Carden v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 3/22/2017. (PSM)

FILED
2017 Mar-22 AM 10:16
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
LINDA DIANE CARDEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

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4:15-cv-01326-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
I.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Linda Diane Carden, appeals from the decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying
her application for Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance
Benefits. Ms. Carden timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies
and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Ms. Carden was fifty-one years old at the time of the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision. (Tr. at 34, 111.) She has a high school education.
(Tr. at 35, 78-79.) Her past work experiences include employment as a Certified

Nursing Assistant, a cashier, and in mobile home sales. (Tr. at 34, 69.) Ms.
Carden claims that she became disabled on March 15, 2008, due to limited use of
her arms, depression, anxiety, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”),
impaired immune system, asthma, Crohn’s disease, arthritis, and migraines. (Tr.
at 306, 312.)
The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential
evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled and thus
eligible for DIB. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245
F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order until
making a finding of either disabled or not disabled; if no finding is made, the
analysis will proceed to the next step.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),

416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determine whether the
plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”).

See id. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the
evaluator moves on to the next step.
The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severity of
the plaintiff’s medically determinable physical and mental impairments. See id. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of
impairments that is not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy the durational

requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding
of not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).

The

decision depends on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart v.
Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that “substantial medical
evidence in the record” adequately supported the finding that plaintiff was not
disabled).
Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the
plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal
to the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed
impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509
and 416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
If the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or
medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. See id.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine
whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the requirements of her past relevant
work.

See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).

If the plaintiff’s

impairment or combination of impairments does not prevent her from performing
her past relevant work, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See id.
The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the plaintiff’s
RFC, age, education, and work experience in order to determine whether the
plaintiff can make an adjustment to other work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
416.920(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can perform other work, the evaluator will find her
not disabled. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff
cannot perform other work, the evaluator will find her disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms. Carden
last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on March 31,
2012. (Tr. at 20.) She further determined that Ms. Carden did not engage in SGA
during the period from her alleged onset date, March 15, 2008, through her date
last insured, March 31, 2012. (Id.) According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s
gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”), hiatal hernia, gastritis, duodenitis,
degenerative changes of the cervical and lumbar spine, hypertension, migraine
headaches, Crohn’s disease, COPD, status post multiple nerve releases, anxiety,
and depression are considered “severe” based on the requirements set forth in the
regulations. (Tr. at 21.) However, she found that these impairments neither meet

nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (Id.) She determined that “through the date last insured, the plaintiff
has the [RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR [§] 404.1567(b) except
with the following limitations: never use feet for operation of foot controls; never
kneel or crawl; no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds; avoid concentrated
exposure to irritants such as fumes, odors, dust, gases, poorly ventilated areas, and
chemicals; avoid exposure to unprotected heights and hazardous machinery; no
assembly line production requirements; unskilled work; only occasional direct
interaction with the public; and only occasional interaction with co-workers.” (Tr.
at 23.)
According to the ALJ, through the date last insured, Ms. Carden was unable
to perform any of her past relevant work. (Tr. at 34.) The ALJ further found that
Plaintiff was a “younger individual age 18-49” on the date last insured, she has at
least a high school education, and she is able to communicate in English, as those
terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 34-35.) Relying on the testimony from
a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ concluded that there are a significant number
of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff is capable of performing, such as hand
packager, labeler, and garment sorter. (Tr. at 35.) The ALJ concluded her findings
by stating that the plaintiff “was not under a ‘disability,’ as defined in the Social

Security Act, at any time between March 15, 2008, the alleged onset date, and
March 31, 2012, the date last insured.” (Tr. at 36.)
II.

Standard of Review
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act

is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there
is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives
deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are
supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal
conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).
Nonetheless, this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute
its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210
(11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir.
2004)).

“The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision

makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen,

793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed.
Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the
proof preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, it must affirm if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin
v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard
[for review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its
entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v.
Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881,
883 (11th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is
grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
III.

Discussion
Plaintiff’s primary argument is that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed

and remanded because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her subjective
complaints of pain. She also makes a cursory argument that the ALJ did not
consider her severe impairments in combination.
A.

