purse in her left hand while she checked
27. Plaintiff fell forward, which resulted in her right arm breaking in
28. Plaintiff does not remember if she fell face first or to her right or
Plaintiff Does Not Know What Caused Her Fall
Plaintiff claims that she fell because her foot became “stuck.”
Plaintiff does not remember which foot became stuck:
Foot stuck. Was this your right foot or the left foot?
You know, I don't remember.
([Doc. 16-1 at 14(50)]).
Plaintiff does not know what her foot became stuck on:
Do you know what your foot became stuck on?
([Doc. 16-1 at 14(51)])
Do you know what your foot was stuck on?
([Doc. 16-1 at 19(71)]).
32. Plaintiff did not see anything on the floor causing her foot to
… You never saw anything on the floor that your foot was
stuck on; is that correct?
([Doc. 16-1 at 20(76)]).
33. Mr. Christopher was not in the ladies’ restroom at the time and
did not see his mother's fall.
According to Plaintiff, The Restroom Floor Felt Tacky
According to Plaintiff, the floor of the ladies’ restroom felt tacky.
35. Mr. Christopher claims that the floor of the ladies’ restroom felt
tacky and that he noticed some dust on the floor.
36. Mr. Christopher also claims that he “just kind of felt [the
tackiness] as [he] was walking.” ([Doc. 16-2 at 8(27)].
Plaintiff Does Not Know The Source Of The Claimed
“Tacky Feeling” Of The Floor
Plaintiff cannot state the condition of the floor at the time of her
Okay. And you don't really have any recollection about the
condition of the floor, do you?
(Doc. 16-1 at 20(76)]).
38. Plaintiff did not see anything on the floor on which her foot
39. Mr. Christopher does not know the source of the claimed “tacky
film” on the floor:
Okay. Do you know where this film came from?
No, I could not. I couldn't tell you where it came from. . .
([Doc. 16-2 at 8(27)]).
Plaintiff Has No Idea How Long The Floor Had Been “Tacky”
40. Mr. Christopher does not know how long the floor had been
Do you know how long the floor had been like that?
([Doc. 16-2 at 8(27-28)]).
No One Else Fell In The Ladies’ Restroom
Mr. Christopher did not fall while he was in the ladies’ restroom.
42. Mr. Christopher saw a lot of people in the restroom taking care of
his mother, but no one fell while doing so.
43. Plaintiff did not talk to anyone at Logan’s regarding the condition
of the floor of the ladies’ restroom.
44. Mr. Christopher did not speak to anyone at Logan’s regarding the
floor of the ladies’ restroom.
45. No one who was with Plaintiff on April 27, 2013 said anything to
Logan’s about the floor of the ladies' restroom.
At The Time Of Plaintiff's Incident, Regular Inspections
Were Performed Of The Restrooms
46. At the time of Plaintiff's injuries, Logan’s had a system for
regularly checking the cleanliness of its restrooms during business
47. Logan’s employees cleaned the restroom every morning and
49. Employees were also trained to check the restroom for water,
trash, and empty toilet and paper towel rolls whenever they entered the
restroom and to report if the restroom was not clean.
50. Logan’s was not aware of any defect with the floor in the ladies’
restroom in April 2013.
51. Logan’s did not make any repairs to the floor of the ladies’
restroom in April 2013.
52. Logan’s did not receive any complaints of a tacky floor in the
women's restroom in April 2013.
(Doc. 17 at 3-10) (citations omitted except where noted) (bold in original).
The Plaintiff’s Proffered Facts Which Were Admitted by the
The following facts, as set out by the Plaintiff, have been admitted by the
Plaintiff was wearing New Balance gym shoes at the time of her
After plaintiff fell, she screamed. Her son heard her, and ran into
the women's restroom to see what had happened. He was one of the first
persons inside the restroom after plaintiff fell.
Shortly after plaintiff fell, paramedics arrived at the restaurant,
and came into the restroom to attend to her and place[d] her on top of a
stretcher. She was transported to the hospital by ambulance.
Plaintiff’s son accompanied her inside the ambulance to the
(Doc. 18 at 2-3) (citations omitted).
Although the Plaintiff was bent over checking the bathroom stalls before she
fell, she was standing up straight when she fell.4
The Defendant’s employees conducted visual checks of the restrooms every
The Defendant specifically disputed only Plaintiff’s proffered fact number 5. (Doc. 19
at 4). That numbered fact has been omitted from this block quote.
See document 19 at 4 (“Logan’s does not disagree with Plaintiff’s characterization of
her testimony that she had already stood up when she fell.”).
fifteen minutes. (Doc. 16-3 at 3 (Affidavit of Anthony Murphy, the Assistant Bar
Manager at the Logan’s Roadhouse where the accident occurred)).5
Christopher described the condition of the floor where his mother fell in the
following portion of his deposition:
Did you inspect the area where your mom fell?