Credibility Determination

Plaintiff testified that she experiences flare ups from her Crohn’s disease at
least four to five times a week where it will “take her down” for a couple of hours

during the day. (Tr. at 54, 56). Plaintiff rated her pain with Crohn’s disease at a
level of ten to the point that she just lies down and screams. (Tr. at 55). She
explained that she has to use the restroom at least six to seven times a day, for 30 to
35 minutes at a time and has no control over her bowels to the point that she wears
a diaper. (Tr. at 67, 68). Plaintiff also testified that pain in her back, shoulders and
neck affects her ability to work. (Tr. at 58). She classified the pain in her shoulders
and arm at the level of eight. (Tr. at 60.) She further testified that anxiety and
fatigue contribute to her inability to work. (Tr. at 62). She explained that her
depression and anxiety worsened in 2011. (Tr. at 63.) Plaintiff testified that in
March of 2012 she could walk for 200 feet at one time and lift about a gallon of
milk. (Tr. at 65).
When a claimant attempts to prove disability based on her subjective
complaints, she must provide evidence of an underlying medical condition and
either objective medical evidence confirming the severity of her alleged symptoms
or evidence establishing that her medical condition could be reasonably expected to
give rise to her alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a), (b); SSR 96-7p;1

Effective March 28, 2016, the Commissioner replaced SSR 96-7p with SSR 16-3p. The
Commissioner explained that the new ruling “eliminat[ed] the use of the term ‘credibility’ from
[the Social Security Administration’s] sub-regulatory policy, as our regulations do not use this
term. In doing so, we clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an
individual’s character. Instead, we will more closely follow our regulatory language regarding
1

Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, at 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2002). If the objective
medical evidence does not confirm the severity of the claimant’s alleged symptoms
but the claimant establishes that she has an impairment that could reasonably be
expected to produce her alleged symptoms, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity
and persistence of the claimant’s alleged symptoms and their effect on her ability to
work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c), (d); SSR 96-7p; Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225-26.
This entails the ALJ determining a claimant’s credibility with regard to the
allegations of pain and other symptoms. See id. The ALJ must “[explicitly
articulate] the reasons justifying a decision to discredit a claimant’s subjective pain
testimony.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005). When the
reasoning for discrediting is explicit and supported by substantial evidence, “the
record will not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553,
1562 (11th Cir. 1995).
In this case, the ALJ’s decision reveals that she articulated several reasons to
discredit Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain that are supported by substantial
evidence in the record. First, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had met the initial
inquiry in that she had the following medically determinable impairments: GERD,
hiatal hernia, gastritis, duodenitis, degenerative changes of the cervical and lumbar
symptom evaluation.” SSR 16-3p at *1-2. Neither party has asserted that SSR 16-3p applies
retroactively to Plaintiff’s claim in this case, which was decided before March 28, 2016.

spine, hypertension, migraine headaches, Crohn’s disease, COPD, status post
multiple nerve releases, anxiety, and depression. (Tr. at 21.) However, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effect of her alleged symptoms were inconsistent with the evidence of record. (Tr.
at 33-34.)
First, as the ALJ noted, the medical records do not support Plaintiff’s claim
to have disabling limitations. As to Plaintiff’s migraines, she complained of
migraine issues to her provider at Family Healthcare in March 2009, and was
prescribed medication. (Tr. at 490). She presented at St. Vincent’s emergency
room two months later, in May 2009, again complaining of a migraine, but she was
not admitted for treatment (Tr. at 415, 418). Plaintiff did not seek treatment for her
migraines again, aside from ordinary medication refills, for almost two years, until
she went to Gadsden Regional Medical Center in March 2011. (Tr. at 627-29).
Plaintiff was diagnosed with acute severe migraine headache, but her symptoms
were noted to be of “mild severity,” and she was sent home. (Tr. at 627-29).
Plaintiff went to Gadsden Regional Medical Center for a migraine on a third
occasion in December 2011, but as before she was not admitted. (Tr. at 792-93). In
short, Plaintiff sought emergency treatment for her migraines three times in four

years during the relevant period, and in each case she was not admitted, and no
treatment beyond medication was required.
As to Plaintiff’s COPD, Plaintiff was diagnosed in April 2010, and the doctor
advised her to stop smoking. (Tr. at 428). A chest x-ray in September 2010 showed
mild chronic COPD. (Tr. at 707). Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s lungs were noted to be
clear on several occasions in 2010, 2011, and 2012. (Tr. at 619, 653, 792, 839). In
addition, in spite of repeated advice to quit smoking, Plaintiff continued to smoke
throughout the relevant period before the date last insured. (Tr. at 413, 428, 561,
566, 665, 797, 842). One can reasonably assume that if Plaintiff’s symptoms were as
limiting as she claimed, she would have attempted to alleviate her symptoms by
following her doctors’ recommendations. Plaintiff’s failure to do so provides
further evidence that her condition was not of disabling severity. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(3)(vi).
As to Plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease, in May 2010 Plaintiff presented at Gadsden
Regional Medical Center for abdominal pain. (Tr. at 733). There was no acute
finding in abdomen CT scans, and Plaintiff was discharged the same day. (Tr. at
729, 730, 735). Another abdominal CT scan in October 2011 again indicated that
Crohn’s disease was the most likely diagnosis. (Tr. at 772). In May 2012, shortly
after the date last insured, Plaintiff again went to Gadsden complaining of