Actually, I did -- I mean, I was looking at it, and I really just didn't
like how it looked, to be honest with you. Because it did feel a little like
-- I don’t know if it was a film on it or what.
Okay. Felt like it had a film on it?
Yeah. Like a --
Was it a clear film?
I wouldn’t describe it as clear.
All right. But you never spoke to anyone at Logan’s and told them
anything about the floor; is that correct?
No, I did not. Like I said, my concern was with my mom.
Right. When you came in did your mom tell you anything about
what caused her to fall?
She just told me she felt like she got stuck because she was going
to go use the bathroom, and she said when her foot stuck, she just kind
The Plaintiff disputes this fact, but cites no evidence to the contrary, except
Christopher’s observation of “dust” and a “yellow film on the floor of the women’s restroom in
the area where [the] [P]laintiff fell.” (Doc. 18 at 2 (citing doc. 16-2 at 9(24)-10(27))). That
observation does not dispute the evidence that visual checks were actually performed.
of fell over.
Okay. Other than seeing a film on the floor, did you see anything
The floor didn’t look very clean. I mean...
I wished I would have took pictures.
Did you ever call anyone after the accident at Logan’s Roadhouse
to complain or anything about the condition of the floor?
No, I did not.
What you told me under oath is that you felt like there might be
a film on the floor; is that correct?
And that you didn’t feel like -- the floor maybe didn’t look very
clean, using your words; is that correct?
And you’re talking about the area around where your mother fell;
is that right?
And this film on it, did it have color to it?
To me it kind of looked a little like yellowish maybe.
Okay. Do you know where this film came from?
No, I could not. I couldn’t tell you where it came from. I know
that, the best way I can describe it to you, is if you’ve ever been in a bar,
and that's kind of how that floor felt to me. Like I said, it just felt a little
tacky to me, but nothing -- that’s the best I can tell you. Like I said, I
didn’t think it was very clean.
All right. So basically the film you’re talking about is that you felt
it had some tackiness to the floor, right?
And it was a yellow, clearish type tacky?
Do you know how long the floor had been like that?
(Doc. 16-2 at 7(24)-8(27)).
In responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff has
abandoned all grounds for recovery except her negligence claim in Count One. (Doc.
18 at 1, n.1). “The elements of a negligence claim are a duty, a breach of that duty,
causation, and damage.” Prill v. Marrone, 23 So. 3d 1, 6 (Ala. 2009). The Defendant
argues that it breached no duty owed to the Plaintiff.
It has been noted:
“The duty owed to an invitee by [a business] is the exercise of
ordinary and reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition.” Lilya v. Greater Gulf State Fair, Inc., 855 So.2d 1049, 1054
(Ala.2003) (internal quotations marks, brackets and citations omitted).
As the Alabama Supreme Court has reiterated, “ ‘[t]he storekeeper is not
an insurer of the customers' safety but is liable for injury only in the
event he negligently fails to use reasonable care in maintaining his
premises in a reasonably safe condition.’ ” Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Hall, 890
So.2d 98, 101 (Ala.2003) (quoting Cash v. Winn–Dixie of Montgomery,
Inc., 418 So.2d 874, 876 (Ala.1982)). For negligence to attach, the
business must have “had or should have had notice of the defect before
the time of the accident.” Hale v. Sequoyah Caverns & Campgrounds,
Inc., 612 So.2d 1162, 1164 (Ala.1992) (citation omitted). This is so
because “ ‘[t]he entire basis of a [business’s] liability rests upon [its]
superior knowledge of the danger which causes the [customer's]
injuries.” Fowler v. CEC Entm't, 921 So.2d 428, 432–33
(Ala.Civ.App.2005) (quoting Denmark v. Mercantile Stores Co., 844
So.2d 1189, 1194 (Ala.2002)). If the business (or one of its employees)
creates the dangerous condition, then the business is deemed to have
actual notice of it. Nelson v. Delchamps, Inc., 699 So.2d 1259, 1261
(Ala.Civ.App.1997). If . . . there is no evidence that the business has
created the dangerous condition, notice can be proved by showing “(1)
that the substance slipped upon had been [present] a sufficient length of
time to impute constructive notice ...; or (2) that [the business] had
actual notice that the substance was [present]; or (3) that [the business]
was delinquent in not discovering and removing the substance.” Dunklin
v. Winn–Dixie of Montgomery, Inc., 595 So.2d 463, 464 (Ala.1992)
(quoting Maddox v. K–Mart Corp., 565 So.2d 14, 16 (Ala.1990)).
However, if the plaintiff cannot prove notice in any of these ways, then
“that superior knowledge [of the business] is lacking, ... [and] the
[business] cannot be held liable.’ ” Fowler v. CEC Entm't, 921 So.2d
428, 432–33 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (quoting Denmark v. Mercantile
Stores Co., 844 So.2d 1189, 1194 (Ala.2002)).
Cook v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1272-73 (M.D. Ala. 2011)
In the instant case there is no evidence, and indeed no argument, that the
Defendant created the alleged dangerous condition in the restroom. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff must show that the Defendant had notice of the condition by showing: 1) that
the substance slipped upon had been present a sufficient length of time to impute
constructive notice; or 2) that the Defendant had actual notice that the substance was
present; or 3) that the Defendant was delinquent in not discovering and removing the
Although she sets them out in her brief (doc. 18 at 4), the Plaintiff fails to argue
the applicability of any of the three methods of proving notice. Instead, she discusses
the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in Maddox v. K-Mart Corp., 565 So. 2d 14
(Ala. 1990), and then compares the facts of the instant case to that case.6 Maddox,
After her discussion of the facts and holding of Maddox, the Plaintiff merely writes:
Similarly, in the present case, plaintiff fell and suffered serious injuries after her
heel became “stuck” on a “tacky” substance on the floor of the Logan’s
Roadhouse restroom. See doc. no. 16-1, at 73-74. She was accompanied by her
son. She did not see the substance prior to her fall. Both plaintiff and her son
testified that the floor in the ladies’ restroom contained a “tacky,” or sticky,
substance. Under those facts, the Alabama Supreme Court would hold that
plaintiff has presented enough evidence to have her case heard by a jury. See
Maddox, 565 So. 2d at 17.
(Doc. 18 at 6).
In Maddox, the court held that there was enough evidence to determine that constructive
notice was imputed to the Defendant and that the Defendant was delinquent in not discovering
and removing the substance. Maddox, 565 So. 2d at 16-17. Since Maddox is the principal case
cited by the Plaintiff, the Court could assume that the Plaintiff is arguing the same basis for
imputing notice here. However, “[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every
potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.
Rather, the onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments[.]” Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d
however is distinguishable on its facts. Further, it applied the now-abrogated
“scintilla” of evidence standard.7
Upon entering [a K-Mart] store, [James Michael Maddox] slipped
and fell near the front customer service desk and, as a result, suffered
injuries to his head, neck, and back. . . . James Michael and his sister
[who, along with Maddox’s mother, was present at the time of the fall]
testified that after his fall they observed a substance on the floor near the
customer service desk where he had fallen. They did not see the
substance on the floor before his fall. His sister stated in her deposition
that she thought that the substance was wet, slippery, and “sticky,” and
that it appeared to her to be a puddle of “Coke.” She also stated that the
substance “looked like it was trying to dry” and that the puddle was
about two feet wide. He, his mother, and his sister also testified that
there was a sticky substance found on his clothes and on his hand after
the fall. His mother said the substance on his clothes dried “stiff.”
Neither he nor his mother or sister knew how long the substance had
been on the floor.
Maddox, 565 So. 2d at 15-16. The Alabama Supreme Court, held:
[W]e find that there was at least a scintilla of evidence that the substance
had been on the floor for such a length of time that constructive notice
was imputed to K–Mart and that K–Mart was delinquent in not
discovering and removing the substance. The testimony that the
substance looked like a puddle of “Coke” and was “sticky” and “looked
like it was trying to dry” provided evidence from which the trier of fact
could infer that the substance had been there long enough that the
defendant's employees should have known it was there. . . . [I]t is
at 599. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate here because the Plaintiff fails to explain
her basis for imputing notice to the Defendant. Regardless, as explained herein, there is
insufficient evidence to support any of the three possible bases for imputing notice.
See footnote 8, infra.
permissible to allow the trier of fact to infer the length of time that the
substance had remained on the floor from evidence regarding the nature
and condition of the substance. “Where the substance is dirty, crumpled,
or mashed, or has some other characteristic [, e.g., is ‘sticky,’] that
makes it reasonable to infer that it has been on the floor a long time, the
defendant may be found to have a duty to discover and remove it.”
[Vargo v. Warehouse Groceries Management, Inc., 529 So.2d 986
(Ala.1988)], citing S.H. Kress & Co. v. Thompson, 267 Ala. 566, 103
So.2d 171 (1957). Therefore, we conclude that the plaintiffs presented
enough evidence that any inference that K–Mart was negligent would
not be the result of mere speculation.
Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).