abdominal pain, with an onset four days earlier, and again was discharged the same
day. (Tr. at 838, 840). The mild findings on CT scans, and the conservative
treatment that did not require hospital admission, both indicate that Plaintiff’s
Crohn’s disease was not as severe as Plaintiff alleged.
As to Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal symptoms and alleged joint pain, in
September 2010 Plaintiff underwent a consultative examination by Dr. Hasmukh
Jariwala. (Tr. at 566). Dr. Jariwala found that Plaintiff had no difficulty getting on
and off the examination table, could stand on heels and toes, could squat and rise
with minimal difficulty, and had normal gait and coordination. (Tr. at 567). He
found “minimal to mild impairment” of Plaintiff’s lumbosacral spine, but the
range of motion in the rest of the joints and the cervical spine was normal. (Tr. at
567, 568). Motor strength, sensation, and reflexes were all normal, and the straight
leg raise was negative. (Tr. at 567). In November 2010, it was noted that Plaintiff
had no back pain. (Tr. at 652). In March 2011, it was noted that she did not have
extremity pain or myalgias. (Tr. at 627). In April 2011, an examination at Quality of
Life Health Services found that Plaintiff had tenderness in her hips, but was
otherwise normal. (Tr. at 795). In December 2011, Plaintiff was again noted to have
no musculoskeletal pain and a full range of motion. (Tr. at 795). Finally, in May
2012, shortly after the date last insured, Plaintiff still had a full range of motion.

(Tr. at 839). The mild-to-normal findings do not support Plaintiff’s testimony of
disabling limitations. (Tr. at 839).
As to Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairments, in August 2007, prior to the
alleged onset date, Plaintiff presented at Gadsden Regional Medical Center for
right-sided chest pain, and while there received a mental health consultation. (Tr.
at 442, 447). She was diagnosed with major depressive disorder. (Tr. at 447). In
August 2010, June Nichols, Psy.D., performed a psychological consultative
examination. (Tr. at 562). She found impairment in recent memory functions that
might cause Plaintiff to have difficulty remembering and carrying out work-related
instructions, and stated she might have difficulty with interpersonal relationships
and withstanding the pressures of work. (Tr. at 564). Plaintiff was diagnosed with
depression and anxiety again in April 2011, was advised to continue with
psychiatric medication, and referred to Behavioral Health for further treatment.
(Tr. at 619). There is no evidence Plaintiff ever followed up on the referral.
Plaintiff’s minimal, conservative treatment, as well as the generally mild findings
on examination, provides additional evidence that her condition was not as limiting
as she alleged during the relevant period. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v).

Also noted by the ALJ is the fact that the medical opinions in the record also
contradict Plaintiff’s testimony that her impairments were of disabling severity. 2 In
September 2010, state agency reviewing physician George Walker, M.D., reviewed
the medical evidence in the record and opined that Plaintiff could lift and carry
twenty-five pounds frequently, fifty pounds occasionally, could both sit and stand
six hours in an eight-hour workday, and had no postural or manipulative
limitations. (Tr. at 584-86). The ALJ gave this opinion great weight because it was
fully supported by the record. (Tr. at 34). There are no conflicting medical
opinions regarding Plaintiff’s physical abilities.
Also in September 2010, state agency reviewing psychologist, Angela
Register, Ph.D., reviewed the medical records and opined that Plaintiff
demonstrated the ability to complete simple, routine two-step commands, would be
able to maintain attention and concentration for at least two hours at a time as
required in order to perform simple tasks, sufficiently complete an eight-hour day
and a forty hour week, and was capable of maintaining adequate social interactions
with the public, peers, and supervisors without substantial restrictions. (Tr. at 593).
She opined that, while Plaintiff’s ability to adapt adequately to changes and
Plaintiff has not challenged the weight the ALJ assigned to the medical opinions in the
record. Therefore, she has abandoned this issue. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Swann, 27 F.3d 1539, 1542
(11th Cir. 1994) (“Issues that clearly are not designated in the initial brief ordinarily are
considered abandoned.”).
2

demands of detailed tasks was limited, her symptoms were not at a level that would
limit adapting adequately to changes and demands of simple tasks. (Id.). The ALJ
gave this opinion great weight as well. (Tr. at 34).
Similarly, medical expert Dr. Doug McKeown, Ph.D., reviewed Plaintiff’s
medical records and testified at Plaintiff’s hearing, shortly before the date last
insured. (Tr. at 92-97). Notably, he explicitly considered Dr. Nichols’s
psychological consultative examination in formulating his opinion, and he noted
that he did not find that it contained disabling limitations, although Plaintiff claims
that Dr. Nichols’s examination supports her allegation of disability. (Tr. at 93). Dr.
McKeown opined that Plaintiff had depressive disorder, not otherwise specified,
secondary to her medical problems. (Tr. at 94). He opined that she had no mental
impairment in performing her activities of daily living, moderate limitations in
social functioning, mild limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace, and no
episodes of decompensation. (Id.). He concluded that Plaintiff would have
moderate impairment in dealing with the general public, but all her other
impairments would be mild. (Tr. at 94-95). The ALJ gave substantial weight to this
opinion because it was well-supported by objective medical evidence and was
consistent with the record as a whole. (Tr. at 31).