Importantly, in Maddox, the Alabama Supreme Court also distinguished its
decision in Vargo v. Warehouse Groceries Management, Inc., 529 So.2d 986
We find Vargo, supra, distinguishable from the present case. In Vargo,
the plaintiff slipped and fell after removing a bag of ice from an ice
machine. The plaintiff and her witness testified that there were several
puddles of water in front of the ice machine and that the water “looked
like it had been there for a while.” An employee for Warehouse
Groceries Management testified that after the accident he did not
observe any water or any evidence of a fall. This Court held:“Based on
the evidence in the instant case, any inference that Warehouse Groceries
was negligent would be the result of mere speculation. Therefore, it was
not error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of
Warehouse Groceries.”529 So.2d at 987.
Maddox, 565 So. 2d at 16. The court continued:
In Vargo, there was no evidence about the nature of the substance from
which the trier of fact could infer that the substance had been on the
floor for such a length of time that constructive notice should be
imputed to the defendant.
Id. at 17.
The facts of the instant case are closer to Vargo than Maddox. Here, like in
Vargo, there is no evidence as to the nature of the substance which allegedly caused
the Plaintiff to fall–just that the floor felt “tacky.” It is undisputed that:
– The Plaintiff does not know what her foot became “stuck” on.
– The Plaintiff did not see anything on the floor causing her foot to become
– The Plaintiff cannot state the condition of the floor at the time of her claimed
– Christopher was not in the ladies’ restroom at the time and did not see his
– Christopher does not know the source of the “tacky film” on the floor.
– Christopher does not know how long the floor had been “tacky.”
Based on these facts, any inference that the alleged substance had been there long
enough to impute constructive knowledge to the Defendant would be pure
speculation.8 See, Cummings v. Target Stores, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-2798-JHH, 2014
Also, as noted, in Maddox, the Alabama Supreme Court determined that “there was at
least a scintilla of evidence that the substance had been on the floor for such a length of time that
constructive notice was imputed to K–Mart and that K–Mart was delinquent in not discovering
WL 3889953, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 5, 2014) (Hancock, J.) (“The problem for
Plaintiff is that her argument for Target’s constructive notice of the spill is mere
conjecture that cannot create a material dispute of fact. She admits that she has no
knowledge of how long the liquid might have been on the floor and she admits that
she merely ‘assumed’ that the liquid came from the ice dispenser.”).
Also, the evidence is uncontroverted that:
– The Defendant’s employees cleaned the restroom every morning and night.
– The Defendant’s employees conducted visual checks of the restrooms every
– The Defendant’s employees were also trained to check the restroom for
water, trash, and empty toilet and paper towel rolls whenever they entered the
restroom and to report if the restroom was not clean.
The Plaintiff has presented no evidence that this procedure was inadequate or
performed inadequately on the day of her fall. Accordingly, there is no evidence that
the Defendant was delinquent in not discovering and removing the substance. See,
Hale v. Kroger Ltd. P'ship I, 28 So. 3d 772, 783 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (“Hale has not
and removing the substance.” Maddox, 565 So. 2d at 16 (emphasis added). As noted in Hale,
“Maddox involved an incident that occurred on November 29, 1985. Effective June 11, 1987, the
scintilla rule was abolished in favor of the substantial-evidence rule. See § 12-21-12, Ala.Code
1975.” Hale, 28 So. 3d at 781, n. 1. Accordingly, it is unclear if the Alabama Supreme Court
would decide Maddox the same way today.
presented any evidence to indicate that Kroger's sweep/spot mop inspection
procedure was inadequate or that it was performed inadequately on the day of his fall.
Without such evidence, he has failed to present a genuine issue of material fact
regarding Kroger's alleged delinquency in failing to discover and remove the
baby-food spill.”); Richardson v. Kroger Co., 521 So. 2d 934, 936 (Ala. 1988)
(plaintiff failed to counter sworn statements indicating that neither the defendant nor
its employees were delinquent in failing to discover and remove the dangerous
Finally, there is no evidence, or argument, that the Defendant had actual
knowledge of the alleged substance which caused the Plaintiff to fall. Indeed, the
evidence is uncontroverted that:
– The Defendant was not aware of any defect with the floor in the ladies’
restroom in April 2013.
– The Defendant did not make any repairs to the floor of the ladies’ restroom
in April 2013.
– The Defendant did not receive any complaints of a “tacky” floor in the
women’s restroom in April 2013.
Because, in this case, “the superior knowledge is lacking . . . the [Defendant]
cannot be held liable.” Fowler, 921 So. 2d at 432-33 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). By separate order, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be
GRANTED, and this case will be DISMISSED with prejudice.
DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of July, 2016.
VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge
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