There are two medical opinions in the record that contain limitations greater
than the ALJ assessed in the RFC, but the ALJ gave each little weight. First, in
August 2011, Jack Bentley, Ph.D., performed a consultative examination on
Plaintiff and found the only diagnoses were dysthymia and nicotine dependence.
(Tr. at 756). He found Plaintiff had low-average to average intelligence, and a
favorable prognosis for her present level of functioning. (Tr. at 756, 757).
Nevertheless, he went on to opine that Plaintiff had extreme limitations in the
ability to understand and remember complex instructions. (Tr. at 761-62). The ALJ
gave this opinion little weight because Plaintiff performed skilled work in the past,
and there was no evidence to suggest that she currently had an extreme limitation
in that area. (Tr. at 34). The other opinion is that of Robert A. Storjohann, Ph.D.,
who examined Plaintiff in January 2014, almost two years after the date last
insured. (Tr. at 1089). He relied entirely on Plaintiff’s self-report for her historical
information. (Id.). He found that Plaintiff had normal speech, was oriented to
person, place, situation, and time, could perform simple mathematical calculations,
and had intact recent and remote memory. (Tr. at 1092). Her thought processes
and speech were logical, coherent, and goal-directed, and her intelligence was
average. (Id.). Nevertheless, Dr. Storjohann opined that Plaintiff appeared to have
marked deficits in her ability to understand, carry out, and remember instructions

in a work setting, and her ability to respond appropriately to supervision,
coworkers, and work pressures in a work setting. (Tr. at 1093). The ALJ gave this
opinion little weight because the examination was performed well after the date last
insured, was an attorney referral, and conflicted with the other psychological
treatment notes, examinations, and opinions in the record (Tr. at 31).
As also discussed by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s self-reported daily activities do not
support her subjective claims, either. In her function report, Plaintiff reported she
prepared simple meals, did laundry and some cleaning, tried to go outside daily,
drove, shopped in stores for groceries and clothing for her children every two
weeks for at least an hour or more, spent time with other people, talked with her
family in Florida and to her mother and her niece daily, and went to church
regularly. (Tr. at 337-39, 563). Further, while Plaintiff indicated in her function
report that she had difficulty following written instructions, she effectively
answered the written questions contained in the function report. (Tr. at 340).
Plaintiff contends that these activities were of short duration, which should not
disqualify her from a finding of disability. However, while participation in everyday
activities does not necessarily preclude a finding of disability, the ALJ still may
consider such activities as evidence undermining a claimant’s allegations of
disabling limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i); SSR 96-7p; see also Macia v.

Bowen, 829 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The regulations do not [] prevent
the ALJ from considering daily activities at the fourth step of the sequential
evaluation process”); Harwell v. Heckler, 735 F.2d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir. 1984)
(“the ALJ properly considered a variety of factors, including the claimant’s use of
pain-killers and his daily activities, in making the finding about pain”). Here, the
ALJ did not rely solely on Plaintiff’s daily activities in discounting her subjective
complaints, nor did she find Plaintiff’s activities to be dispositive evidence of her
ability to work. (Tr. at 29). As demonstrated above, substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s decision to discredit Plaintiff’s testimony of disabling symptoms and
limitations.
B.

Consideration of Impairments in Combination

Plaintiff makes a cursory argument that the ALJ did not consider her
impairments in combination. The ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of a
claimant’s impairments in the assessing whether the claimant is disabled. Walker v.
Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1987). However, the ALJ’s decision here
demonstrates that she properly considered all of the plaintiff’s impairments as a
whole in evaluating Plaintiff’s claim, including when assessing Plaintiff’s RFC.
(Tr. at 15-42.) Specifically, at step three, the ALJ found that “the severity of the
claimant’s impairments, even in combination, does not equal the level of severity

contemplated in the listings.” (Tr. at 21.) Then at step four, she further stated that
she had considered Plaintiff’s impairments “singularly and in combination” and
that she “considered all symptoms” in assessing the plaintiff’s RFC. (Tr. at 21,
23.) Such language has been held by the Eleventh Circuit to be sufficient to show
that the ALJ considered the combined effect of a claimant’s impairments. See
Tuggerson-Brown, 572 F. App’x at 951-52 (citing Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,
at 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2002); Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d
1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991)).
IV.

Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms.

Carden’s arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be
entered.
DONE and ORDERED on March 22, 2017.

_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
160704